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AGENDA 
of the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Orclinary Session 
Paris, 18th-21st June 1979 
1. Report of the Council 
Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the 
Council to the Assembly 
Il. Political Questions 
1. Political activities of the Council - Reply 
to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of 
the Council 
2. Africa's rôle in a European security policy 
3. Various aspects of co-operation between 
Europe and the United States 
4. Political conditions for European arma-
ments co-operation 
III. Defence Queations 
l. Application of the Brussels Treaty - Reply 
to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of 
the Council 
2. Parliaments and defence procurement 
3. SALT II and its implications for European 
security 
4. The balance of force 
5. Study on collective logistical support 
IV. Tecbnical and Scienti6c Questions 
1. Scientific, technological and aerospace 
questions - Reply to the Twenty-Fourth 
Annual Report of the Council 
2. The industrial bases of European security 
V. Relations with parliaments 
Relations with parliaments 
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Report tabled by Mr. Minnocci on behalf of the 
General, .Affairs Oommittee 
Report tabled by Mr. Müller on behal,f of the General 
.Affairs Oommittee 
Report tabled by Mr. Schlingemann on behalf of 
the General .Affairs Oommittee 
Report tabled by Mr. van Waterschoot on behalf of 
the General, .Affairs Oommittee 
Report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Oom-
mittee on Defence Questions and .Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Maggioni on behalf of the 
Oommittee on Defence Questions and .Armaments 
Report tabled by the Ohairman on behalf of the 
Oommittee on Defence Questions and .Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Pawelczyk on behalf of the 
Oommittee on Defence Questions and .Armaments 
Draft order tabled by the Ohairman on behalf of the 
Oommittee on Defence Questions and .Armaments 
Report ta bled by M r. Scheffler on behalf of the 
Oommittee on Scientific, Technological and .Aero-
space Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behal,f of the Oom-
mittee on Scientific, Technological, and .Aerospace 
Questions 
Information report tabled by Mr. Schlingemann on 
behalf of the Oommittee for Relations with Parlia-
ments 
Document 797 
Morning 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session 
Paris, 18th-2lst )une 1979 
MONDAY, 18th JUNE 
Meetings of Politica.l Groups. 
11.30 a.m. 
l. Opening of the Session by the Provisions.! President. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Election of the President of the Assembly. 
4. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
18th June 1979 
6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordina.ry Session. 
7. Ratification of decisions of the Presidential Committee. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Political activities of the Council - Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Minnocci on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
2. Application of the Brussels Treaty - Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
3. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions - Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of 
the Council : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Scheffier on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions. 
4. Twenty-fourth annual report of the Council: 
presentation by Mr. Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chair-
man-in-Office of the Council. 
5. Address by Mr. Aigrain, French Minister of State attached to the Prime Minister, responsible for 
research. 
6. Debate on the annual report of the Council and replies by Committees. 
7. V otes on the dra ft recommenàations. 
TUESDAY, 19th Jane 
Morning 9 a.m. 
10 a.m. 
Meetings of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, of the General Affairs Committee 
and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions for the election of their 
bureaux. 
1. The industrial bases of European security : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
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11.30 a.m. 
2. Address by Mr. Scholten, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Afteroooo 2.30 p.m. 
3 p.m. 
Meetings of the Committee on Budgetary Affaira and Administration, of the Committee on Rules 
of Procedure and Privileges and of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments for the election 
of their bureaux. 
1. "The balance of force : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Pawelczyk on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Study on collective logistical support: 
presentation of the draft order tabled by the Chairman on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft order. 
WEDNESDAY, 20th JUNE 
Moroiog 10 a.m. 
Africa's rôle in a European security policy : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Müller on behalf of the General Affaira Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Afteroooo 3 p.m. 
1. Pa.rliaments and defence procurement : 
presentation of the report ta bled by Mr. Ma.ggioni on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation : 
presentation of the report ta bled by Mr. van Waterschoot on behalf of the General Affaira Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
THURSDAY, 2ht JUNE 
Moroiog 9.30 a.m. 
Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
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10 a.m. 
1. Relations with parliaments : 
presentation of the information report tabled by Mr. Schlingemann on behalf of the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments. 
2. Various aspects of co-operation between Europe and the United States: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Schlingema.nn on behalf of the General Affaira Committee. 
Debate. 
V ote on the drajt recommendation. 
CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION 
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Symposium on a European armaments policy 
Brussels, 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979 
RESOLUTION 62 
adopted by the Presidential Committee 
on 18th January 1979 1 
The Presidential Committee, 
Noting the interest aroused by the symposium on a European armaments policy held in Ma.rch 
1977 and the colloquies on a. European aeronautical policy held in September 1973 and February 1976; 
Considering that it is the duty of the European assembly empowered to deal with security matters 
to organise another symposium with the purpose of helping to define measures to allow the armaments 
industries of the Western European countries to meet the qualitative and quantitative defence require-
ments of our countries in the beat conditions, 
DEOIDES 
1. To organise a second symposium on a European armaments policy in October 1979; 
2. To contribute, on this occasion, to the commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
signing of the agreements modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty. 
Organisation 
1. Topics 
Three topics will be dealt with at the 
symposium: 
(1) definition of armaments requirements 
and procll!rement in Western Europe ; 
.(2) poliltieal, institutional, economie and 
social conditions of defence procure-
ment; 
(3) research, development and production 
of armaments in Western Europe. 
Each of these topics will be dealt with 
under the responsibility of one of the .Assembly's 
three politieal committees, i.e. the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments (topic 1), the 
General Affaira Committee (topic 2) and the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions (topic 3). 
At the second part of the present session, 
each oommittee will have to submit a report to 
the .Assembly on the same topic, drawing political 
conclusions from the sympœium and making 
recommendations to the Coun.cil. 
The Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments will of course be oosponsible for drawing 
the attention of pa:rliame:DJts of member oountries 
to the conclusions. 
2. Documents 
The following documents will be distributed 
to participants for information and to provide 
a basis for reflection : 
(a) A European armaments policy (report 
submitted by Mr. Critchley on behalf 
of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments at the Second Part of 
the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session 
and Reoommendation 325 adopted by 
the .Assembly on 22nd November 1978) ; 
(b) recommendations to be adopted by the 
.Assembly at the first part of the 
present session and the documents on 
which they are baaed : 
- Parliaments and defence procure-
ment (report to be submitted by 
Mr. Maggioni on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments); 
1. In aeeordance with Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. 
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- Polirtical conditions for EUJ:'opean 
armaments co-operation (report to 
be submitted by Mr. Van Waterschoot 
on behaJi of the General Affairs 
Committee) ; 
- The industri;al bases of European 
security (report to be submitted by 
Mr. V alleix on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerœpaoo Questions). 
The last three reports may include 
appendices giving relevant back~und informa-
tion. 
3. Working groupa 
Three working groups will meet during the 
symposium to deal with each of the three topics. 
Each group will be chaired by the Chairman of 
the Committee concerned and include, in addi-
tion to the members of that Committee, parti-
cipants in the symposium appointed for the 
purpose. 
4. Time-table 
The symposium will last two full days and 
one morning and wilJ. be open to the public. A 
working group may, however, decide to deliberate 
in camera. 
First day 
9 a.m. to 11 a.m. Opening sitting during which 
leading politicians will speak 
11 a.m. to 1 p.m. Meetings of the three work-
3 p.m. to 6 p.m. ing groups 
Second day 
Third day 
Morning 
General debate in plenary 
sitting on the texts com-
munieated by the working 
groups 
Presentation of the con-
clusions drawn from the 
symposium and press con-
ference 
S. Date and place 
The symposium will be held at the Palais 
des Congrès, Coudenberg 3, 1000 Brussels, on 
15th, 16th and 17th Oetober 1979. 
6. Chairmanship 
The symposium as a whole will be chaired 
by the President of the Assembly. 
15 
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7. Participants 
Participants, numbering about 400, will, 
except for duly justified exceptions, be nationals 
of Western European oountries as follows : 
(a) Ministers concerned in member countries 
(b) Parliamentarians 
(i) the following members of the WEU 
.Assembly: 
- the Presidential Committee ; 
- the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments ; 
- the General Affairs Committee ; 
- the Committee on. Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace 
Questions; 
- the Conun.ilttee for Relations 
with Parliaments ; 
(ii) - Chairmen and certain. members 
of the defence committees and 
other appropriate committees of 
parliaments of WEU member 
countries, other European mem-
ber countries of NATO or the 
EEC and countries which have 
applred for membership of the 
EEC; 
- the President of the European 
Parliamentary Assembly and 
the Chairman of its Political 
Committee; 
- the President of the North 
Atlantic Assembly and the mem-
bers of its Military Committee. 
( c) Officials and senior of!icers 
( i) national armaments directors of 
member countries and other repre-
sentatives of ministries of defence ; 
(ii) representatives from military head-
quarters of member countries ; 
(iii) permanent representatives of mem-
ber coootries to WEU and NATO 
and their high-ranking representa-
tives to the NATO Military Com-
mittee; 
(iv) representatives of member countries 
to the IEPG, the SAC, FINABEL 
and ·agencies and committees res-
DOOUMENT 798 
ponsible for direeting joint produc-
tion projects ; 
(v) ambassadors of WEU member coun-
tries in Belgium, where the sym-
posium is to be held. 
(d) One or two members of the Commission 
of the European Oommunity 
( e) The secretaries-general of the above-
mentioned international bodies or their 
deputies or assistants 
(f) Representatives of the armaments indus-
tries of member countries and persons 
responsible for bi- or multilateral arma-
rnents projects (international industrial 
consortia) 
(g) Representatives of trade unions in the 
industries concerned 
(h) Persons invited in an individual 
capacity 
B. Languages 
Documents will be issued in French and 
English. Speeches and statements may be made 
in the official languages of member states. The 
Secretariat will provide simultaneous interpreta-
tion of speeches into French and English. 
9. Financing 
The cost of organising the symposium will 
be borne by the Assembly's normal budget. 
10. Preparation 
The Presidential Committee will prepare 
the symposium with the assistance of a con-
sultative group of experts. 
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Topics of the papers 
Wor'king Group I 
1. Prospects of the work of Panel 1 of the 
IEPG - time-table for replacing equip-
ment 
2. Prospects of bi- and multilateral Euro-
pean co-operation 
3. Prospects of the work of the Conference 
of National Armaments Directors 
4. An industrial view of the definition of 
armaments requirements and procure-
ment 
5. The rôle of permanent consortia in Euro-
pean co-operation 
Wor'king Group n 
1. Political conditions of defence procure-
ment - relations between the United 
States and Western Europe 
2. Political conditions of defence procure-
ment in Western Europe 
3. Juridical conditions of defence procure-
ment 
4. Economie and social conditions of defence 
procurement 
5. Financial conditions of defence procure-
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CHAPTER I 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY 
The Chairman-in-Office of the Council and 
other Ministers who addressed the Assembly 
during the twenty-fourth ordinary session con-
firmed the interest of member governmenü; in 
the work of the Assembly, which is concerned 
with both European security and European 
union, and the only European Assembly with 
responsibilities in the field of defence. 
The Council, who are anxious to play their 
full part in maintaining close collaboration 
between the two organs of WEU, continued the 
dialogue with the Assembly on questions relating 
to the application of the modified BI'USSels 
Treaty, including those dealt with by member 
governments in other international fora. 
A. Twenty-third annual report of the Council 
to the Assembly 
The twenty-third annual report to the 
Assembly, gdving a detailed account of the 
activities of the Council and its subsidiary bodies 
during 1977, was transmitted to the Assembly 
at the earliest pœsible date. Additional informa-
tion on armaments control was provided in 
accordance with the procedure applied each year 
since the Council"s reply to Written Question 123. 
B. Assembly recommendations to the Council 
and written questions put to the Council by 
members of the Assembly 
The Council took careful note of the reports 
presented by Assembly Committees during the 
two parts of the twenty-fourth ordinary session, 
on a number of questions concerning European 
security and European union. They also noted 
with interest the subsequent debates on those 
reports. 
The Council gave careful consideration to 
the fifteen recommendations 1 adopted by the 
Assembly during the second part of the twenty-
third ordinary session and the first part of the 
twenty-fourth ordinary session and to the 
thirteen written questions 2 put by members of 
the Assem.bly. 
With the help of national admJinistrations 
and the working group, they made every effort 
to answer the ..AB'sembly as quickly as pos;sible. 
However, the drafting of sorne replies on 
developing problems was deferred so that the 
I. Nos. 307-321. 
2. Nos 179-191. 
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Assembly could be given information of a useful 
nature. They noted that similar considerations, 
mentioned by one of the Rapporteurs, had in 
sorne cases delayed the submission of committee 
reports which had only reached the Council as 
the sessions opened. Furthermore, as the Assem-
bly is aware, the Council have to observe the 
principle of unanimity in prepal'IÎng their replies 
and must therefore agree on texts which reflect 
positions shared by aU seven member govern-
menü;. 
In their replies to .Assembly recommenda-
tions and questions, the Council took account of 
work in progress in other bodies to which the 
member states of WEU belong. The fullest 
possible details were given of consultations in 
which the representatives of the member states 
had taken part, more especially in the framework 
of political co-operation between the Nine and 
in the North Atlantic Council. 
C. Meetings between the Council and 
Assembly bodies 
Two informai meetings took place in Bonn, 
on 5th June 1978, after the ministerial session 
of the Council. 
At a working lunch arranged in accordance 
with the 1968 agreement and presided over by 
Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State at the 
Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, members of the Council had talks with 
the Presidential Committee of the Ass ;mbly. In 
accordance with established practice, the 
Chairman-in-Of:fiice also met the Chairman of the 
General Affai~ Committee. 
In the afternoon, the Council and the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
met, also under the chairmanship of M:r\s. Hamm-
Brücher, to discuss three subjects proposed by 
the Committee : the j<rlnt production of arma-
ments, the MBFR negotiations and armaments 
exports. 
At these two meetings, the Assembly 
representa1Jives were briefed on the progress of 
the Standing Armament.ll Committee's study on 
the Situation of the armaments industry in the 
member countries of WEU, which Ministers had 
discussed that morning. 
On 3rd November, the Council held an 
informai meeting in Rome with the General 
Affairs Committee, under the chairmanship of 
Mr. Radi, Italian Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs. It had been agreed that the exchange of 
views would cover three subjects proposed by 
the Committee, namely, the consequence$ for the 
defence of Europe of the widening of the Euro-
pean Community, Europe's foreign relations and 
the rôle of Africa in a European security policy. 
As they stated in their reply to Recom-
mandation 319, the Cou.ncil ·consider that political 
contacts with Assembly bodies should remain 
flexible and open. The introduction of formai 
procedures which would involve lengthy previous 
consultations between governments and would 
deprive the talks of all spontaneity, should there-
fore be avoided. Furthermore, even at informai 
meetings, the remarks of both the Chairman-in-
Office and of other members of the Council take 
due account of agreed positions and, so far as 
possible, of the views of all governments. 
The Committees expressed a desire to 
contLnue contacts of this kind, but also suggested 
that the procedure might be improved. The 
Council share the Committee's whili that the 
fullest advantage should be taken of such infor-
mai exchanges of views which, in their opinion, 
should help to further mutual understanding 
and extend the political dialogue between the 
Assembly and themselves. 
D. Meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee 
on joint production of armaments 
The purpose of meetings of this body, which 
was set up in 1959 and comprises the members 
of the Deferree Committee, the members of the 
Standing Armaments Committee and the Council 
representatives, is to provide the Committee with 
information on questionS concerning armaments 
co-operation dealt with by the SAC. 
The tenth meeting. of this sub-committee 
was held in Pa:cis on 30th October 1978. It was 
concerned, firstly, with the current work of the 
SAC and, secondly, with the implementation of 
the mandate given to the SAC by the Council 
in 1977. The Assembly Committee reiterated its 
interest in the current study on the situation of 
the armarnents industry in the member countries 
of WEU and was given an up-to-date progress 
report. Information wa8 given on the legal part 
of this study, which had already been submitted 
to the Council. As regards the economie part, it 
was recalled that the SAC had to take account 
of the work of the independant European pro-
gramme group when drafting this section. 
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The Council appreciated the satisfaction 
expressed by the Committee Chairman and took 
note of the Committee 's wish that the Liaison 
Sub-Committee should meet regularly. 
E. Speeches to the Assembly by Ministers 
of member governments 
The Council are aware of the importance 
which the Assembly attaches to participation by 
Ministera in its debates. Several representatives 
of member governments addressed the ASiilembly 
on the principal subjects on the agenda for the 
twenty-fourth ordinary session. 
In June 1978, the Chairman-in-Of:ffice of the 
Council, Mr. Forlani, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Italy, introduced the twenty-third 
annual report ; in the second part of his speech 
he set out his government's views on East-West 
relations, the situation in the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East, the situation in Africa, 
disarmament and terrorism. Mr. Mulley, Secre-
tary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, 
spoke on European security, and Mr. Stirn, 
French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
made a statement on his country's disarmament 
policy. 
In November, Mr. Peijnenburg, Netherlands 
Minister for Sc:ientific Affairs, addreS8ed the 
Assembly on problems of co-operation on energy 
and space questions. Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, 
Minister of State at the Foreign Office of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, spoke on the 
progress of East-West relations and also dealt 
with her government's policy towards Africa and 
Asia. Disarmament again formed the subject of 
a statement by the French representative, Mr. 
Bernard-Reymond, French Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Mazzola, Italian Secre-
tary of State for Defence, gave the Assembly 
some detailil of the work of the IEPG and also 
covered the subjects discussed at the recent joint 
meeoog with the General Affairs Committee held 
in Rœne. Mr. Tomlinson, Parliarnentary Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign and Common-
wealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, spoke on 
assistance to developing countries in relation to 
broad security considerations. 
Ministers also answered a large number of 
questions put to them by members of the Assem-
bly. 
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CHAPTER II 
ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL 
The Council met at mini.steriallevel in Bonn 
on 5th June 1978, under the chairmanship of 
Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. 
The permanent representatives met eleven 
times at the headquarters of the organisation in 
London and there were thirty-four meetings of 
the working group. 
* 
** 
The Council's replies to the Assembly and 
the statements made by Ministers taking part in 
debates during the twenty-fourth ordinary ses-
sion clearly confirmed that the member countries 
of WEU are fully resolved to maintain in force 
all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty 
and its Protocols and remain determined to fulfil 
the obligations entered into for a term of fifty 
years. 
The clause in Article V of the treaty provid-
ing for automatic mutual assistance is a vital 
element in the security of the member countries 
of the union and as the Conncil said in their 
reply to Recommendation 309, they are fully 
àware of the binding character of this provision. 
Furthermore, as was recalled in the replies 
to this recommendation and to Written Question 
185 the Council would be convened under the pro~on of Article VIII if any member so 
requested, to consult on any situation which 
might constitute a threat to peace or endanger 
economie stability. 
In their reply to Recommandation 319, the 
Council stated that in implementation of Article 
VIII they would continue to ensure that the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty is applied and observed 
both as part of their own activities and in con-
nection with consultations held in other frame-
works, particularly within the machinery of poli-
tical co-operation between the Nine and in the 
North Atlantic Council. They observed that, by 
the frequency and pattern of its work, European 
political co-operation plays an important part in 
enabling the Nine to reach an agreed view on the 
most important foreign policy issues and to speak 
with one voice. In directing their own political 
activities, the Council must therefore take 
account of the results so achieved, believing as 
they do in the need to further European cohesion 
and to avoid ali unnecessary duplication of 
activity as weil as the possible delaying effect of 
differences between a narrower or a wider 
framework of European political consultation. 
However, the Council at permanent representative 
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level are still checking regularly that the applica-
tion of the modified Brussels Treaty is in no way 
neglected. Whilst this duty has not involved 
active or detailed consideration of issues forming 
the subject of consultations elsewhere, it never-
theless guarantees fulfilment of the responsi-
bilities and undertakings set out in the modified 
Brussels Treaty. Moreover, the Council, meeting 
at ministerial leve!, consider varions problems 
concerning European unity and security. 
During the year under review, the various 
aspects and phases of the implementation of the 
Paris Agreements appeared twenty-seven times 
on the agenda for Council meetings. 
In Bonn, on 5th June, the Ministers discus-
sed the progress of the study undertaken by the 
Standing Armaments Committee, in implementa-
tion of the mandate adopted by the Council in 
1977, on the situation of the armaments industry 
in the member countries of WEU. The permanent 
representatives kept in touch with the progress of 
this study throughout the year \ 
Furthermore, as stated in Chapter I, the 
development of questions relating to the applica-
tion of the modified Brussels Treaty and its Pro-
tocols again formed the subject of the continuing 
dialogue with the Assembly, which is a major 
feature of the Council's activities. 
A. Political questions 
1. East· West relations 
In Bonn, on 5th June 1978, Ministers discus-
sed East-West relations in depth. 
Statements were presented on the develop-
ment of bilateral relations between the member 
countries of WEU and the eastern countries since 
the previous ministerial meeting. 
Information was given on the many contacts 
between governments with particular reference 
to a number of high level visits including visits, 
in 1977 by the King and Queen of the Belgians 
to Pola~d, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic 
of Germany to Yugoslavia and Poland, the !ta-
lian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to 
Romania, the United Kingdom Foreign and Com-
monwealth Secretary to the USSR and the Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic 
of Germany to Bulgaria, and also by the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratie 
1. See part B. 3 of this Chapter and part A. 1 of 
Chapter IV. 
Republic to Luxembourg and by the First Party 
Secretary of Hungary to Italy and the Federal 
Republic of Germany ; visits early in 1978 by 
the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many to Romania, the Italian Minister for 
Foreign Trade to Hungary, the Czechoslovak 
Head of State and the Soviet Head of State to 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the Polish 
First Party Secretary and Foreign Minister to 
Italy, the Foreign Ministers of Hungary, Poland 
and the German Democratie Republic to Belgium. 
Among visits planned for the following months 
special mention was made of those by the Polish, 
Romanian and Soviet Foreign Ministers and the 
Party Secretary of the German Democratie 
Republic to France, the French Minister for 
Foreign Trade to the USSR and the French 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Cze-
choslovakia, Yugoslavia and the German Demo-
cratie Republic ; visits by the Foreign Ministers 
of the German Democratie Republic and Bulgaria 
to Italy, the Hungarian Foreign Minister to the 
Nether1ands and the Soviet Foreign Minister to 
the United Kingdom and the Polish Finance Min-
ister to Luxembourg. 
The German delegation reported on the over-
all development of relations between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the member cormtries 
of the W arsaw Pact. 
Ministers dlscussed the development of mul-
tilateral East-West relations with particular 
reference to the meeting held in Belgrade in 
implementation of the final act of the CSCE 
and the situation in certain areas outside Europe. 
As the Council recalled in their reply to 
Assembly Recommandation 307, the governments 
of WEU member countries approached the 
Belgrade meeting with the hope that it would be 
possible to achieve a better implementation of ali 
the provisions of the final act of Helsinki and 
that concrete measures to that effect would be 
taken. They considered that although this goal 
had not been realised the meeting had not been 
without value and was one more stage in the 
long process of détente. 
Ministers reaffirmed the great importance 
attached by member governments to furthering 
the process of détente and expressed the hope 
that the conference in Madrid in 1980 will inject 
a new momentum into that process. They 
emphasised that respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms is of primary significance 
for the improvement of understanding and co-
operation between aU the signatory states of the 
final act of the CSCE. 
They further observed that disregard for the 
indivisibility of détente could not but jeopardise 
the improvement of East-West relations. 
In addition, member governments of WEU 
took an active part in consultations held through-
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out the year within the framework of the political 
co-operation of the Nine for the purpose of co-
ordinating closely the positions of the member 
countries of the European communities. They 
also participated actively in the work of the 
North Atlantic Council which included, in parti-
cular, a study of the long-term trends of East-
West relations. During the meeting of that 
Council at ministerial level on 7th and 8th 
December 1978, their representatives and those 
of their partners in the Atlantic Alliance reaf-
firmed the continued commitment of the allies to 
a policy of détente as the best means of promoting 
stable and mutually-beneficial relationships 
between governments and better and more 
frequent contacts between individuals. In doing 
so they emphasised once again the indivisibility 
of détente. Point 5 of the communiqué issued 
after the meeting commented on the results of the 
conference on security and co-operation in 
Europe in the following terms: 
"Ministers expressed again their firm con-
viction that full implementation of aU sec-
tions of the CSCE final act is an essential 
element for promoting détente. They noted 
with regret certain negative developments in 
its implementation during 1978 especially in 
the field of human rights and frmdamental 
freedoms, and in that of information. They 
stressed the need for improvement in imple-
mentation to be shown between now and the 
Madrid meeting, so that the participating 
states could take part on the political level. 
They emphasised that this meeting would 
provide a valuable opportunity for rmder-
taking a further review of the implementa-
tion of the final act and for considering 
future progress. They agreed on the 
importance of careful preparation of the 
Madrid meeting and, to that end, expressed 
their intention to consult closely both among 
the allies and with the other CSCE parti-
cipating states. They noted the positive out-
come of the recent Bonn meeting on the pre-
paration of a scientific forum." 
2. Relations between European countries and the 
People's Republic of China 
Having noted Assembly Recommandation 
315, the Council wished to make it clear that the 
governments of the member states remained wil-
ling to develop and strengthen both their poli-
tical and their economie relations with China. 
They would continue their efforts to deepen their 
political dialogue with that country since they 
considered that no one could be unaware of the 
impact of measures taken by such an important 
country and since the solution of a number of 
problems faced by the international oommunity 
could not be usefully sought and effectively 
ensured without China being associated in it. 
Furthermore, these same governments would con-
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tinue to give due attention to the strengthening 
of economie and technica1 relations, since the 
existence of a stable and confident China seemed 
to them likely to be a propitious factor for the 
maintenance of stability in the world. 
The Council are convinced that the policy 
thus defined, which can and must be followed 
with a view to improving the chances of world-
wide détente, will be a positive contribution to 
peace and will benefit the security of the whole 
international community. 
With regard to the possibility raised in 
Written Question 186 that defensive weapons 
might be supplied to the People's Republic of 
China, the Council noted that the policy of 
member countries was or would be decided on the 
basis of their assessment of the overall progress 
of their relations with that country and taking 
into account their own armaments export policies. 
3. Relations between European countries and African 
co un tries 
The governments of the member countries of 
WEU have played an active part in the discus-
sions which have taken place in European poli-
tical co-operation with the aim of co-ordinating 
the African policies of the Nine. 
Replying to Assembly Recommendation 318, 
the Council stated that they fully supported the 
efforts of the British Government, in co-operation 
with the United States Government, to achieve a 
genuine transfer of power in Rhodesia through a 
settlement involving ail the parties and bringing 
about a ceasefire, and to cali on ali the parties to 
attend, and negotiate constructively at, a "round-
table" meeting, in order to reach a settlement 
acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. 
They also endorsed the view recorded by the 
OAU Council of Ministers meeting in Khartoum 
in July 1978 that the choice of leaders in Zim-
babwe was up to the people of Zimbabwe. 
The Council, who share the Assembly's view 
that apartheid must be terminated in South 
Africa, noted that the institutionalised racism in 
that country was in total contravention of the 
western concept of human rights. 
They emphasised the determination of the 
member courntries of WEU to fulfil their obliga-
tions under United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 418 on South Mrica and 253 on 
Rhodesia. 
As they pointed out, the Nine have nnder-
taken to encourage their companies operating in 
South Africa to implement the "code of conduct". 
With regard to the problem of Namibia, the 
Council fully supported the proposai drawn up 
by the western members of the United Nations 
Security Council for a peaceful settlement in the 
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territory leading to earlier independance through 
free and fair elections under United Nations 
supervision. They fully support Resolutioœ 431 
and 435 adopted by the Security Council on 27th 
July and on 29th September 1978 respectively. 
Responding to other concerns expressed by 
the Assembly, the Council stated that, whil.st all 
countries had the right to advance their interests 
by nol"'nal diplomaûc, economie and political 
means, they supported the position of the OAU in 
believing that Africarn problems were best solved 
by African states themselves, without external 
intervention. They would, therefore, deplore the 
creation of military spheres of influence by 
foreign powers which would jeopardise the 
prospects for peace, both in Africa and in the 
surrounding areas. In this connection, the 
Council also welcomed the improvement in rela-
tions between Zaïre and Angola. 
Furthermore, the Council confirmed to the 
Assembly that their contribution to economie and 
social development was one of the prime objec-
tives of the co-operation of the WEU member 
countries with African states. Referring to the 
negotiations designed to renew the Lomé Conven-
tion, they noted that the European Economie 
Community, in the statement made during the 
formai opening of the conference on 24th July 
1978, made clear its intention to maintain its 
links with the countries party to the convention 
and to develop co-operation with those states to 
the maximum extent possible; the Community 
also stressed the very great importance it 
attached to respect for human rights. 
4. Situation in the Middle East 
In their previous report to the Assembly, the 
Council expressed the hope that the efforts of the 
President of Egypt and the Prime Minister of 
Israel at the end of 1977 towards a settlement of 
the Israeli-Arab conflict would lead to develop-
ments which would make possible a general, just 
and lasting peace with the participation of all the 
parties concerned. 
It is in this spirit that the governments of 
the WEU member countries have taken an active 
share in consultations within the framework of 
European political co-operation in 1978. 
Developments in the Middle East were men-
tioned during the joint meeting between the 
Oouncil and the General Affairs Committee of 
the Assembly held in Rome on 3rd November 
1978. 
5. International terrorism 
The Council considered Assembly Recom-
mendation 314 with the utmost care. In replying, 
they noted that within the framework of their 
political co-operation, the member states of the 
European Communities discussed in depth the 
problems raised by interootional terrorism. They 
stressed that the Eu:I~opean Convention on the 
suppression of terrorism had come into foree on 
4th August 1978. Furthermore, the Committee of 
Ministers of the Conncil of Europe adopted a 
declaration on terrorism at its meeting on 23rd 
November. 
Having referred to the declaration on the hi-
jacking of aircraft adopted at the economie sum-
mit in Bonn on 16th and 17th July 1978, the 
Oouncil stated that they would watch develop-
ments in this field. 
The Council feel that the governments of 
member states within the framework of both 
international and European co-operation, have so 
far made ail the joint efforts it was possible for 
them to make in their fight against terrorism. As 
they informed the Assembly, these efforts will be 
continued in the light of future developments of 
the problem. 
B. Defence questions 
As in previous years, the Conncil confirmed 
on numerous occasions during the year under 
review their determination to fulfil ail the terms 
of the modified Brussels Treaty and to ensure 
their implementation. The Oouncil have given 
full and proper attention to their responsibilities 
in the fields of defence and security, and will 
continue to do so. 
Thus, when presenting the twenty-third 
annual report to the Assembly in June, Mr. 
Forlani, Minister for Foreign Af:fairs of Italy 
and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, stressed 
the resolve of member countries' governments to 
fulfil their commitments vis-à-vis the treaty and 
protocols, and recalled that because of the auto-
matie mutual assistance clause in Article V, the 
treaty is one of the fundamental elements in the 
member countries' system of security. 
The Council have continued to give the fui-
lest possible support to the Armaments Control 
Agency and the Standing Armaments Committee 
in the accomplishment of the important missions 
entrusted to them (see B.3 below and Chapters 
III and IV). 
1. Level of forces of member States 
Ali the procedures prescribed by the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty have been carried out, 
during 1978, by the Council, assisted by the 
Armaments Control Agency and also by NATO 
and SHAPE. 
(a) Forces under NATO command 
The maximum levels of ground, air and 
naval forces which member states of WEU place 
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under NATO command are fixed in Articles I 
and II of Protocol No. II to the modified Brus-
sels Treruty. Article III of the Protocol provides 
for a special procedure, if necessary, to enable 
these levels to be increased above the limits spe-
cified in Articles I and II. 
So that they may satisfy themselves that the 
limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol 
No. II are not exceeded, the Council receive 
information every year concerning the levels in 
question, in acoordance with Article IV of that 
protocol. This information is obtained in the 
course of inspections carried out by the Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe, and is transmitted 
to the Council by a high-ranking officer 
desigm.ated by him to that end 
The in:llormation, as at the end of 1977, 
which was conveyed by this officer at the appro-
priate time, was considered by the Council on 3rd 
May. Information indicating the status as at the 
end of 1978 was requested in December. 
Furthermore, the CoullJCil have taken the 
necessary steps to implement the procedure laid 
oown in their resolution of 15th September 1956, 
whereby the levels of forces under NATO com-
mand are examined in the light of the annual 
review. 
For the year 1977, at a meeting on 17th 
January 1978, in Brussels, the permanent repre-
sentatives (or their substitutes) to the North 
Atlantic Council of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom examined 
the levels of forces of WEU member states and 
reported to the Council. At their meeting on 
15th February 1978, the latter noted that the 
level of these forces, as set out in the NATO force 
plan, feil within the limits specified in Articles 
I and II of Protocol No. II. At the same meeting, 
the Council took note of a declaration on French 
:llorces by the permanent representative of France. 
The same procedure is under way for 1978. 
(b) Forces under national command 
The strength and armaments of forces of 
member states maintained on the mainland of 
Europe and remaining under national command 
- internai defence and police forces, forces for 
the defence of overseas territories, and common 
defence forces- are fixed each year in accord-
ance with the procedure specified in the Agree-
ment signed in Paris on 14th December 1957, in 
implementation of Article V of Protocol No. Il. 
* 
** 
By means of the methods set out in para-
graphs (a) and (b) above, the Council have been 
able, in 1978, to carry out their obligations under 
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Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty 
concerning levels of forces. 
2. United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent 
of Europe 
In aœordance with the undertaking given in 
paragraph 2 of the Council's reply to Recom-
mandation 213, the United Kingdom Government 
declares that the total level of British forces on 
the continent of Europe at 31st December 1978 
amounted to 59,883 men plus the Seoond Tactical 
Air Force. 
The continued need for the presence of 
troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for 
units of the British Army of the Rhine to be 
redeployed for short tours of duty there. At 31st 
December 1978 there were 3,243 men from BAOR 
in Northern Ireland. As has been previously 
stated, these units could be speedily returned to 
their duty stations in an emergency affecting 
NATO. 
3. Study of the situation of the armaments sector 
of industry in member countries 1 
During the year, the Council followed the 
progress of the study undertaken by the Standing 
Armaments Committee in implementllltion of the 
mandate given to it in April 1977. In April1978 
they rooeived the report drafted by the SAC on 
the legal statuses of firms. Noting the interesting 
features of this legal analysis, the Council 
examined the working methods proposed for 
producing the economie chapter. 
At their meeting on 5th June in Bonn, the 
Ministers, reviewing the progress made, stressed 
the need to ensure harmonisation between the 
activities of the Standing Armaments Committee 
and the independant European programme group, 
and to avoid duplication of effort. Aware of the 
.Assembly's interest in the study being carried 
out, Ministers instructed the Head of the Inter-
national Secretariat to give a verbal account of 
the situation to the Assembly Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments during their 
joint meeting with the Council that afternoon. 
The Council follow closely the Standing 
Armaments Committee's continuing work on the 
economie analysis of the study. 
On the matter of the division of work 
between the independent European programme 
group and the Standing Armaments Committee 
on studies rellllting to European armaments co-
operation, and in conformity with the under-
taking at the joint meeting with the General 
Affairs Committee of the Assembly on 3rd Nov-
ember 1977 in Bonn, the Council approved the 
text of an information note on 15th February 
1. See also Chapters I and IV. 
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and this was duly forwarded to the President of 
the Assembly. 
The meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee 
on joint production of armaments, held on 30th 
October in Paris, offered a further opportunity 
for discussing, with the Assembly Defence Com-
mittee, aspects of the study being conducted by 
the Standing Armaments Committee (see point D 
in Chapter I). 
4. Assembly recommendations and written questions 
(a) After receiving Recommandation 320 on the 
application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to 
the twenty-third annual report - the Council 
made a careful study of the views expressed in 
the plenary debate on the report prepared on 
behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. In their reply, they gave the 
information and details requested by the Assem-
bly and took the opportunity to recall the vital 
rôle of the Armaments Control Agency. 
Welcoming Recommandation 308 on com-
munications and crisis management in the Alli-
ance, the Council made a number of points in 
their reply. They observed in particular that, in 
the collltext of crisis prevention measures designed 
to improve stability and increase warning time 
of any real threat, member nations, before 
extending arms control negotiations to cover ali 
categories of weapons having an immediate 
impact on European security, would need to 
assure themselves that their involvement in such 
negotiations would indeed offer the prospect of 
redressing the force imbalance vis-à-vis the War-
saw Pact, and of improving stability. 
Regarding the problem of strategie mobility 
raised by the Assembly in Recommandation 312, 
the Council welcomed in their reply any develop-
ments which seemed likely to assist the forces of 
allied countries. 
A full answer was provided by the Council 
for the wide-ranging Recommandation 313 on 
security in the Mediterranean. Features of this 
reply included various forms of defence co-oper-
ation between members of the North Atlantic 
Alliance in. the area, the use of the consultative 
Co-ordinating Committee for reviewing certain 
aspects of policy on arms exports to sorne 
countries outside the Alliance, and the non-
aligned status of Yugoslavia. 
On the subject of United States-European co-
operation and competition in advanced tech-
nology (Recommandation 316), the Council in 
their reply underlined the value of NATO's long-
term defence programme, whose aim is to achieve 
rationalisation and increased military efficiency 
through greater standardisation and interoper-
ability. Certain measures in the field of tactical 
telecommunications are provided for in the pro-
gramme, with a view to enhancing the overall 
facilities of the Alliance - essential to political 
consultation in times of crisis. 
(b) During 1978, the Council dealt with five 
written questions on defence topics. Nos. 179 and 
180 concerned the disarmament proposais put 
forward by the President of the French Republic 
at the special United Nations session in May. 
Written Question 181 related to the activities 
in Zaïre of a German firm specialising in missiles. 
No. 182 concerned the safeguarding of 
information received by the Armaments Control 
Agency in the course of its work, while No. 188 
dealt with the signature, by member states, of 
bilateral agreements with the United States 
Government (memoranda of understanding) on 
trade in defence equipment. 
C. Scientific, technological and aerospace 
questions 
The Council continued their dialogue with 
the Assembly on the policy of European countries 
in the fields of energy, the aireraft industry and 
space. 
They noted with interest the searching 
reports prepared by the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. They 
gave careful consideration to Assembly Recom-
mendations 310, 311, 316, 317 and 321 on Euro-
pean co-operation, and relations between Europe 
and the United States, in these various fields. 
1. Energy problems 
(a) Europe's energy supplies 
At their meeting in Gopenhagen on 7th and 
8th April 1978, the heads of state or of govern-
ment of the member countries of the European 
Communities underlined the urgent need to make 
Europe less dependent on imported energy and 
acknowledge the need to give high priority to 
large-scale investments in this sector. At their 
subsequent meeting in Bremen on 6th and 7th 
JuJ.y 1978, they similarly emphasised that efforts 
to resolve long-term energy problems should be 
intensified at all levels and that the primary 
objective was for aU countries to reduce their 
dependence on oil imports. In reply to Recom-
mend:ation 321, the Council confirmed that all 
the governments of member countries were pre-
pared to work towards a European energy policy 
and noted that they were concerned with 
prospects for 1990 and beyond. They observed 
that this addition was necessary because invest-
ments in the energy sector had, in most cases, long 
leadtimes, which had to be taken into account. 
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The Cooocil pointed out that discussions on 
energy matters and decision-making in that area 
were being held in several fora, such as the 
European Communities and the International 
Energy Agency. Thus, as they poin.ted out in 
reply to one of the points on which the Assembly 
expressed concern, mechanisms have been estab-
lished within IEA and the European Com-
munities to ensure supplies to the countries con-
cerned in times of crisis. 
Furthermore, the Council assured the 
Assembly that all governments concerned con-
sidered the development of conventional and new 
resou:rces of energy and energy production and 
eoorgy conservation to be of great importance. 
Although the initiative for energy conserva-
tion existed mainly at national level, there was 
a great deal to be achieved through international 
co-operation and through exchanges of informa-
tion and experience. In consequence, the Council 
noted, governments favoured a co-ordinated inter-
national approach. Many governments had 
already implemented a nUJIIlber of measures to 
promote energy conservation through good house-
keeping and the improvement of efficiency in 
the use of energy in the industrial, transport, 
building, agriculture and domestic sectors. Several 
governments had decided to reinforee their 
efforts on researeh, development and demonstra-
tion of new techniques and new forms of energy. 
Finally, the Council pointed OTht that, in 
the framework of general investment stimulation, 
special support would become available for indus-
tries which reduced their dependence on oil or 
on natural gas, by greater efficiency and by 
switching to other fuels. 
(b) Peaceful use of nuclear energy 
The Council noted the concern expressed by 
the Assembly in Recommend:ation 310, regarding 
p~oblems connected with the spread of nuclear 
energy. 
In their reply, they pointed out that the 
member governments had acted. to promote co-
operation between supplier countries for the pur-
pose of safeguarding the peaceful use of exported 
nuclear energy by appropriate controls. The 
guidelines adopted in September 1977 by the 
:fifteen countries composing the nuclear suppliers 
group provide that the International Atomic 
Energy Agency shall safeguard the peaceful use 
of ail sensitive exports to non-nuclear weapon 
states ; these were communicated to the IAEA in 
January 1978. 
Furthermore, the Council explained their 
position to the Assembly on civil nuclear assis-
tance to third countries and on the protection 
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of nuclear facilities ood nudear materials, refer-
ring, in particular, to the nuclear suppliers' 
guidelines. 
2. European aircra(t industry 
In their reply to Recommendation 321, the 
Council noted that ail goverriments were pre-
pared to seek and promote the best employment 
of their respective industrial skil1s and produc-
tion capacities in order to achieve a strong and 
competitive aircraft industry in Europe. 
With regard to the civil aircraft industry, 
the Council fully recognise the need to strengthen 
co-operation between European airframe, aero-
engine and component manufacturers. Progress 
has already been achieved with such products as 
Concorde and the Airbus-300. This last is part 
of a major programme of integration for long-
term co-operation within "Airbus Industrie". 
With regard to the military aircraft indus-
try, the Council agree that there should be close 
and permanent consultation between the Euro-
pean states with a view to finding European 
solutions for the development of aircraft and 
helioopters. In replying to Assembly Recommen-
dation 311, they noted that possibilities of co-
operation in these fields were being intensively 
studied, both at governmental level and within 
the framework of the independent European pro-
gramme group, including co-operation on a Euro-
pean helioopter. The Council are aware of the 
importance of adopting programmes for co-opera-
tion, in the interests of the competitiveness of the 
European aircraft and space industry in relation 
to United States industry. 
The aim of strengthening European co-
operation in the civil and military sectors of the 
industry does not exclude transatlantic collabora-
. tion. With regard to the establishment of co-
operation with American manufactmers for long-
range civil aircraft, the Council informed the 
Assembly that, in their view, this cou1d be 
envisaged in the long term and that the industry 
should determine the category of aircraft which 
should have priority in the negotiations. How-
ever, they consider that in order to offer poten-
tial American partners a counter-balance, the 
European countries need, first of ali, oonsolidated 
co-operation among their own manufacturers. 
3. Space questions 
In replying to Assembly Recommendation 
317, the Council gave the following details on 
the state of European co-operation. 
The overall telecommunications satellite pro-
gramme and the production of a promotional 
series of five Ariane launchers have already been 
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agreed upon by the delegates of the countries 
represented in the European Space Agency. 
The French earth observation satellite pro-
ject (SPOT) was submitted to each of the mem-
ber states of the European Space Agency within 
the time limit and in accordance with the pro-
cedures laid down by the ESA convention. 
Although member states had the opportunity 
to participate in this new project, it emerged, in 
the course of debates in the Council of the 
Agency, that only one of them wished to do so. 
The French Government therefore decided to 
carry out SPOT as a national project, and 
France has stated that she would be prepared, 
if requested by the states concerned which are 
members of the European Space Agency, to per-
mit, when the time cornes, the use of the SPOT 
platform for future European missions. 
In this context, it should be mentioned that 
ESA member states are consi!dering a programme 
for an ESA earth observation satellite to be 
launched by 1985. 
During the 1977-81 period, two programmes 
(Ariane and Spacelab), of a size never bef ore 
achieved in Europe, are due io be completed and 
a number of geostationary satellites (OTS, ECS, 
Meteosat, Marots) have been or are to be laun-
ched. The success of these programmes will, from 
1981 onwards, open for Europe the age of opera-
tional application satellites, especially in the com-
munications field. 
Furthermore, member countries noted the 
Assembly's interest in the pursuit of European 
activities in earth observation including meteor-
ology and remote sensing by satellites. In this 
connection, it should be mentioned that at their 
last meeting of the year, on 12th and 13th Decem-
ber, the Council of ESA approved on the basis 
of the Italian Sirio programme, a European 
Sirio-II satellite programme for study of the 
transmission of high frequency radio waves 
through atmospheric disturbance. 
The Council's reply to Recommendation 316 
oovered various aspects of collaboration between 
European countries and the United States in 
space matters. The Council mentioned agree-
ments concluded by the European Space Agency 
with NASA in connection with the Earthnet 
programme. They also referred to the existing 
co-operation between ESA and the American 
Space Agency for the construction of the Space-
lab laboratory. They added that ESA also co-
operated with NASA in implemeruting its scien-
tific programme ; thus, the European Agency 
has outlined a programme to use the space avail-
able in the Spacelab laboratory for scientific 
experiments. 
They welcome the decision taken on 8th 
December by the governing Conncil of Intelsat 
to procure one Ariane launcher for the future 
launching of one of the Intelsat-V series of 
satellites. 
* 
** 
In their reply to Recommendation 316 men-
tioned above, the Council gave the Assembly 
details on international and European co-opera-
tion in the field of oceanographie activities and 
the conservation of fish species. Whilst the third 
United Nations law of the sea conference was 
still in progress, they noted the efforts made 
by the participating countries to adopt a legal 
régime for oceanographie research which would 
protect the interests of both coastal and research-
ing states. Moreover, with regard to the problem 
of the protection of fish species, the Council 
referred to the work done within the framework 
of the European Communities and the United 
Nations environment programme. 
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D. Secretariat-General 
The new Deputy Secretary-General of West-
ern European Union, Ambassador G. J. Schlaich, 
whose appointment by the CouneR had been 
announced to the Assembly, took up his duties 
on 1st March 1978. 
* 
** 
During the year, the Secretary-General and 
his principal officers, representing Western Euro-
pean Union, attended a number of meetings of 
other intern111tional organisations lliS observers, 
when questions of concern to WEU were under 
consideration. As in previous years, the most 
frequent of these contacts were made with 
authorities of the Atlantic Alliance and the 
Council of Europe. 
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CHAPTER III 
ARMAMENTS CONTROL AGENCY 
A. Introduction 
Under the terms of Article VII of Protocol 
No. IV, the Agency is required: 
- firstly, to control the level of stocks of 
armaments held by member countries 
on the mainland of Europe, this control 
e:xtending to production and imports to 
the extent required to make the control 
of stocks effective ; 
- secondly, to satisfy itself that the under-
takings given by the Federal Republic 
of Germany not to manufacture certain 
types of armaments on its territory are 
being observed. 
In 1978, the Agency's activities continued 
very much along the same lines and at the same 
rate as in previous years. 
Subject to the oomments made under point 
B.2 below, the programme drawn up by the 
Agency for 1978, the twenty-third year of con-
trol, was carried out satisfactorily. 
B. General problems 
1. General operating methods 
The methods used by the Agency are deter-
mined by the provisions of the modified Brussels 
Treaty and by Council decisions on the subject. 
During the year under review they remained 
basically unchanged. 
Within the Agency's terms of reference, 
controls from documentary sources serve mainly 
for checking levels of armaments as a whole. 
They also contribute to the preparation of field 
measures for the control of levels and of the 
non-production of certain categories of arma-
ments. This aspect covers ali activities concer-
ned with processing, for the purposes defined 
a:bove, any useful documentary material includ-
ing, in particular, countries' replies to the 
Agency questionnaire, and the results of field 
control measures carried out earlier. 
The execution of test checks, visits and 
inspections, and aU that is linked with these 
functions, constitutes that part of control carried 
out physically wherever there are activities and 
stocks subject to control and, more generally, 
wherever this is necessary to ensure that the 
information supplied is correct and that under-
takings are observed. 
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The control system is based primarily on 
controls from documentary sources, the purpose 
of field control measures being to verify, physi-
cally, the accuracy of ali the information collected 
in implementation of Part III of Protocol No. IV. 
Documentary and field control measures are 
complementary, and equally essential for the 
accomplishment of the Agency's task. 
Traditionally, the annual report has always 
presented documentary and field control measures 
separately, in the interests of both convenience 
and clarity. However, it must not be forgotten 
that these measures together make up a single 
control function. 
The Agency draws great benefit from the 
continuity of its methods; by its steadily-growing 
knowledge of the organisation of the forces of 
each member state, of the progress of armaments 
production or procurement programmes, the 
Agency develops its control activity efficiently 
and logically, both in the fixing of levels and 
quanrtities of armaments and in the choice and 
assessment of its control measures. 
Furthermore, in implementing the methods 
briefly recalled above, the Agency has, as it is 
permitted, always sought possible improvements, 
with the close co-operation and mutu:al trust of 
the government authorities concerned and for 
certain matters of the NATO and SHAPE 
authorities. Thus, in 1978 it was able to make 
certain improvements to the questionnaire to 
member countries, to the despatching arrange-
ments and in the preparation of combined ACA/ 
SHAPE inspections ; in addition, in planning the 
inspection programme account was taken of 
measures completed or in hand, to reorganise the 
armed forces of certain countries. 
2. Fields where the Agency is or is not authorised to 
exercise its mandate 
The situation described in previous annual 
reports, regarding certain armaments, remained 
unchanged in 1978. 
In present circumstances, the Agency's activ-
ities do not extend to atomic weapons or, in 
one member state, to what that state calls "stra-
tegie forces". 
Nor does the Agency apply any controls to 
biological wea pons. 
The control activities dealt with in this 
chapter do not, therefore, ,concern rthese categories 
of armaments. 
In the case of chemical weapons, only non-
production controls take place ; no quantitative 
controls are made since none of the member states 
have declared possessing such armaments. 
C. Controls from documentary sources 
In this field of contro~ the Agency studies 
the relevant documents with the main purpose 
of comparing the quantities of armaments held 
by the member states with the levels fixed by 
the Council and thus establishing whether these 
constitute appropriate levels within the terms 
of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
1. Information processed by the Agency 
(a) Annual Agency questionnaire and replies by 
member states 
The questionnaire sent to member states for 
1978 was broadly the same as those of previous 
years. 
As in ali previous years, follow-up action 
on the replies was twofold. It is recalled that 
sorne of the facts reported are checked physically 
by means of field control measures. In addition, 
ali the replies are studied by the Agency experts, 
and compared with the other sources of informa-
tion available, including member countries' 
earlier replies to Agency or NATO questionnaires 
and budgetary documents. 
(b) Request for annual information 
Control of undertakings by one of the mem-
ber states regarding the non-production of cer-
tain types of armaments takes the form of field 
control measures. 
These measures are partly prepared from 
a study of documents which, in 1978 as in the 
past, was based, in particular, on the replies of 
the country concerned to the Agency's requests 
for annual information. 
The detailed replies submitted to the Agency 
were an important factor in the selection of 
establishments for the programme of agreed con-
trol measures for 1978. 
(c) Information provided by NATO 
See point 2(a) below. 
(d) Information provided by the United States 
of America and Canada 
(Article XXIII of Protocol No. IV) 
The Agency received, through the Council, 
information supplied by the Governments of the 
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United States and Canada concerning their pro-
grammes of external aid in military equipment 
to the forces of member states stationed on the 
mainland of Europe. Since 1966, these countries 
have provided no aid to the forces concerned. 
(e) Scrutiny of budgetary information 
(Article VII, 2 (a) of Protocol No. IV) 
The Agency studied the defence budgets of 
the member states as weil as the budget section 
of their replies to its questionnaire. In addition, 
its experts had consultations with the appropriate 
departments in the Defence Ministries of member 
countries. 
The conclusions of these budgetary studies 
confirmed the information obtained directly by 
the Agency concerning the quantities of equip-
ment subject to control acquired by member coun-
tries during 1978. 
2. Verification of appropriate levels of armaments 
(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces 
placed under NATO command 
After receiving and processing the member 
states' replies to the annual questionnaire and 
studying the statistical reports furnished by the 
authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
isation (Article VII, 2(a) of Protocol No. IV) and, 
in particular, by the NATO international staff, 
the Agency arranged, as each year, for the 
annual consultations with the NATO military 
authorities called for by Article XIV of Pro-
tocol No. IV. 
As in previous years, these consultations 
included a joint study session at Casteau, on 
24th November 1978, attended by Agency experts 
and the appropriate officers of SHAPE, and 
concluded with a meeting in Paris on 8th Decem-
ber 1978 under the chairmanship of the Deputy 
Director of the Agency ; this meeting was atten-
ded by the representatives of the Director of the 
International Military Staff of the NATO Milit-
ary Committee, and of the Deputy Chief of Staff 
Logistics, Armaments and Administration, 
SHAPE, as weil as by the Agency experts. There 
were no comments on the total quantities of 
armaments declared as held by the member states 
(Article XIII of Protocol No. IV), and pre-
sented by the Agency. 
In consequence, the total quantities of arma-
ments declared to the Agency by the member 
states for forces placed under NATO authority 
and stationed on the mainland of Europe can 
be considered as appropriate levels for the con-
trol year 1978 within the terms of Article XIX 
of Protocol No. IV. 
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(b) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces 
maintained under national command on the 
mainland of Europe 
The quantities of armaments declared to the 
Agency by the member states as being required 
on 31st December 1978 for their forces main-
tained under national command on the mainland 
of Europe have been accepted or approved by 
the Council, who have taken note of these 
figures of maximum levels of armaments for 
these forces in 1978. The quantities notified to 
the Agency can thus be considered as appropriate 
levels of armaments for the current control year 
within the terms of Article XIX of Protocol 
No. IV. 
D. Field control measures 
1. Principles governing the application of field control 
measures and general methods of execution 
(a) As recalled in the introduction to this 
chapter, the treaty requires the Agency : 
- to satisfy itself that the undertakings not 
to manufacture certain types of arma-
ments are being observed ; 
- to control the level of stocks of certain 
armaments. 
Field control measures continued during 
1978 on the same basis as during previous years, 
as an essential part of the Agency's work, in 
accordance with Article VII of Protocol No. IV. 
When drawing up its programme of control 
measures, the Agency again worked on the basic 
assumption, which is supported by the observa-
tions of previous years, that the undertakings and 
declarations of member countries are being 
honoured. 
For non-production field control measures, 
the Agency, as usual, began by reviewing all 
the information available to it, including that 
obtained from the 1977 and earlier inspection 
programmes, its progressive analysis of budget-
acy and other data and particularly the replies 
of the country concerned to the Agency's requests 
for information. At the conclusion of this review, 
it drew up a programme for a limited number 
of control measures on a similar scale to those 
of recent years. 
With regard to the control of levels of stocks 
of armaments declared by member states, sam-
pling techniques were again deemed to be ade-
quate for verifying member countries' declara-
tions with the requisite level of confidence. No 
factors emerged to vary substantially the scale 
of the programme or the distribution of control 
measures between member states, the different 
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armaments or the varions types of establishment 
involved. A shift of emphasis from munitions and 
naval matériel to air matériel was however 
decided upon and, to a lesser extent, from facto-
ries and depots to units. 
( b) With the general scale of the control measure 
programme so determined, the Agency proceeded 
to more detailed studies of certain specifie 
aspects. The armaments of each of the armed 
services of the member states were examined 
fully and in depth. Special attention was given 
to existing logistic systems and plans for their 
development. 
In addition, the programme for control 
measures at factories was designed to ensure that, 
whenever possible, non-production, production 
factory and repair depot inspections were com-
bined: in order to cause the least disturbance to 
the establishment visited. 
( c) To avoid duplication of activities, Article 
VIII of Protocol No. IV pro vides that control 
measures relating to the forces under NATO 
authority shall be carried out by the appropriate 
NATO authorities. The forces subject to the 
Agency's control measures therefore vary in per-
centage and type from country to country, and 
this is an important factor in the Agency's pro-
gramme considerations. Article VIII also affects 
depot inspections, but in a different manner. 
Since the logistic support of forces under NATO 
authority remains a wholly national responsibil-
ity in peacetime, difficulties can occur in defining 
which matériel and munitions in depots are, or 
will be, assigned to forces under national com-
mand. Such problems were again avoided in 1978 
by the renewed approval of the system of joint 
AgencyjSHAPE inspections introduced in 1957. 
( d) As the Convention for the due process of 
law 1 has not yet entered into force, the control 
measures carried out by the Agency at private 
concerns had, in 1978, as in previous years, to 
take the form of "agreed control measures". 
One consequence of this situation is that, 
in order to obtain the agreement of the firms 
concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks' 
notice. This agreement has never been withheld. 
2. Type and extent of field control measures 
In 1978, the programme drawn up by the 
Agency was carried out in accordance with the 
well-tried procedure of previous years. 
1. Convention concerning measures to be taken by 
member states of Western European Union in order to 
enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to 
carry out its control effectively and making provision 
for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol 
No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the 
Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd Oetober 1954 (signed 
in Paris on 14th December 1957). 
The total number of control measures was 
sixty-eight. It should be noted, in this connection, 
that this pattern of control activities carried out 
by the Agency is satisfactory: it enables sorne 
80% of existing armaments to be checked in 
four years for the air force, five years for the 
navy and six to seven years for army munitions. 
These measures fall broadly into the foilow-
ing categories : 
(a) quantitative control measures at depots ; 
( b) quantitative control measures at units 
for forces under national command ; 
( c) control measures at production plants : 
( i) quantitative control measures : 
In 1978, these control measures were 
carried out at plants manufacturing 
aircraft engines, manufacturing 
missiles and ammunition, and 
manufacturing armoured matériel 
and at one shipyard. 
(ii) non-production control measures: 
These control measures related to 
chemicals and missiles. 
3. Conclusions 
(a) In the fields where it is authorised to exer-
cise its mandate, the Agency was able effectively 
to carry out its tasks of applying control 
measures. Such problems as arose in this very 
complex field of inspections were dealt with 
satisfactorily through the excellent relations 
maintained with the national authorities. 
(b) On the basis of ail the field control measures 
carried out in 1978, the Agency was able to 
report to the Council : 
- the measures taken for the control of the 
stocks of armaments at depots, units 
under national command and production 
plants confirmed the data obtained from 
documentary control measures ; 
- the measures taken for the control of non-
production revealed no production con-
trary to undertakings. 
E. State and problems of control in certain 
particular fields 
1. Armaments for land forces 
(a) Current production and purchases 
Land forces armaments modernisation 
schemes and reorganisation programmes are in 
hand in ail member countries. 
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In the field of armoured equipment, procure-
ment programmes for hattie tanks are almost 
complete in France and Italy. Series production 
of the Leopard II is in progress in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
Production of the derivatives, armoured 
recovery vehicles and bridge layers, is con-
tinuing. . .. :·.' 
M-48 tanks are being modernised in the 
Federal Republic of Germany by mounting a 
105 mm. gun and Hot missiles are progressively 
replacing the SS-11 on missile tanks. 
Armoured vehicle programmes previously 
mentioned are continuing as follows: AMX-10 
and derivatives in France; M-113 and derivatives 
in Italy ; YPR-765 and derivatives in the Nether-
lands ; M-113, artillery observation type, in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
With regard to anti-aircraft equipment, pro-
duction of the Guépard is continuing and the 
progrwmme should be completed in about 1980. 
First units with this equipment have been formed 
in Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the Netherlands. 
The Roland programme, which is a co-pro-
duction between France and the Federal Republic 
of Germany, has begun and modernisation of the 
Hawk is continuing. 
With regard to artillery, the acquisition of 
the Lance system by five WEU member conn-
tries is nearing completion. 
Series production of the FH-70 155 mm. 
towed howitzer has begun in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. 
(b) Control activity in 1978 
Control measures were carried out at severa! 
depots, at severa! units under national com-
mand, and at a plant manufacturing armaments 
for land forces. 
2. Guided missiles and other self-propelled missiles 
(a) Current production 
1978 was notable for the start of production 
of severa! new missiles covering widely diverging 
rôles : in the anti-tank rôle, the Hot, which is 
a heavy long-range missile designed to arm a 
wide variety of existing and specialised vehicles 
and helicopters, will provide the armies with an 
improved anti-tank capability ; the Kormoran, 
which is an air-·1aunched anti-ship missile designed 
for operation from a fighter bomber, can be 
launched at very low levels by naval aircraft ; 
the Aspide, which is a dual rôle missile (air-to-air 
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and surface-to-air), will mainly replace the 
American Sparrow missile in the SPADA 
ground/ air deferree system, and the Albatros 
ship-board air deferree system; the Exocet AM-39, 
which is an air-launched variant of the basic 
surface-to-surface Exocet MM-38, being shorter 
and lighter and having an increased range. 
Thus, the following modern guided missiles 
are ·currently in production in member states: 
Milan and Hot (jointly produced by France and 
the Federal Republic of Germany) and Mamba; 
Crotale surface-to-air missile; Matra Magic and 
Matra R-530 air-to-air missiles; Exocet MM-38 
(jointly produced by France and the United 
Kingdom), Otomat (jointly produced by France 
and Italy) and Sea Killer MK-2 ship-to-ship 
missiles; Exocet AM-39 and Kormoran air-to-sea 
missiles; Masurca surface-to-air missile ; the 
Malafon anti-submarine missile; Pluton surface-
to-surface tactical missile with a nuclear capabi-
lity ; Aspide surface-to-air and air-to-air missile. 
A number of missiles of the previous gener-
ation are still being produced: SS-11 surface-to-
surface anti-tank missile ; AS-12 air-to-surface 
missile. 
Mention should also be made of production 
of 110 nrm. artillery rockets in the Federal 
Republie of Germany, and of Zuni air-to-surface 
rockets in Belgium. 
(b) Future out look 
Other guided missiles have reached an 
advanced stage of development or are awaiting 
series production : Seawolf surface-to-air missile, 
Marte air-to-sea missile, and Matra Super 530. 
(c) Control activity in 1978 
Quantitative control measures were carried 
out at a number of depots containing guided and 
other self -propelled missiles or launchers, at 
several units under national command equipped 
with these weapons and at plants manufacturing 
guided missiles. One of these measUJI'es was com-
bined with a non-production control measure. 
3. Military aircra(t 
{a) Production and purchases 
Three new large-scale programmes which 
were mentioned in the Council's previous annual 
report have reached the following stage : the 
French Mirage 2000 has begun flight tests and 
series production is expected to start at the end 
of 1979. Assembly lines for the F-16 have been 
set up in Belgium and in the Netherlands, as 
have those for the Tornado in the United King-
32 
dom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, 
and series production of these two aircraft is 
due to begin in 1979. 
Co-production between France and the 
United Kingdom of the Jaguar A/E continued in 
1978, while joint production of the Alpha-Jet 
by France and the Federal Republic of Germany 
has begun. 
Furthermore, implementation of the F-104S 
programme in Italy has reached its final phase. 
(b) Future out look 
New fighter and close support ai:reraft are 
projected. Thus the Federal Republic of Ger-
many is conducting research on a tactical fighter 
aircraft (TFK) with a major ground support and 
air superiority rôle and the United Kingdom on 
a short take-off and landing aircraft (AST-403). 
Italy is preparing specifications for a combat air-
craft (AM-X) specially designed for close sup-
port. 
(c) Control activity in 1978 
Control measures were carried out at severa! 
aircraft and aircraft engine depots, severa! air 
units under national command and at aircraft 
engine plants. 
4. Warships 
(a) Current construction 
New construction and modernisation pro-
grammes have continued on the mainland of 
Europe in the countries with naval forces. 
New construction mainly comprises frigates, 
small fighting ships and hydrofoil craft as weil 
as submarines, almost ali of which are of conven-
tional type ; these will replace obsolescent units 
which are soon to be paid off. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
construction of a number of missile frigates has 
begun. Destroyers of the Hamburg class have 
been modernised. 
In Belgium, the construction programme for 
a number of anti-submarine escort vessels has 
been completed. 
In France, the fifth nuclear-powered missile 
submarine is nearing completion ; the construc-
tion of a nuelear attack submarine is continuing. 
The construction of a number of conventiona] 
submarines has been completed .. 
As for surface craft, construction of A/S 
corvettes continues. One aircraft carrier has been 
modernised. 
In Italy, the last of a number of missile fri-
gates are being built ; construction of another 
series has begun. Construction of hydrofoil craft 
is progressing. The modernisation of missile 
cruisers is continuing. 
In the Netherlands, the building programme 
of a series of missile frigates is progressing 
satisfactorily. The construction of the first of 
two submarines to replace two others has begun. 
Modernisation of the A/S frigates is continuing. 
(b) Control activity in 1978 
A quantitative control measure was carried 
out at .a naval shipyard. 
S. Chemical weapons 
(a) List of chemical weapons subject to control 
As in previous years, the Agency asked 
member countries whether they wished to renew 
in 1978 the list of chemical weapons subject to 
control. 
The member countries agreed to this renewal. 
This was reported to the Council, who noted the 
fact. 
The Agency therefore continued to use this 
list for its control activities during 1978. 
(b) Control activity in 1978 
As in previous years, the Agency addressed 
to the appropriate authorities of the state con-
cerned a "request for annual information to facil-
itate the non-production control of chemical 
weapons". The reply received to this request was, 
as in the p·ast, of great assistance to the Agency 
in selecting chemical plants at which to carry out 
agreed control measures in 1978. 
The supplementary procedure designed to 
increase the effectiveness of the Agency's action, 
which has been tried out since 1973, was again 
applied successfully in 1978. 
For each control measure carried out, a 
delegation from the national authorities was 
present. 
None of these measures revealed any indica-
tion of production of chemical weapons within 
the terms of Annex II to Protocol No. III. 
In application of Article III of Protocol 
No. III, which lays down conditions to enable the 
Council to fix the levels of chemical weapons 
that may be held on the mainland. of Europe by 
those countries which have not given up the right 
to produce them, the Agency, as in previous 
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years, asked the following question in its 
questionnaire: "Has the production of chemical 
weapons on the mainland territory of ... (member 
state) passed the experimental stage and enrtered 
the effective production stage ?" 
In 1978, as in the past, the states concerned 
replied in the negative. 
Any of the member states could, whilst not 
actually manufacturing chemical weapons on its 
mainland territory, have obtained such weapons 
by other means such as importation. For this 
reason, as it does every year, the Agency 
requested the member states in the corresponding 
sections of its annual questionnaire to report any 
quantities of chemical weapons they might hold, 
whatever their origin. In the reply to this 
questionnaire, no member country declared 
holding any chemical weapons. 
6. Biological weapons 
Ail member countries reported their agree-
ment to renew in 1978 the list of biological 
weapons subject to control. The Council noted 
the fact. 
However, it will be recalled (see point B. 2 of 
the present chapter) that the Agency exercises 
no control in the field of biological weapons. 
7. Atomic weapons 
Since the situation remained the same as in 
previous years, the Agency is unable, as stated 
in point B.2 of this chapter, to exercise any 
control in the atomic field. 
F. Technical information visits and other 
means of improving the efficiency of the 
experts 
1. In 1978, as in other years, technical 
information visits were arranged to enable the 
Agency's experts to keep their knowledge up to 
date. 
The air experts visited the Centre d'essais 
aéronautiques at Toulouse and the wind tunnel 
at Faugat in France, the aerospace research 
centre at Porz-Wahn and the rocket propulsion 
institute at Lampoldshausen in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The land forces expe:rts 
visited the artillery school at Draguignan in 
France and the Royal Army Research and 
Deve1opment Establishment at Fort Halstead in 
the United Kingdom; the naval experts visited 
naval exhibitions at Genoa in Italy and Rotter-
dam in the Netherlands. 
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In the field of biology and chemistry, tech-
nical information visits were arranged to the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands. 
The research centre studying animal viral 
diseases and a major specialised industrial estab-
lishment producing serums and vaccines were 
visited in the Federal Republic of Germany. The 
experts were also received at the military centre 
for ABC weapon counter-measures. 
In Italy, they visited the facilities of a 
plant producing organic and mineral compounds. 
They also had discussions with officiais of the 
General Directorate of V eterinary Services at the 
Ministry of Health. 
Visits in the Netherlands to a national 
research institute, an industriallaboratory and a 
factory provided the experts with an opportunity 
to add to their knowledge on detection of and 
protection against chemical agents, on organo-
phosphorous products and on biological products. 
An Agency expert also visited Establishment 
No. 2 (NBC) of the Defence Research Centre in 
Belgium. 
Discussions with the experts met in the 
course of the visits referred to above contributed 
significantly towards keeping the Agency's 
experts informed of the latest scientific and 
technical developments. 
2. The Documentation Office continued to col-
lect and collate for the benefit of the experts, 
both specialised and other pUJblished documents 
on military subjects (research and development, 
introduction of new weapons, reorganisatian of 
the armed forces, etc.), as weil as on financial 
and economie subjects (budgetary decisions of 
member governments, general economie trends, 
the growth of certain specifie sectors of the 
economy and of certain firms working on defence, 
imports and exports of armaments). 
Liaison was maintained with other technical 
documentation establishments. 
G. Miscellaneous contacts 
1. For the satisfactory conduct of its mission, 
the Agency must carry out its duties in an 
atmosphere of trust and close co-operation with 
the national authorities. To this end, it believes 
that it is essential to maintain frequent personal 
contacts with these authorities. During 1978, it 
continued to take advantage of every opportunity 
for such meetings. 
2. Moreover, as provided for in the modified 
Brussels Treaty, the Agency has maintained close 
contacts with the appropriate NATO authorities. 
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In this connection, mention should be made, 
in particular, of the two meetings held to fix the 
level of armaments of the forces under NATO 
command, already referred to in point C.2 (a) of 
this chapter and of the implementation of the 
system of combined Agency /SHAPE inspec-
tions mentioned in point D.1 (c). 
3. During certain meetings held under the 
auspices of WEU or NATO, the Director of the 
Agency was able to make contacts with senior 
officiais of varions countries. 
H. General conclusions 
In accordance with Article XIX of Protocol 
No. IV, the Age ney was able to report to the 
Council that, as a result of the control exercised 
in 1978, the figures obtained in accordance with 
Article XIII of Protocol No. IV: 
-for armaments of forces under NATO 
command under the terms of Article 
XIV of Protocol No. IV ; and 
- for armaments of forces maintained 
under national command under the terms 
of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of Pro-
tocol No. IV and the Agreement of 14th 
December 1957, concluded in execution 
of Article V of Protocol No. II, 
represented for the control year 1978 and for 
each of the member states, the appropriate levels 
of armaments subject to control for those cate-
gories of armaments over which the Agency has 
so far been enabled to exercise its mandate. 
As required by Article XX of Protocol No. 
IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of 
field control measures at production plants, it did 
not detect for the categories of armaments which 
it controls : 
- either the manufacture in these establish-
ments on the territory of the Federal 
Republic of Germany of a category of 
armaments that the government of this 
member state has undertaken not to 
manufacture; 
- or the existence, on the mainland of Eur-
ope, of stocks of armaments in excess of 
the appropriate levels (Article XIX of 
Protocol No. IV) or not justified by 
export requirements (Article XXII of 
Protocol No. IV). 
ln 1978, the Agency again applied controls 
effectively in those fields which are open to it. 
As in the past, the atmosphere of co-oper-
ation prevailing in relations between the Agency 
and the authorities of the member countries and 
of NATO, as well as those with members of pri-
vate firms, played an important part. 
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CHAPTER IV 
STANDING ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE 
A. Activities of the Standing Armaments 
Committee 
The Standing Armaments Commlittee met 
three times in normal session, on 23rd January, 
23rd June and 16th October 1978. It also met 
three times as an ad hoc group, for the specifie 
purpose of discu~ing the study of the situation 
in the armaments sector of industry in the 
member oountries of WEU undertaken in imple-
mentation of the mandate adopted by the 
Council in April1977. 
1. Study of the situation in the armaments sector 
of industry in the member countries of WEU 1 
On the basis of a draft prepared by the 
International Secretariat, the Standing Arma-
ments Committee produced a report on legal 
statuses in the armaments sector of industry in 
member countries, forming one part of the study 
called for by its instructiom;. This document was 
transmitted to the Council on 24th April 1978, 
and presented orally to the permanent represen-
tatives on 19th May by the Assistant Secretary-
General, Head of the International Secretariat of 
the Standing Armaments Committee. 
For the economie chapter of the study, the 
Committee adopted a work programme at its 
first meeting of the year in January. The Inter-
national Secretariat was invited to collect 
economie data from the available sources, using 
the method followed in preparing the legal study 
and excluding questions coming within the scope 
of the investigations of the independent Euro-
pean programme group. 
The International Secretariat has started to 
collect the data required for the first part of the 
economie chapter, which will be devoted to a 
general economie and financial presentation of 
the armaments sector of industry in the member 
countries of WEU. The second part will include 
a.n analytical description of the armaments 
industries as such ; in view of the need to avoid 
aU duplication, its preparation ~ closely bound 
up with the work of the IEPG. 
At the October meeting, the delegate repre-
senting France, which is the pilot country for 
Sub-Group 4 of Panel III ot the IEPG, gave the 
Standing Armaments Committee a progress 
report on the work of this sub-group. Sitting as 
an ad hoc group, the Committee studied a pro-
visional report summarising the data so far 
1. See also Chapter 1, C and Chapter II, B. 3, second 
paragraph. 
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collected by the International Secretariat which 
was asked to continue its survey with the help of 
national delega:tes. 
2. Other activities of the Standing Armaments 
Committee 
The Standing Armaments Committee 
devoted part of it$ discussions to the work of 
Working Group No. 8 on operational research 
and of the group of experts on the evaluation of 
military equipment. 
The members of the Standing Armaments 
Committee and the Head of the International 
Secretariat took part in the meeting of the 
Liaison Sub-Committee on joint production of 
armaments, held on 30th October 1• 
On the invitation of the French aerœpace 
company (SNIAS), delegates to the Standing 
Armaments Committee accompanied by members 
of the Internatn.onal Secretariat, visited the 
Bourges establishment which specialises in the 
production of missiles. 
B. Activities of the working groups 
1. Working Group No. 8 (Operational research) 
Working Group No. 8 met twice during 
1978, in March and October. 
Exchanges of information took place as 
usual and delegates presented a number of new 
or updated forms on tri-service operational 
research studies. 
The operational research studlies were pro-
vided by various delegations for the library. 
In addition, the group reviewed the progress 
of work on the five language glossary of opera-
monal research terms which is due to be published 
early in 1979 in five volumes (one for each 
language). 
As regards the evaluation of military equip-
ment, the March meetn.ng of W orking Group 
No. 8 adopted directives for continuing the 
activity of the working group of experts on this 
question. 
This meeting of the group waB combined 
with a symposium on "Problems of managing 
personnel of the three services with given 
structures and hierarchies". The pa pers read on 
1. See Chapter 1, D. 
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this subject and the subsequent discussion again 
showed delegations' interest in these symposia 
which are held once a year. 
The second meeting of the group was 
combined with a visit, on the invitation of the 
French authorities, to the French navy's opera-
tional research centre at Toulon, on 19th and 
20th October. A num.ber of studies were presented 
to the military and civilian experts taking part ; 
they were preceded by introductions by the 
Commander of the fleet training centre and the 
Director of the GROT and followed by detailed 
discussions. At the trials centre for air defence 
weapon systems and the fleet training centre, 
parti'Cipants gave particular attention to the 
applica1Jion of data processing for weapon 
systems and for handling operational data. 
2. Group of experts on the evaluation of military 
equipment 
The group of experts, which is responsible to 
Working Group No. 8, continued preparation of 
the report on the first phase of its work. This 
is a comparative study, based on the recovery 
vehicle, of the German "weighted sums" method 
and the French "Electre" method. Other methods 
such as cost effectivene813, "Vera" and the break-
down into main components were also considered. 
At its first meeting of the year, the group 
heard a report by the delegate of the Federal 
Republic of Germany on the practical application 
of the "Vera" method; a professor from the 
University of Paris also gave a talk on "The 
bases of multicriteria selection methods". 
At its second sitting, the group considered 
the final draft of its report on the evaluation of 
the recovery vehicle ; it ris not expected that this 
highly technical document can be submitted to 
the Standing Armaments Committee before the 
spring of 1979. 
C. InternatioMl Secretariat 
1. Contacts with the Council and member countries 
On 19th May, the Assistant Secretary-
General, Head of the International Secretariat, 
presented his annual verbal report on the activ-
ities of the Standing Armaments Committee to 
the Council. On the same occaBion, he reported 
on the progress of the study undertaken by the 
Committee in implementation of its mandate, 
with particular reference to the legal section 
already submitted to the Council. 
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He hs.d official talks at the Ministries of 
Defence in London, Luxembourg and Rome. He 
was also invited to vri.sit the Royal Ordnance 
Factory at Nottingham, the Genoa naval exhibi-
tion, the Farnborough international air show 
and the exhibition of naval equipment at Le 
Bourget. 
2. WEU Assembly 
The Head of the International Secretariat 
reported to the Standing Armaments Committee 
on the debates on armaments questions which 
took place in the Assembly. Extracts from 
speeches, reports, debates and recommendations 
relating to these questions were brought together 
in a document circulated to the members of the 
Committee. 
3. Contacts with the independent European 
programme group 
The Head of the International Secretariat 
had Œiscussions with the Chairman-in-Office of 
the IEPG in Rome concerning the studies in 
progress in the Standing Armaments Committee 
and the IEPG. 
4. Contacts with NATO 
The International Secretariat of the Stand-
ing Armaments Committee was represented by 
an observer at meetings of the Conference of 
National Armaments Directors, held at NATO 
Headquarters in Brussels in April and October. 
A member of the Secretariat also attended 
two meetings of the NATO Group on Naval 
Armaments. 
S. Liaison with FINABEL 
The regular contacts begun in 1973 between 
the International Secretariat of the Standing 
Armaments Committee and the FINABEL Com-
mittee continued as usual. 
In this connection, a member of the Interna-
tional Secretariat paid a liaison vilsit to the 
FINABEL Secretariat in Bl'USSels. 
Furthermore, as in ali previous years, an 
observer from the International Secretariat of 
the Standing Armaments Com:mittee was invited 
to Brussels, at the end of November, for the 
meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee which 
brings together the chairmen of aU FINABEL 
working groups. 
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CHAPTER V 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE 
A. Meetings of the Committee 
The Public Administration Committee held 
its two annual meetings in Amsterdam from 31st 
May to 2nd June, and Stuttgart from 18th to 
20th October. The Committee thus continues to 
prefer towns other than the capital of the coun-
try for iits meetings and so provides opportunities 
for interesting contacts related to its work, with 
looal authorities or, as in the case of the second 
meeting in 1978, a Land administration. 
A subject to which the Committee devotes a 
part of its discussion is the administrative organi-
sation of member countries and the political and 
social factors which influence the administrative 
structure. During the year under review, for 
exa!lllple, the Committee considered plans and 
developments relating to regionalisation and the 
amalgamation of communes in a number of the 
member states as weil as the devolution of powers 
to Scotland and Wales ; it ah;o discussed a num-
ber of studies which had appeared during the 
year relating to the development of computerisa-
tion and, from a strictly administrative point of 
view, compared the principles governing the 
organdsation of services within the various 
ministries in each country. 
Another subject on whlch views and infor-
mation are regularly exchanged concerns the 
duties and terms of service of state employees. 
These are, of course, questions where interests are 
very similar in the administrations of the seven 
countries : the pQisition of unions in the civil 
service, the exercise of the right to strike, the 
extent of political activities of civil "'ervants, 
equal conditions for men and women and the 
problem of remuneration. This last question was 
considered from two angles : firstly the sorne-
times considerable salary differences which often 
exist between officiais in different ministries ; 
and secondly the more general angle of the 
economie difficulties facing the majority of 
countries, which are beginning to have unfavour-
able effects in the admilliÏSti"ation. In this context 
mention was also made of the m1merous measures 
under study or already being implemented as 
part of the fight against unemployment wMch 
are likely to affect the public service to a con-
siderable degree : the creation of new jobs, 
shorter working hours, lowering of the retirement 
age, opportunities for part-time work, etc. 
B. Multilateral courses for govemment 
officiais 
As indicated in the previous report, for 1978 
at least, the Committee modified the formula 
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used for these courses in recent years which, 
by its nature as a training course, was basically 
designed for young civil servants from the mem-
ber countries, to give them a better preparation, 
from a European standpoint, for their future 
duties. This time a specifie ~ubject of common 
interest was chosen for study by a group of fairly 
senior officiais. 
The aim of the course was to enable these 
civil servants to exchange information and 
compare their national experience regarding the 
decision-making process which precedes the carry-
ing out of developments affecting the environ-
ment and the background to people's lives (build-
ing of roads or railways and major installations 
such as ports or airports, nuclear power plants, 
etc.), and regarding the preparotion of town 
planning projects. 
The numerous developments of ail kinds 
which the nation as a whole regards as necessary 
raise the problem of land use ; likewise, urban 
sprawl makes it necessary to regulate land use, 
and town planning documents are becoming 
increasingly important; finally, widespread con-
cern to protect nature and the environment fre-
quently makes it more difficult to arbitrate 
between general economie needs and local condi-
tions. 
The Committee therefore thought it useful 
to provide the opportunity for long-serving civil 
servants with experience of the preparation or 
taking of this type of decision to meet and 
compare their experience of these problems in 
their respective oountries. 
The course, which this year was organised 
by the French Government, was held in Paris 
from 4th to 8th December. Twenty-one parti-
cipants attended, ail of the seven countries being 
represented. 
The work centred around two main aspects 
of the process of decision-taking and control : 
- consultation of the public by prior 
enquiries or by any other means ; 
- whether courts can exercise control over 
the dec~ion taken and to what extent. 
During the first part, each national deleg-
ation presented a sum:mary report on the position 
in their own country. 
The following days were devoted to two 
case studies. The first related to a problem having 
purely local implications and oonsisted of a 
study, based on a dossier provided by the deleg-
ation of the host government, on how the town 
planning project for an average European town 
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should be prepared and approved. The second 
concerned the carrying out of a major capital 
scheme with obvions local consequences but based 
on national requirements. 
C. Study vtsits 
The development of international co-
operation in ali areas, but more particularly the 
development of European co-operation has pro-
v:ided an ever-increasing number of national civil 
servants with the opportunity of work contacts 
with their opposite numbers in. other countries. 
There are consequently many direct links 
between national ministries and those abroad 
and many study and information visits are 
arranged through this channel. Consequently the 
situation is no longer at ali comparable to what 
it was when the Public Administration Com-
mittee, which played a pioneer rôle in this field, 
made the first move to set up a network of 
exchanges of civil servants. Other networks have 
grown up in the meantime and have continued 
to diversify. The Com.mittee, nevertheless, con-
tinues each year to arrange a number of visits, 
under the persona! responsibility of its members ; 
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these visits are carefully prepared and the results, 
recorded on each occasion in a report, are for-
warded to the Committee, as weil, of course, as 
to the administration visited. 
The subjects ~tudied during these visits are, 
naturally very varied as can be seen from the 
following list for 1978 : relations between central 
and local governments; organisation of com-
munes (subjects studied in Belgium) ; compre-
hensive education ; forensic science services (sub-
jects studied in the Federal Republic of 
Germany) ; legislative controls of gamb1ing 
(subjeets studied in France) ; value added tax, 
health service negotiations on pay and conditions 
(subjects studied in Italy) ; organisation of 
censuses : "co-habitation" and social benefits ; 
the control of unfair dismlissal from employment 
(subjects studied in the Netherlands) ; recruit-
ment procedures (subject studied in the United 
Kingdom). 
These visits are arranged on a bilateral basis 
throughout the year by the national delegates 
of the sending and receiving countries, but at 
each of its meetings, the Committee spends sorne 
time on this subject, to enable each delegate to 
comment and to gain from the experience of 
hm colleagues. 
DOCUMENT 799 
CHAPTERVI 
BUDGETARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS 
A. Bu.dget 
Summaries of the main budgets for 1978 
and 1979 are shown in the Appen<lices to this 
report. The proposed budgets for 1979 have 
remained within the boundaries of inflation 
compared with those of 1978. 
The original intention was that the option 
period for the pension scheme should end on 
30th April1978. It was, however, e.xtended until 
30th June 1978 for ali five co-ordinated organ-
isa1Jions. This was due to difficultiea experienced 
within the Co-ordinating Committee of Govern-
ment Budget Experts regarding the interpret-
ation of Article 36 of the pem:;ion scheme rules 
which deals with the adjustment of benefits 
resulting from changes in cost of living and 
standard of living appl[cable to ali pensions. 
However, on the closing date of 30th June 
1978, discussion was still continu[ng regarding 
firstly, the problem of granting survivors' pen-
sions to widowers of female staff members and, 
secondly, the problem of affiliation to the United 
Kingdom social secu:rity legislation in relation 
to the new pension scheme. For these two reasons, 
staff concerned were aliowed to remain in the 
provident fund with the right to reopen their 
option once the current <fulcussions and negotia-
tions had been concluded. lt is hoped that these 
matters will however be ~ettled shortly and ali 
staff members can then make their final decision 
whether or not to join the pension scheme in the 
course of 1979. 
This uncertainty means that figures showing 
the results of the option are not yet final ; more 
staff members might eventualiy join the pension 
scheme but the preliminary figures as at 30th 
June 1978 are given in the Appendix. For the 
same re~U:~on the sums due to member governments 
as a result of validation cannot yet be finaliy 
calculated but the preliminary figures are also 
given in the Appendix. 
The system of partial tax compensation 
and the application of special rules concerning 
the division of contributions and tax as between 
the member governments requires a special pen-
sion budget as P'art of the total WEU budget. 
The contributions to the United Kingdom 
social security scheme, by both staff members 
and the organisation, have been held in a 
suspense account in the organisation'ls budget 
since April 1975, the date of the new United 
Kingdom legislation, pending the final outcOIIlle 
of the current negoma.tions. Meanwhile, at their 
meeting on 13th December 1978, the Council 
were informed by the United Kingdom delegate 
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that his government was now prepared to con-
elude an agreement with WEU whereby staff 
members who were members of the co-ordinated 
organisations pension scheme would be exempt 
from compliance with the provisions of the social 
security acts in the United Kingdom. The British 
authorities are expected shortly to present details 
regarding the new situation. 
B. WEU administrative meetings 
The practice was continued as before of 
bringing together periodicaliy the officiais of 
the Secretariat-General, the Armaments Control 
Agency, the Standing Armaments Committee and 
the Office of the Clerk responsible for adminis-
trative matters. 
The problems arising from the implement-
ahlon of the new pension scheme have necessit-
ated an extra meeting of the Budget and Organ-
isation Committee and an extra period for verific-
ation of the va1idation exercise by the Boa.rd 
of Auditors. 
As in previous years the co-operation with 
the WEU Staff Association has continued to 
be excellent. 
C. WEU provident (u.nd 
As explained above, the op1Jion period for 
the pension scheme terminated only on 
30th June 1978, while at the same time two 
issues remained outstanding. Since discussions 
on theae aspects of the scheme were still con-
tinuing, most staff members made their decisions 
regarding the options rather late, or even 
reserved their option right. This situation has 
made it dif:Dicult to foresee future needs as 
regards an investment policy for the provident 
fund. 
The monies that became - or would 
become - reimbursable to governments as a 
result of the validation process, while awaiting 
the final outcome and as a provisional measure, 
have been invested by the organisation in a 
similar way as the provident fund proper. ln 
order to safeguard the financial interests of the 
member governments, the Council appointed two 
national representatives as temporary members 
of the Secretary-General's advisory panel. 
The advisory panel considered that the inter-
esta of staff and governments were best ~eTVed 
by continuing the existing policy of short-term 
investment in currencies up to the closing date 
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of the option period. During the period leading 
up to the settlement of validation accounts and 
in order to overcome problems of accountancy 
in the face of varying exchange rates, the total 
fund was held in French francs - the unit of 
account. 
As soon as the final audit on the validation 
exercise has been completed, and validation 
mon'Ïies paid over to govermnents, the investment 
policy for the greatly reduced, and henceforward 
continually diminishing, provident fund will be 
considered. 
D. Activities within the framework of the 
co-ordinated organisations 
1. Committee of Secretaries-General 
The Secretaries/Director-Gtmeral of the five 
co-ordinated organisations met twice this year 
to discuss administrative problems, mainly con-
cerned with : 
- the interpretation of Article 36 of the 
pension scheme rules ; the question of 
survivors' pensions for widowers of 
female staff ; 
- means of improving the machinery of 
co-ordination ; problems associated with 
a possible admJÏssion of other organis-
ations as full members to the framework 
of the co-ordinated organisations ; 
- the 1978 general review of salaries ; the 
review of the salary adjustment proce-
dure; 
- relations with the staff associations. 
2. Standing Committee of Secretaries-General, 
Committee of Heads of Administration 
These Committees met as a rule every month 
in conjunction with the meetings of the Co-
ordinating Committee and also held several 
spe0ial sessions to deal with specifie problems. 
At the same time there has been a steadily 
growing degree of co-operation with the Stand-
ing Committee of Staff Associations. 
3. Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget 
Experts 
The Co-ordinating Conrmittee met eleven 
times in 1978 and issued twelve reports, 
Nos. 147-158, in the course of the year. 
These reports dealt with the following sub-
jects: 
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147th report : The 1977 general review of 
remuneration of A and L grade staff members, 
effective from 1st July 1977. Approved by the 
Council on 15th February 1978 (see also 143rd 
report). 
148th report: A decision not to pay staff 
the remaining 20 % of an advance to compensate 
for the increase in cost of living over the second 
half of 1976. Approved by the Council on 
19th July 1978 (see also 141st report). 
149th report: The creation of a Joint Pen-
sions Administrative Section for the co-ord-inated 
organisations to ensure unriform application of 
the pension ~cheme rules as well as to centralise 
as far as possible the necessary administrative 
work. Approved by the Council on 21st April 
1978. 
150th report : Interpretation of Article 36 
of the pension seheme rules and an extension 
of the option pe:ciod until 30th June 1978. 
Approved by the Council on 21st April 1978. 
151st report : Intermediate 'ad hoc salary 
increase for staff serving in Turkey due to an 
excessive rise in the cost of living. Approved 
by the Council on 3rd May 1978. 
152nd report : Periodical updating of the 
daily subsistence allowances for staff travelling 
on official misSions with effect from 1st May 
1978. Approved by the Council on 19th May 1978. 
153rd report : Advances of salary increases 
to compensate for the increase in cost of living 
over the second half of 1977, with a threshold 
of 2 %. Approved by the Council on 19th July 
1978. 
154th report : Acknowledgment of the right 
for female staff to reopen the option for the 
pemri.on scheme once the current discussions to 
grant a survivor's pension to widowers have been 
concluded. Approved by the Council on 19th 
July 1978. 
155th report : Intermediate ad hoc salary 
increase for staff serving in Turkey. Approved 
by the Council on 13th October 1978. 
156th report : Review and periodical updat-
ing of the rules and allowances for staff travel-
ling on duty, with effect from 1st July 1978. 
Approved by the Council on 13th October 1978. 
157th report : The 1978 general review of 
remuneration of B and C grade staff members, 
with effect from 1st July 1978. Approved by 
the Council on 13th December 1978. 
158th report : Periodical updating of the 
children's and dependants'· allowances and educ-
ation allowance applicable to all staff, with effect 
from 1st July 1978. Approved by the Council 
on 24th January 1979. 
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Summary of revised WEU budget for 1978 
A* B* C* Total B + C 
i: Frs. Frs. Frs. 
Salaries and allowances ............ 814,120 6,240,350 13,501,600 19,741,950 
Pensions .......................... 27,425 394,900 1,884,300 2,279,200 
Travel ........................... 26,685 81,000 387,450 468,450 
Other opera.ting costs ............. 87,740 352,475 491,505 843,980 
Purcha.se of furniture, etc. . ........ 3,495 5,500 43,700 49,200 
Buildings ......................... - 67,600 121,680 189,280 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE .............. 959,465 7,141,825 16,430,235 23,572,060 
WEU tax ........................ 270,050 2,140,100 4,590,150 6,730,250 
Other receipts .................... 9,600 39,500 83,500 123,000 
Pension receipts ................... 13,ll0 146,400 1,014,600 1,161,000 
TOTAL INCOME .................... 292,760 2,326,000 5,688,250 8,014,250 
NET TOTAL ....................... 666,705 4,815,825 10,741,985 15,557,810 
National contributions called for under the revised WEU budget for 1978 
600ths 
Belgium ............................. 59 
France .............................. 120 
German y ............................ 120 
Italy ................................ 120 
Luxembourg ......................... 2 
N etherla.nds .......................... 59 
United Kingdom ..................... 120 
TOTAL ......•..................... 600 
* A Secretariat-General. 
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C Annaments Control Agency. 
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i: F. frs. 
65,559.33 1,529,851.32 
133,341.00 3,ll1,562.00 
133,341.00 3,ll1,562.00 
133,341.00 3,ll1,562.00 
2,222.34 51,859.36 
65,559.33 1,529,851.32 
133,341.00 3,ll1,562.00 
666,705.00 15,557,810.00 
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Summary of WEU main budget for 1919 
A* B* c• Total B + C 
;t Frs. Frs. Frs. 
Salaries and allowances .•...•...... 889,285 6,905,400 14,263,600 21,169,000 
Pensions .......................... 66,420 421,200 2,007,400 2,428,600 
Travel ........................... 34,715 84,500 346,000 430,500 
Other operating costa ............. 125,995 443,765 546,430 990,195 
Purcha.se of furniture, etc. . ........ 4,040 8,500 24,900 33,400 
Buildings .........•............... - 132,000 241,700 373,700 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE .....••....... 1,120,455 7,995,365 17,430,030 25,425,395 
WEU ta.x ........................ 304,290 2,389,500 4,893,500 7,283,000 
Other receipts .................... 9,650 50,500 95,000 145,500 
Pension receipts ................... 19,855 255,500 512,600 768,100 
ToTAL INOOME .................... 333,795 2,695,500 5,501,100 8,196,600 
NET TOTAL .............•........• 786,660 5,299,865 11,928,930 17,228,795 
National contributions called for under the WEU main budget for 1979 
600ths 
Belgium. ............................. 59 
France .............................. 120 
German y ............................ 120 
Ital y ................................ 120 
Luxembourg ......................... 2 
Netherlands •.........•.........•..... 59 
United Kingdom ..................... 120 
TOTAL ..............•..•.....•.•.. 600 
• A Secretariat.General. 
B International Secretariat of the Standing Annaments Committee. 
C Armaments Control Agency. 
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! F. frs. 
77,354.90 1,694,164.84 
157,332.00 3,445,759.00 
157,332.00 3,445,759.00 
157,332.00 3,445, 759.00 
2,622.20 57,429.32 
77,354.90 1,694,164.84 
157,332.00 3,445,759.00 
786,660.00 17,228,795.00 
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Pension Scheme 
Numbers opting Numbers opting Numbers opting Staff recruited for full Retired Hors 
as from to retain sin ce 
validation staff grades 1st July 1974 
of service provident fund 1st July 1974 
Option No. 1 Option No. 2 Option No. 3 
Secretariat-General .. 2 14 211 4 5 2 
Arma.ments Control 
Agency ............. 2 32 7 8 22 1 
Standing Armaments 
Committee .......... - 16 6 6 9 1 
Office of the Clark of 
the Assembly ...... 1 19 2 4 2 2 
TOTAL .............. 5 81 36 22 38 6 
1. Includes seven who will review their options when the outstanding question of reversionary rights and United 
Kingdom social security are resolved. 
Provisional statement of WEU pensions validation receipts 1 
Expressed in accounting units (1 AU = 1 F. franc) 
Validation Amounts held Validation Total Proposed Balance of monies for 
monies due at end of validation 
option period 5.5512% P.V. No. 1 afc service after mo nies on 
write-down (2)- (3) lst July 1974 1st July 1974 (P.V. No. 1 afc) (4) + (5) (P.V. No. 2 afc) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Secretariat-General .. 1,948,726 2,752,915 108,178 2,644,737 1,183,176 
Standing Armaments 
Committee .......... 1,580,638 2,079,607 87,744 1,991,863 1,212,013 
Armaments Control 
Agency ............. 2,947,874 3,802,162 163,642 3,638,520 2,874,353 
Assembly ........... 2,363,360 3,363,696 131,195 3,232,501 1,983,945 
TOTALS ............. 8,840,598 ll,998,380 490,759 ll,507,621 7,253,487 
Validation monies transferred to the budgets in 1977 ....................... . 
Validation monies credited to budget income chapters in 1977 .............. . 
Amounts of outstanding loans, etc., to be repaid (to the budgets) in five years from 
1st July 1978 .......................................................... . 
Total of WEU validation monies ......................................... . 
(6) 
3,827,913 
3,203,876 
6,512,873 
5,216,446 
18,761,108 
+ 563,388 
+ 694,550 
+ 1,041,524 
21,060,570 
1. This statement is incomplete because it does not include ali interest eamed, or to be eamed, in 1978 nor 
'Ill sums credited to the budget in 1978. 
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Information Report 
(submiUed by Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur) 
1. Introduction 
1.1. In May 1977, the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments submitted to the Assembly a 
study ()Ill members of parliament and defence, 
prepared by Mr. Delorme, Committee Rappor-
teur 1 • This study covered four aspects of the 
matter : general responsibilities of parldament in 
defence matters ; defence and parliament's 
legislative rôle ; defence and parliament's super-
visory rôle ; defence &J.d parliament's informa-
ti()lll rôle. 
1.2. Inter alia, the Rapporteur emphasised the 
importance of the powers devo1ving on parlia-
ments at both legislative and supervisory levels. 
However, parliaments no longer had certain 
powers which were necessary ü they were to be 
clœely associated with the elaboration of defence 
policy, and the Committee coru;idered it would 
be desirable to set up what might be called a 
national defence council in which members of 
parliament would sirt at the side of technical 
experts. It was nevertheless fully aware that 
expert knowledge ,a;nd sources of information 
were sadly lacking among members of parlia-
ment. 
1.3. AdmiJttedly, in theory members of parlia-
ment in WEU member oountries have very 
extensive powers in respect of legisLation on 
military commitments in their respective conn-
tries both for the number of national service and 
regular servicemen and procurement of the 
equipment nec·essary for the armed forces. But 
in practice although gover.nments submit pro-
posais to them for the rep}acement of one air-
craft by another, for instance, or a tank produced 
in one country by a tank produced in another 
country, in order to be able to compare the pro-
pœals and take decisions members of parliament 
haw to ask the author of the proposal, i.e. the 
government, for the informati()lll they need. They 
may rœort to other mearu; such as the press and 
specialised reviews or research carried out by 
their secretariats, but this is a lengthy, costly 
and far from satisfactory process 2• 
1.4. The Committee therefore asked your Rap-
porteur to study the pœsibility of obtaining 
information by faster and less expensive means, 
dTawi.ng upon more independant sources, while 
retaining government departments as their 
principal source. (It is obvious that if members 
1. See Document 739. 
2. Cf. report on parliaments and military procurement, 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments by Mr. Maggioni, Rapporteur. 
45 
of parliament came to doubt the honesty of this 
source it would not be pœsib1e to continue on 
su ch a basis.) 
II. Information on defence questions for 
members of parliament - use of computers 
2.1. The Committee therefore thought of the 
possibilities offered by the use of various com-
puters which stock military and defence data 
a:nd a:sked your Rapporteur to contact two 
centres having computers of this type and which 
seemed the most suitable for the Committee's 
requirements : 
- the Armaments Documentation Centre 
in Paris; 
- the Strategie Research Institute in 
Vienna. 
A. Armaments Documentation Centre 
2.2. On llth September 1978, your Rapporteur 
visited the Armaments Documentation Centre 
(CEDOCAR) 1 in Paris, where he was received 
by the Director, Generai Y erle, the Assistant 
Director, Mr. GuiHeminet, Chief Engineer, and 
Mr. Klopp, Assistant to the Director for Inter-
national Af:fairs, who were kind enough to 
answer all the questions put to them. 
2.3. The ta:sk of CEDOCAR is to carry out 
research and meet the requirements of the 
General Delegati()lll for Armaments, military 
headqll!arters wd organisations approved by the 
Minister of the Armed Forces in scientific, 
technical, industrial, economie and financial data 
of all kinds re1ating to armaments. This task 
is defined and guided by an advisory committee 
on armaments documentation and a higher 
council for armaments documentation. Action is 
co-ordinated in the General Delegation for Arma-
ments with the assistance of central representa-
tives appointed at the level of the major 
technic:aJ. directorates and local officiais ap-
pointed at the level of establishments and depart-
ments. 
2.4. The centre's main publications are three 
monthly reviews. The first givœ about ten-line 
summaries of documents drafted in French. The 
second covers documents of foreign origin and 
the third bio-medical documents of French and 
foreign origin. In twenty~two chapters, ranging 
from aeronautics to space technology and cover-
ing social!, mathematical and military sciences, 
1. See establishment table at Appendix IV. 
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accompanied by a subject and sequence index, 
they provide detailed information on a vast 
range of texts numbering well over half a million 
each year. Another publication appears every 
fortnight and gives references and indexed sum-
maries of selected scientific and technical news 
on specifie subjects such as air safety and air-
craft accidents, remote-controlled ·aircraft and 
aerial targets, the OPEC countries, new sources 
of energy, political defenœ studies, missiles, cost 
of armaments and communications satemtes, to 
name only a few of the th:ree hundred subjects 
dealt with in this way. The selective dissemina-
tion of information (SDI) makes it possible to 
keep abreast of and update information in a 
specifie area. The references of documents are 
provided simultaJneously with their selection by 
CEDOCAR and other soUI'Ces. 
2.5. The centre has a multiple-media informa-
tion storage system which contains most of the 
primary documents on paper, microfiche or new 
media. A reference storage system hel ps the user 
to find the required information with the 
assistance of the thesaurus, index, Hsts, cata-
logues, directories, memoranda, etc. A documents 
reproduction section, 'a translation section and a 
library complete its services. Finally, a telephone 
assistance service (TAS) operates every day to 
answer general questions and questions on 
sources of scientific and technical information, 
primary texts and French and foreign standards ; 
for scientific questions as such, information may 
be obtained by telephone from the departments 
dealing with the classification of information by 
bran ch. 
2.6. CEDOCAR documents bodies responsible 
to the Ministry of Defence, state establishments 
sueh as universities and defence contmctors and 
bodies outside the Ministry and state depart-
ments. The Assembly, or even better WEU as 
a who1e, might take out a subscription for the 
services available, subject to the agreement of the 
Minister of Defence, Mr. Bourges. Since your 
Rapporteur's visit, the Assembly haB been p1acing 
its documents and proceedings, booklets and dos-
siers at the disposai of the centre. Should agree-
ment be given, a fuller exchange of documenta-
tion might be considered. 
2.7. As regards the preparation of documents 
for the Committees on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, General Affairs, and Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions, the 
centre, which is equipped with a computer, could, 
in the opinion of your Rapporteur, provide an 
entirely new form of assistance for us ; in the 
preparation of questions to be putto the national 
governments or to the Counc.iL, the te'lephone 
assistance service could be of considerable help 
to members of the Assembly. Obviously your 
Rapporteur cannot assess the IUISistance the centre 
might be able to offer the Standing Armaments 
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Committee or the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments, but possibly a contact might prove 
fruitful here too. 
B. Strategie Research Institute, Vienna 
2.8. On 7th and 8th March 1979, your Rap-
porteur visited the Strategie Research lnstitute 
of the Austrian military academy, where he was 
received by the Commandant, General W. 
Kuntner, the Director, Colonel F. Freistetter, 
and severa! members of their staff. Set up on 
1st January 1967, this military academy in turn 
set up the research institute which for the past 
ten years has been trying to answer aU the 
questions put to it by the government, the armed 
forces, parliament and parliamentarians and 
even university professors and journalists. 
2.9. The institute's task is to co-ordinate, 
rationalJise and centralise the work of the ten 
documentation services which exist in the armed 
forces, improve working methods and extend the 
range of subjects covered. There were two initial 
stages in the development of computerised 
documentation: (a) the preparation of registers 
and catalogues for users ; (b) the installation of 
a keyboard terminal to be able to question the 
computer (IRMS : information retrieval and 
management system), bef ore the current stage : 
(c) direct questionirng with display screen and 
use of STAIRSjVS, FAIR and TLS (storage 
and information retrieval) systems. For two 
years, the institute has also had a camera for 
microfilms and apP'aratus for reproducing micro-
films and has thus become one of the most 
modern documentation services in Europe. 
2.10. Apart from a series of studies and reports 
under the sole responsibility of the authors, and 
which do not therefore represent the official 
opinion of the institute, two monthly information-
documentation reviews are published. Series A 
gives general information and series B toohnieal 
information relating to defence. Each review 
covers and analyses between eighty and a 
hundred articles per issue 1 • The rest of the 
information is fed directly into the computer 
after being processed by the staff of the institute 
in accordance with a thesaurus (index) which 
currently lists more than 18,000 words or groups 
of words. Finally, like the French CEDOCAR, 
the institute publishes a series which automati-
cally gives the references of documents on a 
specifie subject, known as profiles of interest. 
The series at present covers more than two 
hundred subjects. 
2.11. Since the institute was set up, its staff 
(which, on 1st Janoory 1979, in addition to ten 
documentalists and two secretaries, included 
eighteen officiais from other departments work-
1. See lista at Appendices V and VI. 
ing at the institute for one or two hours a day 
and a doze.n national servicemen) has worked 
on more than 150,000 documents and now 
handles each month between 2,800 and 3,000 texts 
taken from 800 periodicals from 40 countries and 
written in 16 languages. In 1978, a total of 
9,558 computer searches were made ood 4,811 
articles reproduced. 
2.12. The institute's publications are free of 
charge and could probably be obtained by the 
WEU Assembly. For the time be:ing, requests 
for specifie searches may be made only by 
Austrians. Y our Rapporteur oonsiders that the 
large quantity of documents from Warsaw Pact 
oountries would fully justify an approach being 
made by the Presidernt of the Assembly. The 
speed with which detailed and very specialised 
answers may be obtained, the wide range of 
matters covered and the exjstence of very full 
and completely up-to-date documentation are all 
good reasons for wishing to estJablish useful and 
permanent contacts between the institute and the 
Assembly without delay. Moreover, the Assembly 
has already begun to make available to the 
Vienna centre the same documentation as it sends 
to the Paris centre. 
C. Position in the parliaments of certain member 
countries 
2.13. Answering a question put by Mr. Lromer, 
the German Government gave the following 
information on conditions for the use of federal 
computer services by members of the Bundestag : 
"The Federal Government endeavours to 
transmit information requested or needed 
by the Bundestag as quickly and as fully 
as possible. The Federal Government's store 
of information and the computerised. data 
bank are at the disposai of the Bundestag, 
parliamentary groups and individual mem-
bers within the limits of the possibilities 
prescribed by law. Moreover, the Bundestag 
and its members receive a vast amount of 
information in the framework of the 
presentation of reports, answers to questions 
put in parUaments and statements by 
members of the Federal Government at 
hearings under Article 43, paragraph 1, of 
the Basic Law. 
~quests for information from the Bundes-
tag may sometimes be subject to restrictions 
in accordance with the principle of the 
separation of powers. This principle also 
protects the 'area of internai decision-
making by the Federal Government. More-
over, the communication. of person.al data 
must take acoount of the fact that the 
constitution provides special protection for 
the human person and di.gnity. In accord-
ance with the provisions of the law on the 
protection of federal data, which give a 
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more detailed definition of this protection, 
such data may be oommunicated only in 
specified conditions. Finally, it must also 
be asœrtained that no important matters 
affecting the public interest or professional 
secrecy prevent the information being 
freely communieated." 1 
2.14. In the United Kingdom, the Hause of Lords 
began using computer services expooimentaillly in 
1974 for storage and retrieval of information as 
a result of investigations between 1968 and 1973 
into the possible application of computer techni-
ques to the work of parliament. After two-and-
a-half years of experimental use, a computer 
system was authorised by the House and became 
operational in January 1977. The House has now 
appointed a Computer Sub-Committee of its 
main Offices Committee to give guidance on 
present and future developments. The Lords 
system has been evolved with the closest 
oo-ope:oo.tion from the government's Central 
Computer Agency (CCA). Indeed, the House 
itself is not a party to computer contracts ; these 
are entered into by CCA on behalf of the House. 
2.15. The Informai Joint Committee of both 
Houses on Computers set out a number of 
principles which have been fallowed in the 
development of the House of Lords computer 
system. The most important of these are : 
(i) that a graduai, step-by-step apprœch 
to development should be adopted ; 
(ii) that applications should be easy to 
learn by someone unskilled in the use 
of computera ; 
(iii) that terminals should operate satis-
factorily in a normal office or 
oommittee-room environment ; 
(iv) that the system should not be depen-
dent on any particular manufacturer ; 
and 
(v) that development should take into 
account the possibility of public 
access to sorne parliamentary data 
bases. 
2.16. The system that has been established in the 
House of Lords consista of seven terminais in 
the Lords and two in the Commons. Each ter-
minal comprises a typewriter keyboard and a 
screen, known as a visual disp1ay.unit (VDU). 
In addition, there are two printers in the Lords 
and one in the Common.s. The software, or 
programme, is IBM's STAIRS/ATMS (storage 
and information retrieval system/advanced text 
management system). STAIRS js the informa-
tion retrieval side of the package. ATMS is used 
for data entry and editing. ATMS is also being 
1. See Bundestag Proeeedings, Appendix 441 16th 
February 1979. 
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used for the typing and tempora.ry storage of 
draft committee reports which are then easily 
amended by secretaries and printed out. 
2.17. The system is used by "dialogue" with the 
computer through terminais. A user types words 
or phrases of ordina.ry language together with 
a certain number of symbolic commands. These 
appear on the VDU screen, and are then trans-
mitted to the computer itaelf. On receiving dif-
ferent commands .the computer will carry out 
the variety of functions which its two program-
mes, STAIRS and ATMS, enable it to do. Stores 
of information are built up on different subjeets 
in a number of data bases. Each one of these 
contains documents which are typed into the 
system using the ATMS programme. They are 
then held in permanent storage and can be 
retrieved by using STAIRS. STAIRS enables 
the user to retrieve documents by searching for 
any word, number or reference number that 
occurs in that document. One can therefore 
retrieve a specifie document by searching for an 
item (for instance a reference number) which is 
known to oocur in that document only. 
Alternatively, the computer wili retrieve the 
whole range of documents which it contains on 
a particular subject if a search is earried out 
on a word - such as a subject heading or general 
descriptioo - that occurs in all of them. The 
breadth of a search can be varied by altering 
the complexity of the terms or string of term.s 
that the computer is asked to retrieve. 
2.18. Once documents have been found in this 
way, the list can be manipulated if required 
. - for instance, it can be organised according 
to the dates of the documents, and in ascending 
or descending date order. Each document can be 
dispLayed on the screen in front of the user. 
The list or any part of it can al.so be printed 
out for permanent record. If the ATMS pro-
gramme is being used for editing draft com-
mittee reports, the keyboard and screen are used 
in place of a typewriter, and the draft report 
is only printed out on paper when it is in the 
form required. This is a useful facility which 
can save office time, p.articu:lar1y when a com-
mittee makes frequent revisions to the drafts 
of its reports, and the facility is irudependent 
of any of the permanent stores of information. 
2.19. The system is used by members of the staff 
of the Parliament Office, the libraries of both 
Houses and the Ho use of Commons V ote Office. 
None of these had any computer experience 
before the system was established. Staff who are 
going to enter data require only an hour or 
two of initial training before operating the com-
puter terminais, which they do urnder supervisioo 
at first. AU data entered into the compll!ter for 
permanent storage are checlœd for accuracy. The 
general running of the system is discussed at 
regular progrress meetings attended by ail the 
parties involved in the system, including CCA. 
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Overall guidance oo future developments is the 
responsibility of the Computer Sub-Committee. 
2.20. In the House of Lords, at present computer 
systems are used excrusively by the library staff 
on behalf of peers. Therefore, staff use these 
systems when they judge that they have some-
thing to offer which is not readily available in 
any other form. Staff seldom hand a print-out 
from the data base directly to a peer preparing 
for a debate, but frequently use it to see what 
there is and choose, from what has been retrieved, 
items which they think are relevant to his parti-
cular enquiry. However, it is true that on the 
whole more requests come in for specifie informa-
tion on a particular point relevant to the subject 
of a debate rather than for blanket information 
on the whole subject matter. Staff also search 
on the British Library's data base, which 
includes the Library of Congress files, when this 
is relevant. 
2.21. The peer himself has, of course, direct 
access to the corn-fiche (computer output in micro-
form) catailogue if he wishes which includes a 
seqUJe'Ilce arranged by Dewey Decimal Classifica-
tion, but the computer-produced catalogue is 
more often used by the staff for selecting 
individu:al publications relevant to a peer's 
enquiry or useful to research workers in answer-
ing an enquiry from a peer. There is sorne over-
lap between the catalogue and the on-line data 
base. The catalogue is being taken back to 1950, 
whereas the library data base contai.ns only 
material entered during the last two years. Sorne-
times where the enquiry is for a bibliography, 
staff will have an off-1ine print made, but it 
is more usual for them to search, as with theiT 
own material, for items whieh they will either 
use themselves irn answering ·the enquiry or seleet 
from a retrieve list for the peers' use. 
DI. Activities of the Committee 
3.1. This is the twentieth report which the 
Committee has submitted to the ÂBSembly on its 
activities. If account is taken of the twenty-one 
reports submitted by the Working Party for 
Liaison with National Parliaments (as the Com-
mittee was formerly called), it is therefore in 
fact the forty-first mudy on relations with parlia-
ments. The Committee's activities have had 
variable results, as shown in Appendix I and 
in the paragraphs on the subject in most earlier 
reports. Indeed, Rapporteurs have rarelw been 
satisfied, particularly when, after the steady 
and sustained effort, from 1963 to 1968, a 
constant decline was recorded, reaching a low 
in 197 4, albeit an eventful year during which 
the Assembly adopted a series of mteresting 
reports. In this twentieth report, your Rap-
porteur is happy .to announœ that thanks to the 
untiring work of members of the Committee the 
situation has changed considerably : once again, 
the threshold of a hundred interventions has been 
crossed in the parliaments of mem"OOr countries : 
for 1978, a total of 110 interventions has alTeady 
been recorded by the Committee secretariat and 
Collected Texts 29 re1ating to parliamentary 
action in implementation of recommendations 
adopted by the Assembly therefore heralds 
brighter prospects. 
3.2. The other two publications, the orange 
bookliet and the monthly bulletin, have been 
issued at their usual frequency. It is to be noted 
that the latter publication marked its fifteenth 
anniversary at the beginning of June: 180 issues 
have been prepared by the secretariat with no 
outside assistance. To strengthen the impact of 
this working instrument, which is increasingly 
in demand from documenrtary services, etc., it 
would be desirable for the secretariats of the 
varions delegations to help the Committee 
secretary with his work. Too much information 
eludes hlm simply because the element.~ (docu-
ments, etc.) concerning these activities do not 
reach the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly. 
3.3. At the close of the last session (20th-23rd 
November 1978), the Committee held its half-
yearly discussion on the texts which had just 
been adopted. In accordance with Rule 42bis of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, it 
selected the following recommendations which it 
felt should be discussed in the parliaments of 
member countries : 
- 323 on disarmament ; 
- 325 on a European armaments policy ; 
- 328 on weather forecasting. 
These three recommendations were officially 
transmitted by Mr. K.-U. von Hassel, President 
of the Assembly, to the Presidents of the parlia-
ments of member countries who in turn referred 
them to the appropriate committees. Following 
the selection of the texts transmitted to the 
parliaments of WEU member states, the Chair-
man of the Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments, Mr. Jeambrun, wrote to all Committee 
members on 29th November 1978 sending model 
questions to be put on the three recommenda-
tions. As was to be expected, Recommendation 
328 on weather forecasting was the subject of 
interventions in four countries, whereas there 
were interventions on the other two in only two 
countries (France and Italy). Ministerial answers 
were given on Recommendation 326 on applica-
tion satellites in five member countries. These 
answers are analysed in Chapter IV. 
3.4. In his report of 3rd November 1978 (Docu-
ment 791), your Rapporteur deplored the absence 
of brief reports on Assembly sessions in certain 
member countries and suggested that they follow 
the example of Germany, Italy and France : 
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" a report might be included in the 
Chambre des Députés, a Luxembourg 
review distributed free of charge through-
out the Grand Duchy, and in the Weekly 
Information Bulletin of the House of lJords 
and its equivalent in the House of Corn-
mons which, since July 1978, have been 
keeping the public informed of the work 
of the British parliament (for an annual 
subscription of f24). The Belgian and 
Netherlands Delegations could certainly 
find similar solutions." 
Unfortunately, none of the four countries con-
cerned has followed up this suggestion. The 
Committee joins its Rapporteur in repeating this 
suggestion in the hope that delegations will take 
the necessary action. 
3.5. Moreover, your Rapporteur feels considera-
tion might be given to posting up the agendas 
of the Assembly committees and plenary sessions 
on the notice-boards of the thirteen parliaments 
of WEU member states and including them in 
their bulletins, etc. Finally, he also wishes con-
sideration to be given to the possibility of organis-
ing joint meetings with a national delegation or 
political group when a text adopted warrants 
such action. 
IV. Government answers to questions 
on Recommendations 326 and 328 
A. Application satellites 
4.1. Most questions dealt with the European 
Space Agency programme and the delay in 
implementing it due to the budget not having 
been adopted in time. Answers by the various 
ministries referred above all to the difficult eco-
nomie juncture and the impossibility of compet-
ing with American industry. The Belgian Min-
ister, Mr. Vandekerckhove, was prepared to 
approve the 1978 compulsory budget. He hoped 
that it would be possible to approve it in 1979 
or that member states would agree to include 
the same sums in the 1979 budget which (in 
January 1979 !) has yet to be discussed. The 
Italian Minister said that certain reservations 
on acceptance of the ESA programme had been 
lifted in November 1978. Mr. Huckfield, British 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
Industry, deplored the delay in approving the 
general budget and would endeavour to find a 
solution to the problem. He feared that if the 
situation were to continue the main effect would 
be a reduction in funds available for implement-
ing the agreed scientific programme of the 
Agency. 
4.2. Answering a question as to whether he was 
prepared to afford his active support to examin-
ing the establishment of a meteorological satellite 
system together with a network of mobile ground 
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stations, Mr. François-Poncet, French Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, said the French Government 
was playing an active part in the programme. 
Mr. Hauff, the German Minister, recalled the 
Federal Republic's contribution to ESA pro-
grammes : participation in the Symphonie pro-
gramme ; responsibility for the major part of the 
Telecom programme; participation in the 
development of maritime stations and radio 
distress installations for the Marots programme. 
B. Weather forecasting 
4.3. Questions on the European meteorological 
satellite system Eurometsat, stemming from the 
pre-operational Meteosat programme, led to posi-
tions being adopted by several ministers. Mr. 
Thorn, Luxembourg Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, said direct Luxembourg participation in 
the development of this system appeared difficult 
in view of the high technical level required. 
Consideration might be given to installing a user 
station at Luxembourg-Findel airport but this 
would be very expensive : the station at the 
Belgian Royal Meteorological Institute had cost 
about 25 million Luxembourg francs. Mr. 
Wellbeloved, British Under-Secretary of State 
for Deferree for the Royal Air Force, said the 
European geostationary satellite Meteosat I was 
at present operating as a research system and 
should the system prove to be cost-effective in 
competition with conventional ground-based 
systems a continuing operational programme 
would be contemplated. Meteosat II was cur-
rently being discussed by the appropriate Euro-
pean institutions and it was possible that it 
would function as an operational system. The 
United Kingdom was keeping in close touch with 
developments. 
4.4. In ltaly and the Netherlands, questions on 
short-, medium- and long-term weather fo·re-
casting elicited comments to the effect that "their 
reliability is being assessed", "reliability indices 
apply only to techniques for developing fore-
casting methods" and the search for "a system 
which might merge conventional forecasting 
methods with mathematical methods" was prov-
ing very difficult. 
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4.5. Answers are still awaited to several 
questions on one or other recommendation. In 
view of the number of questions still unanswered, 
it is impossible to analyse the situation in regard 
to Recommendations 322, 323, 324 and 325. It 
is nevertheless important to note that the answer 
to a question in France on Recommendation 325 
(A European armaments policy) was printed in 
two well-known French newspapers, Le Monde 
and Le Figaro, and was mentioned in several 
other newspapers and regional radio program-
mes. Once again, this proves that a written 
question may often stretch beyond the limited 
audience of those who read official reports and 
reach a large section of the population. 
V. The Committee's visit to the Netherlands 
5.1. The Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments paid an information visit to the Nether-
lands on 3rd and 4th May 1979. During its 
working meeting, it asked its acting Chairman, 
Mr. Schlingemann, to write to the Chairman of 
the Committee on Deferree Questions and Arma-
ments drawing the Committee's attention to the 
possibilities of obtaining information on deferree 
and armaments matters through the inter-
mediary of the Armaments Documentation 
Centre in Paris, the Strategie Research Institute 
in Vienna and possibly the computerised data 
banks in the Bundestag and the House of IJords. 
If members of the Deferree Committee were 
interested in the possibilities afforded by the 
use of computers in the various national parlia-
ments, it might be useful to mention the fact in 
Mr. Maggioni's report on parliaments and deferree 
procurement. 
5.2. The Committee also considered the pos-
sibility of drawing the attention of national 
parliaments to the symposium on a European 
armaments policy to be held in Brussels on 15th, 
16th and 17th October 1979. 
5.3. During its stay in the Netherlands, the 
Committee visited the seat of the States-General 
of the Southern Rolland province. An address 
by Mr. Porrey, Divisional Director, on the 
administration of this province was followed by 
a discussion with members of the Committee. 
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APPENDIX I 
Table of action in the parliaments of member countries 
(Totals by country for each session) 
Member countrics 
;8 
Recommandations ~1>. ~ ~ adopted in 
.! Cl) 9:~ î ~ ~ ] i G3 ë~ -.'1 li:~ 1':4 ~ -8'E 
Cl) 
1':4 
-
1956 0 0 3 0 0 0 
1957 4 0 1 0 0 5 
1958 2 0 3 0 0 4 
1959 0 0 9 0 0 0 
1960 3 12 2 8 0 3 
1961 0 2 0 3 0 6 
1962 2 4 4 6 2 3 
1963 0 0 13 22 1 2 
1964 4 14 9 11 1 5 
1965 0 11 12 24 0 5 
1966 2 12 12 49 1 4 
1967 14 9 22 29 2 6 
1968 6 14 20 22 1 16 
1969 Il 15 17 8 0 4 
1970 3 15 15 7 2 3 
1971 0 4 19 9 0 6 
1972 0 6 2 1 0 1 
1973 0 4 2 6 1 0 
1974 0 1 3 13 2 0 
1975 10 28 8 19 3 11 
1976 16 40 13 14 2 3 
1977 4 18 4 15 1 1 
1978 17 37 8 21 4 10 
1979 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Total 98 247 201 287 23 98 
Annua.l average 4.26 10.74 8.74 12.48 1.00 4.26 
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J 
! Total 
'0 
·~ p 
0 3 
2 12 
3 12 
0 9 
1 29 
0 11 
10 31 
3 41 
2 46 
28 80 
18 98 
16 98 
47 126 
36 91 
10 55 
10 48 
0 10 
0 13 
0 19 
3 82 
8 96 
14 57 
14 111 
0 1 
225 1,179 
9.78 7.32 
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APPENDIX ll 
Table of interventions (debates, questions, repUes, etc.) on texta adopted since June 1977 
d s ~ 8 i :§~ 1 ~~ r ~ l 18 g 't:l <1) l j <!),. 1 r ! i ..0 'dl .ËI 1 ~ fil ~ ;.:= <1) 'dl ~ 't:l 3i Ill l j:Q ~ 0 ~'a z ~ C) ..::1 ~Il. <1) <1) ~ l'oc p 
---
297 
-
298 x 1 1 
299 -X 2 2 4 
300 1 2 3 June 301 1 2 3 
1977 302 2 1 2 5 23 
303 
-304 2 2 4 
305 1 2 3 
306 
-
-- ------- ---
307 x 1 1 
308 x 1 1 2 
Nov. 309 x 1 1 2 
1977 310 x 2 2 34 3ll x 1 1 2 
Other action 4 15 4 2 25 
--
312 
-313 x 2 2 2 6 314 x 2 2 1 2 3 2 12 315 2 2 
June 316 
- 30 1978 317 2 1 3 318 x 2 1 1 2 6 319 
-320 
-321 1 1 
322 1 1 
323 x 3 1 4 324 1 1 
Nov. 325 2 1 2 5 81 1978 326 x 2 4 3 2 Il 327 
-328 x 2 4 2 2 4 14 
Other action 7 25 4 4 3 2 45 
1979 
1 1 
1 1 1 
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APPENDIX rn 
Vistts by the Committee for Relations with Parliamenfs 
22nd February 1963 
lOth October 1963 
llth-12th November 1964 
28th-29th April 1965 
15th-16th December 1965 
Paris 
Rome 
Bonn 
The Hague 
Brussels 
30th October-lst November 1966 London 
23rd-24th November 1967 
2nd-3rd April 1968 
26th-27th March 1969 
27th-28th October 1969 
14th-15th April 1970 
lst-2nd April 1971 
4th-5th November 1971 
24th-25th February 1972 
18th-19th September 1972 
lst-2nd May 1973 
15th-18th October 1973 
8th-lOth July 1974 
27th-28th October 1975 
llth-12th !lay 1976 
25th-26th November 1976 
9th-lOth May 1977 
3rd-4th November 1977 
31st May-lst June '1978 
3rd November 1978 
3rd-4th ]!ay 1979 
Berlin (Regional parliament of Land Berlin) 
Luxembourg 
Rome 
Paris 
Bonn 
Rome 
Bonn 
The Hague 
Florence (Regional parliament of Tusca.ny) 
St. Hélier (Regional parliament of the States 
of Jersey) 
llunich (Regional parliament of the Free State 
of Bavaria) 
Pa.lermo (Regional parliament of Sicily) 
The Hague 
Luxembourg 
Brussels 
Rome 
Bonn - Wiesbaden (Regional parliament of 
Hesse) 
Paris - Cergy /Pontoise 
Rome 
The Hague 
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APPENDIXIV 
Simplified establishment table of CEDOCAR 
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 
ASSISTANCE BY SCIENTIFIC AND 
TECHNICAL DATA 
MANAGEMENT DIM, DIS, DIP 
Methods and liaison with computer 
Documentary sources 
Products 
APPENDIX IV 
USE OF DOCUMENTATION AND 
ASSISTANCE BY SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA 
Aircraft manufacture - Missiles -
Toulouse Regional Delegation 
Naval shipbuilding - Communications -
Computers 
Surface weapons - Research and tests 
Translations 
Planning - Breakdown 
TECHNICAL MEANS 
Automatic data processing 
Media library 
Timing - Distribution 
ADMINISTRATIVE MEANS 
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 
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APPENDIXV 
Information-Dokumentation 
List of specialised publications used for Series A 
Academy of Political Science (New York), 
Adelphi Papers (London), Aerospace Internatio-
nal (Washington), l'Aerotecnica Missili e Spazio 
(Neapel), Afrdka heu te (Bonn), Air Force Ma-
gazine (Washington), Aircraft Engineering (Lon-
don), Allgemeine Militarrundschau (Paris), 
Allgemeine Schweizerische Militarzeitschrift 
(Frauenfeld), Alte Kameraden (Stuttgart), Ame-
rdcan Journal of International Law (Cambridge, 
USA), American Science Review (Wiscon-
sin), Archiv der Gegenwart (Bonn-Wien-Zürich), 
Arch!iv des Volkerrechtes (Tübingen), Armada 
International (Zürich), Armamentaria (Leyden, 
NL), Arme NYTT (Stockholm), Armee-Motor 
(Zürich), Armee-Rundschau (Berlin), Armées 
d'aujourd'hui (Paris), Armed Forces Interna-
tional (New York), Armor (Washington), Army 
Logistician (Fort Lee), The Army Quarterly and 
Defence Journal (London), Army Research and 
Development (Washington), Army Times (Wash-
ington), Artillerierundschau (Neclmrgmünd), 
Asian Survey (Berkeley), Astronautik (Hanno-
ver), Au.Benhandel (Moskau), Au.Benpolitik 
(Freiburg), Australian Outlook (Canberra), 
Aviation Week and Space Technology (New 
York), Aviazione e Marina (Genua), Beitrage 
zur Konfliktforschung (Koln), Berichte zur 
Raumforschung und Raumplanung (Wien), Blat-
ter für deutsche und internationale Politik 
(Koln), Bulletin (München), Bulletin of the 
Operations Research (Baltimore), Society of 
America (Baltimore), Canadian Military Journal 
(Montreal), China Quarterly (London), Conscien-
ce et Liberté (Bern), Contact (Brüssel), Current 
History (Philadelphia), Defence (London), 
Defense Management Journal (USA), Défense 
Natrionale (Paris), Deutsche Au.Benpolitik (Ber-
lin), Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Bonn), 
Deutschland Archiv (Koln), Dialogue (Wa.Shing-
ton), Die Bundeswehr (Bad Godesberg), Digest 
d~ Ostens (Konigstein), Dokumente (Offen-
burg), Dokumentation zur Entwicklung der 
Schweizerischen Armee (Zürich), Der Donau-
raum (Wien), Draegerheft (Lübeck), East-West 
Relations (Den Haag), Economica (London), 
Elektronische Informationsverarbeitung und Ky-
bernetik (Berlin, DDR), Esercito (Rom), Europa 
(München), Europa Archiv (Bonn), Europaische 
Rundschau (Wien), Epoche (München), Flugre-
vue/Flugwelt (Stuttgart), Flugsicherheit (Koln), 
Flugwehr und -technik (Frauenfeld), Forces Aé-
riennes Françaises (Paris), Forces Armées 
Françaises (Paris), Foreign Affairs (New 
York), Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Bangkok), For-
tune (Illinois), Forum (Wien), Frankfurter Hef-
te (FrankfurtjMain), Fuerzas Armadas de Ve-
nezuela (Caracas), Futurum (München), Gesell-
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schaft und Politik (Wien), Geschichte, Zeitge-
schehen, Politik (Berlin), Gewaltfreie Aktion 
(Berlin), Government Business Worldwide 
Reports (Washington), Heer (Bonn), Honvedsegi 
Szemle (Budapest), !BE-Bulletin (Wien), Illus-
trierte Neue Welt (Wien), lnfantry (Montgome-
ry, Alabama), Informatik (Berlin, DDR), Infor-
ma1Jions Aéronautiques (Paris), Informationen, 
Beri'Chte, Modelle (Wien), Instant Research on 
Peace and Violance (Tampere, SF), Interavia 
(Genf), International Bulletin (London), Inter-
national Classification (Frankfurt), Internatio-
nal Journal (Toronto), Internationale Politik 
(Belgrad), International Problems (Tel Aviv), 
International Securdty (Cambridge, USA), In-
ternationale Wehrrevue (Genf), Interplay (New 
York), IPW-Berichte (Berlin), Izvestija (Sofia), 
Journal für Angewandte Sozialforschung (\Vien), 
Internationale Zivilverteidigung (Genf), Journal 
of Conflict Resolution (Michigan), Journal of 
International Affairs (New York), Journal of 
Peace Research (Oslo), Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institute (London), Journal 
Südafrika (Bonn), Kampftruppen (Herford, 
(BRD), Kuba (Havanna), Loyal (Bonn), Luft-
fahrt International (Nürnberg), Luftwaffe (Kal-
kar), Marine (Bremen), Marine Corps Gazette 
(Quantico), Marine Rundschau (Stuttgart), Mi-
crowave Journal (Dedham, USA), Military 
Affairs (Manhattan, Kansas), The Military 
Balance (London), Military Review (Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas), Militargeschichte (Pots-
dam), Militar-Politik (Hamburg), Militartechnik 
(Berlin, DDR), Mirovaja Ekonomika i Mezduna-
rodnye Otnosenija (MOISkau), Mitteilungen und 
Berichte (Salzburg), Mizan (London), Monat 
(München), Nachrichten für Dokumentation 
(Frankfurt/Main), Nation, Europa (Coburg), 
National Defense (Washington), Nato Brief 
(Bonn), NATO's Fifteen Nations (Amsterdam), 
Naval Review (Washington), Die Neue Gesell-
schaft (Bonn), Neue Politische Literatur (Frank-
furt/Main), Neue Ordnung (Bonn), Neue Welt 
im Bild, Neue Zeitschrift für Wehrrecht (Bonn), 
The New Hungarian Quarterly (Budapest), New 
Middle East (London), Novaja i Novejshaja 
Istorija (Moskau), Operations Re:search (Balti-
more) , Or bis (Philadelphia), Osteuropa (Stutt-
gart), Osteuropaische Rundschau (München), 
ôffentliche Sicherheit (Wien), ôsterreichis'Che 
Forschungsstiftung für Entwicklungshilfe 
(Wiien), ôl\Œ (Wien), ôsterreische Osthefte 
(Wien), ôsterreichische Zeitschrift für Au.Ben-
politik (Wien), Pacifie Affairs (Vancouver), 
Paratus (Pretoria), Peace Research Review 
(Dundas/Ontario), Piorriere (Darmstadt), Plus 
(Düsseldorf), Polish Perspectives (Warschau), 
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Political Quarterly (London), Political Science 
Quarterly (New York), Politische Dokumenta-
tion (München), Die Politische Meinung (Bonn), 
Pol'Îtische Studien (München), Po1itische Viertel-
jahresschrift (Koln), Presse der Sowjetunion 
(Berlin), Problems of Comm11Il'$m (Washington), 
Problems Sovietiques (München), ProceedingS 
(New York), Promet (Bad Homburg), Propel-
lants and Explosives (Weinheim), Publizistik 
(Bonn), Quadrante (Roma), Relazioni Internazio-
nali (Milano), Report (Wien), Reconquista 
(Madrid), Reservilairnen (Helsinki), Review/ 
Gesundheitswesen und Umweltschutz (Wien), 
Revista de Aeronautica y Astronautica (Madrid), 
Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerre (Bue-
nos Aires), La Revue des Deux Mondes (Paris), 
Revue Militaire Suisse (Lausanne), Rivista Mili-
tare (Roma), Royal Air Forces Quarterly (Lon-
don), Royal United Service Institution Journal 
(London), Rude Pravo (Prag), Rumiinien heute 
(Bukarest), Schweizer Monatshefte (Zürich), Der 
Schweizer Soldat (Zürioh), Science and Public 
Mfairs (Chicago), Sicherheitspolitik heute (Bad 
Honn~f), Soldatenjournal (Wien), Soldat und 
Techndk (FrankfurtjMain), Soldier (Aldershot), 
Soldiers (Alexandria/Virginia), Soviet Military 
Review (Moskau), Sovjetzkij Vojn (Moskau), 
Sozialistische Politik (Berlin), Lo Spettatore 
Internazionale (Roma), Strategie Review 
(Washington), Strategie Survey (London), Stra-
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tégie (Paris), Studies in Comparative (Los 
Angeles), Studies on the Soviet Union (Mün-
chen), Survey (London), Survival (London), 
T AM Magazine des Armées (Paris), Terzo Mondo 
(Milano), Truppendi~st (Wien), Truppenpra.xis 
(Frankfurt/Main), USSR and the Th!ird World 
(London) Verd~ Olivio (Havanna), Vereinte Na-
tionen (Bonn), Die Vereinten Nationen und 
Osterreich (Wien), Viata Mil.itara (Bukarest), 
Voenniy V estnik (Moskau), Vojno Delo (Beo-
grad), War/Peace Report (New York), Wehr-
ausbildung in Wort und Bild (Bonn), Wehr-
forschung (Sinzheim-W~nden), Europiiische 
Wehrkunde (München), W ehrtechnik (Darm-
stadt), Wehr & Waffen (Sasbachwalden, BRD), 
Wehr und Wirtschaft (München), Weltwirt-
schaftliches .Archiv (Tübingen), The Western 
Political Quarterly (Salt Lake City), WÏ$sen-
schaft und Weltbild (Wien), Wissenschaftlicher 
Dienst Südosteuropas (München), World Politics 
(Princeton), The World Today (Oxford), Zeit 
Bild (B~), Zeitschrift für Betriebswi·rschaft 
(Wiesbaden), Zeit4schrift für Luftrecht und Welt-
raufragen (Koln), Zeitschrift für Neutralitiit 
(FrankfurtjMain), Zeitschrift für Organisation 
(Wiesbaden), Zeitschrift für Politik (Berlin), Zi-
tate, Analysen, Kommentare (Zürich), Zivil-
schutz (Bern), Zivilschutz (Wien), Zivilverteidi-
gun (Bad Honnef). 
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APPENDIXVI 
Information Do'kumentation 
List of specialised publications used for Series B 
Airadio News 
Air et Cosmos 
Airline Management and Marketing 
Aktuell (Steyr) 
Allgemeine Schweizerische Militarzeitschrift 
Angewandte Chemie 
Angewandte Informatik 
Archiv für technisches Messen und industrielle 
MeBtechnik 
Armed Forces Review 
Armee-Mo tor 
Army Research and Development 
Atomkernenergie 
Austro-Motor 
Automobiltechnische Zeitschrift 
Aviation Week and Space Technology 
Berichte und Informationen -
üsterrcichisches Forschungsinstitut f. Wissen-
schaft und Politik 
Berichte zur Raumforschung und Raumplanung 
Bild der Wissenschaft 
Brand aus 
Brandschutz 
Brown Boveri Mitteilungen 
Canadlan Defence Products 
Cano pus 
Chemie für Labor und Betrieb 
Chemiker Zeitung 
Chemische Rundschau 
Computer - aktuell 
Das Elektron international 
Der Elektroniker 
Der Fernmeldeingenieur 
Der Schlüssel 
Der Soldat 
Der Stahlbau 
Deutsches Waffenjournal 
Die Bautechnik 
DIN-Mitteilungen 
DK-Mitteilungen 
Elektrisches Nachrichtenwesen 
Elektronics 
Electronics W eekly 
Elektronik 
Elektronik Information 
Elektronik und Maschinenbau 
Elektrotechnische Zeitschrift 
- Ausgabe A 
Elektrotechnische Zeitschrift 
- Ausgabe B 
Elin Zeitschrift 
Erdol und Kohle 
Ericsson Review 
Explosivstoffe 
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Fernmelde-Impulse 
Fernmelde-Praxis 
Fernmeldetechnik 
Fette, Seifen, Anstreichmittel 
Flight - International 
Flug Revue 
Flugwehr und -Technik 
] 1ranzosische Technik 
Bauwesen, Roch- und Tiefbau, Stadtebau -
Aktuelles 
Franzosische Technik 
Bauwesen, Roch- und Tiefbau, Stadtebau -
Erzeugnisse, Gerat und Techniken 
Franzûsische Technik 
Bauwesen, Roch- und Tiefbau, Stadtebau -
Forschung und Entwicklung 
Franzosische Technik 
Chemie, Gas, Erdol - Aktuelles 
Franzüsische Technik 
Chemie, Gas, Erdol - Erzeugnisse, Gerat und 
Techniken 
Franzûsische Technik 
Chemie, Gas, Erdol- Forschung und 
Entwicklung 
l!,ranzosische Technik 
Elektro- u. Elektronik-Industrie - Aktuelles 
Franzosische Technik 
Elektro- u. Elektronik-Industrie 
- Erzeugnisse, Gerat u. Techniken 
Franzosische Technik 
Elektro- u. Elektronik-Industrie 
- Forschung u. Entwicklung 
Franzosische Technik - Maschinenbau, 
Hydraulik, Engineering - Aktuelles 
Franzosische Technik- Maschinenbau, 
Hydraulik, Engineering 
-- Erzeugnisse, Gerat u. Techniken 
Franzosische Technik - Maschinenbau, 
Hydraulik, Engineering 
- Forschung und En'twicklung 
Franzosische Technik - V ersch. Industriezweige, 
Verbrauchsgüterindustrien 
- Erzeugnisse, Gerat u. Techniken 
Fresenius Zeitschrift für Analytische Chemie 
Funk-Technik 
Funkschau 
Gemeinwirtschaft 
GIT - Fachzeitschrift für das Laboratorium 
Hansa 
Heraklit-Rundschau 
Hughes News 
IBM-N achrichten 
Ideen des exakten Wissens 
Informatik 
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Information - Nachrichtenblatt f. Flug-
sicherungstechnik 
Informationsdienst f. Bildungspolitik 
u. Forschung 
(Dokumentation) 
Informationsdienst f. Bildungspolitik 
u. Forschung 
(Reportagen) 
Ingenieur-Digest 
Jnteravia 
Internationale Wehr-Revue 
Isotope in Industrie und Landwirtschaft 
Kampftruppen 
Kerntechnik 
Konstruktion im Maschinen-, Apparate-
u. Geriitebau 
lagern - fordern - transportieren 
Laser 
Lebensmittel und Erniihrung 
Logistik, Technik u. V ersorgung 
Manager-Magazin 
Maschinenwelt - Eletrotechnik 
Materialprüfung 
Mensch und Arbeit 
MeBtechnik 
Military Review 
Militartechnik 
Mitteilungen des chemischen Forschungs-
institutes der Wirtschaft ôsterreichs und des 
ôsterreichischen Kunststoffinstitutes 
Monatsberichte- osterr. Institut f. 
Wirtschaftsforschung 
Motortechnische Zeitschrift 
Nachrichten für Dokumentation 
N achrichtentechnik 
N achrichtentechnische Zeitschrift 
Neues von Rohde und Schwarz 
Nobel Hefte 
Nuclear Fusion 
Olympos 593 News 
ôNORM - Mitteilungsblatt des ôsterreichischen 
Normungsinstitutes 
Ordnance 
Osterreichische Bauzeitung 
ôsterr. Ingenieur-Zeitschrift 
ôsterr. Militarische Zeitschrift 
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ôsterr. Osthefte 
ôsterr. Zeitschrift für Vermessungswesen 
ôsterr. Nachrichtenblatt für Luftfahrer 
Philips Technische Rundschau 
Philips Telecommunication Review 
Physik in unserer Zeit 
Pioniere 
Point-to-Point Communication 
Proceedings of the IEEE 
Progress-Bulletin d'A van cement 
Rationalisierung 
Raumfahrtforschung 
Raumfahrtnachrichten 
ROA-Review 
Rock Mechanics 
Seewirtschaft 
Siemens Forschungs- u. Entwicklungsberichte 
Siemens Zeitschrift 
Soldat und Technik 
Stahl und Eisen 
Statistische Nachrichten 
Technical Review 
Technik und Betrieb 
Technische Mitteilungen 
AEG-'felefunken 
Technische Mitteilungen für Sappeure, 
Pontoniere u. Mineure 
Technische Rundschau 
Technische Überwachung 
Technisches Informationsblatt der Wirtschafts-
abteilung der Franzosischen Botschaft 
in ôsterreich 
Telonde 
The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal 
Truppendienst 
Truppenpraxis 
UKW-Berichte 
Umschau in Wissenschaft und Technik 
Unterrichtsblatter der Deutschen Bundespost -
Ausgabe B 
VDI-N achrichten 
VDI-Zeitschrift 
Vectors 
V" erpackungswirtschaft 
Wehr und Wirtschaft 
Wehrausbildung in W ort und Bild 
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Political activities of the Council -
Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Mr. Minnocci, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
2lst May 1979 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the political activities of the Council- reply to the twenty-fourth annual 
report of the Council 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Minnocci, Rapporteur 
Foreword 
1. WEU in 1978 
II. Relations between the Council and the Assembly 
l. Replies of the Council 
2. Report of the Standing Armaments Committee 
3. Joint meetings 
4. Participation of Ministers in Assembly sessions 
5. Assembly budget 
III. Political questions 
IV. Conclusions 
1. Adopted in Committee by 11 votes to 0 with 
3 abstentions. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mrs. von Bothmer 
(Chairman) ; Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairman) ; MM. Abens 
(Alternate : Hengel), Ariosto, Beith, Sir Frederic Bennett, 
MM. Berrier, Brugnon, Deschamps, Druon, Faulds, 
Gessner, Gonella, Hanin, Mrs. van den Heuwel-de Blank 
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(Alternate : Voogd), MM. Mangelschots (Alternate : 
van Watersohoot), Mende (Alternate : Vohrer), Minnoooi, 
Mo=ersteeg (Alternate: Sohlingemann), Müller, 
Péridier, Perin, Portheine, Reddemann, Segre, Urwin 
(Alternate :Lewis). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote 
are printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the political activities of the Council- reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
Welcoming the fact that in its twenty-fourth annual report the Council confirmed its intention 
to continue "the dialogue with the Assembly on questions relating to the application of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, including those dealt with by member governments in other international fora"; 
Welcoming the content of many replies to recommandations of the Assembly and to written 
questions put by members, particularly Written Question 191; 
Regretting however that the informai procedure employed at joint meetings between Commit-
tees and the Council allows too much ambiguity to be left in the replies of the Council; 
Welcoming the content of the statements made by representatives of severa! member govern-
ments to the .AsSembly during the twenty-fourth session, particularly in voicing the wish to make 
fuller use of WEU for discussing in a European forum ali matters relating to Europe's security and 
for strengthening European co-operation in armaments questions and in disarmament ; 
Noting that the Council is still "checking regularly that the application of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty is in no way neglected" and that the implementation of the Paris Agreements appeared 
twenty-seven times on its agenda; 
Noting that the Council has demonstrated its good will in agreeing to a substantial increa.se 
in the budget of the Assembly, leaving it the possibility of assessing its own requirements, and in 
the active participation of most member governments in the work of the Assembly; 
Considering that since, in due time, WEU will be called upon to take its place in any future 
European union, the smooth operation of this institution is essential for building a Europe which is 
master of its destiny ; 
Aware that such an independant and autonomous Europe can but be a. politica.l Europe based 
on a truly co-ordinated foreign and defence policy leading to integration, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Pursue efforts to extend the dialogue with the Assembly by keeping it regularly informed of : 
(a) the resulta of the work of the IEPG; 
(b) the completed parts of the study undertaken by the SAC which are not covered by mili-
tary secrecy ; 
(c) matters relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty included in the agenda 
of its meetings ; 
2. Seek a procedure for joint meetings which allows each participant adequate freedom of speech 
but which also allows the collegiate views of the Council to be expressed ; 
3. Demonstrate more clearly in its work tha.t it considera the modified Brussels Trea.ty, particu-
larly Article XI, to be a positive contribution to the establishment of a European union; 
4. In the context of direct elections to the European Parliament, have studies made on ways and 
means of including WEU in the framework of a European Community whose responsibilities would 
be extended to foreign and defence policies. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Minnocci, Rapporteur) 
Foreword 
1. Before tackling the essential aspects of his 
report and just before the election of the Euro-
pean Parliament by direct universal suffrage, 
your Rapporteur wishes - speaking for the 
moment mainly in a persona! capacity - to 
mention briefly the basic problem of European 
defence which, if not solved, might mean that 
WEU and its Asse:rhbly would be in danger of 
losing much of their political significance. 
2. He will do so in the words used by a former 
senior official of NATO, Yves Laulan, in his 
remarkable essay published last year under the 
rather strange title of Visa pour un désastre, 
whieh dealt with this problem of European 
defence. On page 183, Mr. Laulan wrote: 
"lt is not a matter of recreating conventional 
European co-operation between national 
defence efforts but of developing an 
integrated system such as the one planned 
in the draft EDC treaty." 
3. Only thus, continued Mr. Laulan, might the 
idea of Europe come to fruition, for "the notion 
of Europe has no meaning unless based on the 
notion of collective security", i.e. on a truly 
integrated foreign and defence policy (and not 
only on economie union): only at this priee can 
true European independence be asserted. 
4. Mr. Laulan therefore concluded that "the 
building of Europe must be started again from 
its foundations, where it was at the beginning of 
the nineteen-fifties." 
5. Your Rapporteur fully shares the views of 
Mr. Laulan, including his very severe criticism 
of WEU. He believes there is much food for 
thought in the important suggestions made in this 
book, pallticularly now that the direct elections 
to the European Parliament seem to be creating 
conditions which are propitious for reviving 
political Europe. 
6. Y our Rapporteur will now turn to the more 
specifie aspects of his report. 
1. WEU in 1978 
7. Since the United Kingdom joined the Euro-
pean Community and as a result of the develop-
ment of nine-power political consultations, there 
has been much speculation about the possible 
future of Western European Union at a time 
when many of its activities under the modified 
Brussels Treaty are being exercised in the frame-
work of other organisations. 
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8. The impending election of the European 
Parliament by direct universal suffrage has also 
raised the question of how far the WEU Assembly 
might, in turn, find its prerogatives undermined 
by the development of the European Parliam.ent's 
activities. Indeed, the latter's adoption of a 
report on European armaments procurement 
co-operation on 8th May 1978 raised the problem 
of the respective responsibilities of the two 
assemblies. 
9. But in the course of 1978 the WEU Council 
gave frequent proof, and in many different ways, 
of its desire to respect the modified Brussels 
Treaty in full and, for the first time, demon-
strated a desire to place the organisation in the 
framework of the future European union which 
is still the declared aim of all our oountries. 
10. In the twenty-fourth annual report of the 
Council, the Assembly is given far more detailed 
indications on this matter than ever before, as is 
also the case in the answers to several written 
questions put by members of the Assembly to the 
Council and, even more so, in addresses by 
several Ministers during the Assembly's last 
session and in their answers to questions put by 
members of the Assembly. 
11. Among these statements, several passages are 
worth quoting because of the clear-cut limits the 
governments intend to impose on the responsibil-
ities of each assembly. For instance, on 20th 
November 1978, Mr. Bernard-Reymond, French 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, said: 
"The primary task of Western European 
Union is to consider security problems. It is 
the only European institution in which it is 
possible to discuss these questions, from 
which our countries can obviously not stand 
aloof. 
As you are aware, 1979 promises to mark an 
important stage on the road to increased 
co-operation among European countries. It 
would therefore appear particularly useful 
to recall a few actual facts. Acoordingly, 
we can only feel astonishment at certain 
insinuations which crop up here and there, 
to the effect that WEU might have outlived 
its usefulness, that other institutions might 
be in a better position to take its legacy in 
hand, and even that its members might not 
really be competent to discuss the problems 
which are in the first instance their concern, 
without the reassuring and protective 
presence of non-member but friendly and 
allied countries. The position of the French 
Government in this regard is devoid of all 
ambiguity. We do not wish to see any 
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weakening of WEU ; for the latter must 
remain the forum in which we can hold 
discussions amongst Europeans on security 
problems and problems of co-operation in 
the armaments sphere. And, in this con-
nection, I should like to pay tribute to the 
useful work performed by the Standing 
Armaments Committee, without prejudice to 
the responsibilities incumbent on the inde-
pendent European programme group." 
Answering two oral questions, the Minister of 
State was more explicit: 
"... I consider that ail matters connected 
with confidence and secur1ty - and hence 
all matters connected with disarmament -
may appropriately be raised here in your 
Assembly ... " 
and referred to the proposais made by Mr. 
Michel Jobert, then French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to the Assembly in November 1973: 
"... the deputy is alluding to a statement 
made here in this Assembly by Mr. Michel 
Jobert. It was completely in line with what 
should, in my view, constitute the activities 
of WEU. And as 1 reminded you just now, 
when speaking at the rostrum of the support 
which the French Government gave, was 
continuing to give and would give in the 
future to WEU, not only is there no conflict, 
but there is on the contrary perfect harmony 
between what Mr. Michel Jobert stated then 
and what 1 have said this morning ... " 
Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic, endorsed 
Mr. Bernard-Reymond's statements as follows: 
"... On behalf of the Federal Government, I 
can endorse unreservedly the statement of 
my French colleague, Minister of State 
Bernard-Reymond. As has been repeatedly 
stated in this Assembly, the Federal Govern-
ment does not wish to see any weakening of 
WEU as created by the modified Brussels 
Treaty ... " 
and said in answer to a question: 
"... 1 do not believe either that there is any 
cause for anxiety that the discussion on the 
future competences of the European Parlia-
ment is in any way linked with an intended 
or even conceivable weakening of WEU and 
its Assembly ... 
... 1 can confirm unreservedly that ail 
parliamentary parties in the German Bun-
destag stand firmly and unswervingly by the 
WEU treaty ... " 
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Finally, Mr. Mazzola, Italian Minister of State 
for Defence, speaking on behalf of his govern-
ment and as Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
said: 
"1 can only at this point express the 
Council's appreciation of the .Assembly's 
rôle in regularly monitoring the developing 
problems of European security and union 
from the particular standpoint of WEU, and 
direct the Council's own attention to the 
problems of major concern to the union. The 
Council too, 1 can assure you, has not failed 
to keep a close watch on application of the 
Brussels Treaty and annexed protocols, given 
the continuing importance attached by the 
member governments to the treaty itself and 
their manifest will to fulfil the obligations 
assumed by them." 
This statement assumes its full importance when 
seen in the context of what the same Minister 
said shortly afterwards : 
"For my part 1 believe that in any case the 
enlargement of the European Economie 
Community and the coming elections to the 
European Parliament may be regarded as 
important milestones towards realising the 
full worth of having a democratie, jointly 
responsible and progressive democratie union 
of the nations of Western Europe. Indeed it 
is the aim of aU European institutions to 
assist in developing and completing Euro-
pean union by gradually enabling its peoples 
to speak with one voice." 
12. From ail these statements, a true government 
doctrine towards the application of the modified 
Brussels Treaty appears to emerge for the first 
time based on the idea that the modified Brussels 
Treaty is one of the foundations of the future 
European union, that it bestows a number of 
responsibilities on the Council and Assembly of 
WEU and that these responsibilities must be 
effectively exercised in order to promote the 
establishment of the union. ln this respect, the 
Council removes much uncertainty by linking, in 
Chapter II of its annual report, Article VIII of 
the modified Brussels Treaty creating the 
Council with Article V defining the automatic 
assistance which the signatories undertake to 
afford each other. This point has been frequently 
emphasised by the Assembly but on occasion it 
has feared that the Council might neglect this 
aspect by drawing too fine a distinction between 
the treaty and the organisation devolving from 
it. 
13. The Assembly can therefore welcome the 
positions adopted by the Council, i.e. by the 
seven governments meeting in the fundamental 
institution of WEU, first because they espouse a 
number of themes and ideas which have been 
upheld in the Assembly for years and second, 
because governments have been brought to voice 
these views through the questions which members 
of the Assembly have steadfastly put to govern-
ment representatives in their national parlia-
ments or in the Assembly. 
14. The annual report of the Council recalls a 
number of points which are not entirely new but 
which, if compared with previous reports, 
confirm the course indicated by the Ministers for 
the present and future of WEU. For instance, 
reference may be made to the introduction to 
Chapter I which recalls that the Assembly: 
" ... is concerned with both European security 
and European union, and [ is] the only 
European assembly with responsibilities in 
the field of defence ... " 
The Council also confirms that its dialogue with 
the Assembly covers: 
"... questions relating to the application of 
the modified Brussels Treaty, including 
those dealt with by member governments in 
other international fora ... " 
15. Furthermore, on its own work, the Council 
announces - and this is the first time it has 
spoken so clearly- that: 
" ... at permanent representative leve! [they] 
are still checking regularly that the applica-
tion of the modified Brussels Treaty is in 
no way neglected ... " 
It even specifies that: 
"... During the year under review, the 
varions aspects and phases of the implemen-
tation of the Paris Agreements appeared 
twenty-seven times on the agenda for 
Council meetings." 
16. Your Rapporteur is perhaps not altogether 
convinced by the latter extracts from the annual 
report of the Council insofar as the European 
political cohesion which should emerge from such 
consultations has not always been translated into 
fact. For instance, reference might be made to 
the œbsence of consultations between members of 
WEU prior to the Guadeloupe summit meeting 
at the beginning of 1979 - although security and 
defence matters were scheduled as a major item 
on the agenda - and uncertainty about the 
attitude of Western European countries towards 
strategy, armaments, joint production and the 
arms trade. The regular checks of the application 
of the modified Brussels Treaty which the 
Council claims to be making at the level of 
permanent representatives do not seem to probe 
very deeply or, to say the least, do not seem to 
result in well-thought-out joint positions. What 
exactly does the Council do in this respecU Could 
it not be that it merely answers the Assembly's 
recommendations and written questions put by 
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members which in fact generally have a bearing 
on the application of the treaty, failing which 
moreover the Council would not have to reply? 
Or does it merely ensure the implementation -
admittedly indispensable, but purely routine -
of the various prescriptions of the Paris Agree-
ments relating to the level of forces and the 
control of armaments1 Or does the Council at 
ambassadorial level really tackle of its own 
accord, as is its duty, matters relating to foreign 
policy and defence when it considers consulta-
tions to be necessary? 
17. Whatever doubts there may be, and which 
may be strengthened by the Council's restrictive 
interpretation of Article XI of the treaty, the 
determination it has expressed to check the 
application of the treaty is worth underlining 
and meets a wish constantly expressed by the 
WEU Assembly. 
18. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to under-
line the importance of the Council's answer to 
Written Question 191 put by Mr. Roper, in which 
the Council confirmed that the range of activities 
assigned to it in the field of defence questions 
and armaments had undergone no restriction 
since the outset and that it would continue to 
inform the Assembly of any questions raised by 
member governments in this context. This too is 
something the Assembly had frequently called 
for without, until now, obtaining such clear com-
mitments. 
U. Relations between the Council and the 
Assembly 
19. Relations between the Council and the 
Assembly have certainly eased insofar as the 
Council has adopted positions close to those 
advocated by the Assembly, and the Council is 
correct in underlining a definite improvement in 
relations between the two WEU bodies. 
1. Replies of the Council 
20. Members of parliament have been able to 
note that their written questions or the recom-
mendations adopted by the Assembly have 
elicited more substantial answers than heretofore, 
particularly on important and delicate matters 
such as the control of armaments, the sale of 
arms to non-European countries and the appli-
cation of the Brussels Treaty. 
21. The Council recognises that answers to 
certain recommendations or written questions 
have been transmitted late and sometimes very 
late. This may weil be due to the difficulty of 
obtaining the necessary unanimity in the Council 
for the adoption of a text. However, one of the 
reasons given by the Council is that the replies 
requested related to "developing problems", and 
it consequently deferred its reply because it 
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wished to give the Assembly "information of a 
useful nature". Here it should be recorded that to 
be really useful the information given to the 
Assembly should refer to matters which have not 
yet been settled. Effective parliamentary parti-
cipation in the work of the institution and the 
application of the modified Brussels Treaty 
depends on the Council providing the Assembly 
insofar as possible with information on current 
problems and not just problems which have 
already been solved. But the Assembly must also 
note that the Council invokes the fact that 
Assembly documents are often distributed late 
as justification for its own delays: 
" ... similar considerations, mentioned by one 
of the Rapporteurs, had in sorne cases 
delayed the submission of committee reports 
which had only reached the Council as the 
sessions opened." 
22. The obvions conclusions must be drawn and 
the Committees must ensure that reports are 
adopted in time for them to be transmitted to 
the Council within the statutory time limit 
before each session. 
23. But one side's mistake is no excuse for the 
other: the Assembly must ensure that its own 
rules are applied as well as possible and the 
Council must diligently demonstrate its desire 
to co-operate closely with the Assembly and 
maintain a dialogue which it steadfastly claims 
to be an important aim. 
2. Report of the Standing Armaments Committee 
24. The General Affairs Committee has already 
pointed out that its work might be hindered by 
the Council's failure to communicate to the 
Assembly the section of the study by the SAC 
approved by the Council in 1978. The situation 
is now even more acute since the Assembly is 
preparing a symposium to be held in autumn 
1979 on the very subject of European armaments 
co-operation. The Assembly could understand if 
the Council's attitude were attributable to mili-
tary secrecy, but if, as the Council has said, its 
intention is to transmit the report only when it 
has been adopted in full, the Assembly would 
have greater reason to complain since there is 
every indication that the second chapter of the 
SAC's study will not be completed for quite sorne 
time. It is to be believed, however, that the 
juridical aspects dealt with in the first chapter 
are public knowledge and consequently there is 
no valid reason why this chapter should not be 
communicated to the Assembly, unless certain 
güvernments are afraid of the publicity that 
might reach other member countries about the 
status of firms. 
3. Joint meetings 
25. On 3rd November 1978, the Council held 
what it called an informai meeting with the 
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General Affairs Committee. The Committee has 
made no attempt to conceal its disappointment 
that the Council has never wished to try out the 
procedure for joint meetings which it itself pro-
posed to the Assembly. 
26. Indeed, contrary to the wish of the General 
Affairs Committee, the Council has deliberately 
reduced joint meetings to the level of so-called 
informai meetings. The dialogue is perhaps more 
flexible and frank in such a framework, but 
however much "the remarks of both the Chair-
man-in-Office and of other members of the 
Council take due account of agreed positions and, 
so far as possible, of the views of all govern-
ments", the position is far from clear and it is 
difficult for members of parliament attending 
such meetings to know on whose behalf each 
member of the Council speaks. 
27. Admittedly, as the annual report notes, 
formai procedure "would involve lengthy previous 
consultations between governments", but is not 
the very object of the WEU Council to provoke 
such consultations between governments rather 
than avoid them? Instead of claiming that such 
procedure "would deprive the talks of all spon-
taneity", it should be noted that the procedure 
specifically proposed by the Council drew a 
distinction between a more formai part requiring 
such lengthy consultations and a less formai part 
where spontaneity would take over. 
28. It should be added that the Council tries by 
varions means to be informed in advance of the 
questions the Committee is to put and at the 
so-called informai meeting in Rome it was quite 
clear that on the Council's side the spontaneity it 
proclaims was false since the Chairman-in-Office 
replied in great detail to questions which had not 
yet been put to him. 
29. In short, the General Affairs Committee does 
not share the Council's enthusiasm for these 
informai meetings. It can but note that the 
Council considers them as a means of avoiding 
lengthy consultations between governments and, 
finally, it has an impression that they combine 
the disadvantages of formai procedure since its 
questions must be communicated in advance and 
the disadvantages of informai procedure since 
it cannot be sure wh ether the replies given con vey 
the joint positions of the seven governments or 
the respective views of each one. In this matter 
the Committee bows to the Council's demands, 
which it considers unfounded, and deplores that 
the Council persists in refusing to apply a pro-
cedure which it worked out and proposed to the 
Assembly and which the Assembly had accepted. 
4. Participation of Ministers in Assembly sessions 
30. The improvement in relations between the 
Council and the Assembly was also evident in 
1978 in the satisfactory participation of Ministers 
from various governments in Assembly sessions. 
Their relatively numerous attendance and the 
high standard of many of their speeches should 
be recorded 
31. It should also be noted that, at a time when 
it was responsible for the Chairmanship-in-Office 
of the Council, the Italian Government was 
represented by a Minister of State for Defence. 
This is not very standard practice since the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council is generally 
a Secretary or Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs. Mr. Mazzola's presence met a wish 
expressed severa! times by the Assembly, i.e. that 
the Council should show that it is not formed 
by Ministers for Foreign Affairs alone but by 
the representatives of the governments of 
member countries in the fields of application of 
the modified Brussels Treaty. Defence Ministers 
are thus perfectly entitled to speak on behalf of 
the Council and the Assembly can but welcome 
the fact that the Italian Government sought to 
demonstrate the fact. 
32. However, in general, the titular Ministers 
should attend sessions of the Assembly more often. 
Although it is often the Ministers of State for 
Foreign Affail'IS who attend meetings of the 
WEU Council of Ministers, it is generally the 
titular Ministers for Foreign Affairs who 
represent their governments in the nine-power 
political consultations and often also in the North 
Atlantic Council. If therefore the governments 
are determined to allow the WEU ~mbly to 
supervise all problems relating to the application 
of the modified Brussels Treaty, even in cases 
where such matters are handled in other frame-
works, it would be desirable for the governments 
to be represented quite often at Assembly sessions 
by Ministers of cabinet ranlr. One is obliged to 
note, however, that severa! governments have not 
been represented at sessions by their Ministers 
for Foreign Affairs for sorne years. This is so for 
Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Netherlands and the United King-
dom. 
5. Assembly budget 
33. Although it is not for the General Affairs 
Committee to deal with budgetary matters, it 
must underline the way the Council confirmed its 
declarations of good will by acceding very largely 
to the requests for increases in the budget for 
political groups and the press. The Assembly is 
particularly pleased that the Council left it the 
task - which is natural but has not always been 
the case - of deciding how to divide the new 
allocations between these two heads. 
m. Political questions 
34. The Council's account of its work in inter-
national policy matters calls for little comment. 
3 
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In fact, the same questions arise year after year, 
particularly East-West relations, and here co-
ordination of the policies of Western European 
countries would appear to be fairly satisfactory 
whether exercised in the North Atlantic Council, 
nine-power political consultations (particularly 
for the CSCE) or WEU which appears to be 
specialising in discussion of bilateral relations. 
35. But for relations between the European 
countries and the People's Republic of China, the 
annual report reveals a failure on the part of the 
Council. Referring to the answer to Written 
Question 186, the Council says that: 
" ... the policy of member countries was or 
would be decided on the basis of their assess-
-ment of the overall progress of their rela-
tions with that country and taking into 
account their own armaments export poli-
cies." 
36. This means that the Council has noted that 
it was incapable of working out a joint policy 
on a matter which is very clearly and very 
directly within its purview. It may be wondered 
whether, on a matter which is outside the res-
ponsibility of the European Community, since 
armaments are involved, the Council has really 
taken the initiative of tackling the problem of 
relations between its members and the People's 
Republic of China other than by replying to 
Recommendation 315 and Written Question 186. 
Apparently, according to the annual report, it 
has not and it is evident that if the Council 
tackles such questions only in order to find an 
answer to recommendations or questions from the 
Assembly, it will have little hope of working out 
a joint policy which can develop only from 
continuing consultations between member count-
ries. Y our Rapporteur has to ask the Council to 
pursue its consultations on the arms exports 
policies of each of its members with a view to 
determining European policy on the question. 
That is its responsibility and no other European 
institution is empowered to take its stead. 
37. Conversely, the description of relations 
between European and African countries given 
in the annual report shows that co-operation 
between Western European countries has been 
pursued in varions frameworks for many years 
and very considerable results have been achieved. 
Thus the Council can claim a remarkable unity of 
views among its members on the question of 
Rhodesia and the de jure recognition of the Zim-
babwe people, apartheid and obligations under 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 253 
and 418. The general application of the code of 
conduct in respect of South Africa is another 
proof. Similarly, in the case of Namibia, the fact 
that the Council was unanimous in affording its 
full support to Security CounciJ. Resolutions 431 
and 435 clearly shows that a European policy 
exists. 
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38. When the annual report states that the 
Council supported the position of the OAU "in 
believing that African problems were best solved 
by African states themselves, without external 
intervention", this too is a joint position which it 
was possible to reach only after lengthy and 
delicate consultations. Of course, these consulta-
tions were not held in the framework of WEU, 
but the Council is right to proclaim that the 
results it has achieved come within the scope of 
the application of Article VIII of the modified 
Brussels Treaty. 
39. However, when the Council says that "they 
would deplore the creation of military spheres of 
influence by foreign powers ... both in Africa and 
in the surrounding areas" it should be more 
specifie about what it means by "surrounding 
areas" or indicate more clearly what it thinks 
of the prospects now taking shape of allied coun-
tries stationing forces in the Arabian peninsula. 
40. With the problem of international terrorism, 
the WEU Council is also able to refer to 
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undeniable results achieved in consultations 
between Western European countries in frame-
works other than WEU, and the Assembly wei-
cornes this news. 
IV. Conclusions 
41. There is no doubt in your Rapporteur's mind 
that the twenty-fourth annual report of the 
Council has made definite progress in three 
areas: first and definitely foremost, co-ordination 
between the various European institutions which 
should allow WEU one day to take its place in 
the future European union, then the related area 
of relations between the Council and the 
Assembly and finally co-ordination of the foreign 
policies of member countries as elaborated in a 
very wide variety of frameworks. 
42. Y our Rapporteur therefore proposes that the 
Assembly approve the twenty-fourth annual 
report of the Council. 
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Amendments 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 
Political activities of the Council -
Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 1 
tabled by Mr. Druon 
18th June 1979 
l. In the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommandation, leave out "take its place 
in any future European union" and insert "play a more important rôle as the possibilities of European 
union progress". 
2. In the eighth paragraph of the preamble, leave out "leading to integration". 
3. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommandation proper, leave out from "to be a positive contribution" 
to the end of the paragraph and insert "to be a necessary complement to the establishment of a European 
union". 
4. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommandation proper, leave out "in the context of direct elections 
to the European Parliament". 
5. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommandation proper, leave out from "of including WEU" to the 
end of the paragraph and insert "whereby WEU might better concert security policies as political co-oper-
ation between the member states of the EEC develops". 
Signed : Druon 
1. See 4th Sitting, 19th June 1979 (Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 5 negatived; Amendment 4 agreed to). 
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Amendment 6 
Political activities of the Council -
Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 6 1 
tabled by Mr. Urwin and others 
6. In the draft recommandation proper, leave out para.gra.ph 4. 
18th June 1979 
Signed: Urwin, van Waterschoot, Konings, Miller, Scheffler, Cook, Ahrens, Faulds, Northfield, Roper, 
Hardy, Stoffelen, Schwencke, Büchner 
1. See 4th Sitting, 19th June 1979 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Political conditions for European armaments co-operation 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee :.> 
by Mr. van Waterschoot, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on political conditions for European armaments co-operation 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. van Waterschoot, Rapporteur 
1. Introduction 
II. Western Europe and the armaments problem 
III. European defence and defence of Europe 
IV. Organisation of Europe and defence problems 
V. Conclusions 
21st May 1979 
1. Adopted in Committee by 12 votes to 0 with 
2 abstentions. 
2. Members of the Committee : Mrs. von Bothmer 
(Chairman) ; Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairman) ; MM. Abens 
(Alternate : HengeZ), Ariosto, Beith, Sir Frederic Bennett, 
MM. Berrier, Brugnon, Deschamps, Druon, Faulds, 
Gessner, Gonella, Hanin, Mrs. van den Heuvel-de Blank 
(Alternate : Voogà), MM. Mangelschots (Alternate: 
·van Waterschoot), Mende (Alternate : Vohrer), Minnocci, 
Mommersteeg (Alternate: SchZingemann), Müller (Alter-
nate : Lenser), Périàier, Perin, Portheine, Beààemann, 
Segre, Urwin. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on political conditions for European armaments co-operation 
The Assembly, 
Considering that the production of modern armaments is necessary for the economie, military and 
political independence of Europe while hoping sincerely that the international community will eventually 
reach agreement limiting the production of and trade in arms ; 
Noting that national armies no longer provide a large enough market for any European country 
to be able to produce armaments at competitive priees; 
Considering that armaments industries occupy an important place in the economies of several 
Western European countries where they make a major contribution to the maintenance of employment; 
Considering that it is evident that their work makes a worthwhile contribution to the development 
of scientific and technica.l research in many fields and to the maintenance of a high level of technology in 
Europe; 
Considering that the course of an armaments policy depends on the co-ordination of defence 
policies provided for in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
Deploring the extension of trade in arms, particularly to countries in areas where there is dangerous 
tension; 
Gratified that the independant European programme group (IEPG) has undertaken the important 
task of co-ordinating the armaments efforts of the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance ; 
Convinced that only the firm and steadfast determination of states can allow this work to be 
developed; 
Noting that the modified Brussels Treaty is the only juridical basis for the organisation of defence 
and armaments in Europe ; 
Considering that WEU will therefore be called upon take its place in any future European union ; 
Welcoming the fact that the task allotted to the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) on 31st May 
1976 is guiding its work in this direction, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE COUNOIL 
1. In application of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, ensure that European armaments 
co-operation develops along lines which conform to the latest technological requirements and to the 
defence policy and strategy applied by the members of the Atlantic Alliance ; 
2. Keep the Assembly informed, by whatever means it considera appropriate, of the results already 
achieved in the study undertaken by the SAC, of the progress made and of the goals towards which its 
work is directed ; 
3. Ensure that the SAC has access to the sources of information it needs so that its study may be 
completed in the reasonably near future ; 
4. Study attentively the results of the study with a view to preparing on this basis directives to be 
addressed to the appropriate authorities in member countries and to the European organisations concerned; 
5. Keep the Assembly regularly informed of the progress of work in the IEPG; 
6. Examine the limitations which Europe should advocate in regard to exportera and importera of 
armaments and itself to prevent the trade in arms stepping up the armaments race, particularly in areas 
where peace is threatened. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. van Waterschoot, Rapporteur) 
1. Introduction 
1. At its session in November 1978, the Assem-
bly debated two reports presented by the Gen-
eral Affairs Committee, one on the consequences 
of the forthcoming enlargement of the European 
Communities for the defence of Europe and for 
WEU and the other on Europe's external rela-
tions. However, circumstances prevented a major 
debate being held on the wider and more 
essential lines of Europe's external and defence 
policies. 
2. In a particularly topical manner, these two 
reports in fact expressed two political philoso-
phies which seem at first sight contradictory. One 
was highly ambitions : Europe was to be allowed 
to play a significant rôle in the world balance 
by asserting itself as a leading power capable 
of making its full weight felt in the search for 
solutions to problems with which the world will 
have to come to grips between now and the end 
of the century. 
3. The other implied a view of Europe whose 
influence in the rest of world would be based 
not on its ability to wield military power but 
on the idea that its very weakness would give it 
an original rôle, i.e. the promotion of peace and 
justice in international relations and within 
states. 
4. However attached one may be to moral and 
political values as important as the search for 
peace and détente, the extension of respect for 
human rights, the development of less privileged 
countries and the success of the North-South 
dialogue, it is not evident that the pursuit of 
these aims alone would provide a sufficient basis 
for a European policy and, even less, ensure 
Europe's security. Refusai to consider security 
problems between Europeans is obviously not 
enough to ensure peace on our continent 
and it would eut back sharply its rôle in the 
world. 
5. It is also questionable whether this view 
of Europe exercising an essentially moral 
influence in the world, not based on strength of 
arms, would arouse the enthusiasm necessary to 
ensure the lasting success of the cause of Euro-
pean unity, particularly among the younger 
generation. Opinion poils in the various conn-
tries in the context of the current campaign for 
the election of the European Parliament by 
universal suffrage indicate that public opinion 
is in favour of developing a Community Europe 
but also less determined than at other times to 
7l 
do its utmost to ensure the success of the cause. 
The fact that Europe has not yet managed to 
make up its mind about matters as important 
for its present and its future as its own 
defence is certainly partly responsible for this 
relative lack of interest in the European cause 
among a large part of the population which 
nevertheless seems favourably inclined towards 
Europe. 
6. In short, the question is whether the prepa-
ration of a more elaborate European policy in 
foreign affairs and defence matters has not 
become essential to the success of economie and 
political co-operation destined to lead to the 
constitution of the European union which all 
our governments declare to be their aim. 
7. Your Rapporteur therefore considers it 
extremely important to place in a somewhat wider 
context all matters relating to European arma-
ments co-operation and particularly the sym-
posium to be held in Brussels in October 1979 
and to examine whether such co-operation is 
necessary before studying the general economie, 
social and political implications of developing 
such co-operation. This he feels is the rôle of 
the General Affairs Committee whose report must 
therefore avoid overlapping with those to be 
presented by more specialised committees. 
D. Western Europe and the armaments 
problem 
8. For several years, the world has witnessed 
a growth in what is known as the arms race. Its 
multiple aspects are in no wise limited to Europe 
and the two superpowers but stretch over a large 
part of the earth, including the Middle East, 
Eastern Asia and to sorne extent Africa. Only 
Latin America, although not completely out of 
it, seems to be playing but a modest part. 
9. According to World Military Expenditure 
and Arms Transfers 1967-76 published by the 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency in July 1978, military expenditure 
throughout the world in 1976 is believed to 
represent 5.8 % of the world GNP, i.e. the 
equivalent of what the world spends on education 
and more than double what it spends on health 
(2.4 %) . But whereas the percentage of GNP 
earmarked for defence in the industrialised 
countries has dropped sharply in the last ten 
years, it has risen in the underdeveloped conn-
tries which, as a whole, spent as much in 
1976 on defence as they did on education and 
health combined. These are only averages and 
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sorne countries show considerably higher 
figures 1• 
10. However, prospects offered by the United 
Nations General Assembly special session on 
disarmament held in 1978, hopes of peace aris-
ing from the Washington treaty between Egypt 
and Israel and the favourable evolution of 
SALT II are pointers that in the next few years 
the limitation of armaments and, in certain cases, 
disarmament will at last enter the field of reality. 
It is evident that a general slow down in military 
expenditure might have sweeping repercussions 
on the growth rate of developing countries if they 
managed to allocate more of their GNP to 
productive investment and if the industrialised 
countries set aside slightly more of theirs for 
assisting the third world. These are prospects 
which cannot be overlooked in a European policy 
concerning the production and sale of arms since 
any limitation of the arms race can but foster 
both the maintenance of peace in Europe and 
the development of international trade in which 
Europe plays a major part. 
11. Among the severa! reasons for the arms 
race, a prominent one is of course the confronta-
tion between the two blocs. So far, the agree-
ments on security and co-operation in Europe, 
the SALT I agreements and SALT II negotia-
tions, as well as the MBFR talks, have failed to 
bring about any reduction in the build-up of 
1. According to The MilitMy Balance 1978-79 pub-
lished by the International Institute for Strategie 
Studies, the percentages of GNP spent on defence are 
given as follows : 
United States : 
Turkey: 
United Kingdom : 
Greece: 
France: 
(1) Atlantic Alliance 
6 % Netherlands : 
5.7% Federal Republic: 
5 ·% Belgium : 
5 % Italy: 
3.6·% 
(2) W a'l'saw Pact 
Soviet Union : from 11 to 13 •% 
3.6% 
3.4% 
3.4% 
2.4% 
Other countries: from 5.9% (GDR) to 1.7% (Romania) 
(3) Eest of Ewrope 
Yugoslavia : 5.2 % Sweden : 3.4 ·% Others : less than 2 % 
(4) Middle East 
Israel : 29.9 % Jordan: 
Egypt : 22.8% (in 1974) Iran: 
Syria : 16.4 % Iraq: 
(5) Asia 
15.5% 
10.9•% 
10.2•% 
North Korea : 10.5 '% Singapore : 6.3 % 
China: 
Taiwan: 
8.5% Pakistan : 4.6% 
8.3% •••••••·•·•••••••·····•· South Korea : 6.5% India : 3.1 % 
Peru: 
Argentina: 
Venezuela: 
(6) Af'l'ioa 
Nigeria : 7.8% 
Rhodesia : 7. 7 % 
South Africa : 5.1 % 
(7) Latin A m6'1'ioa 
3.1 % Brazil : 
2.8 % (1976) Colombia : 
1.4 ·% Mexico : 
1.1·% 
1.1•% 
0.6•% 
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armaments; at the very most it has been chan-
nelled in certain directions. But hostilities out-
side Europe, the need for security or the ambi-
tions of certain powers have led them to procure 
large quantities of the latest equipment. The 
Yom Kippur war in 1973 illustrated the danger 
such weapons might constitute for international 
peace and the need for those who felt threatened 
to increase and modernise their equipment. 
Another reason is probably the status states or 
governments may expect to gain by possessing 
a modern army. 
12. However, the rôle played by industrialised 
countries in this race should not be under-
estimated : as producers, they often derive con-
siderable revenue from arms exports which help 
to maintain the balance of payments which had 
been in jeopardy since the rise in the priee of 
oil and raw materials after the October 1973 WaJ.'. 
The sale of arms is now more than ever a major 
factor in the trade battle between our countries 
and for economie reasons they more or less close 
their eyes to the drawbacks and dangers involved 
in the spread of modern weapons in areas where 
peace is often uncertain. For sorne, arms sales 
may be part of their policy for keeping a check 
on their customer countries and for others merely 
a question of winning markets as in the case of 
any other product. 
13. But in the West other reasons encourage 
an aggressive search for external outlets for the 
armaments industries, one being that national 
armies can no longer absorb the full output of 
armaments producers in their own countries and 
the other member countries of the Alliance do 
not always provide an additional market. They 
therefore look elsewhere for additional markets 
and any drop in their exports might jeopardise 
their ability to produce at competitive priees. 
Their concern to keep their production capacity 
intact makes them increasingly dependent on 
their customers. 
14. The armies of the West are now faced with 
the need to take important decisions affecting the 
future of the armaments industries. They have to 
take account of the considerable build-up of 
armaments by the W arsaw Pact forces in recent 
years. In spite of the redeployment of Soviet 
forces to the East, facing China, the W arsaw 
Pact has acquired undisputed superiority over 
NATO forces in the West (primarily in the 
central sector) and to an ever increasing extent 
on the northern and southern flanks, particularly 
in tanks and aircraft. If only as a deterrent and 
for their defence policy to be effective, the NATO 
countries must make a considerable effort to 
equip themselves with armaments capable of 
meeting attacks which are backed by tank and 
air support. In a work published in 1977, 
L'Europe sans défense, a Belgian general was 
able to contend that, with the armaments then 
available, NATO forces were incapable by con-
ventional means of preventing a Soviet offensive 
reaching the Rhine within three days. Presum-
ably there is no question of equalling the number 
of tanks and aircraft deployed by the eastern 
countries but of acquiring the means of defence 
needed to counter them, which implies con-
centrating research and production on new 
weapons which will play a major rôle in the 
armies of tomorrow : precision-guided missiles, 
enhanced radiation weapons, lasers, etc. 
15. This new course would require a consider-
able increase in sums earmarked for investment 
in ali the western armies. To this end, since 1978, 
the NATO countries have agreed to increase their 
defence budgets by 3 % per year in constant 
value. This is a valid increase but it will not be 
enough if it not used rationaily to have the 
maximum effect on NATO's defensive strength. 
16. Europe therefore has to meet contradictory 
requirements : on the one hand, it is clear that 
the world as a whole is expending too great a 
proportion of its intellectuai, economie and 
financial resources on the production of arma-
ments which, although leading to useful spin-off 
in many fields, is in itself sterile. A large amount 
of money, work and grey matter which might be 
more usefully employed in research, particularly 
into new sources of energy, food or medicine, 
is employed in the manufacture of highly-
sophisticated instruments which in the best of 
cases will pile up in silos, hangars and depots 
until they become obsolescent and are sent to 
the scrapyard, which, after ali, is better than 
having to use them. But, on the other hand, 
such waste seems essential to the maintenance 
of peace and security in Europe. No serious 
attempt can be made to limit it without endanger-
ing the credibility of the West's deterrent 
capability which means being able to meet every 
threat by the most appropriate means : if it is 
acknowledged that the first requirement of any 
rational policy is to ensure the security of the 
population, no pennypinehing in the means of 
doing so can be considered acceptable. 
17. The problem now facing the West is how 
to eut down waste and ensure maximum security 
at least cost. This is ail the more essentiai since, 
at the present difficult juncture in the West, 
security efforts are often misunderstood and 
hard to accept in the eyes of the public even 
though the armaments industries may help to 
limit the the problems of unemployment now 
troubling most European countries 1• It must 
1. It is extremely difficult to obtain detailed, accurate 
information on the numbers employed in the armaments 
industries since many firms producing modern weapons 
or eomponents for weapons systems also work for the 
civil sector. This is the case inter alia for the aireraft, 
automobile and electronics industries and even, to a 
certain extent, naval shipbuilding and explosives. It is 
with some reservation therefore that the following figures 
3. 
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therefore be shown that such expenditure is 
neither useless nor excessive; and that it is not 
a burden on the countries' balance of payments. 
Thus, any procurement of expensive weapons 
today is normally offset by purchases made by 
the selling country in the buying country. 
18. At the present juncture, everything indi-
cates that, at !east within the Atlantic Alliance, 
this situation is beneficiai mainly to American 
arms producers who can take advantage of the 
large market represented by the United States 
army to offer items on outside markets for which 
the overheads (including research and the 
development of prototypes) can be spread over 
very long production runs, whereas European 
industries have to cover their overheads in the 
far smaller numbers ordered by their national 
armies. Compared with their American com-
petitors they are therefore in a poor position on 
the markets of their European partners. The 
situation seems even worse when the compensa-
tion aspect is studied. Since smaller numbers of 
finished products are produced in Europe at 
higher cost, the number of parts and components 
purchased in exchange has to be increased 
accordingly in order to offer equal compensa-
tion. The phenomenon of the scaie of the economy 
therefore operates doubly in favour of American 
producers as compared with their European com-
petitors, which explains their frequent trade 
successes in Europe itself in recent years. Such 
successes help to limit still further the outlets 
available to European producers and extend 
American outlets and therefore accelerate a 
process which would quickly relegate European 
industry to a secondary, sub-contracting rôle to 
the benefit of its American rivais. 
19. Renee, it is not surprising that European 
countries which are the most capable of supply-
ing the more sophisticated weapons should find 
themse1ves forced into options which may sorne-
times be regretted. The choice they have is : 
(i) to promote sales to non-member conn-
tries of NATO, particularly those 
which, for political reasons, are not 
prepared to procure American weapons 
or to which the United States refuses 
or may refuse to sell certain weapons ; 
this obstructs the elaboration of a joint 
policy by NATO member countries on 
many international questions, includ-
ing those affecting the Middle East, 
and might lead to the progressive 
destruction of the cohesion of the 
Alliance; 
are quoted for numbers employed in the armaments 
industries : between 160,000 and 300,000 in France, the 
Federal Republic and the United Kingdom and between 
15,000 and 80,000 in Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy. 
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(ii) to accept co-production agreements 
with American firms on terms which 
leave them little say in the latter's 
decisions; 
(iii) to resign themse1ves to producing only 
a limited number of types of weapons 
for which they are sure of having a 
wide-enough market, even if they have 
to rely on the United States to pro-
duce other equipment needed for 
western defence. This option, like the 
previous one, can but reduce the 
capability of European armaments 
industries and eventually, in view oî 
the steady and fast-moving progress 
of technology, make Europe incapable 
of producing many of the weapons it 
needs for its defence for lack of invest-
ment and sooner or later for lack of 
technological know-how. The last two 
options would thus mean leaving the 
United States permanent responsibility 
for Europe's defence and complete 
control over it. 
20. The Americans seem to have realised these 
difficulties and for several years have been seek-
ing solutions. -
21. One step is for the establishment of a two-
way flow of trade in armaments between Europe 
and the United States. In 1978, it led to the 
signature of a series of. bilateral agreements 
between the United States and European mem-
bers of NATO to encourage reciprocal procure-
ment of armaments on the basis of free competi-
tion. It is clear that these agreements fall well 
short of providing a satisfactory solution to the 
essential problem, i.e. the survival of a European 
armaments industry, because they do not guaran-
tee that the American armed forces will purchase 
European equipment but merely seek to allow a 
free market which in this case favours American 
manufacturers. 
22. Moreover, the two-way street is interpreted 
differently on either side of the Atlantic : Europe 
considers that the aim is to achieve a balance of 
arms procurement and sales between the Euro-
pean and American partners, whereas the United 
States tends to seek a balance between imports 
and exports of money spent on the defence of 
Europe, which includes on the American side of 
the scales the cost of maintaining American 
armed forces on the mainland of Europe. In this 
way, the overall balance would show a deficit for 
the European partners in the field of armaments 
proper. 
23. However, in the United States itself many 
now consider that the maintenance of a major 
armaments industry in Europe contributes to 
the cohesion of the Alliance as a whole. But 
although sorne feel that protecting this branch 
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of the European market may encourage organised 
production and markets in Western Europe, 
others on the contrary consider that Europe will 
only manage to achieve this if it is forced to do 
so by the merciless laws of the market. 
24. Thus, insofar as the forces of the Atlantic 
Alliance would have to co-operate closely in the 
event of war and as such forces must be avail-
able to SACEUR in accordance with operational 
needs, it is essential to achieve the highest pos-
sible degree of interoperabi1ity in the framework 
of the Alliance, i.e. it must be materially possible 
for the holder of a weapon of whatever origin 
attached to a unit of a country of the Alliance 
to have access, anywhere in the Alliance's armed 
forces, to supplies of munitions, spare parts or 
fuel, or to be able to use its means of communica-
tion to contact its partners thanks to unified 
standards, calibres and specifications. This is an 
operational necessity apparently recognised by 
ail members of the Alliance but still far from 
being achieved satisfactorily in national armies. 
25. This is not a matter of standardisation 
which would imply a far greater degree of 
unification of weapons and equipment in use. 
Sorne members of the Alliance, including France, 
are afraid that this concept, based on practical 
and operational considerations, may, if applied, 
mean European armies being fitted out with 
American equipment since each time decisions 
had to be taken in this field the weight of the 
United States plus that of countries procuring 
American equipment would inevitably be greater 
than that of European manufacturers. But would 
the reaction of these countries be less negative 
towards a European standardisation of arma-
ments, perhaps starting with a 1imited number 
of categories of weapons ? Such an operation 
should have the immediate effect of favouring 
European producers on the European market 
and in the longer run improve Europe's position 
in negotiations with the Americans on standard-
isation extended to cover the whole Alliance. 
Should it not prove possible to make a serious 
effort to obtain standardisation among the Euro-
pean members of the Alliance, it may weil be 
wondered whether they have any choice other 
than to conclude the most advantageous agree-
ments possible for the purchase of American 
equipment. 
26. However this may be and whatever attitude 
the United States eventually adopts, as matters 
now stand everything indicates that an effort 
should be made to organise production among 
the European members of the Atlantic Alliance. 
There is now l,ittle doubt about this and, in many 
fields, industrialists are making the effort them-
selves - in aircraft, naval shipbuilding (mine-
sweepers) and missiles for instance. Y et, co-
operation between states and military head-
quarters is still far from adequate, despite a 
whole series of attempts made in the last thirty 
years, most of which have so far produced no 
decisive result. 
27. Although neither the North Atlantic Treaty 
nor the modified Brussels Treaty defines the 
elements of a common armaments. policy, they 
have both provided frameworks for trying to 
work out and organise such a policy. 
28. (a) FINABEL was set up in 1953 by the 
chiefs-of-staff of the French, Italian, Belgian, 
Netherlands and Luxembourg armies, joined by 
the Federal Republic of Germany in 1956 and 
the United Kingdom in 1972, with the aim of 
defining the nature of army equipment require-
ments, working out specifications jointly, con-
ducting joint tests and holding exchanges of 
information. 
29. (b) The WEU Standing Armaments Com-
mittee, set up in 1955 by the signatories of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, was given a first task 
of promoting agreements on the joint production 
of armaments by member countries. In addition, 
in 1976 it was asked to make a study of Euro-
pean armaments industries. 
30. (c) When the idea emerged in NATO of 
forming a European nucleus, which became 
Eurogroup, the latter set up a sub-group of arma-
ments directors, EURONAD, in which represen-
tatives of all the European members of the 
Atlantic Alliance except France take part. 
31. (d) At the end of 1975, the members of 
Eurogroup formed the independant European 
programme group, in association with France. 
This is not an institution any more than Euro-
group and has no secretariat. There is an annual 
meeting of under-secretaries of state of partici-
pating countries, meetings of national armaments 
directors and of experts. The latter have three 
tasks: 
(i) to prepare lists of equipment in use 
in national armed forces, replacement 
schedules and the equipment that 
might be used for replacement ; 
(ii) to study co-operation between member 
countries in a number of specifie 
projects; 
(iii) to examine procedural and economie 
problems which have to be solved if 
co-operation is to be effective, e.g. com-
petition, technology transfer, com-
pensation, trade, industrial co-opera-
tion and procedure for developing new 
weapons systems. 
32. (e) Finally, the importance of bi- or multi-
lateral programmes carried out by certain mem-
ber countries should be underlined, particularly 
in the aircraft and missiles industries. So far, 
such undertakings have given the best results 
where production is concerned. 
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33. With the exception of this last case, it is 
clear that results achieved are in no way com-
mensurate with the effort made : although 
FINABEL's aims were modest, this was not so 
for the SAC, yet its work has come to little, 
although it may take credit - to a degree dif-
ficult to assess - for much of what has been 
achieved at bi- or multilateral level since the 
SAC on the one hand has made national 
authorities come to grips with the problem of 
European co-operation and on the other it has 
brought together qualified representatives from 
the Defence 1\finistries. Finally, provided there 
is sufficient good will to facilitate its task much 
may be expected of the study which it is making 
of European armaments industries about which 
today only partial, abridged and inadequate 
information is available. 
34. Eurogroup, for its part, has now lost much 
of its reason for existence where armaments are 
concerned since the IEPG has so to speak taken 
its place, but it is yet too early to review the 
group's achievements since it was formed so 
recently. It should be pointed out, however, that 
sorne believe it will play a leading rôle in the 
near future but information available about its 
effective working fails to confirm this optimism 
in view of the difficulties it seems to be encoun-
tering in tackling economie problems and the 
small number of specifie projects which seem to 
be taking definite shape. 
35. Apart from these efforts at institutional 
level, it should be added that in this respect the 
WEU Assembly for its part has constantly played 
a driving rôle by urging the governments of 
member countries to promote European co-
operation in armaments matters. Numerous 
reports, symposia organised by the Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions and by the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments and approaches made 
by many of its members to their countries' 
authorities all add up to shape what may be 
called a true Assembly doctrine, over and above 
the inevitable differences which emerge from 
time to time regarding the possible ways and 
means of such co-operation. 
36. On the ultimate goals, it has in fact always 
been widely agreed that the aim of European 
armaments co-operation was to maintain and 
increase Europe's capability in this field so as 
to strengthen its general economie potential and 
improve the effects of efforts made by each 
state for the common defence and to ensure that 
Europe was more independent of American pro-
duction so that it might be better able to take 
upon itself the options which are essential for 
its defence. 
37. The problem of armaments cannot be 
separated from the more general question of 
defence policy and the strategies adopted by the 
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Atlantic Alliance and also from their use as 
envisaged by national military staffs. An arma-
ments policy is not built on purely technical or 
industrial bases but is designed to provide the 
armed forces with the means they need to fulfil 
their rôle. Y et, it would appear that, apart from 
limited forces assigned by a few countries for 
possible distant attack, ali the forces of the 
Western European countries would have to be 
deployed or in any case exercise their deterrent 
effect on the same terrain in the event of 
hostilities. From this point of view, the situation 
of France, which is outside the NATO integrated 
command system, is no different from that of the 
other ·western European countries since France 
has its place in the second line of western forces 
deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
38. There is every reason to think that the 
requirements of these forces on the same hattie-
field will be identical and that a weapon which 
is suitable for one European country will also 
be suitable for ali the others. It would therefore 
seem logical for ali the Western European conn-
tries to have the same weapons, and in this case 
the principle of economy of scale would apply to 
the full. Indeed, the growing cost of sophisticated 
weaponry forces each national army to use less 
of a given item of equipment. For instance, the 
number of aircraft deployed by most European 
countries is considerably less thau just before the 
second world war. 
39. It has therefore become much more costly 
to set up production lines and it is also taking 
much longer to do so. Once lines have been set 
up, the cost priee of each finished item becomes 
higher as runs become shorter in view of the vast 
sums needed for what is now known as research 
and development. The fact that the Western 
European countries have in the last ten years 
had to reduce drastically the proportion of their 
gross national product earmarked for defence 
makes them wait longer thau desirable before 
replacing obsolete equipment, to the detriment 
of the efficiency of their forces. 
40. It would therefore seem quite logical for 
these countries to pool their resources, efforts, 
research and technology for the design, develop-
ment and production of what might be a uniform 
item of equipment. It may naturally be con-
sidered that the American armed forces deployed 
in Europe have requirements similar to those of 
European troops and that there might therefore 
be co-ordination at Atlantic level. However, 
American military authorities have to plan the 
deployment of their forces not at European level 
but at world level. At one time, many American 
forces were deployed in Vietnam. The United 
States is now considering sending troops to the 
Near or Middle East. They must be prepared for 
fighting on the shores of the Pacifie or of the 
Atlantic, in polar or tropical regions and in a 
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very wide range of climate, vegetation, terrain 
and population. 
41. For instance, for the Vietnam war the 
American army developed a large number of 
new types of weapon. The American military 
authorities therefore have to equip their forces 
with more polyvalent weapons thau those needed 
by the European forces or with a far wider 
range of weapons. Joint production of armaments 
by Europeans and Americans is not impossible. 
Most Western European countries do so on a 
bilateral basis in a manner corresponding to their 
respective economie structures, and in 1978 
several of them signed agreements with the 
United States for developing trade in this field. 
But it cannot be as general or complete as it 
might be between European countries. 
42. The fact is that there is no lack of bodies 
responsible for co-operation but twenty-five 
years' work are far from having produced con-
clusive results. 
43. There are varions reasons for this slowness 
or even failure. 
(a) Political reasons 
44. Possibly sorne countries, anxious to retain 
a degree of independance vis-à-vis their allies, 
are not kindly disposed towards too much 
standardisation which would make them 
dependent on foreign suppliers for sorne of their 
weapons. However, too much importance should 
not be accorded to such reasons. Indeed, France, 
which has steadily proved to be the country with 
the greatest concern for its independance of 
decision, is also one of the most zealous in organ-
ising joint production of armaments by Euro-
peans in such bodies as the SAC or the IEPG 
and through bilateral agreements. 
(b) Commercial, economie, social and flnancial 
reasons 
45. In recent years, the European countries 
with the largest production of the most varied 
armaments have developed a policy for sales of 
arms abroad 1 • This is the case inter alia of 
1. Statistics on the arms tracte are usually fairly 
unreliable and do not always tally. According to 
Die W elt of 19th April 1979, in 1976 this trade repre-
sented a sum of $13,300 million. It reported that the 
principal exportera were : 
United States : 
Soviet Union: 
France: 
Federal Republic of Germany : 
The principal importera were then 
countries: 
Iran: 
Israel : 
Iraq: 
Libya: 
$million 
5,200 
3,700 
840 
636 
Middle East 
$ million 
1,400 
947 
765 
741 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the United Kingdom. They were encouraged in 
this direction by the increase in the priee of oil 
and a number of raw materials which forced 
them to increase sales of manufactured products, 
including armaments, in order to stabilise their 
balance of payments. This led them to view the 
armaments they produced no longer merely from 
the point of view of Europe's defence but also 
from that of possible markets. Particularly in 
countries which are not large-scale exportera of 
armaments, there are growing complaints about 
sales of armaments which at least part of public 
opinion considers to be dangerous for inter-
national peace, whereas the governments of 
exporting countries often seem anxious to retain 
a free hand in this field. This does not facilitate 
the C()-ordination of the production of armaments 
between European countries, although the diffi-
culty must not be exaggerated since certain 
jointly-produced armaments, such as the Jaguar 
training and tactical support aircraft, have found 
good markets abroad. 
46. Conversely, even in Europe there sometimes 
seems to be the utmost difficulty in finding 
purchasers for armaments produced in Europe. 
Preference often goes to armaments produced 
abroad, particularly in the United States, because 
of their lower cost or more rewarding industrial 
compensation, which factors carry considerable 
weight among purchasing countries. In recent 
years, this was the case for a number of aircraft 
deals, particularly in Belgium and the Nether-
lands. 
47. But it must be observed that in the absence 
of organic C()-operation between producers of 
aeronautical equipment in Western Europe 
these countries have had to choose between bids 
not from Europe but from individual European 
countries and the United States. Decisions were 
reached in the light of national interests because 
the bids were national bids. In several of the 
most important cases, national interests led them 
to opt for the procurement of American equip-
ment and this will probably always be so as long 
as their industries are not directly involved in 
equipment produced by the whole of Europe 
rather than by a single European country. As 
long as production conditions remain unchanged, 
there is every reason to fear that European 
solidarity will not be enough to allow govern-
ments to purchase, perhaps at a higher cost, 
equipment produced by European industries. 
48. This leads to a third aspect of the economie 
obstacles to the joint production of military 
equipment by the European countries. Such pro-
duction would certainly involve a far-reaching 
restructuring of firms and it is to be feared that 
this might lead to a drop in the overall level of 
employment. The crisis prevailing in Europe 
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since 1973 has made it very sensitive to such 
consequences. However, it must be borne in mind 
that in the longer term rationalised production, 
far from limiting employment possibilities, 
improves them insofar as it makes European 
products more competitive on the European and 
world markets. 
(c) Juridical reasons 
49. The status of armaments industries differs 
from one Western European country to another 
since sorne parts are nationalised and others are 
privately-owned. Moreover, whatever their status, 
states have had to keep tight control to prevent 
clandestine exports of armaments and to ensure 
the maintenance of production capacity whatever 
the economie situation. 
50. Progress in European economie integration 
is now reaching company rights, but those pro-
ducing armaments have very largely escaped 
Community intervention, for instance where 
regulations protecting free competition are con-
cerned. It would therefore seem essential if any 
progress is to be made towards wider CÜ"-Operation 
to attain sorne degree of uniformity of state 
control methods and procedure, labour legislation 
and protective regulations in order to achieve 
joint production on the basis of inter-firm or 
inter-state agreements or through the creation 
of multinational groups for the development of 
new weapons. One of the aims of the symposium 
to be held in October might be to determine how 
such joint production could be organised. 
51. Here, mention should be made of the 
WEU Council's instructions to the Standing 
Armaments Committee in May 1976 to under-
take a far-reaching enquiry for the purpose of 
studying and analysing the European arma-
ments industries. According to information com-
municated by the Council, the Standing Arma-
ments Committee has completed the section of 
its enquiry on the juridical aspects. It is regret-
table that the Council did not consider it desir-
able to transmit to the Assembly more infor-
mation on the contents of this chapter as it 
promised in reply to Recommendations 293 
and 299. The question is probably not to ask the 
Council to communicate to the Assembly the full 
text of a report written for governments since 
this might incite sorne of them to be restrictive in 
supplying the SAC with the information it needs 
for pursuing its enquiry. However, it would be 
natural and highly desirable for parliamenta-
rians, who have to give their views in their own 
countries on the adoption of defence budgets and 
hence on matters relating to the procurement of 
armaments, to have as much information as 
possible about the prospects of European co-oper-
ation in this field. 
52. In any event, the mandate given to the 
SAC is clearly defined, since : 
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(i) although set in the context of "pos-
sible rationalisation on a European 
scale", it calls for "a descriptive 
analysis of the situation", thus depriv-
ing the SAC of the right to submit any 
form of recommendation. As such, this 
is already a considerable and 
absolutely new task ; 
(ii) the enquiry is limited to a "definition 
of the armaments sector", the "collec-
tion of economie data" and a study of 
the "legal status of firms and domestic 
legislation", i.e. it takes no account of 
other types of obstacle ; 
(iii) the SAC is asked to "take account, in 
particular, of the tasks undertaken" 
by the IEPG without specifying how 
far the ·SAC's study is to depend on 
results achieved by the IEPG, parti-
cularly in the definition of standards 
on which to base its definition of the 
armaments sector. 
53. However this may be, it is quite clear that 
apart from the points raised in the SAC mandate 
there are other obstacles whose importance should 
not be overlooked, as implied by the Council in 
its reply to Recommendation 309 : 
"The sole purpose of the study at present 
being carried out by the Standing Arma-
ments Committee is to describe the econo-
mie and legal position of armaments indus-
tries in member countries. It is not required 
to include any political assessments or con-
clusions leading to the regulation of the 
sale of arms ... " 
(d) Militar;y reasons 
54. It is difficult to assess the rôle military 
reasons have played, but it would appear to be 
considerable. This is due to the high degree of 
independence enjoyed by each country's military 
authorities. They all have their own traditions, 
staff, working methods and equipment replace-
ment schedules. Financially they depend on 
national budgets and must obtain the sums they 
require from national parliaments or govern-
ments. They define their requirements in the 
light not only of the needs of an overall Euro-
pean defence but also of all these factors and 
the rôle of these factors in decisions taken must 
not be underestimated. The only remedy would 
be to compel military authorities to define their 
requirements together, to agree on the type and 
specifications of the equipment they need for the 
years to come and to set up a body capable of 
taking decisions in the event of differences and 
disputes in order to define equipment adapted 
to the needs of a European army in stages to be 
determined jointly and in advance. 
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55. One of the tasks of the independent Euro-
pean programme group is to meet these require-
ments and its Panel 1 has the specifie task of 
taking stock of requirements on the basis of 
NATO defence plans. But the IEPG seems to be 
progressing only slowly towards the definition 
of equipment, however valuable its work may be, 
and there is probably no reason to doubt this 
even if available information on the matter is 
very sparse. This is probably due to the fact that 
armaments experts taking part in its work do 
not sufficiently commit the military authorities 
for which many other factors and constraints 
count very strongly. The logical solution would 
obviously be to set up a European military 
headquarters, i.e. a European army. It is hardly 
possible to consider this at present, so the search 
if not for a solution at least for an improvement 
in the present situation should be made through 
increased consultations between national military 
authorities. 
56. Failing such arrangements, it is to be 
feared that attempts by government experts to 
align national definitions in forums such as the 
SAC, Eurogroup and the IEPG will never 
achieve anything more than mediocre results. 
m. European defence and defence of Europe 
57. Now, as thirty years ago, rouch ambiguity 
still surrounds the aim pursued by those who 
speak of Europe. Is it a step towards a wider 
form of society, western today, world-wide 
tomorrow, in which the state in its traditional 
form would be destined to decline ? Or, on the 
contrary, is state power to be strengthened by 
separating it from over-narrow national societies 
and adapting it to the needs of this century 1 
Are national entities to be strengthened so as 
to hold each other up in a confederal system in 
order to allow them to face the twenty-first 
century Y The first option seems the most 
rational, the most in conformity with a moral 
philosophy which refuses to set the state or 
nation on a pedestal and offers the best prospect 
for the fulfilment of mankind. 
58. But can one act as if the triumph o.f 
universal reason was sufficiently certain and 
anticipate the decline of the state Y What would 
be the worth of a policy which was not based on 
a strict analysis of the facts and on an assessment 
of the threats and the means of meeting them ? 
Should the future be planned as if the security 
of an international system was guaranteed ? Con-
sideration of collective security, i.e. each coun-
try's defence policy, cannot be dispensed with. 
59. In Europe, such a policy no longer has to 
lean on feelings once thought of so highly. For 
the people of Europe, war is no longer a means 
of pursuing a policy ; the aim of defence is to 
ensure the survival of the population by avoid-
ing war. It must therefore be stripped of all the 
finery surrounding military things and tackled 
with the coolness of the chess player. 
60. What is to be defended is the possibility 
for the society in which we live to determine its 
own present and its own future. Who is threaten-
ing it 1 Those who might be tempted to determine 
them in its stead either by enclosing it in a 
system which would progressively stifle its 
freedom of action or by threatening to use force 
to make it come to terms. Faced with this twofold 
threat, ail Europeans are in an identical position 
even if they do not see it in the same way 
because they have ail inherited costly and inef-
ficient institutions from the past : a conscript 
costs more than a horse guard but is probably 
no more useful when faood with nuclear missiles. 
61. An attempt may be made however to define 
a few guidelines : 
62. (i) The aim of any defence policy in Europe 
is to deter attack. 
63. (ii) The essential element of deterrence is 
the strategie nuclear weapon. 
64. (iii) Europe alone does not have a strong-
enough nuclear deterrent. It therefore needs an 
external deterrent. 
65. (iv) The external deterrent is not enough 
since it is not conceivable that the United States 
should risk the destruction of its cities for the 
sake of meeting a limited attack on European 
territory. 
66. (v) It must therefore be completed by a 
limited deployment of forces designed merely to 
deter local attacks by demonstrating that Europe 
can and will stand firm and any escalation would 
involve the risk of nuclear war. The numbers 
deployed should not be too great since this would 
weaken the deterrent by increasing the prob-
ability and credibility of limited hostilities. They 
should be limited enough to show that Europe 
cannot allow its fate to depend on the outcome 
of one hattie but strong enough to show that it 
is determined to defend itself. 
67. (vi) To play its rôle, this limited deploy-
ment must be efficient, i.e. it must have the 
backing of the most appropriate weapons 
constantly adapted to the needs of a doctrine 
which takes account of the possibilities of the 
latest weaponry. Thus, to offset the enormous 
superiority of the W arsaw Pact in tanks and 
aircraft, it is not necessary to have an equivalent 
number of tanks or aircraft but : 
(a) a defensive doctrine allowing the chal-
lenge to be met ; 
(b) weapons to back up this doctrine; 
:Cc) officers and men fully conversant 
with this doctrine and these weapons. 
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68. Ali information currently available on the 
deployment of NATO forces indicates that for 
political reasons there is sorne confusion as to 
the type of doctrine which would be applied in 
the event of attack, that ail sides are hesitant 
to use sorne of the weapons known to be the most 
effective, that officers are often trained in 
accordance with out-of-date doctrines and that 
the troops are far from having mastered the use 
of modern weapons which which they are more-
over not always equipped. 
69. However, the cries of alarm raised in 
certain military circles in recent years have not 
gone unheeded. It is clear that consideration of 
the possibilities of rethinking strategy has 
developed in a particularly remarkable manner. 
For the first time since the second world war, 
this has not been a purely American or Soviet 
phenomenon but has spread to Western Europe 
where defence research institutes have been 
increasing in numbers for the past fifteen years 
and there has been a renaissance, if not of a 
doctrine, at least of an endeavour to take account 
of present-day political, military, economie and 
technical data. A bibliography of reviews and 
other publications on this research published in 
recent years would be very long. The symposium 
organised by the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments of the WEU .Assembly in 1977 
illustrated the work of advanced industries in 
the armaments field. The slight increase in sums 
earmarked for investment in the defence budgets 
of most of our countries and the redeployment 
of sorne of their forces show a definite will to 
adapt to new circumstances. Are these efforts 
enough ? For many reasons, it is doubtful. 
70. (vii) While the defence of Europe is based 
on strategie deterrence and tactical deployment, 
it is evident that at the present juncture strategie 
weapons are held by a small number of powers 
and for various reasons this situation will not 
change for a long time to come. On the contrary, 
Europe is forced to consider what might be the 
battlefield in the war of tomorrow so as to 
exercise the supplementary deterrence needed for 
the credibility of overall deterrence. This is the 
field in which the most spectacular progress has 
been made in recent years both in nuclear and 
conventiona1 weapons and in the doctrine for 
their use. Most probably, the development of the 
strategie arms limitation talks, by blocking 
strategie armaments, helped to guide research 
towards what are known as the grey zones. 
71. (viii) Europe currently has the means to 
back up this policy which it has been pursuing 
successfully for the past thirty years. But it 
could pursue it more cheaply and effectively 
if it managed to transform the de facto solidarity 
of European firms into a common defence under-
taking. It is prevented from doing so by the 
heavy burden of national pasts: what with the 
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fears of smaller countries, which prefer the 
hegemony of far-away America to that of a 
powerful neighbour, speculations about the 
prestige conferred on larger countries by their 
relative force, nostalgia for past glories and 
established positions in military headquarters, 
everything opposes a cool analysis of aims and 
means. 
72. This does not mean that there is no basis 
for co-operation between Europeans in defence 
matters because, in 1954, the modified Brussels 
Treaty instituted WEU. The task of the WEU 
Council was to promote continuing consultation 
between governments, necessary if the essential 
provision of the treaty was to work properly : 
the automatic assistance clause in Article V. But 
very soon - in sorne instances from the outset 
- WEU relied on other bodies to exercise a 
number of its responsibilities: NATO for defence 
matters, the Council of Europe for cultural and 
social affairs and the EEC, once Britain became 
a member, for economie affairs. Its rôle has there-
fore been confined to ensuring that these 
responsibilities were really exercised by the 
organisations to which they had been entrusted, 
account being taken of the fact that WEU does 
not have the same membership as the European 
Community nor the same way of working since 
it has no supranational elements nor the same 
powers. It does not form part of the European 
Community except insofar as the treaties of 
alliance provide an essential basis for any corn-
mon European policy in any field whatsoever. 
73. The weakness of the European pillar of 
the Alliance is an element of imbalance in the 
Alliance and of division between Europeans. 
Attempts to remedy this, such as the Harmel 
plan, have had only partial results. For the 
defence of Europe, American and European 
views do not necessarily concord. The first aim 
of any American government is the survival of 
the United States and its inhabitants. This may 
result in a strategy rather different from what 
Europeans would like, involving a more ready 
acceptance of the possibility of a limited war 
whereas for Europe any war, even limited, would 
be catastrophic. Again, Europeans know that 
there is every chance that their territory will 
become a battlefield in the event of hostilities 
between the United States and the Soviet Union 
and therefore they wish NATO to ,pursue an 
offensive strategy - which does not mean an 
aggressive defence policy - to avoid fighting on 
their territory. Conversely, the United States can 
· accept a strategy which tolerates more flexibility 
in the use of space to allow more effective use 
of its armed forces. 
74. Naturally, for many years, the North 
Atlantic Council and the NATO Defence Plan-
ning Committee have been used for discussions 
between allies on these strategie concepts. The 
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Europeans have obtained considerable advantages 
there such as the adoption of the forward stra-
tegy. But they may still wonder how far the 
means at the disposai of NATO in face of the 
massive deployment of forces in Eastern Europe 
are in a position to guarantee the application 
of the principles on which the allies have agreed. 
In point of fact, they can hardly complain 
because their contribution to the common defence 
effort, in spite of increases in 1978, is still less 
than that of their American allies and a fortiori 
than that of the Soviet Union or the Eastern 
European countries. 
75. The search for détente and above ali the 
limitation of nuclear weapons also brings out 
different points of view among Europeans and 
Americans. 
76. (i) There are differences over the nature 
of the balance which must be organised and 
maintained. Whereas the first preoccupation of 
the United States is the maintenance of an 
overall balance between the strategie nuclear 
weapons of the two great powers, Europeans are 
primarily anxious that NATO should continue 
to wield the means necessary for local deterrence 
in Europe. The development of new weapons in 
recent years and decisions taken by the United 
States Government to limit their development -
for instance, in the case of the neutron bomb -
raise problems for the Alliance which yet seem 
far from solution. 
77. (ii) In another respect, the Soviet Union 
seems keen on having the third round of SALT 
include western nuclear armaments as a whole, 
including those of France and the United King-
dom, in the overall calculation of the strategie 
nuclear potential of the western partners. For 
the moment, France and the United Kingdom 
seem reluctant to have their military arrange-
ments included in negotiations between the two 
great powers, even if they were to be more 
closely consulted by the United States in the 
course of such negotiations. 
78. (iii) Finally, in the case of détente proper, 
there have sometimes been sharp differences 
between American views and those of certain 
European countries about the nature of the 
provisions of the Helsinki final act. Europeans 
have tended to lay greater stress on the pro-
visions which concern non-intervention in the 
internai affairs of states whereas the United 
States has laid particular emphasis on those 
relating to respect of human rights. 
79. Admittedly, there is nothing fundamental 
in these differences and they in no way caU in 
question the principles on which the Alliance 
is based. Nevertheless, the very different weight 
carried by the European states on the one hand 
and the United States on the other within the 
Atlantic system and throughout the world makes 
it very difficult for consultations between allies 
on problems relating to the general course of the 
Alliance to operate smoothly. 
80. These various considerations indicate that 
the defence field is the one where the greatest 
differences still exist between members of the 
European Community. It was not by chance that 
the EDO failed but for deep-rooted reasons 
whose effects are still felt today : France's recent 
request to its partners to change the respons-
ibilities of Euratom to make Community activ-
ities compatible with the development of its 
own nuclear force is further proof. As long as 
this situation prevails, it would be dangerous 
for the future of the European union to link 
defence policy too closely with the Community 
institutions. First, certain countries would very 
probably object from the outset. Subsequently, 
if a few immediate results were achieved, they 
might be called in question shortly afterwards 
and, what is more serious, result in the overall 
Community achievements being challenged. 
81. This does not mean that Europe should 
neglect joint and detailed examination of its 
defence, it is merely that one should not rush 
into linking this examination too closely with 
the institutions of the European Community. 
This observation is not unrelated to a study of 
the prospects of European co-operation in arma-
ments matters. 
IV. Organisation of Europe and defence 
problems 
82. The question obviously arises as to what 
extent a European armaments policy can or 
should be the business of the European Com-
munity. It would be undeniably logical for the 
European Community, which is responsible for 
co-ordinating the whole of Europe's economie 
policy, to take the place of states for armaments 
production and trade as it has done for the 
coal and steel industries, nuclear energy and 
agriculture. This point is strongly emphasised 
in the report on European armaments procu-
rement co-operation submitted to the European 
Parliament by Mr. Egon Klepsch, Rapporteur 
of the Political Committee, on 8th May 1978 
(Document 83/78). In adopting this report, the 
European Parliament called on the Commission 
"to submit to the Council in the near future a 
European action programme for the development 
and production of conventional armaments within 
the framework of the common industrial policy". 
83. However, if suggestions are to be made 
only if there is a possibility of applying them, 
the fact must be faced that the armaments 
industry has a number of special characteristics 
and, however necessary it may be, here European 
co-operation runs up against difficulties which 
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have been described in the previous chapter. 
It is already evident that the Commission is 
hardly equipped to respond to the invitation of 
the European Parliament and there is every 
reason to think that the Council of the Com-
munity would not, at the present juncture, wish 
to take over such a programme, on the one hand 
because the Community now includes one coun-
try, Ireland, which would not agree to take part 
in a joint defence policy and on the other because 
France has so far refused to discuss in the 
Community framework any matter relating to 
defence. It already showed its radical opposition 
to the procedure envisaged by Mr. Klepsch when 
the latter submitted his report to the IEPG. 
Answering a written question put by a member 
of parliament on the subject, Mr. Barre, French 
Prime Minister, said on 18th December 1978 : 
"... The Chairman of the IEPG reported 
on this visit at the meeting of the group 
held in Rome on 3rd October at the level 
of national armaments directors ... at the 
express request of the French Delegation 
the group did not take note of Mr. 
Klepsch's report but only of the statement 
by the Chairman." 
Answering a question by another member of 
parliament on 14th December 1978, Mr. François-
Poucet, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
said: 
"... the European Economie Community 
can neither have nor acquire responsibilities 
in respect of defence policy. Armaments 
policies, which naturally form an essential 
part of defence policy, are also a matter 
for member states. As far as the govern-
ment knows, the Commission has not con-
tradicted this interpretation although cer-
tain of its members noted that the EEC 
might, by taking industrial and customs 
policy measures, assist in the elaboration 
of a European armaments policy. The 
government has already had an opportunity 
of specifying in reply to other questions 
on the same subject that it is determined 
to oppose any attempt by the Community 
institutions to take action in a matter 
which is outside the field of application 
of the treaties. It notes that no proposai 
of this kind has been made." 
84. As pointed out by your Rapporteur, Euro-
pean armaments policy is not solely an emanation 
of industrial policy and although he is convinced 
that it must take its place in the future European 
union this does not necessarily imply that the 
Community must take it over in the immediate 
future. So far, European governments have 
organised co-operation in this field outside the 
Community framework and these efforts must 
neither be slowed down nor a fortiori broken off 
because of an institutional difference. On the 
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contrary, an examination must be made to see 
how they can be increased and made more 
effective at the present juncture. 
85. It is quite evident that the nine-power 
political consultations bringing together the 
members of the European Community form the 
framework in which this common external policy 
essential for the effective development of joint 
production of armaments can be worked out. 
However, in these consultations, the Nine have 
not yet tackled matters relating directly to the 
defence of Europe either because some of them 
do not wish to consider such matters outside 
NATO or because others do not want to become 
too closely linked with NATO through the inter-
mediary of these consultations. 
86. Conversely, the North Atlantic Council 
holds many consultations on such matters, but 
NATO covers only a clearly-defined area whereas 
crises and tensions are on the increase outside 
this area. Most European countries have 
interests in or links with other parts of the 
world, but they vary considerably from one 
country to another. On the other hand, the 
United States now has world-wide interests and 
responsibilities which means that through its 
action anywhere in the world it commits allies 
who pay only a fairly remote rôle in formulat-
ing decisions which nevertheless concern them. 
87. The reactions of the European public to 
the Vietnam war are a demonstration of this 
weakness. But one may wonder whether more 
recent crises in Africa, the Middle East and 
the Far East may not further upset at least 
a part of European public opinion. 
88. Such difficulties have apparently already 
affected the process of consultation in NATO. 
Atlantic News No. 1101 of 23rd February 1979 
analyses the progress of consultations as follows : 
"It is on questions outside the NATO 
region that allied cohesion disperses, and 
- which is more serions - there is resis-
tance by certain nations to any attempt to 
formulate even an agreed NATO analysis 
of such problems, much less an agreed 
NATO position or policy for action by the 
West. Any member nation is of course 
free to raise any subject for discussion that 
it wants to, but that is as far as the matter 
can go. Other nations can - and do -
state that they will only listen to the 
discussion, that they will make no con-
tribution to it, and that they will, in effect, 
veto any effort to formulate any Alliance 
analysis or solution regarding it. Certain 
nations do this consistently. Others do it 
variably, according to what 'extra-NATO' 
problem is raised. 
82 
This in turn has led to discussions in 
Alliance circles as to whether or not the 
traditional NATO policy of acting only on 
consensus (that is, unanimity) of ali mem-
bers is still relevant to the new challenges 
coming at the West from regions outside 
the NATO area. 
Dr. Henry Kissinger articulated the prob-
lem precisely in an interview published in 
the International Herald Tribune last 
December. He said, 'We and our allies 
must have a capacity for regional defence 
inside and outside the NATO area. If we 
do not develop this, then in the eighties 
we are going to pay a very serions priee. 
The first instalments are already visible'." 
89. The attempt to hold consultations on a 
more restricted basis as at the summit meeting in 
Guadeloupe in J anuary 1979 does not seem to 
have produced conclusive results. Reports avail-
able indicate that there was no prior consultation 
either in the framework of NATO or among 
the Nine, which is ali the more regrettable in 
that many European members of the Alliance, 
not to mention Canada, were not represented. 
The concept of a directorate of the larger powers 
replacing a faltering Europe cannot be a solution 
to the questions raised by co-operation between 
the United States and its European partners. 
90. The greatest uncertainty therefore hovers 
over the way a European foreign policy can be 
worked out from the moment it is a question of 
defence. Consequently, Europeans often find 
they are unable to assert their views on questions 
discussed in the framework of NATO because 
there is no European policy on such matters : 
concepts which are to become those of the 
Atlantic Alliance are prepared in Washington 
and the European policy of the United States 
Government is then to induce its European 
partners, one by one, to endorse its views, not 
because it wishes to stifle a European voice -
it has often urged Europeans to organise them-
selves - but because, in the absence of a clear 
response from Europe, it can hardly do other-
wise. 
91. Moreover, on questions relating to common 
security but not the responsibility of NATO, the 
absence of consultation sorely paralyses Europe 
or, even worse, sets Europeans against each other 
on matters over which they do not, a priori, 
fundamentally disagree. This was evident in 
1977 during the disturbances in Zaïre. Both 
France and Belgium sent limited forces to carry 
out missions in Kolwesi. But the two missions 
were based on different concepts and appeared 
to compete with each other whereas everything 
called for joint action by the Western European 
countries to ensure the repatriation of Euro-
peans and help to restore peace in the area. 
The consequences of conducting two operations 
m.ight have been most serious and Europe should 
do its utmost to avoid any recurrence. 
92. It is precisely for matters which do not 
concern NATO, because they are not related to 
the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, 
or the Nine, because they relate to security, that 
the WEU Council is, under the modified Brussels 
Treaty, obliged to meet and consider measures 
to be taken under Article VIII, paragraph 3, of 
the treaty: 
"At the request of any of the high con-
tracting parties the Council shall be 
immediately convened in order to permit 
them to consult with regard to any situ-
ation which may constitute a threat to 
peace, in whatever area this threat should 
arise, or a danger to economie stability." 
93. In none of the other treaties now associat-
ing the Western European countries are there 
any equivalent undertakings and although it is 
quite right for the WEU Council to rely on 
wider organisations to exercise those of its 
responsibilities which they can exercise, it is still 
committed to intervene directly when the prob-
lems arising are not within the purview of these 
bodies. The Assembly has asked it to act on many 
occasions, particularly when it adopted the 
recommandation in the report presented by Mr. 
Leynen on behalf of the General Affairs Com-
mittee in November 1975 (Document 680). This 
was also the sense of the address by Mr. Michel 
Jobert, then French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, on 21st N ovember 1973. As long as no 
other European organisation has effective res-
ponsibilities in these matters, the proposais he 
made on that occasion and which were endorsed 
by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, French Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs, and Mrs. Hamm-
Brücher, Federal German Minister of State, at 
the Assembly's last session, retain their full 
importance. The French Minister said : 
"For an undertaking in the interests of 
security such as I have attempted to out-
Une, with détente allied to defence, Western 
Europe Union has its part to play and 
is not without importance. 
I do not forget that the treaty setting 
up WEU created an alliance among seven 
European countries. If aU its members 
were in agreement, WEU could constitute 
a valid theatre for the thinking and talks 
which I have just suggested. These, today, 
are more necessary than ever, for Europe 
must now concern itself with a future 
which may not be very distant. It must, 
in any case, concern itself with strategie 
developments themselves, which have called 
into question so many programmes that 
we go on pursuing more through wishful 
thinking than from conviction. 
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... Why, for example, should the horizon 
of our thinking, and indeed of the organ-
isation generally, not be widened, both in 
detail and as a whole~ so as to take on a 
real European dimension Y" 
94. Possibly members of the European Par-
liament may wish to use the new authority 
deriving from their election by direct universal 
suffrage to have the Community authorities 
intrude in armaments, if not defence, matters. 
There seems little chance of their succeeding, 
but should they do so, it is to be feared that the 
governments may take advantage of the fact that 
the European Community binds them to no for-
mal commitment in this field to evade sooner or 
later any form of control or co-ordination which 
they do not consider to be in their immediate 
interests. 
95. Compared to this, under the modified 
Brussels Treaty the seven signatories accepted 
specifie comm.itments in defence and armaments 
policy. Signatories are bound by Article IX, 
under which the WEU Assembly's responsibility 
covers the application of the whole treaty, which 
means, as the Council has often recalled, that it 
is the only European parliamentary assembly 
with responsibilities in defence matters. It 
receives a report from the Council and is there-
fore entitled to be kept informed of the activ-
ities of the Standing Armaments Committee 
which depends on the WEU Council. 
96. But while it is true that the Council's 
responsibilities may be exercised by other organ-
isations such as the Council of Europe, the Euro-
pean Community for economie matters and 
NATO for defence questions on which it reports 
to the Assembly, this should also be true of the 
IEPG whose prerogatives come within the Coun-
cil's responsibilities. It is therefore perfectly 
logical and in conformity with the modified 
Brussels Treaty for the WEU Council to report 
to the Assembly on the work of the IEPG. 
97. In 1978, the Council assumed quite a clear 
comm.itment in this sense when, in answer to 
Recommandation 319, it affirmed that : 
"... the duty which belongs to the Council 
alone of inform.ing the Assembly on aU 
aspects of the application of the modified 
Brussels Treaty forms a major aspect of 
their political activities. 
The Council therefore intend to meet the 
Assembly's request for fuller information 
on consultations between member countries 
on matters relating to the application of 
the modified Brussels Treaty ... " 
98. Answering Written Question 191, the 
Council, in the enigmatic style of which it is so 
fond, stated that : 
"With regard to the joint production of 
armaments, the Assembly was informed 
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that the Council had begun a study which 
resulted in the mandate adopted in April 
1977, calling on the Standing Armaments 
Committee to undertake the study now in 
progress of the situation in the armaments 
sector of industry in the WEU member 
countries. 
With due regard for the confidential nature 
of their deliberations, the Council will con-
tinue to inform the Assembly in the 
appropriate manner of any questions raised 
by the member governments in this con-
text." 
99. It may however be wondered whether the 
seven WEU governments would be prepared for 
the IEPG to report directly to the Assembly. 
If not, consideration should be given to what 
their true objective was when they sought to 
develop European armaments co-operation in the 
framework of new organisations which had no 
ties with international i!Ultitutions or treaties. 
The sparse results achieved in these unofficial 
bodies do not even allow them to quote efficiency 
as a reason. Is it not just a question of avoiding 
parliamentary control because the seven govern-
ments are unable to agree on the type of infor-
mation they may communicate to a parliamentary 
assembly since their consultations on such matters 
are still in a state of gestation Y 
100. However this may be, WEU is still the only 
European assembly with defence responsibilities 
and the only truly European institution with 
the task of keeping watch on the application of 
a treaty of alliance between European countries, 
and one day or another it would be desirable for 
this treaty to be merged with those establishing 
the European Community so that defence matters 
may take their place in the future European 
union. The fact that WEU has not yet carried 
out fully the task entrusted to it by the 
signatories of the 1954 agreements does not 
mean, as is sometimes implied, that it has a 
contagious disease. It is the governments that 
for various reasons, overt or covert, have not 
wished to make the most of the instrument they 
gave themselves. There is no reason to think that 
they would agree to do something outside this 
framework which they do not wish to do inside it. 
101. In any event, Europe must be allowed a 
future in defence matters by keeping intact the 
treaty itself and the bodies responsible for apply-
ing it. To claim to consider the treaty as negli-
gible compared with the Atlantic Alliance and 
the WEU Council as pointless compared with 
niue-power political consultations would a priori 
deprive Europe of the only grip it now has on 
defence matters and consequently jeopardise the 
future European union. It is not by neglecting or 
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destroying what already exists that the future 
of Europe will be prepared, but, on, the contrary, 
by developing it and making the most of what the 
treaties as they now exist offer for organised 
co-operation. 
.V. Conclusions 
102. Behind this at first sight rather Iimited 
problem of co-ordinating the armaments produc-
tion and co-operation of European industries is 
the far wider problem of what kind of Europe 
it is possible and desirable to build today, since 
these matters involve the national responsibilities 
to which states are the most attached. Today, 
everything indicates that the store set by sorne 
in the building of a federal Europe cannot come 
to fruition immediately and at best the Europe 
of tomorrow will still be confederal. Defence and 
armaments are still the most serious obstacle in 
the way of European union. 
103. But whatever its framework, Europe will 
have to meet the requirements of its population 
particularly in terms of employment, the econ~ 
orny, the standard of living, protecting the 
environment and energy. But it must be given 
the means to do this. European co-operation must 
not be just a question of dividing the burden 
of a world crisis on the various national econ-
omies but a means of overcoming the effects of 
this crisis by improving the organisation of pro-
duction and a better division of employment and 
consumption. It is clear that the armaments 
industry has its place in such a Europe even if 
it must remain outside the responsibilities of the 
European Community for sorne time to come. 
104. Europe will also have to rise to the aspira-
tions of the younger generations who, in the 
over-narrow confines of the national states which 
are a legacy of the last century, no longer find 
room for developing their initiative and hopes. 
They are showing growing concern about the 
limited prospects available. 
105. It is not in the type of international 
co-operation in which Europe's industrial rôle 
would be reduced to one of subcontractor of 
greater or lesser importance that Europe would 
be able to provide work for its research workers 
or technicians for very long. It must retain ali 
its creative possibilities if it is to stop a brain 
drain that has threatened its future for a long 
time already. Just as it will have to come to 
grips with ali the problems relating to energy 
production, it will have, if it wishes to keep 
control of its future, to assume responsibility for 
everything relating to its armaments and, more 
generally, its security, even if this has to be in 
the framework of an alliance and in close co-oper-
ation with the United States. · 
106. Y our Rapporteur did not wish to go further 
into this subject as he knew it was to be con-
sidered in greater depth by the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-
tions, on a report by Mr. Valleix. He will there-
fore merely emphasise that, apart from its 
military and economie aspects, the joint produc-
tion of armaments brings into play a whole series 
of political factors which he has sought to describe 
in this report, the main one being the independ-
ence of the Europe of tomorrow, i.e. its ability to 
retain responsibility - in the framework of the 
alliance with the United States, admittedly - for 
matters relating to its own defence and its rôle 
in the world. 
107. Your Rapporteur has attempted to list the 
obstacles which have stood in the way so far : 
practically all of them are tantamount not to a 
refusai, but to an absence of political will which 
has allowed too great a rôle to be played by the 
protectionist reflexes of nationalised or private 
firms and the states themselves or even of admi-
nistrative departments which are in principle 
under the political authority of the state but are 
often skilful in asserting special or limited 
interests. In the case of armaments, this is often 
so for military authorities. But insofar as the 
production of armaments involves many indus-
trial firms it should be noted that in many cases 
the latter do nothing to help to form the groups, 
mergers or consortia necessary for joint produc-
tion. From this point of view, nationalised firms 
seem no more flexible or co-operative than private 
firms and may sometimes be suspected, on the 
contrary, of benefiting from their situation by 
confusing their own short-term interests with 
those of the public. This means that a political 
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will clearly expressed by the state authorities 
might, in most cases, overcome these obstacles. 
But such a firm will is only too rarely apparent. 
108. Undeniably, progress in the study by the 
SAC in the framework of WEU will be a 
criterion of the governments' will. How much 
assistance, documentation and information will 
they provide for this study which they themselves 
commissioned 1 Information obtained so far points 
to very little. And then, once the study has been 
completed, if it is not lost in the sands of time, 
which is still to be feared, what use will the 
governments make of it 1 If they file it in their 
archives without trying to work out an effective 
policy for armaments co-operation on the basis 
of its results, this will mean that the step taken 
in May 1976 will, at best, have been only a 
passing impulse with no future, or perhaps too 
an operation designed to deceive public opinion 
and let it be thought that there was a desire to 
succeed which was, in fact, inexistent. On the 
basis of its conclusions from the study, the Coun-
cil should draw up directives to be addressed 
to aU responsible authorities, both civil and 
military, national and international, so that it 
may be considered that it is applying the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty in armaments matters. 
109. European armaments co-operation cannot 
therefore be considered as a purely military 
matter, nor purely industrial. It is both, but it 
is above aU political, and the future of a Europe 
which can exist only if it proves itself adult and 
responsible, even in areas where it would be 
easier to keep silent, largely depends on the 
efforts and sacrifices which will effectively be 
made by aU concerned to allow progress to be 
achieved. 
Document 802 
Amendment 1 
Political conditions for European armaments co-operation 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Cook and others 
19th June 1979 
1. At the end of the fourth paragra.ph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add : 
"whilst noting that the resources that are absorbed by armaments production limit the investment 
available for civil production ;". 
Signed: Cook, Urwin, MiUer, Konings, Stoffelen, Schwencke, Roper, von BothrneT 
1. See 6th Sitting, 20th June 1979 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Document 802 
Amendment 2 
19th June 1979 
Political conditions for European armaments co-operation 
AMENDMENT 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Roper and Mr. Valleix 
2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommenda.tion proper, leave out "directives" and insert "guidance". 
Signed: Roper, Valleix 
1. See 6th Sitting, 20th June 1979 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Document 803 2lst May 1979 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMJIIENDATION 
on various aspects of co-operation between Europe and the United States 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur 
1. Introduction 
II. Economie co-operation 
A. Monetary questions 
B. Trade 
C. Energy 
III. Europe's security 
A. Strategie problems 
B. Limitation and control of armaments 
C. Armaments co-operation 
IV. External policy 
A. East-West relations 
B. Near and Middle East 
C. Far East 
V. Conclusions 
1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 0 with 
1 abstention. 
2. Members of the Committee : Mrs. von Bothmer 
(Chairman) ; Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairman) ; MM. Abens 
(Al tema te : H en gel), Ariosto, Beith, Bir Frederic Bennett, 
MM. Berrier, Brugnon, Deschamps, Druon, Faulds, 
Gessner, Gonella, Hanin, Mrs. van den Heuvel-de Blank 
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(Alternate : Voogd), MM. Mangelschots (Alternate : van 
Watersohoot), Mende (Alternate : Vohrer), Minnoooi, 
Mommersteeg (Alterna te : Bohlingemann), Müller, 
Péridier, Perin, Portheine, Reddemann, Segre, Urwin. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote 
are printed in italios. 
The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on various aspects of co-operation between 
Europe and the United States 
DOCUMENT 803 
Welcoming the desire shown by the United States Governm.ent to pursue and develop its co-
operation with Europe in every field ; 
Also welcoming the fact that the United States Government continues to consider the development 
of a European union as a favourable factor in such co-operation; 
Considering that, in an unfavourable economie situation, recourse to protectionism would be a 
serious danger for Europe and noting with satisfaction that the United States, like Western Europe, has 
set itself the aim of progressively freeing international trade ; 
Considering that the creation of the European monetary fund is a major step in the search for the 
balance necessary for developing trade ; 
Considering that Europe's security, based on the Atlantic Alliance, requires improved consulta-
tions between European members and the United States on external policy matters; 
Considering that such consultations can be improved to the extent that Western Europe manages 
to define a joint foreign policy itself ; 
Welcoming the success of the SALT II negotiations, but considering that the development of 
strategie arma limitation talks caUs for the adoption of joint positions by the European members of 
the Atlantic Alliance and participation by Europe in the SALT III negotiations; 
Welcoming the United States' intention to organise a two-way street for trade in armaments but 
concerned lest such a trend should inhibit European co-operation in this field, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE ÜOUNCIL 
1. Ensure that consultations between the European members of the Atlantic Alliance allow them, 
in the presence of their American partners, to uphold an external policy worked out by all the member 
countries of WEU in accordance with their goals of security and freedom of their peoples ; 
2. Study in particular the implications for Europe's defence policy of the Soviet Union's deployment 
of new weapons; 
3. At regular intervals, make a critical appraisal of the strategie concepts adopted by NATO; 
4. Ensure that the organisation of European co-operation in armaments production is not hampered 
by bilateral agreements concluded between the United States and severa! European members of the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur) 
1. Introduction 
1. Close co-operation with the United States 
was not Europe's choice, it was an unescapable 
necessity. The rôle played by the United States 
in the world is such that the currencies of the 
whole world are defined in relation to the dollar 
raw materials priees are fixed on America~ 
~a:kets and United States arms directly or 
md1rectly ensure the security of a large part of 
the world, whereas Europe, united or not, no 
longer has the means for an external or defence 
policy capable of meeting the Soviet challenge, 
whether m Europe or a fortiori in the rest of 
the world. Alone, it cannot contemplate ensuring 
its defence in face of the tremendous nuclear 
and conventional arsenal deployed by the Soviet 
Union. To ensure and organise close co-operation 
with the United States is therefore essential for 
the foreign policy of each of the Western Euro-
pean countries and the concern for greater 
independence sometimes shown by sorne of them 
has never led them to deny the need for such 
co-operation, although they may have loosened 
or sought to limit certain aspects. 
2. On the American side, co-operation with 
Western Europe also seems necessary insofar as 
the United States alone cannot shoulder all the 
responsibilities stemming from its vocation as 
a world power. Europe's economie, and above 
all commercial, power is essential for the main-
tenance of an international economie order from 
which the United States is the first to benefit. 
Relations between Europe and a large number 
of countries on other continents, particularly in 
Africa, are an important factor of cohesion in 
international society and the return of the 
United States to an isolationist policy reminiscent 
of the situation immediately after the first world 
war now seems unthinkable. Renee the United 
States can no longer view its own security 
as being in dependent of that of Western Europe 
and if it maintains large conventional and 
nuclear forces in Europe it is not just to fulfil 
an undertaking entered into almost thirty years 
ago, it is because it is now essential. 
3. However, co-operation between Europe and 
the United States raises a problem insofar as 
the yv estern Europea~ countries are steadfastly 
movmg towards particularly close co-operation 
among themselves with the aim of setting up a 
European union whose shape and institutions 
are still uncertain. In every field therefore the 
question arises as to whether priority should 
be given to intra-European co-operation, i.e. 
the building of Europe, or to co-operation 
between Europe and the United States. To 
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pursue these two aims simultaneously is certainly 
n~c~ssary but, i.n practice, it is often very 
diffiCult to avmd having to choose between 
policies leading in one or other of two directions. 
In this report, consideration will be given to 
what form of co-operation with the United 
States would not affect the search for a Euro-
pean union for which the Americans continue 
to voice their strong support. 
4. In fact, it is not the deliberate wish of the 
United States that transatlantic co-operation 
should clash with European union. During its 
visit to the United States from 19th to 
23rd March 1979, the Committee saw that the 
present government is just as intent as its 
predecessors, if not more so, on asserting its 
twofold desire to co-operate closely with Europe 
and to encourage the development of the Euro-
pean union. On this point, the Committee heard 
no dissonant voice. But co-operation with a 
Europe anxious to continue the process of 
unification encounters a number of obstacles 
based not on opposition on principles but on 
practice dominated by facts, many of which are 
beyond the free choice of either side. 
5. One obstacle is the way the democratie 
system works in the United States. American 
society as a whole is not well informed about 
matters outside the American continent and like 
any society - but perhaps to a greater d~gree 
because of the size and mass of American 
territory - it views world problems only 
through the screen of national politics. It is 
therefore inevitable that those governing the 
United States, and to an even greater extent 
American parliamentarians, should be extremely 
sensitive to the reactions of the electorate which 
sees the world's realities through the prism of 
its own affairs. President Carter's difficulties 
in imposing a real energy policy on American 
society is further proof, if proof were needed 
of this difficulty facing the world's greatest 
power in pursuing a policy which conforms to 
its world vocation. 
6. Moreover, the United States Government 
itself, although quite sincere in declaring that 
co-operation with Europe is one of its foremost 
co:r:cerns, also has to meet other requirements 
wh1ch, perforee, at times take priority over 
everything else. 
7. First is the security of the United States 
and its territory. Admittedly, the Americans are 
probably almost unanimous in considering that 
United States security depends on that of 
Europe but they may not have the same view 
of two different aspects of American security. 
For instance, the idea of a conventional, or even 
a nuclear war if limited to the use of theatre 
weapons on the mainland of Europe, is not 
unthinkable for the American authorities. Y our 
Rapporteur was able to note that on many 
occasions the Americans whom the Committee 
met asserted, either deliberately or as a slip 
of the tongue, that the aim of American policy 
was to avoid any nuclear war. Many Europeans 
would refrain from making such statements 
because they consider that even a conventional 
war on the territory of Europe would be as 
fearsome as nuclear war and consequently 
NATO's policy of deterrence should seek to 
avoid aU forms of war and not just nuclear war. 
8. Second, the United States is very interested 
in reaching agreement with the Soviet Union, 
particularly on aU matters relating to strategie 
weapons. The very aim of agreement is to 
eliminate the risk of nuclear war as far as 
possible, and, secondarily, to develop peaceful 
coexistence between the two great powers. But 
such agreement has to be based on negotiations 
in which Europeans can take no part although 
the matters discussed are of direct concern to 
them such as those relating to the level of forces 
and weapons not only in Europe itself but 
throughout the world. 
9. Third, the range of resources available to 
the United States has induced it, on a number of 
economie matters of world importance, to adopt 
positions determined by somewhat different 
requirements from those of Europe. For instance, 
a restriction on international trade would harm 
Europe far more than the United States in view 
of the relative importance of its trade. But an 
increase in raw material priees and particularly 
in oil priees may make the United States 
increase its own production even if the cost 
priee of American o'il is relatively high, whereas 
Europe with hardly any resources to develop 
will have to bear the cost of any priee increases. 
10. Finally, events anywhere in the world may 
make the Americans turn their foreign policy 
in a particular direction without European 
concerns having any influence on their action 
or assessment of the situation. For instance, 
where American policy towards the Middle East 
is concerned, members of the General Affairs 
Committee were able to see that there were wide 
differences in the varions assessments of United 
States action. 
11. Moreover, while American policy is in 
principle in favour of the establishment of a 
European union it has to take Europe as it is, 
i.e. as a group of countries in which most 
political and even economie decisions are still 
taken at the level of national states. It cannot 
therefore be blamed for increasing bilateral steps 
for developing its trade with each individual 
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European country or sorne of them. Moreover, 
the Americans are not the losers since their 
partners, being weaker and leS/9 competitive, are 
not so weil placed for negotiations. But one 
may wonder how far the development of these 
partial or bilateral relations with Europe is 
not contrary to the establishment of a European 
union. 
12. Two recent examples illustrate this alter-
native. One concerns the arms trade. In 1978 
the Americans increased their bilateral agree-
ments with the European member countries of 
NATO with a view to activating trade in arms. 
But whatever reservations may have been 
written into these agreements in favour of Euro-
pean co-operation it is not evident that increased 
trade really helps Europe's attempts to ration-
alise production and co-operate more closely in 
this field. 
13. The other example concerns general policy : 
the summit meeting in Guadeloupe in February 
1979. Anxious to consult European partners, 
President Carter met President Giscard 
d'Estaing, Chancellor Schmidt and Mr. 
Callaghan, the British Prime Minister. These 
three statesmen represented their own countries 
and not Europe as su ch. Nor could the re be 
any claim to do so since, according to the press, 
intra-European consultations before and after 
the Guadeloupe meeting were particularly unsat-
isfactory. Such meetings at which the European 
Community as such is not represented but at 
which heads of state or of government of certain 
countries constitute privileged partners for the 
United States President obviously make little 
contribution to agreement between Europeans 
nor to the development of European unity. It is 
quite understandable that the United States 
finds it more convenient to limit such summit 
talks to a few powers and that these should be 
the larger European countries, but the United 
States cannot be unaware that by so doing it 
gives its partners a privileged position which 
others find hard to accept. 
14. In fact, it is not the United States but the 
Europeans who, with their slow stumbling 
progress towards unity, bear main responsibility 
for the hesitations shown by the United States 
in seeking Europe's point of view : it is faced 
by a scattering of states which are often 
incapable of consulting each other. 
15. For aU these reasons, Europe is divided 
over two options which have been facing it for 
many years : one is the priority to be given to 
co-operation with the United States as compared 
with the establishment of a European union. 
Naturally, all Europeans believe that both aims 
should be pursued but, depending on circum-
stances, the aspect and the time, they give 
priority to one or the other and so far they 
have never managed to co-ordinate the two aims. 
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The second point at issue between Europeans 
is the growing suspicion among sorne of them 
about the very building of Europe because, 
hidden behind bilateral relations between sorne 
of their partners and the United States, they 
believe they can discern a means used by the 
United States to dominate Europe or by certain 
Western European countries to rely on 
American power to strengthen their positions in 
Europe itself. In. short, although the need for 
co-operation between Europe and the United 
States is not challenged, the ways and means 
are. 
16. In this report, your Rapporteur does not 
intend to propose an overall solution. He 
considers it as pointless to wish to postpone 
co-operation with the United States until the 
day European union exists asto jeopardise this 
union by developing bilateral co-operation which 
takes no account of Europe's decision to move 
towards union. Starting from problems effec-
tively arising today, he wishes to study how 
co-operation between Europe and the United 
States can be pursued and organised parallel 
with real and tangible progress towards Euro-
pean union. 
U. Economie co-operation 
A. Monetary questions 
17. Until the first world war, gold was the 
monetary standard for all countries engaged in 
international trade and each currency was con-
vertible into gold. After the first world war and 
the accompanying inflation it became impossible 
to restore natural, stable parities between 
national currencies and gold. Ali were defined 
in relation to gold at rates which were nominal 
because they were not convertible. However, the 
dollar was less affected by inflation than Euro-
pean currencies and it became the most widely-
used unit of account in international trade. The 
European countries consequently assimilated 
their dollar reserves to gold reserves and this 
had a very strong inflationary effect since the 
dollars accumulated by the central banks were 
generally reinvested in the United States. As 
a result, money spent by Americans was not 
withdrawn from circulation in the United States. 
18. This trend was accentuated during and 
after the second world war, and the Bretton 
Woods agreements set up an international 
monetary system based on a fictitious parity 
between the dollar and gold at a level of $35 
per ounce of gold. For better or for worse, this 
system lasted more than twenty years with 
resulting inflation which steadily increased the 
gap between the reality of the money in circula-
tion and the fiction of the exchange rate, to the 
point that in the wake of severa! European 
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countries the United States had to accept a 
floating rate for the dollar, i.e. no reference 
to a monetary standard. As for ali European 
currencies, the value of the dollar now depends 
solely on public confidence in the United States 
economy and hence in the management of the 
United States Government. As a result, there 
have been extremely wide and sudden fluctua-
tions in the exchange rates of the various western 
currencies between each other. This phenomenon 
has become more marked since October 1973 
due to the spiralling cost of oil and the start 
of a deep-rooted economie recession. 
19. ln March 1978, a number of member coun-
tries of the European Community set up a 
European monetary fund designed to keep 
parities between their currencies at a steady 
level. It is yet too early to say whether these 
countries will manage to keep this European 
monetary system going since this would mean 
equal self-control in the management of their 
economies. In the United States, the creation 
of the European monetary fund was initially 
thought to be directed against the supremacy 
of the dollar. But in March 1979 the American 
authorities concerned were able to assure the 
General Affairs Committee that this was no 
longer the case and that on the contrary they 
considered the attempt to be a positive effort 
to solve the international monetary crisis. ln 
fact, the relationship between the dollar and the 
ECU may develop in an atmosphere of rivalry 
which will mean that everything which is 
beneficiai to one will be to the detriment of the 
other and vice versa. 
20. In the medium term, at least, the results of 
the United States economy in 1978, with a 
progression of 3.9% in constant terms in the 
GNP and a drop in the unemployment rate from 
8% to 5.7 %, might herald a reversai of this 
trend if in 1979 the Americans manage to 
redress the two weak points of their economy, 
i.e. the rate of inflation (7.5 %) and the trade 
balance, whose deficit ($16,000 million) beat ali 
records in 1978. Although the deficit in the 
trade balance appeared to be dropping at the 
beginning of 1979, the rate of inflation has on 
the contrary risen 1 • But in the longer term, such 
rivalry would be particularly disastrous as it 
would do absolutely nothing to solve the world 
monetary problem. If by creating the European 
monetary fund the participating countries are 
trying to become a true European partner 
capable of negotiating with the Americans on 
an equal footing to re-establish an international 
monetary system, the fund will play a highly 
1. These figures were given to the Committee by the 
United States Department of the Treasury. They are 
definitely more optimistic than those published in the 
press at the same time (inflation rate : 11.3 % ; deficit 
in the trade balance in 1978 : $28,000 million). 
positive rôle. If on the contrary the fund helps 
to boost speculation it will then be a destabilising 
factor and may lead the West into a most serious 
monetary catastrophe. 
21. Machinery exists for consultation between 
central banks and bodies responsible for the 
financial policy of the western states. The IMF 
in particular should play such a rôle. But this 
can be done only ü there is a true will on all 
sides to eliminate monetary anarchy and revert 
to a world monetary system. But although the 
European countries which have decided to take 
part in the new monetary fund seem determined 
to fight inflation vigorously, it may be wondered 
whether, despite the recovery plan adopted in 
October 1978, the United States Administration 
is aware of the problem. Will it be strong enough 
to resist pressure to allow the United States to 
base its economie recovery - which has been 
taking shape for the past three years - on 
inflation Y If this were to happen the worst fears 
would be confirmed for the monetary, com-
mercial and economie future of the whole 
western world, and consultations in the IMF 
would not change much. 
B. Trade 
22. In Europe, external trade cornes within the 
terms of reference of the Community so your 
Rapporteur will not dwell on the matter. 
However, he wishes to recall a few points 
directly governing relations between Europe and 
the United States because, since the Tokyo round 
negotiations are coming to an end, 1979 may 
be strongly marked by the debates on the 
ratification of these agreements in all the 
signatory countries, including the United States 
Congress. While there is a tendency in Europe 
to accuse the United States of pursuing a non-
tariff policy aimed at restricting United States 
imports of products manufactured in Europe, 
the Americans make similar complaints about 
the Common Market, particularly for agricul-
tural produce. 
23. It may be thought that each side embarked 
on the Tokyo round negotiations with the inten-
tion of removing the other's obstacles but on 
both sides of the Atlantic the economie recession 
brought added pressure. Both sides must there-
fore be equally aware of the need to make the 
sacrüices necessary to avoid having to resort 
to protectionism to meet difficulties in national 
economies. 
24. However, the United States' purported 
good will towards the European Community and 
the unification of Europe must be demonstrated 
in the trade field by recognising that unity is 
the vocation of Community Europe, i.e. that the 
reciprocal trade advantages which the member 
countries of the Community offer each other, 
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particularly preferences stemming from the corn-
mon agricultural policy and hence the Rome 
Treaty, are based not on protectionism but on 
a political will to achieve unity. To be logical 
with the policy it says it is pursuing, the United 
States Government should consider Community 
Europe as an economie whole and not as an 
organisation of independant states, and it must 
not claim to be a victim of discrimination when 
Europeans treat intra-Community trade as a 
domestic market. Otherwise, serious misunder-
standings may subsist in trade negotiations 
between Europe and the United States. 
25. Nevertheless, Europe for its part must see 
the customs union on which it based its economie 
unity as a step towards more open markets. It 
is the weakness of the organisation of Europe, 
apart from the customs aspect, that has led 
Europeans to attach too much importance to the 
customs protection on which European unity 
has been based and which has made the EEC 
a divisive factor in the international market. 
C. Energy 
26. Since October 1973, the United States like 
the Western European countries has come up 
against the problem of the shortage of energy 
resources. In fact, the October 1973 crisis merely 
highlighted an extremely serious problem 
caused by the unbridled rise in the consumption 
of energy, particularly oil, by all the industri-
alised countries. This phenomenon was even 
more pronounced in the United States than in 
Europe. 
27. Even if specifie political reasons had not 
sparked off the sudden increase in priees at 
the end of 1973 and the beginning of 1974, the 
shortage would probably have caused a similar 
increase in priees a few months later. But 
because the crisis surfaced through events in the 
Middle East a political solution appeared 
possible. The world took time to realise that this 
was not so and that the West could not for ever 
increase its expenditure on energy in such a 
wasteful manner. It is now clear that the era 
of cheap energy has come to an end and con-
sequently it is urgent for industrialised countries 
to redirect their economies along lines which, 
to be effective, must be concerted. 
28. (i) It is essential for all the western coun-
tries to limit their energy consumption, parti-
cularly in cases where it does not serve 
productive purposes. Everywhere the waste of 
light, heat and milage helps to burden the 
balance of payments of industrialised countries 
and heightens the threat of an energy shortage. 
In early 1979, the United States Government 
launched an active propaganda campaign to 
reduce wastage which is a greater problem in the 
United States than in Europe, where there is 
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perhaps less wastage but the problem is a real 
one and governments have so far doue little to 
encourage the population to reduce consumption. 
In any event, the American authorities made no 
secret of the fact that the campaign has had 
little effect and that they are relying mainly 
on higher energy priees to restrict consumption. 
But does this not mean choosing inflation as a 
temporary measure against waste ~ Can Europe 
afford to follow such a course ? Even here, where 
mainly internai measures should be taken by 
each state, they should be concerted so as to 
avoid major upheavals in the economies of the 
states concerned. 
29. (ii) Building up reserves is obviously no 
answer to a serious and prolonged crisis but it 
should allow immediate difficulties to be met, 
as resulted from the Iranian crisis at the 
beginning of 1979, and also ensure the possibility 
of survival in the event of war or a blockade 
of oil supplies. The Western European coun-
tries have made a major effort in this field by 
agreeing to build up reserves corresponding to 
more thau two months' consumption. The United 
States, which has oil resources on its own terri-
tory, does not seem to have made a comparable 
effort. It has undertaken not to allow Israel 
to be the victim of a blockade or boycott by 
the oil-producing countries, but this undertaking 
will have its full deterrent effect on the oil-
producing countries only if the United States is 
able to cali on large-enough reserves. In 
February 1979, however, President Carter, 
Mr. Brown, Secretary of Defence, and Mr. 
Schlesinger, Secretary of Energy, announced 
military and naval measures designed to allow 
the United States to move quickly to ensure 
that western countries had access to oil from 
the Gulf area should it be threatened. 
30. (iii) It is obviously essential to develop 
alternative forms of energy among which the 
only one which seems to offer prospects of fast, 
large-scale development ~ nuclear energy. 
However, the nuclear energy production pro-
grammes adopted after the 1973 crisis by most 
western countries have everywhere been slowed 
down, held up or stopped by very strong public 
reaction, particularly in areas where new power 
stations were to be built. Nowhere have these 
programmes been fully respected. Nuclear 
energy production certainly involves risks, as 
shown by the incident at Harrisburg on 1st April 
1979, but present-day technology appears to 
allow such risks to be mastered provided all 
necessary steps are taken in time, even if this 
means taking longer to build power stations. 
Further, since the development of nuclear 
energy production is extremely costly, countries 
which have the means of acquiring a complete 
nuclear industry have every interest in finding 
external outlets to help them to amortise the 
cost of their technology. But in many respects 
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these industries depend on patents purchased 
from the United States or on imports of natural 
or enriched uranium which is difficult to obtain 
other thau from the United States or one of its 
close allies. It is evident that the policy of 
exporting nuclear energy-producing industries 
involves considerable risk of proliferation of 
nuclear weapons in the world and it is under-
standable that any country aware of its respon-
sibilities should avoid supplying its customers 
with means of participating in this proliferation 
and ensure that aU necessary steps are taken 
to prevent buyer countries from recycling 
plutonium. For this reason, the Americans have 
firmly opposed the policy of exporting nuclear 
power stations pursued by sorne of their Euro-
pean partners. Because they own the patents and 
control the uranium market they have managed 
to delay and sometimes even prevent the con-
clusion of certain deals. European countries 
victims of these measures readily suspected their 
American ally of using the fear of proliferation 
of nuclear weapons to protect their own indus-
try's markets, thus precluding dangerous com-
petition from their European partners. 
31. It is difficult to sort out the true facts from 
warped interpretations in such accusations. But 
what emerges is the need for dialogue and 
agreement between the United States and its 
European partners on nuclear and energy 
policies as a whole and on the type of provisions 
and standards to be included in all contracts 
relating to equipment for countries which do not 
have nuclear weapons, since : 
(a) in face of the oil-producing countries, 
whose coalition has carried considerable 
weight on the international oil market, 
it is in the interests of both the United 
States and Europe, as consumers, to 
concert their approach in order to avoid 
too great a shortage or too fast a rise 
in priees; 
(b) if Europe and the United States are 
to achieve such results, they must 
pursue a twofold policy of limiting 
energy consumption and accelerating 
the development of alternative sources 
of energy; 
(c) finally, in nuclear matters, all coun-
tries producing nuclear power stations 
must reach agreement on standards to 
be applied to exports of plants of all 
kinds so as to avoid the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons while enabling the 
world capacity to produce nuclear 
energy to expand as quickly and on as 
broad a basis as the requirements of 
security allow. Early action should be 
taken, for several countries are now in 
a position to produce nuCilear weapons. 
32. On the whole, economie co-operation between 
Europe and the United States is proceeding 
fairly satisfactorily. Where trade is concerned, 
mutual complaints are the subject of overall 
negotiations such as the former Kennedy round 
and the present Tokyo round. These negotiations 
have already produced most important results 
and have above all prevented the present world 
recession from affecting international trade. In 
the monetary field, it is to be hoped that the 
European monetary fund will allow Europe to 
carry more weight in the IMF consultations and 
speed up the search for a new world monetary 
system. Where energy is concerned, in view of 
the existence of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, there is still a means of controlling 
everyone's activities, and agreement should be 
possible on the limits to be imposed on the 
sale of production plants to third countries. 
33. This does not mean that consultations 
between Europe and the United States are 
satisfactory. There are in fact many wealmesses 
to which both Europe and the United States 
should pay greater attention. But the existence 
of the European Community and the work of 
its Commission mean that in economie matters 
Europe is a relatively well-organised entity and 
a partner which is not without weight in the 
balance with the United States. Whether a 
satisfactory solution will be found to problems 
which will inevitably continue to dominate rela-
tions between Europe and the United States in 
the coming years depends on how far Europe 
can maintain and develop its structure and 
tackle consultations with the United States 
collectively. 
ID. Europe's security 
34. While there may be sorne economie rivalry 
between Europe and the United States, this is 
obviously not the case for defence. The United 
States can hardly separate the problem of 
Western Europe's security from that of its own 
security any more than Europe can assume 
responsibility for its own defence other than 
in close co-operation with the Americans. The 
framework for co-operation here is the Atlantic 
Alliance and the organisation which stemmed 
from it, NATO. It may be said that in its thirty 
years of existence NATO has worked fairly 
satisfactorily since it has managed to avert war 
in Europe, which was its essential aim. American 
forces have been permanently stationed in 
Europe to guarantee that Europe will be pro-
tected by the United States nuclear deterrent. 
35. However, there have al ways been differences 
in the European and American view of how the 
Alliance should ensure joint security. This is 
easy to understand if it is recalled that the 
position of the United States shelters it from 
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certain dangers and the threat of invasion or 
war other than nuclear, whereas Europe fully 
realises that any war, whether nuclear or not, 
would cause widespread devastation in Europe. 
On the other hand, its position as a leading 
power confers world-wide responsibilities on the 
United States which Europe has not had since 
the end of the colonial empires. 
A. Strategie problems 
36. These considerations explain certain diver-
gences, or rather different approaches to the 
problems of the Alliance's strategy. For a long 
time, Europe insisted on maintaining the concept 
of massive retaliation as the basis of the 
Alliance's strategy because the threat of the whole 
American nuclear arsenal seemed to be the best 
means of ensuring what was intended to be a 
global deterrent. Progressively, the European 
partners in the Atlantic Alliance came round to 
the concept which the United States had started 
to develop once Soviet missiles began to threaten 
its territory, i.e. graduated response. This 
doctrine is based on the idea that a war will not 
necessarily destroy the territory of the super-
powers and that if it broke out it would be 
possible to contain it at a level determined by 
tacit or explicit agreement between the belliger-
ents. In short, a distinction could be drawn 
between a world-wide nuclear war, disastrous 
for all, and a European war during which 
negotiations between belligerents would be 
possible. 
37. There is a serious danger of such a doctrine 
making war less improbable and unthinkable 
thau with a doctrine of massive retaliation. 
However, it must be noted that the credibility 
of a doctrine of massive retaliation reduced 
considerably with the growth of Soviet nuclear 
power. Who indeed could imagine the Americans 
taking the risk of total destruction of their 
territory and cities in response to a limited 
attack in Western Europe Y The presence of 
American divisions and increasingly diversified 
nuclear weapons on European territory allows 
the deterrent to be graduated so that for each 
level of weapons used in an attack there is an 
appropriate means of response which makes 
retaliation more credible. 
38. To satisfy the Europeans and make them 
accept this doctrine of graduated response, 
NATO, after long and difficult negotiations, 
adopted its forward strategy intended in 
principle, in the event of hostilities, to carry the 
fighting immediately into enemy territory, the 
aim being to make the prospect of limited war 
more acceptable to Europeans. This is still the 
official doctrine of the Alliance but in fact it 
is increasingly necessary to ascertain whether 
it corresponds to real possibilities, failing which 
its deterrent value would be naught. Apart from 
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the event, difficult to entertain, of members of 
the Atlantic Alliance adopting an offensive 
policy in Europe, forward strategy implies a 
defensive policy based on an offensive strategy 
using appropriate weapons in quantities placing 
NATO clearly above the Warsaw Pact. But it 
is weil known that this is not the case and a 
considerable effort would have to be made to 
change the situation. It would take severa! years 
with the forthcoming budgetary increases 
planned by the United States and a number 
of European countries for their armaments. 
39. Moreover, most recent progress is not in 
offensive weapons but in defensive weapons 
thanks, in particular, to precision-guided missiles 
and the neutron bomb. At the present stage 
of technology, provided large enough quantities 
are available, these new weapons are extremely 
effective against ali offensive weapons used by 
ground forces, and particularly tanks. There is 
every indication that the greatest armaments 
efforts in recent years have been directed 
towards precision-guided missiles on which the 
most research has been done. Finally, on 
lOth July 1978, the United States decided to 
manufacture certain components of the neutron 
bomb even if, as the Committee was told in 
Washington, implementing decisions are taken 
only very slowly in view of the reactions of 
Congress. 
40. Such investment implies the choice of a 
defensive strategy, whether it has already been 
made or whether it is subsequently imposed by 
the type of armaments available to NATO forces. 
It is probably reasonable since there would be 
no point in accumulating tanks in a period of 
technical development when such a weapon 
seems more or less condemned. But a choice 
of this kind will have considerable repercussions 
on the Alliance's strategy. It can thus be seen 
that the dominating country within the Atlantic 
Alliance is in fact opting for a strategy which 
is probably perfectly reasonable but differs from 
the one in principle adopted by members of the 
Alliance as a whole. 
41. In recent years, a number of European 
military authorities have expressed very pessi-
mistic views about the ability of NATO forces 
to resist an unexpected Soviet attack, estimating 
at between three and ten dàys the time it would 
take Soviet tanks to reach the Rhine. Even if 
the Soviet Union is not now thought to harbour 
aggressive intentions, it must be noted that the 
military authorities have rendered a great 
service to ali the members of the Alliance and 
have helped to induce severa! European members 
of the Alliance as weil as the United States to 
make a financial effort - however modest - to 
increase their military budgets by 3 % per year 
as from 1978 in constant terms, this increase 
being earmarked essentially for investment in 
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conventional weapons. Information now available 
indicates that this effort has been enough to 
increase considerably the defences of the Atlantic 
Alliance in Europe and hence its possibility to 
deter aggression. 
42. The situation is evidently less clear in the 
case of nuclear matters. The American author-
ities concerned confirmed to the General Affairs 
Committee that they were anxious to draw a 
sharp line between nuclear and conventional 
weapons and, in order to avoid automatic escala-
tion to nuclear war, they emphasised their 
hostility to the "mini-nuke" doctrine at one time 
contemplated by American defence authorities. 
Europe cannot consider basing its defence on 
escalation any more than the United States, but 
a defence policy based on deterrence means 
according greater importance to the develop-
ment of cruise missiles which alone can meet the 
challenge of Soviet SS-20 missiles and Backfire 
bombers. In face of these nuclear weapons, most 
of which are aimed towards Western Europe, 
only the deployment of an adequate number 
of cruise missiles, which are hard to intercept, 
can offer an adequate deterrent. In this respect, 
American determination in the strategie arms 
limitation talks to retain their right to develop 
and deploy cruise missiles will inevitably be 
viewed by Europeans as a test of their true 
wish to defend Europe since only a demonstra-
tion of this wish can act as an effective deterrent. 
Information obtained on this matter by the 
General Affairs Committee makes it impossible 
to conclude with ali certainty that the United 
States Government is determined, in the frame-
work of SALT, to retain its ability to deploy a 
defence system in Europe based on cruise 
missiles. Those with whom the Committee spoke 
in the United States made no secret of the fact 
that there was no concerted plan between the 
European members of NATO and the United 
States in this field. 
B. Limitation and control of armaments 
43. At the end of 1978, the United States and 
the Soviet Union succeeded in preparing the 
texts of three agreements which were to bring 
SALT II to an end and mark the beginning 
of SALT III. However, at the beginning of April 
1979, the SALT II agreement had not yet been 
concluded. There is sorne unease in Europe about 
these negotiations as a whole, probably not 
because of the content of the SALT 1 and 
SALT II agreements but rather because of a 
number. of questions which are inevitably raised 
in the minds of Europeans about the aims of 
United States policy in this domain. 
44. During the General Affairs Committee's 
visit to the United States, American govern-
mental authorities strongly emphasised the fact 
that the SALT agreements were only additional 
elements in a defence policy and that in no case 
would SALT determine United States defence 
policy. However, Europeans cannot help won-
dering about the ultimate aims of these negotia-
tions and their possible implications for the 
future defence of Europe, particularly as it is 
now clear that the Soviet Union is going to 
ask for French and British nuclear weapons to 
be included in SALT III. 
45. SALT II covered only the limitation of 
strategie weapons, i.e. means of delivery with 
a range of more than 5,500 km. and thus capable 
of reaching American territory from the Soviet 
Union or vice versa. AU weapons deployed in 
Europe, consisting mainly of continental 
(medium-range) weapons or tactica1 (short-
range) weapons, were thus excluded. In recent 
years, the Soviet Union has made considerable 
progress with continental weapons thanks to the 
production of the SS-20 missile which, launched 
from Soviet territory, can reach any target 
whatsoever in Europe and the Backfire bomber 
which has a similar range. 
46. There is therefore a danger of the area 
covered by SALT, i.e. strategie deterrent 
weapons, which would be frozen at their present 
level and in which reductions might subsequently 
be made, being disconnected from medium- and 
short-range weapons, i.e. those used mainly in 
Europe, where there would be no brake on the 
armaments race. Any such disconnection might, 
although this is not at present the aim of the 
Americans, result in the fate of Europe being 
dissociated from that of the United States, 
leaving the Soviet Union with overwhelming 
superiority over the European allies of the 
United States. 
47. It is therefore becoming increasingly neces-
sary to establish a closer link between strategy 
and the diplomacy of armaments control. 
Apparently the United States has largely 
achieved this but it seems that its European allies 
are still a long way behind and the Atlantic 
Alliance has stayed with strategie concepts which 
take insufficient account of the current strategie 
arms limitat.ion talks. 
48. In the United States, the Administration is 
afraid that Congress may blame it for the 
inadequacy of means of verification and super-
vision to be included in the agreement. In 
Europe, there will probably be less criticism and 
reservations about this aspect than about the 
possibility of the deterrent effect of American 
weapons being reduced under the SALT II 
agreements, not to speak of fears of what might 
happen in SALT III. 
C. Armaments co-operation 
49. For several years the American authorities 
have been particularly concerned about achieving 
4 
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co-operation between members of the Atlantic 
Alliance for the joint production of armaments. 
The two-way street formula was adopted under 
the Republican administration for associating the 
two sides of the Atlantic in a common effort. 
The fundamental concepts of this proposai were 
quite clear. On the one hand, cost priees were 
to be eut by extending markets and on the other 
better use was to be made of the military equip-
ment of NATO forces thanks to interoperability 
of weapons of various origins. In general, these 
proposais were welcomed in Europe both because 
of the military requirements they met and of 
the European!>' wish for lower cost priees for 
the weapons needed by their forces. 
50. However, at the same time the European 
countries made a new effort to increase the joint 
production or at l~ast the standardisation of 
their weapons. Their aim was slightly different 
from that of the Americans since it was not so 
much a question of trying to base common defence 
on uniform equipment as of lowering cost priees 
so as to promote and develop a truly European 
armaments industry instead of one shaped on a 
purely national basis as is now the case. Although 
it may not have been the intention, the American 
proposais might in effect endanger these joint 
production plans because of the size of American 
firms and their much longer production runs. 
In joint production on an Atlantic scale, there 
was a risk of European industries being reduced 
to subcontractor status which, however profitable, 
might allow the United States to gain such a 
lead in research and development that Europe 
could have no hope of regaining its place in 
international competition. 
51. The establishment of the IEPG in Europe 
and the bilateral negotiations between European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance and the United 
States, which led in 1978 to the signature of a 
series of memoranda of understanding, thus 
occurred at the same time and it may now be 
wondered whether the memoranda will not make 
the work of the IEPG even more difficult insofar 
as they may give pri(}rity to transatlantic co-
operation, sometimes more advantageous for the 
industries concerned, over truly European co-
operation. 
52. Moreover, the concepts on which this two-
way street is based vary from (}ne side of the 
Atlantic to the other. In the United States, there 
is a growing tendency to consider that there 
must be an overall balance between United States 
expenditure on common defence and expenditure 
by the European countries in the United States 
to the same end. But European expenditure con-
sists essentially of purchases of military equip-
ment, whereas much of American expenditure 
lies in the cost of maintaining forces in Europe. 
The Europeans, on the contrary, consider that 
the two-way street should, as far as possible, 
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bring about a balance between Europe's 
expenditure on armaments in the United States 
and American expenditure on armaments in 
Europe. Under such a concept, there would have 
to be a major change in United States armaments 
procurement policy since so far the quantity of 
weapons purchased by the United States in 
Europe has been very small. 
53. Third, the question arises in the United 
States of how and to what extent the European 
industries should be encouraged to group and 
organise themselves to achieve a size and power 
enabling them to compete with corresponding 
American industries. One school of thought 
accepts sorne protectionism for the European 
armaments industries insofar as this allows them 
to grow into va1id partners or competitors for 
American industry, free competition then becom-
ing the only determining factor in the procure-
ment of all Alliance countries. But another 
school of thought believes that the European 
industries alone will never make this organisa-
tional effort in the framework of a protectionist 
policy and the only way to regroup them and 
rationalise European production is to bring 
Europe face to face with a market in which 
everyone has to meet the same conditions. This 
means all the members of the Atlantic Alliance 
being free to choose the equipment they find the 
most suitable and the cheapest, the two-way 
street thus no longer being an organisation of 
trade but merely an opening up of the market. 
54. Y our Rapporteur considers that the aim of 
transatlantic armaments co-operation should be 
to open up and liberalise markets so as to allow 
European armies, as well as the American army, 
to obtain the best equipment at the lowest priee. 
However, to achieve such a result quickly, it is 
not certain that the way is to open markets 
completel,y straight away. He thinks that an 
effort to organise production in Europe as 
envisaged in the framework of the IEPG and 
the broad lines of which should emerge from the 
SAC study is needed before such results can be 
achieved. This means waiting inter alia to know 
more - thanks to the work of the SAC - about 
the various conditions in which European arma-
ments co-operation might be developed. 
55. Y our Rapporteur is convinced that the Euro-
pean governments will meet with understanding 
in the United States if they seriously wish to 
embark on co-ordination. of the European arma-
ments industry. If, on the contrary, the work 
of the IEPG and the SAC continues to mark 
time without achieving significant results, the 
wish to form a European armaments industry 
would be nothing more than a pretext for 
protecting national interests, which would fully 
justify American insistence on free access to 
everyone's markets. 
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IV. Extemal po licy 
56. Every alliance has a problem of co-
ordinating the foreign policies of its members 
since they are aU committed to supporting their 
partners in the event of hostilities with other 
powers. The Atlantic Alliance attempted to solve 
this problem by creating the North Atlantic 
Council. However, since the Atlootic Alliance 
covers clearly-defined areas consultations are an 
obligation regarding those areas alone and in 
fact it has frequently happened that one or other 
member of the Alliance, whether European or 
American has pursued policies in other areas of 
the world which did not at ali tally with the 
views of its partners. This has sometimes led 
to serious crises, a most characteristic one being 
the confrontation between the United States and 
France and the United Kingdom over the Suez 
affair in 1956. At present, the main problems 
relate to three fields : East-West relations as a 
whole which are admittedly considered regularly 
in the North Atlantic Council but on which 
co-ordination of externa1 policies seems far from 
perfect, the Far East and the Middle East. 
A. East- West relations 
57. The word détente which has been used to 
describe East-West relations in the last fifteen 
years is certruinly very ambiguous and it jg natural 
that it should be interpreted differently not only 
by East and West but also by the various 
member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and 
even within these countries by the various parties 
or sections of public opinion. 
58. Certain aspects of East-West relations 
should be studied apart since although they are 
interrelated they pursue separate aims by differ-
ent means. One such aspect is of course the 
1imitation of armaments and disarmament. A 
second one is the consolidation of the status quo 
in Europe so that each one may be certain, 
insofar as possible, that the other has no aggres-
sive intentions. A third aspect is that individuals 
should be allowed to escape the power of reasons 
of state to develop to the maximum their eco-
nomie freedom, and their freedom in the arts, 
science and of expression. In short, human rights 
must be able to flourish, bearing in mind that 
they are not merely formai rights guarante_ed 
by the constitutions of most western countnes 
but include requirements of an economie nature 
without which the first would be meaningless. 
59. Since President Truman defined the policy 
of containment, the United States has based its 
relations with the Soviet Union and other com-
munist countries on maintaining frontiers as they 
were after the second world war. This desire 
for stability has been an essential factor in the 
trend of East-West relations and seems to be a 
major objective of the Soviet Union, whereas 
for the West it is but a priee to be paid for 
the consolidation of peace. 
60. Conversely, when President Carter took 
office, the United States Government started to 
emphasise other aspects of détente, and showed 
an active interest in what was happening inside 
the eastern bloc and even in individual countries 
including the Soviet Union. The final act of the 
Helsinki conference is typical of the present 
situation since it juxtaposes two principles which 
are not absolutely contradictory but nevertheless 
frequently come into conflict in practice, i.e. non-
intervention in the internai affairs of states and 
the collective responsibility of the signatory 
states for the respect of human rights and free-
dom. 
61. In this connection there is no opposition 
between the Western European countries and the 
United States. Ali pursue the same aims. There 
is no doubt however that priorities are not 
everywhere exactly the same and Europe now 
attaches increasing value to the maintenance 
and development of healthy economie and trade 
relations between Eastern and Western Europe 
although sorne are sceptical about outside efforts 
to induce the Soviet Union and its allies to have 
greater respect for human rights. On several 
occasions, the United States Administration, 
under pressure from Congress, has envisaged 
economie reprisais against the Soviet Union if 
it failed to show greater willingness to respect 
human rights. These threats have not been 
without avail and it is to be noted, for instance, 
that the number of Soviet citizens authorised to 
emigrate, to Israel in particular, has increased 
oonsiderably in recent years. Similarly, the Soviet 
Government now seems to think twice before 
using more forceful means of curbing dissident 
factions. But even measures of such limited 
effectiveness are possible only if policies are 
permanently co-ordinated. Should the United 
States refuse to deliver certain equipment to the 
Soviet Union and allow its European partners 
to gain control of the markets thus freed, the 
result would be a de facto disruption of the 
Atlantic Alliance in face of the very danger it 
was formed to fight. One such instance has just 
arisen with regard to France's sale of a computer 
for the forthcoming Olympie Games in Moscow 
which the Soviet Union had ordered from the 
United States and which the latter finally 
refused to deliver. A consensus must therefore 
be found among members of the Atlantic Alliance 
to avoid sorne of them taking firm stands which 
isolate them and to maintain the cohesion of 
the western alliance outside times such as that 
of the preparation and holding of the Helsinki 
conference when consultations in the NATO 
framework were a wor.thwhile complement to 
those held by Europeans in the framework of 
the Nine. 
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B. Near and Middle East 
62. The Middle East is now more than ever an 
area of East-West confrontation, but generally 
indirect confrontation in which local factors play 
a decisive part. Whereas it might have been 
thought that developments in Egypt and a 
number of other Arab countries since 1973 would 
have allowed the crises clouding the area since 
the end of the second world war to be progres-
sively settled, severa! events have allowed or may 
allow the Soviet Union to intervene more actively 
than before, sparking off even more serious 
confl'ontations than in the past. 
63. This evolution started with the revolution in 
Afghanistan in 1977 and Pakistan's turn towards 
dictatorship. In 1978 there was even more serious 
unrest in Iran following which the Shah had 
to leave the country in January 1979 and make 
way for a régime which has not yet managed 
to assert its control over the whole country. It 
is impossible at the moment to ascertain the 
exact rôle of the Soviet Union in this series of 
events but there is every indication that the 
Iranian revolution Wlas not directly due to the 
intervention of outside forces. 
64. The unrest and insecurity in Iran led to a 
eut in its oil output and then a total halt in 
exports, which was very serious for the West as 
a whole since Iran was the world's second oil 
exporter after Saudi Arabia. Since the change 
of régime, oil production has picked up again 
but the present government does not wish it to 
return to its 1977 level. Again, it has cancel-
led a large number of contracts under which 
Iran was to have been equipped with modern 
industries and means of transport and thus use 
its profits from oil to become an industrial 
power. 
65. The United Staites Government appears to 
have taken a long time to realise the full serious-
ness of the crisis and it supported the Shah's 
régime longer than necessary in spite of the 
strong internai opposition to the régime. It sup-
plied the most sophisticated weapons, considering 
Iran as the most reliable outpost of western 
positions in the midst of an area of instability. 
Consequently, the Iranian revolution adopted a 
hostile attitude towards the West and the United 
States in particular, which was accused of having 
intervened in Iran's internai affairs to maintain 
by force a régime which had lost popular sup-
port. 
66. Europe seems to have been quicker to realise 
the threats to the Shah's régime and it was in 
France that Ayatollah Khomeini, who inspired 
the Iranian revolution, took refuge after being 
banished by the Iraqi Government. In France 
he was able to use the press, radio and television 
to spread extremely violent propaganda against 
the Shah's régime. It was thus apparent that in 
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autumn 1978 two member countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance, France and the United States, 
were pursuing two diametrically-opposed policies 
since one was still supporting the old régime 
whereas the other did nothing to hide its 
assistance to the advocates of revolution in Iran. 
The two countries' attitudes may be judged in 
various ways, but they are characteristic of the 
lack of harmonisation between the foreign 
policies of the United States and Europe. 
67. Relations between Israel and the Arab 
countries have not led to open opposition between 
Europe and the United States but the trend 
of American policy towards Palestinian problems 
has given rise to reservations and fears in 
Europe. It is known that the United States 
Government brought strong pressure to bear on 
the Egyptian and Israeli Governments to induce 
them to take part in the Camp David negotia-
tions which were to lead to the signing of a 
peace treaty between the two countries in 
Washington on 26th March 1979. Naturally, no 
one in Europe disapproves of the search for 
peace between Israel and neighbouring Arab 
countries, but many European observers 
wondered whether President Carter's methods 
for achieving this result might not jeopardise 
the chances of a true settlement. Indeed, 
although the United States Government still con-
siders, as the General Affairs Committee was told 
many times by the American authorities during 
its visit, that the Washington treaty is a step 
towards a more general settlement of ail Middle 
East problems and that a sort of peace movement 
was thus set in motion in which the whole Arab 
world would progressively become involved, 
Europeans have often felt that, quite the reverse, 
the Washington treaty merely made a general 
settlement more difficult and made absolutely 
no contribution to solving the most serious prob-
lem, that of the Palestinians. They believed it 
might endanger the Arab governments the least 
hostile to a general settlement, increase unrest 
throughout the Arab world as shown by events 
in Lebanon and foster anti-western reactions 
which might inter alia produce a fast and 
inconsiderate rise in oil priees thus perhaps 
causing a crisis which would be extremely serious 
for Europe. It should be added that there is 
nothing to show that the Israeli Government 
shares the American view that the Washington 
agreements are but a step towards general peace 
and the very fact that two days before the treaty 
was signed it was announced that more Israeli 
colonies were to be established on the West Bank 
indicates that Israel is not at all prepared to 
make more concessions than it has a1ready done. 
68. In short, American policy in the Middle 
East seems dangerous and disputable to many 
Europeans, and certain governments have shown 
- so far discreeùy - that they were anxious 
not to be associated with an American policy 
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in which they had no part, while others have 
voiced approval of American policy. 
69. Thus, in the Middle East and Iranian affairs 
there has boon a blatant absence of consultation 
and co-ordination between the policies of the 
United States and of its allies, the outcome of 
which might be extremely dangerous for the 
whole western world. 
C. Far East 
70. It is easy to understand that after the Viet-
nam affair the United States has taken the 
greatest care not to become involved in another 
war in the Far East. It is equaily evident that 
the Soviet Union has tried to take advantage 
of this situation to extend its influence, parti-
cularly as it felt threatened in that area by the 
growth of Chinese power and the increasingly 
hostile attitude of China towards it. At the end 
of 1978, Vietnam, backed by Moscow, invaded 
Cambodia, overthrew the government in office 
and set up a régime favourable to it. China was 
the only country to react to this invasion and 
at the beginning of 1979 launched an offensive 
on its Tonkin frontiers. 
71. The United States for its part had for ten 
years or so been drawing closer to China, this 
being marked by President Nixon's visit to China 
and then, after the death of Mao Tse-tung, 
recognition of the People's Republic of China, 
the severing of relations with the Taiwan Govern-
ment and the very rapid development of eco-
nomie relations with the People's Republic of 
China. The United States was not thereby depart-
ing from the policy 1ong pursued by most 
Western European countries which ail had 
diplomatie relations with the Peop1e's Republic 
of China and had also considerably increased 
their economie and trade relations in 1978. 
72. The problem now is how far the develop-
ment of friendly relations betweén China and 
the western countries can and should lead to 
further co-operation in political and defence 
matters. At present, politica1 differences do not 
seem very great since no one seems prepared 
to endorse Chinese ventures in its frontier 
disputes with the Soviet Union or in its ambi-
tions in South-East Asia. Nevertheless, certain 
·western European countries have concluded 
arms contracts with the Chinese Government, 
while the United States Government, fearing that 
the Soviet Union might consider such deals as 
provocation and close western rapprochement 
with China as an encirclement of its territory, 
is proving most reserved about such a policy. 
As long as such arms sales are small, these dif-
ferences are not too serious. But the member 
countries of the Atlantic Alliance will have to 
concert their approach to China and Far East 
problems so as not to al1ow situations to develop 
in the same way as in the Middle East and alBo 
because their policy towards China may have 
considerable repercussions on Soviet external 
and defence policy as a whole and hence on the 
security of all. 
* 
** 
73. Although necessary, the co-ordination of the 
foreign policies of Europe and the United States 
encounters considerable difficulties. Sorne are 
psychological because, since the end of the Viet-
nam war, the United States seems determined 
to keep within the strictest limits its commit-
ments in both Asia and Africa but it alone is 
able to supply weapons, guarantees or forces 
which might effectively contribute to preventing 
developments too unfavourable to the West. The 
Western European countries certainly do not 
have the means of taking effective action every 
time there may be a clash with Soviet power. 
74. As a result, serious differences have surfaced 
in various connections and many Europeans now 
seem to be afraid that the United States will 
pm'Sue a policy which no longer guarantees due 
respect for its commitments to its allies. At one 
and the same time Europe is therefore concerned 
about the world balance, maintaining its rela-
tions with the Arab world and the security of 
its oil supplies and how much confidence it may 
have in American commitments. 
V. Conclusions 
75. Mter this review of the difficulties of co-
operation between Europe and the United States, 
it wou1d be illusory and naïve to expect the 
United States to be something different and not 
draw the conclusions it thinks it should draw 
from the recent past, even if many Europeans 
reach different conclusions. 
76. Europe must realise that for geographical 
reasons and in view of its economie possibilities 
and history the United States cannot share the 
same views on ali world problems, be it in eco-
nomies, ·armaments or external policy. The 
cohesion of the West, which is essential for the 
security of all, can be guaranteed only through 
continuing agreement between the United States 
and Western Europe. But this means that 
Western Europe must really exist. In areas 
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where it has achieved a degree of unity as in 
international trade and perhaps tomorrow mone-
tary matters, it is proving possible and fruitful, 
if not always easy, for Europe and the United 
States to reach agreement based on joint interests 
and compromises between special interests. The 
expected success of the Tokyo round is most 
·encouraging in .this respect. But in areas where 
Europe has not really taken shape it is unable 
to exercise the rôle justified by its commercial 
strength, economie activity and even its efforts 
to help to ensure its own security. Its ability 
to be a true partner of the United States and 
to assert its legitimate interests therefore 
depends on how far it manages to organise itself 
in common institutions and elaborate a European 
policy. Europe's vital interests are certainly at 
stake in matters such as the strate·gic arms 
limitation talks, the international monetary 
system and the search for peace and balance in 
the Middle E·ast. It is clear that the United 
States Government has decided to take account 
of this but it is equally clear that Europe is 
unable to assert its views. 
77. The establishment of a European monetary 
system may give it the means to do so. 
78. In foreign policy matters, nine-power 
political consultations have not so far achieved 
adequate results, apart from a few c·ases such as 
the CSCE. 
79. Where defence is concerned, Europe's 
weakness is not due only to its vulnerability 
and to its inadequate troop levels and weapons 
but rather to its institutional inexistence and 
lack of will. Proof of this in 1978 is to be found 
in the way European governments evaded 
adopting a clear stand on the neutron bomb 
when the United States Government sought their 
opinions. The main obstacles to co-operation 
between Europe and the United States lie on 
the European side and it is mainly for Europe 
to find a solution. In the fields in which it is 
already united, Europe can pull its weight as 
a partner. A divided Europe will at best be 
mediocre, commanding but little respect or heed, 
continually complaining about decisions taken 
without it, whereas the United States seems to 
realise fully that European unity is necessary 
to achieve balance in the Alliance which will be 
as beneficiai for the United States as for Europe 
itself. 
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Amendment 1 
20th June 1979 
Various aspects of co-operation between Europe and the United States 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Urwin and others 
1. In the draft recommandation proper, add a new paragraph 5 as follows: 
"5. Consider in view of more recent developments the need for closer consultation on energy 
problems between the United States and the European countries." 
Signed: Urwin, van WaterBclwot, Schwencke, Scheffler, KoningB, Cook, Stoffelen, FauldB, Northfield, 
Dejardin, Roper, Hardy, Büchner 
1. See 7th Sitting, 21st June 1979 (Amendment agreed to). 
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20th June 1979 
Various aspects of co-operation between Europe and the United States 
AMENDMENT 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Péridier 
2. Leave out the fust paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommandation and insert: 
"Considering that there is the utmost interest in maintaining co-operation between Europe and 
the United States, inter alia in order to try to settle any disputes which may arise in certain fields;". 
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Draft Recommendation 
on Africa's r8le in a European security policy 
The Assembly, 
Considering that Africa has resources which are essential for the economie activity and security 
of Europe as well as for the development of African economies and for the improvement of the standard 
of living of the African peoples ; 
Noting that harmonious economie development provides the firmest basis for political stability 
in Africa; 
Considering that the Lomé Agreements provide the basis for co-operation which is profitable both 
to Western Europe and to Africa and grati:fied that most African states have freely taken part in this 
co-operation ; 
Welcoming the measures taken recently by some Mrican states to establish democratie régimes; 
Believing that any outside military intervention inhibits this trend ; 
Welcoming the end of the dictatorial régime in Uganda, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
l. Promote the co-ordination of the African policies of its members ; 
2. Encourage all attempts by African states to base their political régimes on free, universal and 
pluralist elections ; 
3. Ensure that a free, universal and pluralist vote is respected in the forthcoming elections in Namibia; 
4. Examine, in view of information available on the elections in Rhodesia in April 1979, whether 
freedom to trade with that country should not be re-established. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Müller, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. In June 1978 your Rapporteur had the 
opportunity of presenting a report on European 
security and African problems in which he 
underlined the importance for Europe of its 
relations, particularly economie, with the African 
continent and hence its interest in developing 
and organising co-operation and promoting the 
maintenance of peace in Africa without interven-
ing in the internai affairs of that continent. A 
year later, there seems to be no reason to change 
this view. 
2. At the beginning of 1979, Sir John Rodgers 
drafted the part of this report dealing with the 
economie aspects of co-operation between Europe 
and Africa. Regretting that Sir John is unable to 
join him in presenting, rus planned, the whole of 
this report, your Rapporteur felt he could 
integrate the part of the report prepared by Sir 
John in the document he is presenting today to 
the General Affairs Committee. 
3. If the overall evolution in Mrica over the 
last year is now contemplated, it is rewarding to 
note that, although it might have been less 
protracted and in calmer <lircumstances, it is 
nevertheless more or less in conformity with the 
wishes expressed by the General Affairs Com-
mitttee. 
4. It is clear that while the development of the 
application of the Lomé agreements has been 
considerable, progres;s has also been made 
towards peace based on better respect for human 
rights, particularly in southern and eastern 
Africa. Unfortunately, this does not mean that 
ali African problems are in sight of solution. The 
fact is that new fighting has broken out which 
may always lead to further intervention from 
outside, but so far it is the African states them-
selves that have handled the affairs of their 
continent. Other matters such as developments in 
Ethiopia, Chad or Mauritania are a subject of 
preoccupation. Nevertheless, the overall evolution 
of the African continent in the last year may be 
conrsidered with sorne optimism. 
PART ONE 
Economie aspects 
1. Economie relations between Western Europe and 
Africa 
5. In the last thirty years, relations between 
Western Europe and the Mrican continent as a 
whole have been marked by the sweeping move-
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ment of decolonisation with the result that no-
where on the continent is there now a territory 
dependent on a former colonial power. Although 
graduai, decolonisation was long enough ago and 
is now sufficiently advanced for it to be possible 
to try to study its repercussions on relations 
between Europe and Mrica. 
6. One question which arase was whether 
colonisation created a form of artificial economie 
solidarity based on the principle of imperial 
preference and, consequently, whether decoloni-
sation might not have changed the course of the 
economy of the African countries leading to a 
break in this solidarity which, after ail, was not 
of long standing. Sorne Mrican countries in fact 
tried breaking off economie links with Europe as 
a complement to the political independence they 
had acquired. A study of the trend of external 
trade in these countries in recent years shows 
that the links of solidarity did survive decoloni-
sation and that, far from having diminished, they 
still play an essential rôle in the economies of 
the African countries. 
7. Table VI in Chapter III of the appendix 
gives ~tatistics for three of these countries : 
Guinea, Mali and Tanzania. Although the 
statistics available for Guinea are inadequate, it 
can nevertheless be seen that in 1975, although 
.its aim had been to establish profitable economie 
co-operation with the Soviet Union, less than 
3 % of its imports came from socialist countries 
and only 0.52 % of its total exports went to those 
countries. Of the countries whose trade statistics 
are given in Table VI, it will also be seen that 
Guinea has the lowest trade f,igures. This 
probably explains the desire of the Guinean 
Government, which has not changed since the 
country achieved independence and is still 
attached to revolutionary principles, to renew 
links with its former- tu tor country, France, 
which it broke off when it became independent. 
8. Similar remarks may be made in respect of 
Mali and Tanzania. Camparison between the 
three reference years 1970, 1975 'and 1976 shows 
that only a little over 11 % of Mali's total exports 
were to socialist countries. Where imports are 
concerned, although almost 20 % came from 
socialist countries in 1970, the percentage fell 
to just over 10 % in 1976. In Tanzania, the trend 
has been similar: its imports from socialist conn-
tries fell from 15.42 % in 1970 to 8.32 % in 1976 
and its exports to these countries from 5.28 % 
to 4.79 %. 
9. This means quite clearly that attempts by 
certain African countries to divert traditional 
flows of trade and seek new supp1iers and 
custamers, particularly in the Soviet Union and 
its allies, have largely failed. Moreover, there 
have been many cases in which Soviet experts or 
manufactured products from the Soviet Union 
have had difficulties in meeting the needs of the 
African countries which have turned to suppliel'l3 
or experts in the European countries who were 
better equipped to meet their requirements. 
10. However, unlike the situation prevailing 
before decolonisation, solidarity has not been 
limited to trade with the former colonial powers 
but now covers the whole of Western Europe and 
the EEC in particular. 
11. The Yaoundé Agreements defined the shape 
of the economie relationship between the six-
power Community and the associated African 
countries. Subsequently, changes had to be made 
to take account of the enlargement of the EEC 
and the large number of African or other 
developing countries wishing association status. 
This was the rôle of the Lomé Convention of 
28th February 1975 which so to speak codified 
this solidarity in a number of principles which 
your Rapporteur will examine later. It would 
therefore appear that North-South solidarity has 
been maintained and has even gained in import-
ance in the lrust th'irty years, at leam in relations 
between Western Europe and Africa. 
12. A glanee at the map of the world shows 
that the North American industrial powers are 
the main customers and the main suppliers of 
the Latin American raw matecial producing 
countries and the main consumers of their 
agricultural produce. The Soviet Union for its 
part has developed relations with certain Asian 
countries and above ali has sufficient raw 
material resources and agricultural produce on 
its own terl"itory to meet its consumption needs 
to a very great extent. Its status as a trading 
power falls far short of its industrial capabilities. 
It consumes relatively few tropical products and 
is not a major potential customer for countries 
exporting such products. 
13. Europe, a small but very densely populated 
continent with highly developed industry, can 
find only a very smali proportion of its require-
ments domestically, be it for its own consumption 
or to supply its industry with energy and raw 
materials. Conversely, Africa, because of ti.ts size, 
relatively ~mali population, rich mineral 
resources and low level of industrialisation, ris in 
a position to supply Europe with what it lacks, 
and the development of trade between these two 
parts of the world is imperative both for the 
Africans, who can find the equipment and 
experts they need for the development of their 
countries and society only in the industrialised 
countries, and for the Europeans, who have to 
Wle their exports to pay for the raw materials 
and food products they import. 
14. The crisis with which the world has had to 
grapple since 1973 has had major effects on 
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trade between Europe and Africa, ali the reper-
cussions of which cannot yet be assessed. Up-to-
date statistics about the activities of many 
African countries are fragmentary and 
incomplete. Moreover, d$turbances in severa! of 
these countries in recent years make it difficult 
to distinguish between permanent trends and 
accidents of particularly eventful history. 
15. The increase in the priee of oil was followed 
by increases in the eost of many raw materials 
essential for the economies of the industri~ed 
countries. In the case of agricultural produets, 
the sometimes very sharp increases were often 
foliowed by equally marked reductions, as for 
coffee in 1977-78. However, certain eomments 
may be made after analysing available statistics 
for the lam few years. 
16. First, the crisis hrus not yet had such cata-
strophie effects as the 1929 erisis because 
solidarity remained intact which was not so in 
1929 outside the imperial systems. The mainten-
ance of open or, at least, non-prohibitive cmltoms 
systems by the industrialised western countries 
aliowed the flow of trade to be kept open and 
therefore also allowed industry to remain at a 
level tolerable for the p·eople of both developed 
and developing countries. World-wide solidarity 
was probably a major factor in alieviating a crisis 
which threatened to be the most serious ever 
kno"''11 in the industrial$ed world. Although the 
crisis is still far from over, it is now evident that 
no one any longer has confidence in economie 
nationa1ism for countering it. 
17. Second, the position of the less-developed 
countries with regard to the new economie dif-
ficulties was not always the same. The income of 
those able to produce oil or raw materials quickly 
showed a sharp increase. Although their income 
may have slowed down somewhat since 1975, they 
were able to push forward their development 
plans, create processing industries and move 
rapidly away from underdevelopment. Con-
versely, those whose resources failed to gain 
value through the crisis became considerably 
poorer since they had to pay much more for raw 
materials, energy produc~ and the manufaetured 
goods necessary for their equipment, which was 
consequently delayed. If to this is added the 
special crisis in Western Africa due to a long 
period of drought and the spread of desert areas, 
it must be noted that a number of African conn-
tries, far from escaping underdevelopment, 
appear to have sunk even further in the last 
five yeanJ. Whatever assistance they may obtain 
from abroad has become essential for their very 
survival and it is only from Western Europe 
that they have obtained or hope to obtain most 
of it. 
18. Third, the Soviet Union intended to exploit 
the economie crisis by increasing direct and, 
above ali, indirect intervention on the Afriean 
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continent. Admittedly, it did not send troops in 
large numbem but there is no doubt that it 
encouraged and helped the Cubans to play the 
rôle of being invited to send troops for the 
dissidents and ~o-called freedom fighters for 
whom the Soviet Union supplied the arms and 
pay. But the Soviet Union did not wish to take 
full responsibility, probably in order not to 
spark off a reaction from the United States. It 
also supplied arms to countries or uprisings over 
a large area of Africa. 
19. A question which arises is what is the Soviet 
Union's aim. The limited extent of its economie 
efforts and the very meagre assistance it has 
afforded African states which seem prepared 
to become its customers imply that the Soviet 
Union has not given serious consideration to 
gaining a colonial-type foothold on the African 
continent. On the contrary, rather than seeking 
to establish a presence there is every indication 
that its aim is subversion, fomenting unrest and 
the extension of insecurity. It would therefore 
seem that Soviet calculations are directed less at 
Africa itself than at solidarity between Africa 
and Western Europe. 
20. For the Soviet Union, the aim was to 
reduce Europe's sources of raw materials in 
Africa so asto increase their cost to the detriment 
of the balance of trade of the European countries 
or to eut them off completely, thus forcing 
Europe into a major economie crisis in the hope 
of exploiting the social and political effects. 
Operations such as those undertaken by the 
Cubans in Angola and then in the Shaba are 
typical of this method. Similarly, the Soviet 
Union has made repeated bids in Tanzania, which 
is one of the principal outlets for the rich Shaba 
mining area. Nor is there any doubt that subver-
sive movements in Rhodesia have received active 
Soviet support as has Algeria to encourage its 
operations directed towards the Western Sahara 
and the Mauritanian mineral resources. 
21. In short, the indications are that the Soviet 
Union's aim in Africa is to strangle the European 
economy rather than transform the African con-
tinent. It is a constant of Soviet policy to wage 
a high-powered campaign of revolutionary pro-
paganda in sparsely industrialised areas, not to 
solve these countries' proble~ but to promote 
revolution which it considers to be the end result 
of the capitalist system in highly industrialised 
countries. The recent history of Soviet relations 
with China can but accentuate its suspicion of 
revolutionary movements, even if supposedly 
communist, in developing countries. 
II. Western Europe and Africa's resources 
22. Industrial Europe is and must be a large-
scale consumer of raw materials and energy is 
found in only very small quantities on its ter-
ritory. It therefore depends on its purchases 
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abroad for maintaining and developing its 
industry. First and foremost, this is true for 
energy and oil, 94 % of its consumption having 
to be procured abroad. 
23. The same is true for almost aU metals. 
Europe has insufficient deposits, many of which 
are on the point of running out and most of which 
contain only low-grade ores which are expensive 
to exploit and give mediocre yields. In the case 
of iron ore, for instance, European deposits 
generally contain only 30 to 35 % metal whereas 
ore imported from Mauritania contains about 
65 %. It is therefore for economie reasollJ'I that 
European iron and steel industries have had to 
move from their traditional operating areas 
towards the coast where it is possible to bring in 
higher-grade ores more cheaply, as well as the 
coal needed for their furnaces. On the whole, the 
crisis has favoured new industries at the expellJ'Ie 
of older installations. But, except for negligible 
quantities, Europe has no production of many 
metals to be alloyed with iron in the production 
of special steels needed for the manufacture of 
machinery, engines, etc. For instance, the EEC 
countries produce only 2.8 % of the iron 
extracted in the world, 2.5 % of the bauxite, 
4.8 % of the lead and 1.9 % of the zinc whereas 
its industries supply 17.5% of the cast iron, 
18.7% of the steel and 14% of the aluminium 
and smelt 16.3% of the lead and 20% of the 
zinc produced in the world. For rarer metals, 
it is even more badly placed. For instance, 
Europe produces no copper and the development 
of its nuclear power stations makes it necessary 
to purchase large quantities of uranium which 
it produces in only small quantities. 
24. But apart from its economie requirements, 
Europe also needs these products for its security 
and defence. AU the metals it lacks are essential 
for modern arms-producing industries. Rising 
priees and possible threats to Europe's ~pplies 
jeopardise this security. Most European govern-
ments have therefore built up stocks to hedge 
against temporary shortages. However, stocks 
are not sufficient to meet a prolonged shortage. 
In this respect the United States is not 
and cannot be a valid partner for Europe since it 
has itself to import an increasingly large propor-
tion of the raw materials and even the energy 
products which it consumes. T·able V in Chapter 
III of the appendix sho~ the percentage con-
sumption of certain products imported by the 
United States. The proportion has increased 
steadily in recent yeam. It can thus be seen that 
trade with Africa is increasingly essential both 
for Europe and for the whole free world. Europe 
for its part has the utmost need to maintain free 
acceB!il to mineral deposit.s in Africa. Most of 
these consist of metals, sorne of which are rare, 
such as tin, copper, manganese and vanadium, 
and which it would be impossible for Europe to 
find elsewhere. 
25. It is naturally extremely difficult to give 
figures for these deposits since m()l'lt of them are 
not weil known and only a very approximate 
estimate can be given of their extent. But the 
tables given in Chapter I of the appendix show 
that apart from fairly common met.als such as 
iron and aluminium Africa also has large-scale 
deposits of copper, zinc, lead, tin and manganese 
and above ali it has large uranium depû$its. 
26. Uranium, essential for the production of 
nuclear energy, is also in short supply in Europe 
since so-called "reasonably certain" deposits in 
the EEC amount to only 37,500 tonnes of exploit-
able uranium at a priee below $30 per pound 
compared with world reserves of 1,650,000 tonnes 
of which 522,000 tonnes in Africa, mainly in 
South Africa and Niger. In 1977, the EEC coun-
tries produced 2,140 ton..'lEJ\9 compared with 28,400 
tonnes in the world and 5,708 tonnes in Africa. 
As Europe has only very small depœits of coal 
and oil, it is facing the need, which will probably 
become more urgent in future years, to develop 
its nuclear power stations. But the conditions 
imposed by many producer countries for exports 
of uranium lead to increased precautiom'! and 
delays in deliveries. At the present time, twenty-
two contracts between EEC countries and the 
United States, covering 1,000 pounds of uranium, 
are being held up, although the United States 
supplies Europe with 70 % of the uranium it 
consumes. It is therefore clearly in Europe's 
interest to help the African countries which have 
large natural uranium deposits to exploit these 
resources systematically and develop their 
marketing arrangements. The only alternative 
for Europe is to resort to breeder reactors whose 
technology does not yet appear to have been fully 
mastered. Similarly, the maintenance and 
development of nuclear forces by certain Western 
European countries means they must retain 
acce!'fl to uranium. 
27. The first table in Chapter III of the 
appendix shows Africa's growing share in the 
impol't$ of industrialised countries and sub-
sequent tables clearly show that the western 
countries are by far Africa's biggest customers 
in this field. Europe must also be able to count 
on regular supplies of raw materials because the 
operation of many of its industries depends on 
them. 
28. Nowadays, industrialised countries tend to 
constitute increasingly large stockpiles of the 
raw materials used by their industries both as 
a protection against soaring priees and to avoid 
shortages caused by subversion, unrest or fight-
ing in Africa. But efforts in this field are 
necessarily limited and stocks cannot account for 
the requirements of European industries for 
more than a few months. Their rôle is one of a 
strategie reserve to allow European armaments 
industries to continue producing should raw 
material supplies from Africa be interrupted 
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by a temporary crisis rather than to meet the 
peacetime requirements of industry over a long 
period. 
29. Regular supplies are also essential for main-
taining priees, this being the only way western 
industrial firms can organise their production. 
The example of the crisis caused by the sudden 
increase in crude oil priees at the end of 1973 
shows how dependent the European economies 
are on raw material priees. This crisis was in 
fact accompanied or followed by a rapid rise in 
the priee of most metals, including uranium, and 
even of a number of agricultural products such 
as coffee. To maintain regular supplies and stable 
priees, Europe must ensure the security of the 
sources of such products and transportation from 
the site of the deposits which are often a long 
way from the coast, as is the case of copper from 
the Shaba and uranium from Niger, as well as 
sea communications to European ports. Disturb-
ances in Africain recent years have had a direct 
effect on the security of such routes, particularly 
in the Shaba and Mauritania. Most European 
states have taken account of this and have 
provided considerable technical and financial 
ll.ISSistance in the organisation of ports and the 
development of railways in Africa, particularly 
in Gabon. But the transfer of mineral products 
from the Shaba to accessible ports is still a 
delicate problem because it aepends very largely 
on the good will of the countries through which 
the railways of the region pass, particularly 
Angola, Zambia, Rhodesia and Mozambique. This 
is a particularly unstable area and threats to 
security are far from over : it is to be feared that 
crises will be even more serious and perhaps more 
last'ing in the future than hitherto. 
30. European economie requirements fall in 
with the true interests of the African peoples 
themselves, who need to be able to organise the 
development of their own economies, which 
implies that they must be guaranteed stable 
incomes over long periods. They therefore have 
the utmost need to ensure continuity of exports 
and stable priees, as well as the possibility of 
transporting their ores to the industrialised 
countries. 
31. If, in addition to these factors, it is borne 
in mind that Africa lies on a route which has 
again assumed great importance, particularly for 
oil products from the Gulf states and the Middle 
East wMch, even today, cover more than 60 % 
of Western Europe's oil consumption, the 
strategie importance of the African continent 
becomes clear. The closing of the Suez Canal in 
1956 resulted in much larger oil tankers being 
built which nowadays ean hardly use the 
reopened Suez Canal and therefore continue to 
sail round Africa. The security of these routes is 
at least as important for Europe as the protec-
tion of African mineral supplies. 
DOOUMENT 804 
32. Finally, a glanee at the map in the appendix 
showing mineral output shows that it is the 
southern part of Africa, i.e. the part furthest 
away from Europe, which is the richest in 
mineral products and round which ships from the 
Indian Ocean and the Gulf must pass. The 
statistics in Table B of Chapter I and Table III 
of Chapter III demonstrate the major rôle played 
by southern Africa. But this is the region of 
Africa where there is the greatest threat and the 
most instability. 
33. Europe therefore has excellent reasons for 
wishing to put an end to these threats and ensure 
stability in the area. Such a result can be 
achieved only by maintaining or re-establishing 
peace in this area leading to open frontiers, full 
employment and the development of lines of 
communication, the possibilitie,s of which will in 
any event remain limited for a long time because 
of the natural obstacles which geography places 
in the way of the economie penetration of Africa. 
Continued disturbances and threats to the future 
of certain states provides little encouragement 
for those who have the means of making the 
investments nec~ary for the rational exploita-
tion of African resources for the benefit of the 
international economy and the development of 
local industry and consequently of the standard 
of living of the African peoples. It would be 
absurd to make the efforts needed for this 
transformation of economies and societies subject 
to the possible attainment of certain objectives, 
however generous they may be. On the contrary, 
it is this transformation which should allow the 
African states to move more quickly towards a 
democratie structure which has never managed to 
find a solid basis in countries whose economies 
were still underdeveloped. 
DI. Economie co-operation between Western Europe 
and Africa 
34. The organisation of the Economie Com-
munity in Europe and itJJ subsequent enlarge-
ment raised the problem of how to adapt 
economie links between the Western European 
countries and Africa as a whole. The imperial 
system which ha,d prevailed until then had in 
fact allowed the establishment of close economie 
links between the colonial powers and their 
colonies. There were privileged markets based on 
customs systems which were sometimes prohibi-
tive and in any event protected by very high 
customs barriers. These markets could survive 
neither the independence of the former colonies 
nor the opening of Europe's frontiers. 
35. Indeed, the very principle on which the 
European Economie Community was based 
implied the speedy removal of customs barriers 
within six-power Europe. The problem then was 
to ascertain how far special links between colonial 
powers and their former possessions could be 
maintained, and this could be possible only if 
llO 
they were extended to aU members of the Euro-
pean Community. It would have been logical for 
a parallel organisation of African states to form 
a true African common market. For various 
reMons, this has not been possible so far. First, 
the African states have often proved to be weak, 
torn by rivalry and internai strife, both 
ideological and tribal, and by outside battles 
which the decision to maintain the frontiers of 
the colonial era failed to prevent. These weak 
and unstable states could hardly consider 
regrouping themselves. The stronger and best 
adapted might have been dragged down by the 
others. 
36. Nor WIU'! regrouping helped by the geography 
of Africa or the absence of an adequate internai 
communications network. Penetration of the con-
tinent by waterway and railway had not 
produced a continuous rail network and efforts 
in recent years are still far from successful. It 
is always lines of penetration that are built and 
they do not form a real network. The absence 
of a standard gauge also makes the organisation 
of trade between African states very difficult. 
37. Third, the ideological and economie options 
of newly-independent states made it difficult for 
them to agree on a joint economie and trade 
policy. An i'llstance of this was the failure of the 
attempt by three East African countries, Uganda, 
Kenya and Tanzania, immediately after their 
accession to independence. While Tanzania 
nationalised many of its industrial and com-
mercial firms and adopted a firm policy of 
dirigism, Kenya tried, not without succeff!, to 
attract western capital and technology by main-
taining and developing a liberal form of eco-
nomy. This led to considerable distortion of the 
predominating tendency in both countries: 
whereas Kenya profited from large-scale invest-
ment and provided a point of penetration for 
many western industriral and commercial firms 
wishing to extend their activities in Africa, Tan-
zania endeavoured to protect itself against such 
foreign installations and consequently had to 
oppose the activities of firms established in 
Kenya on its own territory. It should be added 
that the coup d'état carried out by General Idi 
Amin Dada in Uganda in 1971 caused rivalry 
and clashes between Uganda and Kenya, so that 
most joint undertakings, such as East African 
Airlines, for instance, had to be dissolved and 
split between the participating states iri condi-
tions particularly unfavourable to the mainten-
ance of normal economie relations. On several 
occasions, frontiers were even closed between the 
members of this association, which is now 
completely inactive. 
38. The situation is hardly better in West 
Africa, where connections between the various 
ports linked by national railways to a hinterland 
relatively isolated from the rest of Africa have 
not allowed a true common market to be set up 
in these arerus. The same political rivalries, the 
same differences between economie systems and 
the same internai and external struggles are to be 
found there as in East Africa. Generally 
r.peaking, it may be said that so far there has 
been no success in grouping states. 
39. This has not been without consequence since 
many African states are at the mercy of internai 
subversion and external intervention which have 
increased in recent years. Most noteworthy are 
the cases of forces entering Zaïre from Angola 
and the struggle between Ethiopia and Somalia 
for the Ogaden region. But the civil war in Nige-
ria must not be forgotten, nor that in Chad, 
accompanied by frontier clashes between that 
country and Libya, nor the case of the Western 
Sahara and Mauritania which still involves a 
risk of pitting Morocco against Algeria, the 
Burundi massacres and the many threats to 
severa! Western or Central African countries. 
40. Finally, southern Africa has for many 
yea:rs been the scene and stake of a series of 
conflicts between colonialists of European origin 
and certain local populations, encouraged by 
neighbouring countries. Insecurity has increased 
considerably in this area, whose future now seems 
most problematical. 
41. So Europe was not faced with a single 
partner but a series of states or territories which 
needed to pursue the economie co-operation 
launched in the colonial era but which were 
most anxious to retain every aspect of their 
independence. 
42. In 1963, the then six-power European Com-
munity managed to reach an agreement with 
thirteen African states and Madagascar (AASM). 
In this agreement, signed in Yaoundé on 20th 
July 1963, a series of free trade areas was set 
up between the EEC and each signatory African 
state within which the movement of products 
of EEC origin was conducted under the same 
tariff conditions. Each African state remained 
master of its customs protection against other 
African states and Madagascar associated with 
the Community but within the EEC benefited 
from progressive liberalisation measures similar 
to those applred among the Six. The Community 
customs tariff was soon lowered but an import 
system for AASM products was set up at the 
same time which included special tariffs for 
agricultural products which competed with Euro-
pean products, with total exemption for a certain 
number of African products. In addition, the 
Yaoundé Agreement provided for the granting 
of financial assistance for improving agricultural 
methods in Africa, promoting diversification so 
as to terminate the system of monoculture of 
coffee or groundnuts prevailing in severa! coun-
tries of the Gulf of Guinea and supporting the 
priee of agricultural foodstuffs, particularly lin 
the event of a sharp drop in priees. 
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43. For the first time, a system was freely 
accepted by independent African states after 
true negotiations. The Yaoundé Agreement was 
subsequently renewed for five years. Signed on 
19th July 1969, it included most of the provisions 
of the first agreement but extended them to cover 
a series of measures to promote the marketing of 
AASM products in the EEC while leaving the 
AASM the right to protect their economy against 
European products, subject to application of the 
most-favoured-nation clause in respect of the 
EEC. . 
44. When the question of the possible accession 
of the United Kingdom to the European Eco-
nomie Community arose, that of relations 
between members of the Commonwealth and the 
EEC were ipso facto also raised, which led the 
Community to announce that it was prepared 
to extend to other underdeveloped countries the 
advantages granted to the AASM. An agreement 
on trade preferences was concluded with the 
three countries of the East African Federation in 
September 1969. 
45. But the transition to a nine-power Europe, 
the extension by the EEC of the generalised pre-
ference system to ali underdeveloped countries 
and the rise in the priee of raw materials and 
oil introduced new conditions which led the 
Community to make a full review of the whole 
question of its relations with the countries of 
the third world as a whole and negotiations 
began in 1973 with forty-three African, Carib-
bean and Pacifie states (ACP). The ACP man-
aged to work out joint positions which were 
upheld by a single spokesman, thus allowing them 
to ask the Community to drop its insistence on 
reciprocity in respect of trade advantages and 
grant full freedom of access for their agricultural 
products on EEC markets and industrial co-
operation to allow on-the-spot processing of an 
ever greater proportion of the rel'lources of the 
beneficiary countries. 
46. Finally, on 1st February 1975, when the 
Yaoundé Agreement expired, it was replaced by 
the Lomé Convention associating forty-six 
African, Caribbean and Pacifie states with the 
Nine. Since then, the number of ACP signatories 
has risen to fifty-two, most of which are African. 
47. This convention includes new elements. The 
first is trade co-operation based on the principle 
of non-reciprocity and voluntary imbalance 
between the obligations of the Community and 
of the ACP states. In fact, apart from a few 
agricultural products which compete with Euro-
pean products, products originating in the ACP 
states are admitted to the Community with full 
exemption from customs duties, but the ACP 
states are free to choose their own customs 
policy, subject to their guaranteeing the EEC 
most-favoured-nation treatment and making no 
discrimination between its members. 
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48. This trade co-operation is also intended to 
bring stability to the export revenue of the 
developing countries with a view to guaranteeing 
as far as possible their economies against fluctu-
ations in prie~ or in quantities of products 
offered on the EEC market. This henceforth 
became the case for a whole series of products : 
twelve basic commodities of which eleven are 
agricultural or stockbreeding products, the 
twelfth being iron ore, and a number of their 
by-products. The principle on which the stabilis-
ation system is based (STABEX) consista of 
ensuring that ACP states receive financial com-
pensation in the event of their income from 
exports to the EEC during a specifie year being 
noticeably lower than the average income of the 
preceding four years. STABEX has the backing 
of 375 million units of account to cover a five-
year period. There is a special agreement in the 
case of sugar, of which the EEC undertakes to 
import 1,400,000 tonnes per year, although a 
large-scale producer of sugar itself. 
49. This priee stabilisation is accompanied by 
a policy of financial and technical co-operation. 
A global sum of almost 4,400 million units of 
account is available for this purpose, provided 
in constant proportions by the nine EEC conn-
tries. This Community assistance is for inclusion 
in the framework of the development programmes 
of each beneficiary country and is therefore 
worked out by joint agreement between the EEC 
and these countries on the basis of proposais 
made by the states. They themselves are respons-
ible for implementing projects, particularly for 
the negotiation and conclusion of works agree-
ments for technical assistance contracta. 
50. Sorne of this assistance, amounting to about 
10 % of the total, is :intended for the creation 
of a sufficiently-wide market within the ACP 
states and neighbouring developing countries to 
aliow a reduction to be made in the economie 
dependence of the underdeveloped countries on 
their suppliers. The le$8-favoured nations benefit 
from privileged treatment to meet their special 
requirements and a major effort has been made 
for financing sm.all and medium-size :firms in 
the ACP states. 
51. In the industrial field, the Lomé Conven-
tion sought a better division of industry within 
the ACP states, the establishment of new 
industrial relations between them and the EEC 
for improving the tran,sfer of technology and 
its adaptation to the specifie requirements of 
the beneficiary countries, improving the market-
ing of ACP industrial products and increasing 
the rôle of the local staff in industrial develop-
ment. This implies a far-reaching policy of 
information, contacts between firms, transfers of 
patents and the development of research for 
which the Lomé Convention provides a frame-
work. Its true value is still difficult to asseœ 
since it depends on so many different elements. 
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52. The Lomé Convention came into force on 
1 st April 1976. Since then, seven new states have 
acceded including the Comoro Islands in 1976 
and the Cape Verde Islands and St. Thoma::; and 
Prince in 1977 among the African countries. 
The ACP states represent a surface area of 
almost 20 million sq.km., i.e. eleven times more 
than the European Community. Together, they 
have sorne 300 million inhabitants, the equivalent 
of the population of the Community. They 
represent 65 % of the area of Africa and 70 % 
of its population. In 1973, they supplied about 
half the gross internai product of Africa, amount-
ing to $42,067 million, which demonstrates the 
importance of these agreements for the continent 
as a whole. 
53. Trade results already achieved are extrem-
ely encouraging, but it is yet too soon to make 
an accurate assessment of the long-term impetus 
to trade. In 1977, there was a 19% increase in 
EEC imports from the ACP states which is 
particularly remarkable since the share of oil 
in this expansion of sales by the ACP to the 
Community was very small. The share of the 
ACP in imports from the EEC rose for the 
first time in 1977, amounting to 7.3 %. ThÎ!!I 
overall increase was accompanied by sorne stagna.. 
tion or even a drop in their share of imports 
from the former colonial powers, but this was 
offset by the increasingly large proportion of 
imports from the ACP in the trade balances of 
Italy and Germany. 
54. Agricultural and food products form a 
large and growing proportion of imports by 
the Nine from the ACP (43% in 1976) ; oil from 
Nigeria and Gabon account for 33 % of these 
importa. Fertilisers, o~ and metals account for 
about 20 %. In ali, about 50 % of ali ACP 
exports go to the Community compared with 15% 
to the United States. For sorne agricultural 
products, practicaliy ali ACP exports go to the 
Community where freedom of access is gua-
ranteed for more than 99 % of imports from 
the ACP. 
55. However, there are less promising aspects 
too, such a:; an uneven distribution of imports 
from the ACP between Community countries, 
the development of competition between equi-
valent or substitute products, erosion of pre-
ferences due to the application to ali third world 
countries of the generalised preference system 
and, finally, the fact that EEC exports to the 
ACP have increased faster than its imports. 
The ACP's share of exports from the Nine has 
increa::;ed steadily since 1975, rising to 6.7% 
in 1977, but it should be pointed out that 
although the Community provides an outlet for 
more than 50% of exports from the ACP, these 
countries are incapable of offering a comparable 
outlet for exports from the EEC. 
56. For instance, the European Community 
tried to introduce an original form of co-
operation intended to establish lasting channels 
of trade between it and a very large number 
of African countries and other third world conn-
tries. The African countries occupy an important 
place in this system which admittedly is intended 
to maintain and develop traditional economie 
links between Europe and Africa but also to 
allow the quick613t possible transformation of 
the economies of the African countries by improv-
ing and diversifying their agriculture, initiating 
and developing industries, promoting specialisa-
tion and broadening the basis of their trade not 
only with Europe but also with each other. 
57. In short, if applied satisfactorily, the Lomé 
Convention should bring about the progressive 
transformation of the whole continent. On the 
other hand, it should provdde Europe with access 
to African re,9ources which are essential for its 
security and its prosperity. Application of the 
Lomé Convention began too recently however 
for it to be possible today to assess the results. 
* 
** 
58. Thus the structure for close association 
between the EEC and Africa exists and its 
operation depends eJ'Isentially on the good will 
with which the Lomé Convention is applied. 
As has been seen, the interests of all concerned 
reside in far-Teaching co-operation with due 
respect for the full independence of the African 
states and their freedom to direct their economie 
development rus they think fit, while affording 
them the means to do so. This may not neces-
sarily be the result because for political rather 
than economie reasons the African states may 
not pursue such co-operation actively. 
59. It is quite evident that they are encouraged 
in this direction by the active propaganda of the 
Soviet Union and Cuba against the neo-
colonialism of which they accuse the Western 
European countries. But so far no other partner 
hrus offered the African states outlets comparable 
to those offered by Europe, such :favourable 
market conditions for their products, particularly 
in view of the efforts made to 13tabilise priees, 
such large-scale financial assistance and such 
extensive and effective technical assistance. 
60. But Europe must also ensure that co-
operation is not jeopardised by other trends 
in the common trade policy of member13 of the 
EEC. Further or faster enlargement of the Com-
munity towards southern Europe, the speedy 
development of Mediterranean policy or an un-
bridled search for partners among the countries 
of the third world might deprive the Lomé Con-
vention of sorne of its substance. The value of 
Africa for Europe is so great that care must be 
taken in the years to come to ensure the smooth 
operation of a system of co-operation for which 
there is no precedent in history and which can 
do much to strengthen stability and peace in the 
world. 
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PART Two 
Political aspects 
1. Developments in southern A(rica 
61. The situation is still dominated by the 
policy pursued by South Africa which seems 
to have a twofold aim : on the one hand, in res-
pect of human rights to make a number of 
concessions to international public opinion ,in 
order to end the isolation to which it has been 
condemned, on the other hand, to confer greater 
stability on its relations with neighbouring stateJ'I 
by allowing régimes more representative of the 
coloured population to be established in Namibia 
and Rhodesia although without condoning more 
radical or rebellions factions. 
62. Within the state of South Africa, a few 
measures, albeit timid, have been taken in favour 
of the black community, although the execution 
for political reasons on 6th April 1979 of 
Solomon Mahlangu, in spite of pleas by author-
ities of many western countrieJ'I, leaves consider-
able doubts about the liberal intentions of the 
South African Government. Yet the autonomy 
of the Bantustans seems to have been better 
respected than heretofore. Most progress seems 
to have been made in the search for a solution 
to the problems of Namibia and Rhodesia. 
(a) Namfbia 
63. South Africa accepted not only the prin-
ciple of the independence of Namibia but also, at 
least in outline, the plan proposed by five 
western powers - the United States, Canada, 
the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and France - for guiding this ter-
ritory towards independence. Application of this 
plan started on 26th February 1979 with the 
start of the progressive deployment of a United 
Nations force to maintain order and peace in the 
area until the free elections to be held in Septem-
ber. In fact, a whole series of secondary problems 
remains and may easily jeopardise what was 
gained in February since one of the nationalist 
organisations, the SWAPO, seems determined to 
obstruct the peaceful conduct of the elections. 
Again, South Africa is making a number of 
claims which, if not respected, might induce it to 
revise its position in the Namibian affair. 
(i) South Africa is calling for the liberation 
of political prisoners held in Zambia. These are 
former members of the SWAPO who turned 
againl3t that organisation and then were interned 
in camps in Zambia. The number of prisoners 
has been reported to be as high as about 2,000 but 
many of them have now disappeared for reasons 
which have not been explained satisfactorily and 
the Zambian Government claims that now there 
are no prisoners. Its point of view is shared by 
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the representative of the United Nations Secre-
tary-General, Mr. Martbi Ahtisaari, but strongly 
clrallenged by the South African Government 
which claims that several hundreds are still 
detained in the camps. The South African Govern-
ment seems to have valid sources of information 
since it was able to communicate to the United 
Nations Secretariat-General in August 1978 a 
list of 79 pl'IÏ.soners and their place of internment 
and in view of the attitude adopted by the 
representative of the Secretary-General, the 
South African Government is believed to have 
doubts about his impartiality. 
(ii) The composition of the United Nations force 
also raises difficulties since South Africa is pre-
pared to accept the presence of Romanian, Cana-
dian, British and Indian troops but objects to 
Scandrinavians and Nigerians whose governments 
it believes have opted too clearly for the SWAPO 
cause. 
(iii) More serions is the problem defining the 
area,s over which the authority of the United 
Nations would be extended. South Africa wants 
a United ·Nations presence on the territories of 
Angola and Zambia where SWAPO guerrillas 
have their rear bases. The Afric'an states are 
not oppœed to this but in that case wish control 
to be exercised also over the part of South 
African territory bordering on Zambia. 
(iv) Far more serions seerm; to be the question 
of applying the cease-fire which should start 
once the United Nations forces are in place. 
South Africa and the SWAPO must both under-
take to respect it but South Africa insists on 
peace being effectively re-established before 
beginning to withdraw its forces which now 
number 20,000 men and which should be reduced 
to 1,500 within three months. Consequently, any 
incident may delay the Wlithdrawal of the South 
African forces. 
(v) Should there be such incidents, it is to be 
feared that the African parties will refuse to 
maintain the date ftixed before the end of 
September for the vote since they would not 
agree to it being held under the control of a 
large South African force. 
64. However this may be, the governments of 
the five western powers behind the plan for 
United Nations intervention show sorne confi-
dence in the evolution of the situation and have 
expressed their readiness to ~end observers to 
keep their governments linformed of how the 
United Nations' work is progressing. These repre-
sentatives ·are to be housed in the same building 
in Windhoek. They consider the installation of 
the United Nations contingent as irreversible and 
consequently that it constitutes an adequate gua-
rantee of the favourable development of the 
Namibian problem. That is not without import-
ance because the SWAPO is far from grouping 
aU the African population of Namibia. It is 
114 
particularly strong among the Ovambo tribes 
which account for about half the population of 
the country whereas the Democratie Turnhalle 
Alliance draws its support from among eleven 
other etlrnic groups. 
65. The elections last December showed that 
with a high participation the Democratie Turn-
l!alle Alliance obtained a majority of 80 % 
throughout the country, 60 % in Ovambo terri-
tory and 99 % in Herero territory. More moder-
ate and with a greater Nkelihood of finding 
a compromise between the wMte and black popul-
ations and reaching agreement with the govern-
ment in Pretoria, this party is therefore in a 
good position to win the elections in September 
provided they are surrounded by adequate free-
dom. Naturally if it won the SWAPO would 
object as it diid in December 1978 on the grounds 
that the support of South Africa swung the 
balance too much in favour of the DTA. Con-
versely, assistance of ali kinds, including military 
assistance, 'afforded to the SWAPO by the Soviet 
Union, Cuba and above ali the German Demo-
cratie Republic proVIÏdes grounds for fears that 
the elections will not be conducted in aU tranquil-
lity. These threats brting heavy responsibility to 
bear on the shoulders of the five powe:rs con-
cerned. 
(b) Rhodesia 
66. In Rhodesia too, elections were organised 
in April 1979 to form a parliament of 100 mem-
bers of whom 28 should be Europeans and 
72 Africans. These elections were organised by 
the provisional government of Mr. lan Smith. 
67. The question was whether the majority of 
the population would afford its support to the 
compromise between the Rhodesian Government 
and certain representatives of the black majority 
including Bishop Abel Muzorewa. However, 
many rebel elements refused to take part in these 
elections of which they condemned the very prin-
ciple. The Rhodesian guerrilla movement was 
reported to have decided to try to prevent them 
being held. In fact, the Rhodesian Government 
mobiHsed virtually the whole wh.lite population 
since all whites in Rhodesia up to 59 years of 
age were called upon to ensure the maintenance 
of order during the elections, thus enabling the 
government to deploy 70,000 black or white 
soldiers throughout the country to protect the 
electors. To these should be added the private 
militia of the main leaders of the African parties 
agreeing to the elections, i.e. about 5,000 men 
whose task was to prevent an army estimated 
at sorne 10,000 guerrillas from disturbing the 
process of the elections. 
68. Thus, from the outset, the elections were 
heavily lrandicapped by the refusai of the leaders 
of the guerrillas to take part on the grounds that 
forces were being deployed and also that an 
electoral system guaranteeing the whites 28 % 
of the seats whereas they only constitute 4 % 
of the population was inherently unequal. In 
addition, whatever the results of the elections, 
the transitional me~œures planned guarantee that 
the white minority will continue to control the 
government of the country for at least five 
years. Finally, the Smith government is criticised 
for a series of military operations against the 
rebellion not only on Rhodesian territory but 
also on the territory of neighbouring countries 
such as Zambia where the Rhodesian army fought 
against the Zimbabwe rebellion through to the 
capital, JJusaka. For its part, the Salisbury 
government justified these operations by the need 
to prevent guerrillas jeopardising the freedom 
of the electors. 
69. It may therefore be wondered whether the 
April 1979 elections will be a true contribution 
to re-establishing peace and a cons1Jitutional order 
acceptable to the black majority of the country 
or whether on the contrary the main result will 
not be to disarm the African rebellion by divid-
ing its forces and enabling the western countries 
to resume their supplies to Rhodesia. Indeed 
it seems that the South African Government 'and 
the Rhodesian Government have based thei.r tac-
tics on the sincere desire of the great majority of 
the population to live in peace. There have been 
estimates of over 14,000 deaths in the civil war, 
at least half of them among the civilian 
population, which would signify wide popular 
support for the approach worked out by the 
Rhodesian Government whereby the leaders of 
the rebellion would be kept out of the political 
game. 
70. The parliaments of western countries invited 
to send observera to supervise the conduct of the 
elections turned down tM! offer but a number 
of parliamentarians went in a personal capacity. 
Their testimony IÏndicates that the elections were 
conducted in an atmosphere of relative freedom. 
71. Considering the circumstances, participation 
in the elections was relatively high: 64 %· The 
victory of the United African National Council 
of Bishop Muzorewa was clear since it obtained 
67 % of the votes cast, i.e. 1.8 million votes, and 
shou1d secure 51 of the 100 seats in parliament 
as against 28 for the white minority represented 
by Mr. lan Smith's Rhodesian Front and 21 for 
the other African parties, 12 of which go to 
Mr. Sithole's Zimbabwe African National Union. 
The new prowsional government should include 
10 representatives of the United African National 
Council, 6 from the Rhodesian Front and two 
from each of the minority African parties, 
making 14 black representatives and 6 whites. 
72. The question now :is what will be the attitude 
of the western countries towards the new Rhode-
sian Government. Will they recogruise the April 
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1979 elections as valid and end the boycott of 
lan Smith's régime? Naturally the Soviet Union 
and a number of its African allies, including 
those who afforded their support to the Zim-
babwe Patriotic Front, will reject the result of 
the elections outright. So far the western coun-
tmes have reserved their opinion. However, the 
United States Ambassador, Andrew Young, has 
already announced that President Carter would 
not recognise the new Rhodesia-Zimbabwe 
Government but certain American observers such 
as Senator Helms have pronounced that the 
elections were absolutely free. This senator has 
tabled a bill to raise the embargo and a signi-
ficant part of Congress would seem prepared 
to vote for it. 
73. European governments should also examine 
the results of these elections with the utmost 
attention and concert their vli.ews so as to adopt 
a joint approach. Any such position should be 
reached on the basis of a calm assessment weil 
removed from the heat of the elections. It should 
take due account of the danger of backing a 
régime which was not sufficiently representative 
and on the other hand of encouraging movements 
of rebellion which would be representative only 
of a minority but whose operations might increase 
tension in southern Africa and bring about a 
further hardening of the policy of the Pretoria 
government. A government in Rhodesia with a 
black majority but tolerant towards whites would 
be an invaluable encouragement to the search 
for a reasonable régime in South Africa. 
( c) Mozambique 
7 4. For months, attacks, sabotage and varions 
disturbances have been on the increaae in this 
countrv. Sorne were attributed to Rhodesian 
guerriÙas but others were claimed by the Mozam-
bique National Resistance (MNR), an under-
ground movement agaÏI$1; the Frelimo régime. 
This movement seems to have had steady support 
from the government of Mr. lan Smith in Rho-
desia in oppositJion to the Maputo régime and the 
Rhodesian guerrillas of Robert Mugabe. It is 
reported to be equipped with modern weapons 
and to have been joined by a number of Frelimo 
defectors including officers trained in the USSR. 
The requisition of foodstuffs by the Mozambique 
army and the Frelimo IÏs reported to have brought 
it wide support among the rural population. 
75. At the moment the MNR seems incapable 
of seriously challenging the power of the Mozam-
bique government but its development and activ-
ity testify to the urgency of finding a solution 
to the Rhodesian conflict and the danger of any 
prolongation of present tension in the eastern 
part of southern Afr!ica. European governments 
must take this into account when examining 
the problem of raising the boycott on Rhodesil\ 
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ll. East Africa 
(a) The U ganda revolution 
76. The most serious disturbances have most 
certainly been in East Africa. Bobltered by the 
support they had from the Soviet Union and 
Cuba, and also certain countries of North Africa, 
the Tanzanian Government in support of a wide-
spread movement of Ugandan refugees launched 
a major operation against the highly-discredited 
régime of Marshal Idi Amin Dada in Uganda. 
In April 1979 the Tanzanian army took strong 
action to help the opponents of the Uganda 
régime to invade that country where it seized 
the capital, Kampala, and forced the troops still 
faJithful to Marshal Amin Dada to take refuge 
in the forest areas near Kenya. It thus put 
an end to one of the cruellest dictaton!hips with 
the least respect for human rights and set up 
in Kampala a provisional government drawn 
from among the !Ïnsurgents. 
77. The reasons which led Tanzania to d!Ïs-
regard the principle of the territorial integrity of 
the African states set up after colomsation are 
certainly complex. There is no hint of hegemony 
in the Tanzanian Government's action but the 
indications are that it wished first to secure 
guarantees against the threats so often levelled 
at it by the former dictator of Uganda and, 
second, to promote the downfall of h:is régime 
without calling on forces from outside Africa. 
It is yet too soon to form an opinion on the 
new régime in Kampala. It may however be 
considered that it has every chance of being 
more democratie and having greater regard for 
the preservation of the rights and liberties of 
mankind than the previous réglime. It should be 
noted that this is its clearly-expre$sed intention 
whereas, during their withdrawal towards the 
frontJ.iers of Kenya, troops still faithful to 
Marshal Amin Dada have multiplied their acts 
of repression. The Ugandan and Tanzani'an forces 
which took over Kampala have found many 
traces of massacres carried out under the Ugan-
dan dictator. 
78. It remains to be seen whether the new 
régime will have the energy and drive nec~ary 
to restore the economy after such a long period 
of absolute despotism in Uganda producing such 
deep-rooted disorder. 
79. Many African and European countries have 
hastened to recognise the new régime in Uganda. 
In doing so, they have condoned Tanzania's 
military operation which put an end to the 
dictatorship in Uganda. 
(b) Ethiopia and its neighbours 
80. Information available on the evolution of 
the situation in Ethiopia and neighbouring 
terrtitories is still extremely limited which makes 
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it very difficult to form a substantiated opimon. 
It appears that with the assistance of Cuban 
volunteers and Soviet al"'IllS the government which 
emerged from the 1975 uprising putting an end 
to the régime of the Negus has managed to 
control a large part of the territory of Ethiopia 
and former Eritrea. The régime is despotic and 
repressive and has already led to the departure 
of many refugees, mainly Eritrean, who are now 
crowded in Djibouti, Somalia and the Sudan in 
appalling material and moral conditions. As of 
now, 35,000 Ethiopian refugees constitute about 
12 % of the population of Djibouti where the 
government is unable to accommodate them. 
There are reported to be about 300,000 refugees 
in the Sudan, i.e. more than 10 % of the popula-
tion of the country, equally ill-equipped to receive 
them, particularly since it has already had to 
take in several thousand refugees from Zaïre. 
81. These refugees constitute a human problem 
for the world as a whole and a political problem 
for the receiving countries which are afraid that 
a problem similar to the one in Lebanon will 
develop in the camps whose numbers are swelling. 
The United Nations High Commissariat for 
Refugees has so far been unable to find a 
satisfactory solution to these questions and, to do 
so, it would require a demonstration of interna-
tional solidarity. In not wishing refugees to 
settle permanently on their territory, Djibouti 
and the Sudan have particular fears for their 
security and vital interests ~ould an Ethiopian 
revolutionary power emerge. Such is the case in 
particular for Djibouti whose Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mounin Dahdon Farah, is 
reported to have 'appealed to the governments of 
Arab countries for assistance in resisting a threat 
of subversion directed by the Ethiopian Govern-
ment. According to the authorities of Djibouti, 
the leaders of Ethiopia have armed a revolu-
tionary group which ha$ already started opera-
tions against the armed forces of Djibouti. 
(c) Libya 
82. There is now every indication that East 
Africa is one of the most unstable areas on the 
African continent. Events in Ethiopia and neigh-
bouring countries in the last three years seem to 
threaten the staoolity of the whole of this area 
and Libya for its part seems to be playing an 
increasingly important rôle in destabilising 
North-East Africa. According to information 
from various sources, it is reported to have pro-
vided Marshal Idi Amin Dada with assistance in 
defending Uganda against Ugandan rebels and 
Tanzanian forces. If the N'Djamena government 
is to be believed, it provided increasing assistance 
to the rebels in Northern Chad, part of whose 
territory it is claiming, moreover. It is also sruid 
to have supplied arms and perhaps troops to the 
Ethiopian Government. 
83. The aim.s pursued by Colonel Kadhafi's 
government have never been very clear but more 
than ever it is emerging as a subversive element 
and trouble maker in a large part of the African 
continent which is ail the more formidable in that 
its revenue from oil has allowed it to equip its 
army with the latest weaponry purchased from 
members of the W arsaw Pact and from certain 
western countries too. 
m. Central Africa 
84. After its difficulties in 1978, Zaïre now 
seem.s to be passing through a calmer period. 
However, there is still much aDXJiety about its 
stability and the means available to the Kinshasa 
government for effectively controlling the coun-
try as a whole and promoting the necessary eco-
nomie changes. At least the assistance obtruined 
by Mr. Mobutu's government from many African 
states during the 1978 crisis leaves room for hope 
that African solidarity will continue to act in its 
favour and should there be a further threat to 
the integrity of Zaïre there would no longer be 
any need for intervention by European powers. 
85. But the situation in Chad seems far more 
complicated. In 1978 the N'Djamena government 
was replaced by a new régime whœe roots were 
to be found in the rebellion in the northern area. 
Christian elements in the south of the country 
are finding it increasingly difficult to accept the 
authority of the capital but this is not preventing 
a new rebellion backed by Libya from developing 
in the north. A conference of five different 
armed organisations was convened in Kano, 
Nigeria, in March 1978. An agreement was 
reached but when the question arose of associat-
ing six other militant organisati.oThS in April, the 
Kano conference had to resort to setting up a 
committee of enquiry into the representativity 
of these organisations. It is difficult to see how 
a government lacking the support of the various 
ethnie groups forming the population of Chad 
could remain in office for long in N'Djamena 
without the support of outside powers. If Europe 
does not wish to take direct action in this area 
it should encourage the Organisation of African 
Unity to assume its responsibilities and promote 
the formation in N'Djamena of a government 
which secures the backing of all fractioll$ of the 
population of this country. 
IV. West Africa 
86. West Africa has been an area of rela!tive 
stability si.nce tht~ end of the civil war in Nigeria. 
The development of oil in this country has 
allowed its economie activity to be restored 
without delay and the economies of several other 
West African countries such as the Ivory Coast 
seem to be developing fairly quickly in a frame-
work of political stability. 
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87. This is not so for all co un tries in the area 
however. The further deterioration in the climate 
in the Sahel and the extension of desert regions 
have steadily reduced the areas under cultivation 
and particularly those suitable for breeding 
livestock with a consequent increase in poverty 
and often famine. 
88. In Nigeria, the military government which 
has been directi.ng the country for thirteen years 
has decided to stand down and allow free 
elections to be held on 7th May 1979, as was done 
by the military rulers of Ghana in 1969. The 
attempt in Ghana failed after twenty-seven 
months. The Nigerian Government has taken 
account of this unfortunllite experience by first 
re-establishing democratie procedure at local 
level and establishing a federal system with 
nineteen states as a ploy aga;in:st tribalism. Five 
parties are to take part in the May 1979 élections 
in an atmosphere of remarkable freedom after 
thirteen years of bans on political parties. It 
remruins to be seen whether the elections will 
produce a stable majority capable of continuing 
the realistic policy pursued by the military 
régime, particularly in economie matters. Should 
this not be so, it :is to be feared that democratie 
practices will be jeopardised for a long time to 
come, not only iÎn Nigeria but also in neighbour-
ing countries. 
89. Important elections are also to be held in 
Ghana ·in the coming months with a V'Ïew to the 
adoption of a democratie constitution. 
90. The only international conflict in West 
Africa is between Mauritania and Morocco. Once 
Spa;in put an end to the colonisation of the Rio 
de Oro, the area was shared between Morocco 
and Mauritania. A rebellion, encouraged and 
armed by Algeria on whose territory it set up its 
rear bases, developed outside the former territory 
of Rio de Oro in Morocco and Mauritania where 
the railway for transporting Mauritanian iron 
ore was subjected to frequent attacks, which led 
to a reaction from France with the commitment 
of ,its forces stationed in Mauritania. 
91. This problem produced high tension between 
Morocco and Algeria, both of which have quite 
powerful armies, and there is still a danger of 
hostilities worsening. There have been two 
revolutions in Mauritania since July 1978 and 
each new régime undertook to negotiate with 
the leaders of the rebellion but on terms which 
have so far proved unacceptable to the rebels. It 
is extremely difficult to assess the true extent of 
the rebellion since statistics about the population 
in that part of the Sahara are extremely dubious. 
92. However this may be, a solution should be 
found giving due satisfaction to thlJ;! population. 
But at the same time it is to be feared that before 
a solution is found there will be fighting between 
Morocco and Algeria which might most probably 
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provide the Soviet Union with a new pretext for 
intervening on the African continent. Here too, 
western interventlion seems hardly desirable, 
whatever the interests at stake, since this could 
but provide an opportunity and pretext for other 
ouŒide intervention. 
Conclusions 
93. After this brief glimpse of the situation, 
your Rapporteur ha:!! to conclude that more thau 
ever African problems must be handled by the 
population of Africa :itself. The relative modera-
tion of the Soviet Union and its allies in African 
affairs in the last year has allowed the Africans 
to take far more action thau heretofore in the 
settlement of the problems a.rising on their con-
tinent. 
94. Certain measures however may be taken to 
facilitate this proceœ. One is the development of 
co-operation between Europe and Africa on the 
basis of the Lomé agreements. lt now seems clear 
that most African countries have realised what 
advantage they cau draw from these agreements 
and have understood that this is not a new 
colonialist operation on the part of the Euro-
peans but a basis for co-operation based on new 
princip les. 
95. Second, Europe must be far more cautions 
and moderate in its supplies of arms to African 
ll8 
states. Several times, arms procured by one 
African country or another have been used in 
other areas. Libya in particular has been an 
active agent of a policy of destabilisation in 
Africa thanks to the arms it has procured in 
Europe and elsewhere. 
96. Finally, the policy of presmre against South 
Africa and Uganda has produced tangible results 
which should not be compromised by over-
systematic support for the aims of rebel move-
ments. Resulm are obviously more conclusive in 
the case of Uganda where the Tanzanian Govern-
ment was encouraged to help the Ugandan rebels 
to terminate the régime of terror in their country. 
In the case of southern Africa, there is nothing 
conclusive in the nature of the compromises which 
have allowed elections to be held in Rhodesia and 
promised elections in Namibia. What is positive 
is the use of universal suffrage decided on in 
N amibia and alrea.dy applied in Rhodesia. Even 
if the results of these first elections are being 
challenged and even if they fail to allow a régime 
to be set up which might re-establish order and 
peace, they nevertheless demonstrate that the 
sovereignty of the people has been recognised as 
the basis for a new state. That is the basis on 
which iit is possible to institute régimes with 
sufficient backing to produce effective peace and 
permanent respect for human rights. 1t is 
Europe's duty to take account of this now in its 
attitude towards the boycott of Rhodesia and 
guarantees of free voting in Namibia. 
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Country Iron 
Morocco 60 
Algeria 600 
Tunisia 40 
Egypt 430 
Ma uri tania 130 
Sene gal 400 
Niger 
Guines. 600 
Sierra. Leone lOO 
Liberia. 700 
Ghana. 
Nigeria. 
Central African 
Empire 
Gabon 940 
Zaïre 
Za.mbia. 
Rhodesia 440 
Namibia 400 
CHAPTER 1 
Mineral products in Africa - known reserves 
A. Principal ores 
Bauxite Copper Zinc Lead Tin Manga-nese 
---
600 1,400 680 
600 600 
4,064 
lOO 
320 
276 
90,000 
25,000 900 195 3,100 
29,000 700 
600 
1,000 1,400 
Source : Industries et travaux d'Outre-Mer, March 1978. 
B. Share of southern Africa in world reserves 
Chromium 
Industrial diamonds 
Platinum 
Gold 
Cobalt 
Manganese 
Vanadium 
Fluorine 
Uranium 
Copper 
Asbestos 
Antimony 
Source: Défense Nationale, December 1978. 
120 
% 
96 
89 
71 
50 
40 
37 
19 
17 
14 
13 
6 
5 
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(Estimate million tons) 
Uranium Co al Phos-phates 
16,200 
45 
270 
1,090 
120 
40,000 
450 
7,000 
20,000 
200 
6,600 
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CHAPTER II 
Mineral production in 1916 
(in thousand tons) 
Country Iron ore Bauxite Copper Zinc Lea.d Tin Ma.nga- Uranium Coal Ph os-
nese phates 
Morocco 40 4 15 67 118 700 15,293 
Al ge ria. 2,800 14 2 820 
Tunisia. 485 7 11 3,294 
Egypt 1,242 4 550 
Ma. uri tania. 9,415 9 
Sen egal 1,580 
Niger 1.460 
Guines. 11,316 
Sierra. Leone 660 
Liberia. 21,340 
Togo 2,068 
Ghana. 267 312 
Nigeria. 4 300 
Ga. bon 2,217 0.955 
Congo 2 5 
Zaïre 444 68 4 157 90 
Angola. 
Uga.nda. 7 
Ta.nza.nia. 753 10 
Zambia. 709 38 14 
Rhodesia. 600 50 2,600 
Na.mibia. 39 46 42 
Botswana. 12 1 224 
Others 272 3 2 556 173 
-- --
ToTAL A.FmoA 36,222 12,248 1,276 193 139 11 2,808 2.415 5,223 23,788 
Source: Industries et travaua: d'Outre-Mer, Maroh 1978. 
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CHAPTER III 
Trade 
1. Africa's share in industrialised countries' importa 
($ million) 
1967 1976 1977 
Total exports to developed market economies (a) 147,460 658,351 749,390 
From Africa.n developing market economies ( b) 6,750 34,431 39,596 
From South Africa 1,460 3,803 5,383 
Africa's share 5.6% 5.8% 6.0% 
(a) Excluding South Afrioa. 
( b) Exoluding Southern Rhodesia. 
Source: United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistios, special tables in the June issue. 
ll. Exporta from developing Africa 
(a) Crude fertiliser& and mineral& 
1967 1976 Annual average 
growth rates 
$ million % $ million 
1967-76 
% (%) 
World 210 805 + 16.1 
Developed market economies (a) 168 80.0 585 72.7 + 14.9 
Developing market economies 14 6.7 91 ll.3 + 23.1 
Centrally planned 24 ll.4 132 16.4 + 20.9 
(b) Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 
World 365 1,117 + 13.2 
Developed market economies (a) 354 97.0 1,000 89.5 + 13.2 
Developing market economies 2 0.5 23 2.1 + 31.2 
Centrally pla.nned 9 2.5 63 5.6 + 24.1 
(c) Mineral fuels and related materials 
World 2,070 27,265 + 33.2 
Developed market economies (a) 1,903 91.9 23,768 87.2 + 32.4 
Developing market economies ll5 5.6 2,828 10.4 + 42.7 
Centrally planned 6 0.3 334 1.2 +56.3 
(a) Exoluding South Afrioa. 
122 
APPENDIX DOCUMENT 804 
(d) Non-ferrous metals 
1967 1976 Annual average 
growth rates 
$ million % $ million 
1967-76 
% (%) 
World 1,020 1,734 + 6.1 
Developed market economies (a) 944 92.5 1,052 60.7 + 1.2 
Developing market economies 16 1.6 419 24.2 + 43.7 
Centrally planned 19 1.9 40 2.3 + 8.6 
(e) Total 
World 7,960 41,839 + 20.2 
Developed market economies (a) 6,576 82.6 35,899 85.8 + 20.8 
Developing market economies 720 9.0 4,964 11.9 + 23.9 
Centrally planned 530 6.7 1,961 4.7 + 15.6 
(a) Excluding South Mrica. 
Source: United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Special tables in July 1975, August 1976, May 1977, June 1978 and 
July 1973 issues. 
m. Exports from South Africa 
1967 1976 1977 
$ million % $ million % $million % 
--
World 1,900 4,787 6,690 
Developed market economies 1,460 76.8 3,803 79.4 5,383 80.5 
Developing market economies 355 18.7 918 19.2 1,220 18.2 
Centrally planned economies 4 0.2 20 0.4 21 0.3 
Source: United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, special tables in the June issue. 
IV. Oil movements from Africa 
(in million tons) 
1967 1976 1977 
To: 
United States 3.0 98.1 123.6 
Canada 1.5 2.5 19.6 
Western Europe 130.5 123.2 124.6 
Latin America 
- 19.1 21.0 
Africa. 
- 0.7 0.2 
South-East Asia. 
- 1.9 0.9 
Japan 
- 3.5 1.2 
Australasia 
- - -
Other Eastern Hemisphere 0.8 11.1 4.5 
Destination not known 3.0 - -
TOTAL 141.0 260.1 276.0 
Source: BP Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry, annual issues 1967 to 1977. 
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V. United States importa 
Bauxite 
Chromium 
Cobalt 
Tin 
Manganese 
Nickel 
Oil 
(of which 40 % by the Cape of Good Hope) 
(as % of oonsumption) 
88 
lOO 
75 
(imported from Zaïre) 
lOO 
95 
90 
60 
VI. Share of state-trading countries in the trade of certain Afrlcan countrles 
1. 1 mports from : 
1970 1975 1976 
Country Sooialist Sooialist Sooialist 
World ooun- % World ooun- % World ooun- % 
tries tries tries 
-- ----
Angola 368,514 315 0.07 430,000 200,000 
Ethiopia 173,058 9,533 5.51 293,978 16,223 5.52 406,042 
Guinea 55,023 154,320 4,490 2.91 123,000 
Mali 44,799 8,951 19.98 189,295 28,662 15.14 150,153 15,568 10.37 
Mozambique 324,000 216 0.07 401,130 70 0.02 350,000 
Nigeria 1,058,986 61,408 5.80 6,041,232 175,057 2.90 8,194,632 259,894 3.17 
Tanzania 271,488 41,869 15.42 718,260 92,101 12.82 566,578 47,157 8.32 
Zaïre 532,975 3,776 0.71 727,127 16,682 1.80 827,000 
Zambia 476,992 8,962 1.88 928,716 30,312 3.26 850,000 
2. Exports to: 
Angola 423,385 1,699 0.40 900,000 200,000 
Ethiopia 122,302 1,516 1.24 230,778 5,910 2.56 313,258 
Guinea 42,377 130,000 680 0.52 202,000 
Mali 35,456 647 1.82 36,766 8,157 22.19 84,537 9,394 II.II 
Mozambique 156,774 122 0.08 294,620 180 0.06 190,000 
Nigeria 1,058,986 35,377 2.88 7,991,994 132,993 1.66 9,726,421 49,590 0.51 
Tanzania 238,326 12,589 5.28 348,679 20,691 5.93 459,981 22,053 4.79 
Zaïre 735,366 17 742,366 4,461 0.60 930,000 
Zambia 1,000,950 54,183 5.41 8II,503 20,849 2.57 1,046,000 
SO'IIh"C6: United Nations statistioal yearbooks. 
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($ thousand) 
1977 
World 
349,000 
145,000 
704,000 
610,000 
817,000 
330,000 
145,000 
II,772,000 
501,000 
981,000 
898,000 
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Vfi. EEC trade with certain African countries 
Country lm ports Exports 
% % 
Morocco 51.1 59.2 
Algeria 59.9 45.4 
Tunisia 64.5 53.7 
Libya 54.2 49.6 
Egypt 37.4 30.1 
Su dan 46 42.4 
Ivory Coast 63.1 57.9 
Ghana 42 38.2 
Nigeria 60.2 35.1 
Cameroon 66.8 62.3 
Gabon 78.5 32.2 
Zaïre 54.2 73.3 
Angola 32.2 12.5 
Kenya 40.7 35.9 
Tanzania 34.8 39.2 
Zambia 43.3 46.3 
South Africa 48.1 48 
Source: Eurostat, 1978,_pages 136·137. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Co-operation under the Lomé Convention 
Percentage of STABEX products in exports 
Country 
Botswana 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central African Rep. 
People's Rep. of Congo 
Ivory Coast 
Dahomey 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Upper Volta 
Kenya 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Ma uri tania 
Niger 
Uganda 
Ruanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Chad 
Togo 
Products 
Rides and skins 
Coffee, cotton, hides and skins 
Cocoa, coffee, timber 
Coffee, timber, cotton 
Timber 
Cocoa, coffee, timber 
Palm products 
Coffee, hides and skins 
Timber 
Groundnuts, groundnut oil and 
oilcake 
Cocoa, timber 
Groundnuts and groundnut oil, 
cotton 
Coffee, tea 
Iron ore 
Coffee, hemp 
Tea, groundnuts 
Cotton, groundnuts 
Iron ore 
Groundnuts, groundnut oil 
Coffee, cotton, tea 
Coffee, raw hides 
Groundnuts and groundnut oil 
Iron ore, palm nuts 
Bananas, copra 
Cotton, groundnuts 
Cotton 
Coffee, cotton, hemp 
Cotton 
Cocoa beans, coffee 
Source: International Financial Statistics, November 1974. 
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% 
9 
95 
61 
62 
42 
67 
34 
51 
32 
94 
80 
30 
33 
71 
33 
24 
46 
73 
24 
86 
65 
35 
15 
71 
65 
3 
31 
69 
39 
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Amendments 1 and 2 · 
Africa's r6le in a European security policy 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Hardy and others 
19th June 1979 
1. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommandation, add a new paragraph as follows: 
"Condemning the policy of apartheid as still pursued by the South African Republic as contrary 
to the principles of democracy and human rights and as a threat to world peace ;". 
2. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommenda.tion proper, add: 
"and induce the South African Republic to termina te apartheid ;". 
Signed: Hardy, Faulds, von Bothmer, Urwin, Cook, Lewis, Miller 
1. See 5th Sitting, 20th June 1979 (Amendment 1 nega.tived; Amendment 2 a.greed to). 
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Amendment 3 
Africa's r6le in a European security policy 
AMENDMENT 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Faulds and others 
19th June 1979 
3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommandation proper, leave out aU the words after "Examine" and 
add: 
"in view of the nature of the constitution and the circumstances of the elections in April 1979, 
whether recognition can yet be given to Southern Rhodesia or sanctions yet be lifted." 
Signer],: Faulds, Urwin, von Bothmer, Roper, Stofjelen, SCkwencke, Oook, Enders, Northfield, MiUer, 
Oraigen, Konings 
1. See 5th Sitting, 20th June 1979 (Amendment negatived). 
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Amendment 4 
Africa's rôle in a European security policy 
AMENDMENT 4 1 
tabled by Mr. Boucheny 
4. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommandation proper, add: 
19th June 1979 
"and, taking account in particular of the repeated condamnation by the United Nations of the 
régime in South Mrica, strive resolutely to restore freedom for all races and ethnie groups in that 
country;". 
Signed : Boucheny 
l. See 5th Sitting, 20th June 1979 (Amendment not moved). 
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Amendment 5 
Africa's rôle in a European security policy 
AMENDMENT 5 1 
tabled by Mr. Page 
19th June 1979 
5. In pa.ragraph 3 of the dra.ft recommandation proper, a.fter the first word "in" insert "and a.fter". 
Signed : Page 
1. See 5th Sitting, 20th June 1979 (Amendment agreed to). 
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The industrial bases of European security 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 2 
by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the industrial bases of European security 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
II. General aspects of industrial problems 
III. Drawbacks of dispersal 
IV. Military requirements and European industry 
V. Indus trial bases of defence 
APPENDICES 
I. Different programmes pursued on a co-operative basis 
II. Estimated armaments exports from 1965 to 1974 
2lst May 1979 
III. Expert opinion on military requirements (submitted by Ingénieur Général 
Brindeau) 
IV. European aircraft programmes 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Warren (Chair-
man) ; MM. Valleix, Lenzer (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. 
Adriaensens, Bemini, Cavaliere, Comelissen (Alternate : 
Portheine), Hawkins (Alternate : Beith), Konings, Lewis, 
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Malvy, Mart (Alternate : Hengel), Müller, Péronnet, 
Pinto, Schwenclce, Talon, Treu, Ueberhorst (Alternate : 
Scheffler), van Waterschoot. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
prin t ed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the industrial bases of European security 
The Assembly, 
Considering that the time is ripe to review the results achieved so far by the various forms 
of European armaments co-operation ; 
Considering the military and economie need for Europe to acquire at least cost the means 
of ensuring its security, a condition of its independance ; 
Considering the technical possibilities of member countries and the constantly-rising cost of 
armaments at the research, development and production stages ; 
Considering moreover the importance of the armaments industries in the economies of severa} 
member countries and the ability of sorne of them to produce many types of equipment without 
international co-operation; 
Considering finally the immediate need to conclude an agreement on programmes for the 
production of military equipment to be interoperable by the end of the century or standardised 
wherever possible, taking account of the fact that research, development and production cover a 
period of from ten to fifteen years ; 
Noting Resolution 62, adopted by the Presidential Committee on 18th January 1979, on the 
organisation of a second symposium on a European armaments policy on 15th, 16th and 17th Octo-
ber for which this report is to be a preparatory document, 
REooMMENDS THAT THE CoUNOIL 
1. Urge member countries to determine the military equipment: 
(a) to be produced on a co-operative basis; 
(b) to be produced with due regard for interface conditions to ensure interoperability; 
(c) to be the object of special efforts because of present shortcomings in Europe and their 
foreseeable importance ; 
2. Assess the results and advantages of the various forms of industrial co-operation in these 
fields to date, together with the di:fficulties and setbacks encountered; 
3. Define methods of ensuring greater European co-ordination of research and development in 
such branches of advanced technology as integrated circuits, microprocessors, radar systems, lasers 
and infra-red sensors for weapons systems ; 
4. Improve methods of procuring armaments and, in close liaison with the industries concerned, 
introduce appropriate measures for facilitating the exchange of know-how and the protection of 
industrial proprietary rights ; 
5. Seek frameworks for lasting co-operation between member countries by forming permanent 
industrial consortia, concluding European agreements on specifications and replacement schedules for 
military equipment and working out harmonised methods of financing ; 
6. Work out methods and structures to improve decision-taking and production capacity in 
European co-operation. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur) 
1. Introduction 
1. In his report on British membership of the 
European Communities and the prospects of 
scientific and technical co-operation in Europe\ 
Mr. Lloyd demonstrated that Europe had made 
far le..'lS progress in advanced technology than 
the United States. For instance in the aerospace 
' ' nuclear and computer industries, the European 
effort could not really be compared with that 
of the United States although the scale of the 
European market and the extent of Europe's 
combined resources were comparable. Continued 
economie progress in Europe would ultimately 
depend on technological progress and to keep a 
good lead high technology skills would have to 
be developed. 
2. Although research and development of 
modern computer and data-processing systems 
took place in the United Kingdom the industrial 
development was promoted by IBM and the 
United States navy at the end of the second 
world war ; the first all-electronic digital com-
puter was completed in 1945. Commercial use 
started in 1950 and IBM became commercially 
active in the computer field in 1952. The 
explosive growth of this industry was sustained 
by the concurrent development of mini- and 
microe1ectronic hardware that began with the 
invention of the transistor in 1947. 
3. Without mentioning the progress of com-
puter programming, the introduction of time-
sharing and micro-computers has considerably 
reduced costs and helped to boost applications 
and sales. 
4. Aware of the potential of computers, the 
Pentagon and American military authorities 
have urged industry to strive for even better 
performances. This was not the case in Europe 
and it took a long time for European govern-
ments and industries to realise the need to 
acquire such means. By then the IBM pœition 
was so strong that neither individually nor 
jointly in UNIDATA (Philips, Siemens and CII) 
could national European industries compete 
effectively. 
5. A similar example in .the sixties is the 
conquest of space if one compares American 
successes with Europe's failure with the Europa 
I launcher in ELDO. . 
6. It thus may appear that only the super-
powers can afford to allocate a major part of 
their gross national product to work considered 
1. Document 573. 
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to be of national interest, and defence work in 
particular, and that only they are able to promote 
very expensive new developments as in the cases 
mentioned. The question therefore is whether the 
combination of numbers, size, wealth of natural 
resources and scientific and~ technological 
expertise will, in industrial matters, lead to a 
difference in kind or degree between the super-
powers and other nations of the world. 
7. The example of France, which has con-
centrated its resources on nuclear weapons, and 
of Switzerland, Sweden and the Netherlands 
with certain industries, seems to demonstrate that 
it is not a question of kind but of scale and that 
if an adequate volume of resources combined 
with the will to complete a given programme 
exists, European scientists and industrialists can 
succeed as weil as those of the superpowers. 
8. The question therefore arises as to whether 
Europe is to use the industries which are the 
basis of its defence. Will Europe always be 
handicapped by a lack of political will or can 
European collaboration compensate for American 
science, technology and resources Y 
9. In its reply to Recommendation 325 on a 
European armaments policy 1 the WEU Council 
of Ministers rightly stated that : 
" ... the Council consider that efforts to 
organise European co-operation in the field 
of armaments production are essential and 
should be vigorously pursued. 
... Indeed, the search for standardisation 
must not be allowed to operate exclusively 
to the advantage of equipment of American 
origin, leaving the European industry with 
only a subordinate rôle as subcontractors 
which in the long term would be a threat to 
its existence. 
The restructuring of the European arma-
ments industry raises a number of complex 
problems which are not limited to industrial 
and customs policy or research policy, but 
directly involve the security of states." 
10. Your Rapporteur is happy to note that the 
Council is of the opinion that the suggestion to 
restructure the European armaments industry 
under the aegis of the European Community 
would "imply a wide interpretation of the field 
of application of the Treaty of Rome" and that 
"such an interpretation has already been opposed 
by a number of governments." 
1. Document 786. 
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11. During discussion of the working paper on 
4th April, sorne members pointed out that the 
report should also stress the need for an overall 
policy of détente with the East. In this context 
your Rapporteur might mention the proposais 
to set up an arms control group within NATO 
to advocate steps for curbing theatre nuclear 
weapons with a view to paving the way for 
greater European participation in the next 
round of United States-Soviet Union nuclear 
arms negotiations. This proposai was made at 
the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 
6th April 1979 by the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. Your Rapporteur believes this subject 
should be developed further in the General 
Affairs or Deferree Committee as the techno-
logical aspects are far Jess important than the 
political and military aspects. 
U. General aspects of industrial problems 
12. The technological basis of a modern indus-
trial nation is considered a national asset of 
great importance. Governments believe that it 
is both a political and economie necessity to 
protect and improve this basis, especially if it 
is rooted in investment in advanced military 
technology. The European Community, which is 
the world's second largest industrial grouping, 
is an economie and not a deferree community and 
therefore has to exclude technology for military 
purposes from its field of interest. Among our 
nations, defence-related industries are either 
nationalised or under close national governmental 
scrutiny ; they are considered national instru-
ments for the execution of certain national 
poli ci es. 
13. In order to overcome the recognised small-
ness of scale and series, certain weapon projects 
have become bilateral ; Britain, France and Ger-
many have collaborated on several weapon 
systems projects which have resulted in Anglo-
French, Anglo-German and Franco-German 
projects, but unfortunately there are no major 
trilateral Anglo-Franco-German deferree projects. 
14. In the civil field many governments are 
aware of the need for co-operation, research and 
development. The late Netherlands Minister for 
Scientific Affairs, Mr. Peijnenberg, said, addres-
sing the Assembly on 2nd November 1978 : 
"In vario~ countries it has now been 
realised that a stimulus needs to be provided 
by the authorities if an adequate degree of 
technological innovation is to be achieved, 
thus bringing about both economie growth 
and new job opportunities." 
15. He remarked further that the industrialised 
countries should concentrate on innovation in 
those areas where traditionally and inter-
nationally they had always held a leading posi-
134 
tion and that scientific and technical knowledge 
should thus have as wide a basis as possible. 
International co-operation was essential, not only 
from the viewpoint of exchanging information 
but certainly also from that of acquiring know-
ledge, especially in areas where capital-intensive 
investment was called for. 
16. In recent years NATO members have 
increasingly found that modern weapons techno-
logy requires ever broader markets. Thomas 
A. Callaghan, famous for his report about United 
States-European military co-operation, described 
the situation as follows : 
"In the years leading up to the first world 
war nations of 25 million people could 
largely provide for their own defence. By 
W orld W ar II and its immediate aftermath, 
only nations of 50 million people had the 
resources to develop and produce their own 
military hardware. By the sixties, however, 
nations of the size of Britain, France, Ger-
many and Italy could no longer bear the 
burden of weapon system development and 
production ... " 
17. Your Rapporteur thinks this is correct, at 
least over the overall spectrum of armaments 
systems development but not in special cases. 
18. The disparity between the United States and 
any one European country in terms of military 
requirements, deferree budgets, resources, com-
panies and markets is one of the most di:fficult 
problems to solve with regard to European-
American co-operation. Bilateral projects such as 
the American-German tank or the British-
American Harrier development project have not 
come to fruition because of the difficulties 
involved in this type of co-operation. Disparity 
in scale makes it impossible to structure several 
major development programmes on a bilateral 
basis between the United States and Britain, 
France or Germany. A single bilateral project 
might be possible, but not a second or third. 
Several projects between the United States and 
any single European nation state would com-
pletely distort the financial, economie, techno-
logical and industrial balance within that nation 
state as the development work and cost would 
be extremely di:fficult to share ; American 
requirements are often five to six times greater 
than those of any single European nation state. 
There are in fact four structural obstacles to 
bilateral co-operation between the United States 
and a major European power : first, one 
individual project is too small a structure for a 
co-operative effort ; second, taken individually 
the European states are too small for bilateral 
co-operation on several projects, third, dispersed, 
European industry is not large enough to pro-
duce weapon systems on a continental scale and, 
finally, the United States has its own national 
military requirements based on its own ideas and 
inventions and therefore the question of national 
pride is introduced. 
19. Moreover, no European nation state is 
financially able to risk research and development 
on a continental scale without having prior 
a.<lSurances of continuous continental-scale 
markets. The national budgets, the companies 
and the markets are scaled to national rather 
than to continental efforts. 
20. In order to overcome the difficulties in the 
"two-way street" between Europe and the United 
States regarding a balanced flow for selling and 
buying armaments, a weapons family concept has 
been proposed. This means that on each side of 
the Atlantic a weapons system is to be developed 
which is complementary to a weapons system 
developed on the other side. The United States, 
for instance, would be the sponsoring govern-
ment for an advanced medium-range air-to-air 
missile and one of the major European govern-
ments, acting on behalf of a consortium, would 
be the sponsoring government for an advanced 
short-range air-to-air missile. Such a plan should 
be accompanied by general memoranda of under-
standing to waive various national restrictions on 
imports, etc., on a reciprocal basis and to pre-
vent dual production in NATO countries. 
21. There are various disadvantages in such a 
programme for weapons families. First, it would 
mean that a given weapons technology would for 
an extended period of time be handled by one of 
the partners in the Atlantic Alliance. This would 
imply that the industries on the other side of 
the Atlantic would pay no attention to the 
technical development of any such weapons 
system and there would be the additional burden 
of having to formulate a common policy for sales 
to third countries. 
22. Within Europe and the Alliance, the export 
policies of the various countries are quite dif-
ferent. It seems doubtful whether a compromise 
could be found between France and the United 
Kingdom on the one hand and the Federal 
Republic and the United States on the other, 
which for different reasons follow different 
export policies. In the United States there are 
important Presidential limitations on third 
country sales. The Federal Republic of Ger-
many wants weapons exports only to NATO 
countries and in exceptional cases to other conn-
tries, as long as the security of such a weapons 
system is assured. The sale of any modern 
weapons system abroad may help the Soviet 
Union to gain knowledge of it or acquire it. 
23. In addition, it is highly unlikely that Euro-
pean governments would give their industries a 
free hand in drawing up agreements between 
themselves or leave negotiations in the hands of 
prime contractors. The United States Govern-
ment seems more inclined to give industry a 
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free hand, except for "classified" or "sensitive" 
equipment. 
24. In order to overcome the difficulties that 
would arise if certain technology were researched 
and developed on only one side of the Atlantic, 
it might be suggested that 20 % or more of the 
total sub-system design, development and testing 
be carried out by subcontractors on the opposite 
side of the Atlantic to that of the prime con-
tractor. One could go even further by suggesting 
that there should be comparable levels of trans-
atlantic subcontracting in each of two com-
plementary programmes in a family of weapons 
systems, as in the case of the medium-range and 
short-range air-to-air missiles. 
25. In sorne fields of militarily significant 
technologies such as electronics, commercial 
applications may occur three to five years in 
advance of military applications. For example, 
large-scale integration integrated circuits were 
first applied in computers and microprocessors 
and while they have already been used in exist-
ing weapons systems, they will play an increas-
ingly important rôle in electronics for weapons 
systems in the 1980s. 
26. The control of such critical technologies does 
not need to be absolute in order to be effective. 
The objective should be to delay their acquisition 
by the Warsaw Pact countries. The allies should 
keep a measurable lead time in the practice of 
such technologies, perhaps from five to ten years. 
It is of the greatest importance that these 
security aspects should be taken into considera-
tion in an exchange of weapons systems and this 
again has a direct influence on exports of 
weapons systems. 
27. The following fifteen technologies may be 
considered as critical : 
- computer network technology ; 
- large computer system technology; 
- software technology ; 
- automated real time control technology ; 
- materials, structures, fabrication, proces-
sing and manufacturing technology; 
- directed energy technology ; 
- LSI-VLSI (large-scale integration and 
very-large-scale integration describe 
microcircuits in electronics) design and 
manufacturing technology ; 
- military instrumentation technology ; 
- telecommunications technology ; 
- guidance and control technology ; 
- microwave component technology ; 
- military turbine engine technology ; 
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- fibre optics and advanced optics techno-
logy; 
- sensor technology ; 
- undersea systems technology. 
lU. Drawbacks of dispersal 
28. The lack of standardisation of munitions 
used in large quantities and the lack of adequate 
interoperability between the communications 
systems of each member of the Alliance and 
between certain other equipment which may for 
instance prevent the refuelling of one country's 
aircraft in another's installations are sources of 
inefficiency which are unacceptable from a 
military standpoint. Interoperability and sorne 
degree of standardisation are therefore an 
absolute minimum necessity for the armies of 
allied countries which may one day have to stand 
side by side. 
29. In economie terms, the lack of standardisa-
tion of equipment or components produces a 
heavy logistic burden for ali the countries con-
cerned since one way or another more support 
facilities are needed because of the diversity of 
the equipment deployed. It is necessary to double 
up teams of experts, stocks of spare parts, 
specialised training means such as simulators, etc. 
Thus, for the same number of weapons, the use 
of more than one type increases the expense. 
30. A similar handicap is encountered at pro-
duction level : the cost of research, development 
and manufacture has to be multiplied by the 
number of different models produced, and the 
shorter each production run is, the greater is 
the cost of amortising the operations in question ; 
for that reason and to secure acceptable unit 
priees, the main manufacturers of sophisticated 
equipment have endeavoured to work on a 
co-operative basis \ mainly bilateral but also tri-
and multilateral, and to export their wares. This 
is the case for the United States and, in Europe, 
for France, the United Kingdom, Italy and 
Germany 2• 
31. Can this situation be improved ? 
32. A satisfactory solution is difficult to find : 
the problem has been recognised since the 
beginning of the sixties but has become worse 
due to several factors such as : 
- the Atlantic Alliance is an association 
of independent democratie states each of 
which has its own political, economie and 
1. The list of the different programmes pursued on a 
co-operative basis is given in Appendix I. 
2. Appendix II. 
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military problems and consequently 
interests and motivations which may be 
different from those of its partners ; 
- each country is responsible for the 
logistics of its own forces ; 
- once rebuilt after the second world war, 
the newly fitted-out European industries 
started work in increasingly-advanced 
branches of technology in many new 
sectors such as nuclear energy, elec-
tronics, communications, aerospace, etc. ; 
this technological surge allowed the · 
medium-sized European powers to 
produce almost the whole spectrum of 
weapons they considered necessary ; 
- at the same time, American equipment, 
which at the end of the war was the 
main equipment of most European 
forces, became obsolescent. These 
countries then quite naturally turned to 
their own industries for replacements ; 
- technological gains and industrial pro-
prietary rights are a source of wealth 
for these countries and their industries, 
whose greatest value resides in the fact 
that they can thus maintain a high 
economie standard in face of the com-
mercial offensive of developing countries 
with very low-cost manpower. This 
applies to everyday products. For 
products, even very complex ones, which 
have to be produced in very large 
quantities, account must also be taken 
of Japan and the United States, which 
have, or are developing, highly-
automated means of production, and 
countries with socialist economies for 
which the cost priee is not of the same 
importance as in liberal economies. 
Maintaining a high level of research and 
study potential is therefore essential for 
our industries and this potential must 
be kept fully occupied even at the risk 
of duplicating work in a rival firm of 
the same or another nationality. This 
factor will be a major obstacle to the 
standardisation of armaments equipment 
for a long time, whatever steps may be 
proposed for pooling technological know-
how; 
- the unemployment crisis throughout the 
West incites industrialists and govern-
ments to seek work even with a low 
profit margin. This is true for such 
sensitive areas as the iron and steel 
industry, boiler making, shipbuilding, 
car and aircraft industries, chemical 
industries, electronics, precision engin-
eering, etc. ; 
- laws, regulations and standards in force 
in the varions Europeam countries are 
also often major obstacles to the progress 
of co-operation, particularly as 'they 
express different attitudes, ways of 
thinking and motivations. 
IV. Military requirements and European 
industry 
33. National strategies determine the military 
options of national general staffs. Based on the 
national strategy and the options available, the 
military authorities define their requirements. It 
is clear that nuclear weapon countries such as 
France and the United Kingdom have national 
strategies different to those of the Federal 
Republic of Germany or Italy. The strategie 
considerations of the Benelux countries are 
different again. As long as there is no common 
denominator for the national strategies, it will 
be impossible to have an overall armaments 
programme at European level which could be 
translated into a coherent programme of orders 
to the armaments industries in the WEU 
countries. 
34. This brings out the important point that 
military staffs do not have the same concept 
of the threat and how to meet it. Moreover their 
range of military means is not composed in the 
same way nor, in the case of equipment of a 
similar type, is there the same time-table for 
phasing out obsolescent items. Requirements and 
replacement schedules are therefore different in 
member countries. In order to harmonise the 
technical and industrial effort of the member 
countries, co-ordination of strategie and tactical 
guidelines should be established and replacement 
time-tables progressively harmonised. In order 
to assess the military situation your Rapporteur 
asked an expert, Ingénieur Général Brindeau 
to outline as accurately as possible the situations 
that must be faced in order to iden'tify 
methodically the nature and volume of the 
principal requirements of the armed forces. 
General Brindeau's opinion is appended to this 
report 1 • 
35. Past history has shown that the possibilities 
of regrouping efforts for Europe's defence can 
be achieved only on the long term. The member 
countries' objectives and defence conditions are 
still varied, in spite of the solidarity which has 
emerged under the WEU and North Atlantic 
treaties. Co-operation can develop only from a 
graduai, pragmatic approach. The same will be 
true for the co-ordination of efforts to develop 
the advanced technology sectors essential for 
modern defence. General Brindeau's paper 
1. Appendix III. 
5. 
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underlines the sectors in which such co-ordina-
tion should be undertaken or promoted, i.e. 
aeronautics, telecommunications, computers and 
space - in the space sector of course a great 
deal has already been achieved in the European 
Space Agency. The industrial bases of European 
defence are however not restricted to these 
advanced technology sectors nor to the industries 
which work directly on armaments. They also 
include the advanced technology industries 
linked with energy which, in view of their 
importance for the European production cycle, 
makes the latter highly vulnerable. 
36. In the energy field, as in many others, 
everybody agrees that fundamentally no effec-
tive solution can be found by any one country 
alone. But on neither side of the Atlantic has 
it been possible to establish an efficient corn-
mon energy policy. Recently Common Market 
energy ministers gave up their attempts to 
create such a policy. The reason for this failure 
is that importing countries are afraid to adopt 
a uniform position. 
37. Where aeronautics are concerned the Com-
mittee has taken many initiatives to promote 
co-ordination in the civil and military fields. At 
the colloquies organised in 1973 and 1976 it 
urged the member governmerrts to establish a 
family of airerait based on the Airbus. By the 
end of 1978 the eight-year-old Airbus Industrie 
had captured 37 % of the wide-bodied aircraft 
market, and was second only to the American 
Boeing company. Because of the success of its 
original model, the Airbus A-300B, Airbus 
Industrie is to sell a shorter version, the A-310, 
scheduled for completion in 1983. The planes 
are being built by a consortium of companies 
from five European nations and their success 
is partly due to the fact that in an area of 
increasingly expensive energy they are designed 
for low energy consumption. The French Trans-
port Minister, Mr. Joël Le Theule, declared in 
Toulouse in April 1979 that Airbus, which now 
provides 17,000 jobs in the five nations which 
build it, will employ 40,000 workers by the late 
1980s. 
38. In the military field, your Rapporteur put 
a written question to the Council on the next 
generation of fighter aircraft : 
"Does the Council not consider that the 
time is ripe to approach the Europeans 
concerned with a view to reaching agree-
ment on the concepts from which will 
emerge the next generation of fighter air-
erait and a harmonised military policy ~" 
and on 21st March 1979 he received the follow-
ing reply: 
"The Council are aware that much work is 
already going on nationally on the concepts 
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for the nen generation of fighter aircraft. 
Effective arrangements exist for these con-
cepts to be compared and harmonised. The 
work on a possible European tactical combat 
aircraft is being co-ordinated by the inde-
pendent European programme group, which 
has set up a special study of the operational 
factors as the first step towards seeking to 
establish a co-operative programme. The 
technical, financial and military problems 
to be overcome are very great, but there is 
every indication that those concerned are 
fully aware of the importance and desira-
bility of finding a European solution to the 
requirement, if this is at all possible." 
39. In the field of computers Europe's future is 
not so bright. So far European collaboration has 
come to naught, but the industries should be 
regrouped in a European framework. If Europe 
does not take decisive action in this field it will 
never be able to compete with IBM or the 
growing Japanese computer industry. 
40. The domination of IBM in particular is 
reinforced by the absence of standardisation, 
especially of software, at European level. The 
software aspect has never received sufficient 
attention in the European computer industry 
with the result that Europe is now three to five 
years behind the Americans. 
41. There is of course an important rôle to 
be played by computers in defence as is clear 
from the accelerated introduction of computers 
in American military and space programmes. It 
appears that existing computers might be able 
to meet military needs at present, but this will 
not necessarily be so if no special measures are 
taken in the meantime. Europe cannot remain 
dependent on imports of computer elements for 
its own military equipment when they are pro-
duced only outside Europe. This would certainly 
have political consequences which would be 
unacceptable to many European countries and 
would also affect the export of weapons systems 
which in turn would have social consequences for 
the armaments industries. 
42. With regard to military satellites, your 
Rapporteur wishes to point out that these have 
been dealt with in earlier reports by the Com-
mittee, i.e. Document 766 on application satel-
lites, Document 773 on United States-European 
co-operation and competition in advanced tech-
nology and Document 785 on weather fore-
casting. 
V. Industrial bases of defence 
43. Throughout the preceding chapters, it has 
been evident that research and the development 
and production of efficient weapons was based 
on the application of every form of advanced 
technology by leading industries : 
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- aerospace industry ; 
- electronics, radioelectric and communica-
tions industry ; 
- opto-electronic industry ; 
- nuclear industry ; etc. 
44. These advanced technology industries have 
certain common features : 
(i) their products are highly sophisticated 
technically ; 
(ii) their output is being continually 
renewed; 
(iii) expenditure on researeh and develop-
ment is very high ; 
(iv) they employ highly-qualified staff, 
more than in other industrial sectors ; 
(v) the programme generally constitutes 
an economie entity ; 
(vi) the state intervenes at every level ; 
(vii) there is a dominating industry: that 
of the United States ; 
(viii) in general these industries do not 
hesitate to launch co-operative pro-
grammes; 
(ix) for all these reasons the western 
governments are trying to develop 
them to the maximum, leaving them 
as much independence as possible. 
45. Two remarks introduce the organisation of 
this section : 
- whether for engines or for weapons, 
co-operation at European level in the 
nuclear field is out of the question. 
Although sorne degree of Franco-British 
co-operation may be possible for means 
of delivery, this could only be in the 
fairly distant future ; 
- the aircraft and space industry as a 
whole reaches the highest level in the 
various aspects of advanced technology. 
The study of this industry will therefore 
be the central theme of this section. 
46. The aerospace industry has five branches of 
operation, i.e. airframes, engines, equipment, 
missiles and space, and three markets, i.e. civil 
aviation, military aviation and space. Through 
aircraft, missile and space equipment, it is in 
direct contact with the electronic, radioelectric 
and opto-electronic industries. Technical com-
plexity is a characteristic of the products of 
these industries. 
47. The aerospace industry produces equipment 
which owes its survival in air or in space to its 
reliability and that of all its components. In 
addition, such equipment must be light and 
capable of high performances. All components 
are therefore at the highest level of the tech-
nological capability of a country in all the 
technology used. 
48. To produce a modern aircraft, the number 
of subcontractors under the prime contractor is 
very high, varying from several hundred to 
several thousand, and in order to qualify each 
of these firms must pursue major research and 
development programmes. The following percent-
ages may be quoted for expenditure on research 
and development compared with turnover : 
- aerospace industries 
- electronic industries 
- machine tool industry 
- communications industry 
- chemical industries 
20% 
6% 
4% 
8.5% 
4% 
This high technical level explains the qualifica-
tions required of the staff employed : 
- engineers and executives 
- technicians, draughtsmen 
- skilled workers 
- unskilled workers 
13% 
34% 
38% 
15% 
49. High research and development costs must 
be amortised over a large number of aircraft. 
For instance, for large-capacity civil aircraft, 
account being taken of the market, sorne 350 
airerait must be sold to achieve a good financial 
balance. This result can usually be attained only 
ten or fifteen years after the programme is 
launched. The major programme is therefore an 
economie entity. 
50. To give an idea, a current major programme 
represents about $2,000 million and provides 
work for 20,000 to 50,000 persons over a period 
of fifteen to twenty years. 
51. The civil work of firms therefore depends 
on only a few major programmes. The whole 
European civil airerait industry depends essen-
tially on Airbus. As a consequence : 
-· the danger of a programme coming to 
a sudden end may be reduced by seeking 
to produce families of aircraft with as 
many common parts as possible and not 
taking technological strides which are 
too great; 
- risks may be spread and reduced through 
co-operation instead of cut-throat com-
petition; 
- civil work is part of a wider framework 
of civil and military programmes in 
which the volume of military orders 
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often accounts for three-quarters of the 
firm's work and, even for civil orders, 
the state is directly or indirectly the 
most important customer. 
State intervention 
52. In both the aerospace and the armaments 
industries, the state intervenes and the Ministry 
of Deferree is the guardian ministry. Its action 
covers orders for equipment, verification of 
technology used, production controls, etc. 
53. The state acts as a privileged customer by 
helping to promote research and development 
programmes which may or may not be followed 
by production ; it acts as customer through the 
airlines, whether nationalised or not ; it exercises 
control over export sales. It plays a leading rôle 
in space and military work. 
54. But it is also a constructor by producing 
in its arsenals and nationalised firms, investing 
and making its own means of production 
available to private industry - duly com-
pensated of course - and testing materials, 
components and equipment in its laboratories 
and complete systems in its in-flight testing 
centres, etc. 
55. It intervenes in financing programmes, 
wholly in the case of military and space pro-
grammes and for specifie aspects of civil pro-
grammes : half the Concorde programme was 
financed by the French state and half by the 
British. For Airbus, the states concerned 
(France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Netherlands and Spain) made available to the 
manufacturers' banks a sum of $1,000 million 
and guaranteed a further $1,000 million if 
necessary ; reimbursement is planned over a run 
of 360 aircraft. 
56. Finally, the state intervenes through the 
regulations it introduces to ensure the standard 
of products (normalisation, technical specifica-
tions, etc.), to protect its own industry, to 
regulate the industrial proprietary rights to 
be attributed to the partners or to control export 
(war matériel) or import policy. 
A dominant armaments industry 
57. The United States is the world's leading 
producer and exporter of arros. 
58. In the civil field, the various European 
aerospace industries now have an excellent 
programme, Airbus, a large medium-haul trans-
port aircraft which is being pursued at Euro-
pean level and has good export possibilities. 
This is a master programme which may result 
in a truly European aerospace industry of which 
this programme may form the cornerstone of 
its unity. 
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59. The success of the programme shows the 
effectiveness of the form of co-operation 
adopted : Airbus Industrie is a firm set up to 
implement the programme. It is committed to a 
process of development which makes it the hub 
of integration in the European civil aircraft 
industry with sole and almost unchallenged 
responsibility for running the programme. It is 
at present 44.6 % responsible to the French 
Government, 44.6 % to the Federal German 
Government, 6.6% to the Netherlands Govern-
ment and 4.2 % to the Spanish Government. The 
British Government has just joined in. 
60. In fact, Airbus Industrie integrates the 
major part of the civil work of all the leading 
European firms : British Aerospace, SNIAS, 
MBB, VFW-Fokker and CASA (Spain - 6,300 
persons). 
61. This example shows what results European 
industry can achieve when it concentrates on 
the implementation of a major programme. It 
confirms that a united European industry may 
be three times smaller than American industry 
in numbers employed but Europe can improve 
its relative position. 
62. For military equipment, a growing trend 
for Europe to meet its own requirements should 
be recorded : eight countries purchased 1,500 
F-104 Starfighters, five countries purchased 
600 F-4 Phantoms and finally four countries 
purchased 310 F-16s. The latter instance might 
never have been necessary had a competitive 
European aircraft been presented jointly by 
several European countries. This decline in 
American supplies to Europe has been offset 
by European-produced equipment. 
63. Several joint projects have been or are in 
the process of being carried out : Alpha-Jet, 
Jaguar, MRCA, helicopters, missile weapons 
systems and Ariane ·launchers for placing civil 
or military satellites in orbit, etc. 
64. However, a division must be noted between 
the position of the manufacturing countries 
which are more or less in favour of procuring 
equipment in Europe and that of other Euro-
pean countries which opt for American equip-
ment (Norway, Denmark, Greece, Turkey and, 
to a certain extent, the Netherlands and 
Belgium). This division allows American 
strategy to maintain and increase its military 
and technological leadership in the framework 
of NATO. This American position is meeting 
growing reluctance among the principal Euro-
pean countries which wish the NATO market to 
be opened to the varions armaments industries 
of the countries of the Alliance - on both sides 
of the Atlantic - whereas the Americans place 
various obstacles in the way of procurement of 
European equipment by their forces (in general, 
the impact of the Buy American Act is 5 % on 
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civil aircraft, 5 to 15 % on spare parts and 50 % 
on foreign arms; United States standards, etc.). 
The policy of standardisation so skilfully 
advocated by the Americans in the varions 
NATO bodies and in the press is intended to 
propagate American products and is a corner-
stone of their strategy. American reluctance to 
open its own defence market to the other 
countries of the Alliance and pressure in favour 
of its armaments increase the tendency of the 
principal European countries to develop their 
armaments industries. 
65. Another important element is what, in the 
European view, is the over-hasty evolution of 
NATO's strategie planning and European conn-
tries are far from enthusiastic about financing 
the very expensive purchases of new American 
equipment which this entails. Reluctance about 
introducing the A W AC system clearly illustrates 
this trend. Consequently, and in spite of many 
difficulties, European military aerospace pro-
duction and, more generally, the co-operative pro-
duction of sophisticated weapons systems, is 
being organised and is developing in every 
field : aircraft, helicopters, missiles, artillery and 
even tanks and combat vehicles, depriving 
American industry of much of the European 
market and ultimately and already competing 
with American products in the third world. 
European shortcomings 
66. Although smaller in size than the American 
branch, the order of magnitude of the European 
bran ch of the armaments industry is nevertheless 
comparable, but : 
- because the military requirements of the 
various European countries are dif-
ferent; 
- because their equipment replacement 
schedules are different ; 
- because national peculiarities are too 
marked; 
- because co-operation is still sometimes 
considered a last resort when a purely 
national programme proves impossible ; 
- because in any event national egoism is 
behind ail agreements; when countries 
find agreements are no longer in their 
interests, they abandon them and move 
on; 
- because a jointly-produced product is 
often a mediocre compromise, relatively 
costly and with longer delivery delays 
than national products ; 
- because once a programme has been 
completed the co-operative structure is 
dismantled and when a new programme 
is started a new structure has to be 
formed and participants again taught to 
co-operate ; 
- because there are always conflicts of 
national pride in the race to be prime 
contractor and for the resulting spin-
off and the problem of sharing pro-
duction is often difficult to settle ; 
- because there are always countries which 
wish to export and exports may run up 
against political conditions imposed by 
partner countries ; 
- because there may then be problems 
in obtaining parts needed for producing 
equipment for export ; 
- finally, because industrialists are relue-
tant to allow others to avail themselves 
of their own industrial proprietary 
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rights without guaranteed protection and 
remuneration, 
European production is compartmentalised, 
which precludes longer production runs and the 
amortisation of research and development costs 
over a sufficient volume of production. 
67. However, although not the best, the policy 
pursued by the European countries makes them 
competitive in many areas, except perhaps very 
recently, because of the present weakness of the 
American dollar. 
68. The fact remains that for major pro-
grammes which may involve high research and 
development expenditure, the capital available 
at national level alone is not sufficient, being 
below the critical threshold guaranteeing an 
effective programme. A joint effort is therefore 
essential but the legal structure in the various 
partner countries does little to facilitate such 
an effort. 
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Different programmes pursued on a co-operative basis 
CVRT 
Gepa.rd (AA 35 mm) 
RITA 
Alpha-Jet 
Tra.nsall 
F-16 
Tyne fOlympus logistic support 
Minehunters 
Olympus gas turbine support 
Sea.gna.t - anti-ship missile decoy system 
Anti-surfa.ce ship missile 
SP-70 - 155 mm self-propelled gun 
FH-70 - 155 mm towed gun 
Midge surveillance system 
Milan 
Hot 
Roland 
Euromissile 
Tomado, multi-rôle combat a.ircraft 
Jaguar, strike fattack aircra.ft' 
Puma, twin angine GP helicopter 
Gazelle, GP light helicopter 
Lynx, anti-submarine and utility helicopter 
Martel, stand-off air-to-surface guided weapon 
JP-233, airfield attack weapon 
..4. bbreviations : 
BE - Belgium IT Italy 
C.AN- Canada 
DK Denmark 
NL 
NO 
N ether lands 
Norway 
FR France UK - United Kingdom 
FRG- Federal Republic of Germany US - United States 
Bowrce: Document 786, Appendix IV. 
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BE, UK 
BE,FRG 
BE, FR 
BE, FR, FRG 
FR, FRG 
BE, NL,NO, DK, US 
BE,NL, UK 
BE,NL, FR 
FR,UK 
DK, FRG, NO, UK, US 
FR, FRG,NL,NO, UK 
FRG, IT, UK 
FRG, IT, UK 
CAN, FRG, UK 
FR, FRG 
FRG, IT, UK 
FR,UK 
FR, UK 
FR, UK 
FR, UK 
FR,UK 
UK, US 
APPENDIX II DOOUMENT 805 
APPENDIX II 
Estimated armaments exports from 1965 to 1914 
Amount Increase 
Country ($ '000 % between 1970 
million) and 1976 (%) 
United States 31.5 50.50 511 
Soviet Union 18.8 30.00 
France 2.9 4.65 140 
United Kingdom 2.2 3.50 
Federal Republic of Germany 1.2 1.95 
Others 6.0 9.40 
Total 62.6 100.00 
Sowrce: Official report of the WEU symposium, March 1977. 
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Expert opinion on military requirements 
(submitted by Ingénieur Général Brindeau) 
1. General 
It is proposed to examine briefly the extent 
to which European industries can or cannot meet 
the requirements of the military authorities of 
their own or of other European countries allowing 
them to fulfil their rôle. This remark brings out 
a first important point, i.e. that military head-
quarters do not have the same concept of the 
threat and above all of how to meet it. Moreover, 
their range of means is not composed in the same 
way nor, in the case of equipment of a similar 
type, is there the same time-table for phasing out 
obsolescent items. For a given military situation, 
requirements and replacement schedules are 
therefore different. 
It is necessary to outline the possible situa-
tions which must be faced in order to identify 
methodically the nature and volume of the prin-
cipal requirements of the armed forces. This is 
what has been done below as an example and to 
provide food for thought ; but for a subject which 
would warrant lengthy development, the ques-
tion is dealt with very briefly and superficially, 
account being taken only of cases which allow the 
fields where a special common effort seems neces-
sary to be circumscribed very quickly. 
For geographical reasons, NATO armed 
forces have little room for manoeuvre and 
deployment. A direct attack on European ter-
ritory would therefore have to be contained on 
the land or sea frontier or frontiers under attack. 
There is no question of withdrawal in depth to 
gain time, particularly as the human and econo-
mie resources of the European powers are 
relatively close to the frontiers and very 
vulnerable because of their relative concentration. 
It should be stressed that the European 
countries together on a relatively small slice of 
land have little choice but to share the same 
strategy towards the threat from the East. How-
ever, in view of their nuclear capability, the 
United Kingdom and France, unlike other Euro-
pean countries, have direct means of deterring 
the Soviet Union. Their position is therefore quite 
different from that of the other countries. 
But Europe as a whole has its back against 
the sea, set in the midst of a bloc of hostile or at 
best neutral or neutralised countries, with high 
import or reinforcement requirements in men and 
equipment, energy and mineral resources, or even 
food. Due to the strengthening of the Soviet navy 
and above all the state of its submarine forces 
and the fact that they may have the support of 
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bases established along our supply routes, a state 
of latent crisis exists which may break into 
violence at any time, first in countries of political 
strategie or economie interest for Europe and 
then in Europe itself. In short, and without going 
further, two possibilities have to be considered: 
(i) a brief, violent war ; 
(ii) a long war with alternating periods of 
violence and relative calm. 
However, before describing these possible 
instances, mention should be made of the strategy 
of deterrence which the nuclear powers hope will 
continue to prevent war. They are well aware 
that miHtary action within Europe would result 
in its almost total destruction. 
The two possible instances mentioned above 
may be described as follows: 
In the first ca.se, vast quantities of means 
are consumed in a short period of time. Until the 
end of the war, it must in practice be possible to 
subsist on stocks of equipment and other supplies, 
and fighting stops: 
- because one side is unable to continue the 
fight for lack of means, 
- because negotiations are successful, as a 
result of nuclear deterrence, for instance, 
- or because nuclear escalation cornes into 
play. 
However, unless one side is to give itself up 
to the enemy on relatively unfavourable terms, 
or be annihilated, the second possibility must 
intervene before means are exhausted. 
In the second case, periods of relative calm 
allow the two sides time to build up their means 
from large stocks in bases away from the fighting 
area or areas, it being possible to replenish such 
second reserve stocks from industrial means 
mobilised for the purpose. 
The build-up of stocks in the first case raises 
no particular problem for a medium-sized country 
or for Europe: it is a question of financial means 
and time. 
To assess Europe's situation in the second 
event, the table hereafter must be borne in mind. 
In view of the hazards of sea transport in the 
event of prolonged war, Europe's situation 
appears critica:l in all circumstances. It may 
therefore be concluded that it would be able to 
resist only as long as its stocks lasted and that 
war products obtained by mobilising industry 
would probably arrive too late. 
APPENDIX III 
Imports United Soviet Union EEC States 
Energy 10% 0% 55% 
(possibly 
less) 
Mineral 
products 25% 10% 60% 
Agricul-
tural 
products O% 10% 20% 
From these considerations it may be noted 
that the European countries must constitute and 
~aintain _stocks of armaments (weaJ><>ns, muni-
tiOns, var10us equipment), foodstuffs and stra-
tegie products (oil, rubber, cotton, etc.), at a high 
enough level to allow the fighting ability of their 
units to be maintained despite wide-scale des-
truction and to ensure the life or survival of their 
inhabitants for as long as deemed necessary to 
bring the war to an end or at :least until the next 
relatively calm period which would allow essen-
tial supplies to be brought in. 
To make a qualitative and quantitative 
assessment of the means necessary the declared 
doctrine of each possible enemy, the level and 
type of their armaments and the means afforded 
by friendly resources must be taken as a basis. 
It is well lmown that the W arsaw Pact 
forces have a clear superiority in conventional 
weapons over the NATO forces. 
1 t is now vain to hope to achieve a balance 
with available resources because the financial 
Estimates 
NATO Warsaw Pact 
Total fighting 
strengths 1,176,000 1,331,000 
Battle tanks 11,300 27,900 
Mechanised 
divisions 20 57 
Tactical aircraft 3,315 5,700 
Major combat 914 4 
ships (NATO (Eastern 
-surface Europe) Europe) 
172 243 
(United States) (USSR) 
- attack 133 12 
submarines (NATO (Eastern 
Europe) Europe) 
75 243 
(United States) (USSR) 
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effort needed to achieve such a balance is not 
considered politically acceptable. Less conven-
tional solutions must therefore be sought. 
The problem is therefore to constitute and 
maintain initial strategie stocks and armaments 
at an appropriate level. 
It has always been possible for material 
superiority to be effectively countered by the 
strategie and tactical skill of far smaller numbers 
of forces. Since there is no question of attaining 
the level of forces of the Warsaw Pact, it is 
essential to explore other courses which may at 
least allow an attack to be contained. 
It should be added that all military actions 
conform to the following cycle: 
- collection of information about the 
enemy; 
- exploitation of this information; 
- decision and transmission of instructions; 
- positioning; 
- attack; 
- protection of friendly installations or 
systems against enemy action before, 
during and after the main action. 
Moreover, these various operations may be 
conducted on land, sea or in the air or any com-
bination of the three elements. Finally, for the 
sea, two distinct areas, on and below the surface, 
must be taken into consideration. 
2. Monitoring the battlefield 
The main factors of a successful offensive 
include the effect of surprise and the superiority 
obtained at a given time in a given area. Advan-
tage was taken of these factors by the Arab forces 
at the time of the initial attack in the so-called 
Yom Kippur war in October 1973. 
To meet the threat with limited but adequate 
means, it must first be possible at ail times to 
obtain various kinds of information concerning 
each potential enemy: unit strengths, equipment, 
strong and weak points in deployment, intention 
to attack, defend or withdraw, location of head-
quarters, location and size of depots, logistic 
deployment, network and capacity of lines of 
communication, contact action, radioactivity, air 
cover, location of assembly areas, fire planning 
(location of batteries, adjustment fire) etc. 
The problem described here, which applies 
mainly to ground forces, is equally crucial for air 
and naval forces, not forgetting the variations 
which are of course peculiar to them. 
In the case of ground forces, present-day 
heavily-mechanised and motorised units, both 
friendly and enemy, have become extremely 
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mobile. To exploit or counter such mobility, 
further increased by the possibility of helicopter 
transport, caUs for extremely fast command 
reactions to any enemy move. Such reactions are 
possible only if almost instant knowledge is 
available of the situation on the battlefield and 
in the adjacent airspace or sea area. 
There are many means of obtaining the 
necessary information, starting with conventional 
means such as patrols, observers, agents operating 
in enemy territory, reconnaissance units and 
reconnaissance aircraft, but each of them can 
supply only part of the puzzle and often with a 
time-lag. In foreseeable fighting conditions, these 
means will be inadequate since they do not allow 
full cover of the area concerned, or detailed 
knowledge of points of interest or real-time 
information. 
The command of a major operational sector 
must therefore have at its direct disposal power-
ful means of observing the .battlefield, effective 
in all circumstances, by day or by night, in a 
clear or naturally or artificially opacified 
atmosphere, in an environment which may be 
subjected to interference (counter-measures, 
screens, e.lectromagnetic shocks, decoys, etc.). It 
must also have the auxiliary means essential for 
dispatching information and processing it to 
make it assimilable and for transmitting orders, 
reports, etc. 
The kind of information which has to be 
obtained has already been mentioned and air 
observation appears to offer the greatest pos-
sibilities of obtaining the required results. Other 
conventional means listed and batteries of 
dispersable detectors capable of transmitting 
observations, such as those developed and used by 
the Americans during the Vietnam war, add to 
and confirm information gathered by air 
observation. 
In addition to the military characteristics 
mentioned, it must also be possible to dispense 
with fixed installations and to operate on open 
terrain or sections of roads and to remain 
operational with limited support facilities and in 
spite of enemy reactions. 
Air facilities for monitoring the battlefield 
may be: 
- satellites; 
- manned aircraft; 
- remote-controlled systems. 
Satellites 
Observation satellites can supply interesting 
strategie information and in certain cases im-
portant tactical information. For instance, during 
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the Yom Kippur war, it is believed that the gap 
between the flanks of the second and third 
Egyptian armies was discovered by an American 
satellite. The timely communication of this 
information to the Israeli military authorities 
allowed the Egyptian front to be eut in two and 
the situation was thUB reversed. But it is doubtful 
whether such information could have been 
obtained by satellite if operations had been 
conducted in a covered area. Furthermore, satel-
lites are vulnerable and are prone to destruction, 
damage or jamming. 
l'tfanned aircraft 
These have proved their worth either as light 
observation aircraft used in the world wars or as 
high-performance reconnaissance aircraft (Mirage, 
Jaguar, etc.) fitted with various kinds of 
observation equipment (radars, photographie 
apparatus and optical cameras) or infra-red 
equipment. 
These means provide worthwhile information 
but it is generally slow to process, partly because 
of the large number of images recorded which 
have to be sorted out before use. 
Slower aircraft may be used with better 
results but their slowness makes them extremely 
vulnerable. This can be remedied by choosing 
highly-manoeuvrable aircraft, duly protected and 
equipped with detectors and the necessary means 
of storing information or, even better, effecting 
the initial processing and transmitting the infor-
mation in a more or less final form. Such means 
can provide a good solution to the problem. The 
helicopter is naturally an excellent vehicle which, 
when equipped with appropriate means of 
observation, can make a detailed reconnaissance 
of the battlefield. 
But if the enemy considers the objective 
worthwhile, strong air deferrees will have been set 
up making air reconnaissance too risky to be 
conducted by manned aircraft. 
Remote-controlled aircraft 
Remote-controlled or pilotless aircraft -
drones, RPV (remote-piloted vehicles) - were 
successfully used on a large scale by the Ameri-
cans in Vietnam and by the Israelis at the end 
of the Yom Kippur war. 
A distinction must be drawn between drones, 
whose flight is programmed and which receive 
no instructions from the ground, and remote-
controlled airerait which are more or less entirely 
controlled from the ground. 
Both may be equipped with day or night 
cameras or television cameras or with other 
detection systems with an all-weather capability 
thanks to thermal infra-red sighting. 
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The principal technical problems to be solved 
for equipping forces with appropriate apparatus 
of this kind are: 
- where photography is concerned, the 
possibility of prod.ucing very high-
performance films in Europe without 
having to rely on America; 
- where detectors are concerned, the need 
to develop sensitive elements in various 
thermal or other infra-red fields (very 
high-frequency electromagnetic waves, for 
instance); 
- the need to miniaturise components, 
inertial guidance systems and memory 
storage cameras with charge couple 
deviees ( CCD) ; 
- the need to have whole systems which are 
as reliable as possible, in spite of 
unfavourable environmental conditions; 
this raises problems, in particular for 
wholly or partly remote-controlled sys-
tems which must be protected against 
enemy counter-measures. 
In addition to air observation, there are, as 
we have seen, a host of other means: 
- observers, patrols, etc., who may be 
helped by various opto-electronic systems 
using pa~ive infra-red sensors, for 
instance; 
- many kinds of radar with which units 
on special duties are equipped (pin-
pointing the source of enemy fire, for 
example); 
- laser bearn apparatus for guiding pro-
jectiles or for range finding, etc. 
In all these fields, although present-day 
technology is very effective, not all requirements 
can be met and an effort must be made in all 
areas, both at the research and at the develop-
ment and manufacturing level, to remain at the 
desired level. 
Data processing 
The speedy collection of reliable information 
on the enemy is not sufficient. The quantity of 
data obtained on enemy and friendJ.y forces as 
well as on many other elements such as ground 
conditions, the weather, available resources, etc., 
forms a volume which is difficult to handle 
without the help of a large staff or, even better, 
by automatic computerised data processing which 
is almost instantaneous. 
W orking out a situation which must cover 
at one and the same time enemy troops, friendly 
troops and many other factors necessitates 
recording many messages, reports and data, 
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keeping the information recorded up to date, 
extracting and compiling data needed for 
preparing syntheses, displaying them on a map 
of the terrain by means of symbols or in the form 
of numerical situations or any other form 
allowing them to be put to use. 
This data-processing system, necessary for 
the command and control of operations, may 
also be used as a data bank allowing the neces-
sary information to be found easily and displayed 
directly or in synthesis so as to allow the corn-
maud to take decisions and draft and transmit 
operational orders and information to upper and 
lower echelons and to parallel echelons in neigh-
bouring units. 
Such a system therefore includes: 
- a computer which stores information and 
instructions received and prints out the 
information requested when required; 
- input units allowing information to be 
entered and kept up to date; 
- display systems allowing the foHowing 
to be obtained: 
- cards giving the information requested 
(i.e. by means of symbols representing 
en emy or friendly tanks) ; 
- messages adapted to the current situa-
tion. 
Similar systems are also needed for artillery 
purposes, for operating communications networks 
and for other activities (NBC in particular). It 
should be noted that these various systems must 
be interconnected and exchange selected inform-
ation between each other. They must therefore 
be interoperable between each other and also 
with corresponding systems in allied countries. 
From a technical point of view, in addition 
to the production of economical, high-performance 
and compact computers, there are complex prob-
lems to be solved. For this purpose, use must be 
made of mini- or microelectronic hardware such 
as: 
- large-scale integration circuits (LSI); 
- microprocessors ; 
- read only memories (ROM); 
- hubble memories; 
- charge couple deviees (CCD). 
A research, development and manufacturing 
effort must be promoted for all this hardware so 
that Europe may become technically and indus-
trially independent in these matters. A further 
attempt should be made to establish European 
collaboration in the computer field in order to 
compete with the American and, soon, the 
J apanese industries. 
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Communications networks 
The second function is the transmission of 
messages of all kinds needed for the communica-
tion of information and circulating orders. Note 
should be taken of the development of intercon-
nected computer networks and above all of the 
ever-greater integration of all information and 
command networks. This has led to extremely 
complex systems which must be handled by one 
or several computers. 
The radio-electric part of these networks 
may be protected against enemy jamming and 
leaks by the use of transmitters and receivers 
using synchronised frequency changes. Such 
equipment allowing systems to be interoperable 
is extremely complex and raises many technical 
problems. 
3. Land forces 
Although the foregoing considerations have 
been developed mainly from the point of view 
of land forces, they are valid for the three arms 
(land, sea and air) subject to a few minor varia-
tions. There are greater differences in the other 
stages of hostilities and they will therefore be 
considered separately for each of the armed 
forces. 
Force mobility 
The mobility of units calls for little comment 
since Europe's technical level and industrial 
capability allow it to meet all the requirements 
of its ground forces, except for very large cap-
acity traœport helicopters, but there is only a 
limited requirement and market for them and it 
is therefore preferable to huy them. To sorne 
extent this is also true for long-range capacity 
transport aircraft. 
Fire power 
N ow to consider the attack proper, i.e. firing 
capacity, weapons and weapons systems, with 
reference only to conventional weapons. 
A point worthy of note where conventional 
weapons are concerned - infantry weapons, 
artillery, tank guns, etc. - for most current 
types is the usefulness of being able to use 
standardised munitions, or more precisely, muni.-
tions with the same interior ballistics. Standard-
isation must be advocated initially for varions 
infantry weapons, rifles, machine guns, automatic 
guns and 105 and 155 mm artillery. 
The re are varions calibres of machine gun: 
20 mm, 25 mm, 27 mm, 30 mm, 35 mm, etc. It is 
evident that such a disparity does not facilitate 
mutual logistic support and that the difference 
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in performance between 27 and 30 mm pro-
jectiles, for instance, probably does not justify 
the existence of these two calibres. 
A worthwhile goal is for the artillery of the 
same calibre belonging to different nations to be 
able to fire the same ammunition and this is also 
desirable for each class of mortar. 
Still in the field of artillery, it is worthwhile, 
as from 155 mm, to be able to use projectiles 
which are guided to their targets at the end of 
their trajectory, as this allows enormous savings 
in the tonnage of munitions needed to attain a 
given result. In spite of the higher cost of each 
projectile, this innovation is of very great mili-
tary value. Such projectiles require inbuilt 
guidance systems which home in on a target along 
a bearn (laser or radioelectric for instance) and 
the military problem is to pinpoint the target. 
Another major improvement is the pro-
duction of artillery capable of firing as many 
projectiles as possible in a very short space of 
time and changing its position very quickly to 
avoid being caught in enemy counter-fire. Such 
a use calls for a sophisticated target computer 
integrating all data needed for firing, parti-
cularly data showing the position of each gun, to 
be supplied by accurate navigation systems. The 
performance of propellant charges must also be 
very consistent. 
The same computers should also allow any 
quantitative inferiority to be offset by high 
flexibility of fire manoeuvre allowing several 
separate targets to be fired at in a short space 
of time. 
Data on the enemy obtained by artillery 
observation units are fed into the computers. 
Since such information may be useful to the com-
mand by adding details to the picture of the 
overall situation, the desirability of linking the 
artillery data-processing networks with those of 
the command is recalled. 
An anti-tank capability is one of the most 
important aspects of ground hostilities. In terms 
of fire-power, there are at present four con-
ventional means of attacking a tank: 
- direct-firing guns using hollow-charge 
shells or high initial velocity projectiles 
(tank guns); 
- indirect-firing mortar or gun with special 
projectiles particularly effective against 
light armoured vehicles; 
- mines placed or scattered by another 
projectile, helicopter or other means; 
- guided missiles with a hollow-charge 
military warhead. 
Mention is made for the record of existing 
nuclear mines and the neutron bomb which might 
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be an effective weapon for use against tank 
formations. 
There are advantages and difficulties inhe-
rent in the implementation and use of each of 
these means. Here again, in each category, the 
European countries produce excellent equipment 
which has proved its worth. But the ever-
increasing demands of users and the endless 
search for the weapon against armour caU for a 
constant effort in every field: 
- improvement in the ability of hollow 
charges to pierce armour, which is being 
continuously improved; 
- accurate high initial velocity 105 and 
120 mm tank guns firing armour-piercing 
fin-stabilised discarding sabots with 
tracers (APFSDS-Ts) capable of piercing 
thick, high-resistance armour at great 
distances. For these guns, an attempt is 
also being made to obtain accurate fire 
when the tank is moving, which calls for 
the development of high-performance 
stabilising deviees and high-quality sus-
pension for armoured vehicles. 
Indirect-firing guns or mortars may be used 
with anti-tank projectiles. This method of indi-
rect fire is effective against infantry and artillery 
support units and light armoured vehicles. It 
involves the use of projectiles (105 or 155 mm 
shells or 120 mm mortar projectiles) which 
explode on target at a wide angle of sorne 70° 
projecting a high-speed lateral cone of burst 
from a prefragmentation of one body of the pro-
jectile. 
Although not 100% destructive, widespread 
use of mines can provide an effective barrier 
against vehicles and slow down or hait armoured 
or mechanised formations for the time necessary 
to clear paths through the minefields. This may 
allow friendly forces to mount a counter-attack 
or bring anti-tank units into action more effect-
ively than would be the case against moving 
targets. 
The following problems are encountered with 
mines : they are effective only if laid in very 
large numbers, if the resulting minefields are 
booby-trapped in order to hamper mine-clearance 
and finally if a deterrent effect can be created 
by including a few highly-destructive mines 
among the large numbers of more economical 
mines. 
In addition to the question of quantity and 
quality, there is the problem of their use on 
moving fronts with effective means for laying 
them mechanically to allow large quantities of 
anti-tank mines to be buried quickly. 
Here again it would be desirable if the most 
common types of anti-tank mine could be laid by 
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the various automatic laying deviees and con-
versely if a laying deviee could handle the 
various types of the most common mines. 
In addition to this equipment and in order 
to hamper enemy movements within an area of a 
certain depth leading up to the line of contact, 
small-size mines have been envisaged, to be 
carried to the drop-off point by aircraft, rockets 
or helicopters and scattered over the area to be 
closed off. 
Studies have been made of such equipment, 
based on rockets, in the United States and several 
European countries, but each project was based 
on a different military concept. Rockets and their 
mines or other military payloads have already 
been produced but because of the high cost of 
such projects the countries concerned would 
appear to be moving towards a joint project. 
Finally, there are anti-tank missiles, where 
Molotov cocktails and their more sophisticated 
hollow-charge counterparts fired by short-range 
rockets are mentioned for the record. 
The European countries have second-genera-
tion wire-guided anti-tank missiles with very 
acceptable performances. Third-generation fire-
and-forget systems, i.e. which can fire a projectile 
and then move away or fire at another target, are 
being studied. The most difficult to develop is the 
self-guiding system, i.e. the element which must 
lock on to the target and keep the missile on 
target. An all-weather deviee must be found 
which is not affected by jamming, decoys or 
screens, and studies still need to be made of 
sensors on the correct wavelengths which have 
perhaps not yet all been exploited and which 
would allow the effective scope of weapons to 
be extended. 
Laser guidance, for example, which is very 
effective in good visibility, can become totally 
illusory when fine particles are suspended in the 
air. The possibilities to be explored range from 
infra-red to thermal infra-red, from laser beams 
to electro-magnetic waves, from optical sensors 
to radar, with or without monitoring or being 
followed to the target by a guidance unit. 
A similar type of equipment is used by air-
craft against targets on the ground, moving tanks 
and objectives designated by observation systems, 
such as the command post, active radar, etc., and 
the solutions to be found for improving surface· 
to-air missiles are little different from those 
needed for third-generation anti-tank missiles. 
4. Air forces 
It is well known that control of the sky is a 
decisive factor in conventional warfare. For this, 
friendly forces must have the ability: 
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- to carry out ground attacks with tactical 
support aircraft to back up the ground 
forces; 
- to conduct reconnaissance missions at 
every altitude but particularly at high 
and low altitudes because of possible 
action by en emy air defences; 
- to send up interception missions to 
prevent enemy flights over certain areas; 
- to fly ever more deeply into enemy 
territory, generally to carry out bombing 
missions; 
- to fulfil certain transport tasks; 
- to carry out special missions with certain 
aircraft such as maritime patrol aircraft. 
For each mission, which requires aircraft 
with different performances, there must be a cor-
responding type or types of aircraft and, in 
addition to projects pursued jointly by two or 
more countries (Jaguar, Tornado, Alpha-Jet, 
etc.), there are many purely national projects. 
In civil aviation, Europeans are increasingly 
inclined to co-operate. Expenditure on develop-
ment and production of a new aircraft can be 
amortised only over fairly long production runs 
of about 300 if the project is to be reasonably 
profitable as in the case of the Airbus project, 
for instance; but this number may vary according 
to the complexity and degree of innovation of the 
equipment. It is therefore clear that those co-
operating must agree among themselves and 
promote exports in order to increase sales. 
Military aircraft are generally far more 
complex thau civil aircraft since they are 
bursting with electronic and other equipment. 
Moreover, higher performances are expected, at 
least in certain fields (e.g. rate of climb, 
manoeuvrability, maximum speed, maximum 
altitude, etc., for fighter-interceptors). 
In the circumstances and in view of the 
relatively smallnumber of aircraft which can be 
procured and sold by European countries, the 
latter are more and more inclined to pool their 
efforts and industrial capabilities for developing 
new projects, as is the case for the successor to 
Jaguar. 
Moreover, co-operation raises many diffi-
culties, as for the exportation of jointly-produced 
aircraft by one or other country which may be 
contrary to the political views of another 
participant. Yet the number of aircraft which 
have to be produced to amortise development 
costs is even higher thau for civil aircraft. Once 
this or other similar difficulties have been solved, 
such as questions of industrial proprietary rights, 
which are not insurmountable as shawn by the 
success of many co-operative projects, Europe's 
ability to design and produce airframes, engines 
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or most other equipment should allow the 
requirements of European air forces to be met, 
provided the latter can agree on what their 
requirements are. 
There would appear to be no need here to 
go into the question of air-to-air, air-to-surface 
or air-to-sea weapons. The technical problems are 
of the same type as have been discussed in the 
context of ground forces. 
However, reference must be made to the 
special problems raised by cruise missiles which 
mainly fly at low altitude and have an original 
navigation system which makes use of topo-
graphical knowledge of the ground overflown. 
Similarly, in the case of air-to-sea weapons, 
weapons systems such as anti-submarine weapons 
in particular and torpedoes are special because of 
the environment in which they operate (water) 
and because of the special type of sensors equip-
ping their self-guidance systems. 
One way of gaining control of the sky is 
through air defence. This is an overall hattie 
waged like a ground hattie on the basis of inform-
ation gathered, which may be translated by the 
term early warning. This information is obtained 
from powerful radar installations, generally 
permanently installed in suitable areas allowing 
in-depth observation of enemy air space. Radar 
echoes recorded are identified, monitored and 
processed in air defence data-processing centres 
which alert and can scramble means of destruc-
tion or interception (air defence surface-ta-air 
missile batteries, Hawk for example, or inter-
ceptors). 
The vulnerability of fixed radar installations 
in wartime is obvions and A W ACS (airborne 
warning and control system) was developed by 
the Americans on the one hand as a solution and 
also to augment the possible spectrum of observ-
ation, to detect low-flying aircraft and to process 
and transmit the information obtained, each 
system being a complete airborne observation, 
command and control post. A similar system, but 
less complete and complex, has been developed 
by the British on the basis of Nimrod with a more 
markedly maritime rôle than A W ACS. 
All the countries of the Alliance except 
France take part in the system consisting of a 
combination of A W ACS and Nimrod, which is 
to enhance the possibilities of the Alliance's air 
defence and ground environment network, 
NADGE, in whose operation France participates, 
having taken part in its development. 
Where weapons are concerned and men-
tioning fighter-interceptor aircraft for the record, 
Europe produces several air-ta-surface missiles 
intended for use against aircraft flying at low 
(150-800 ft) or medium (800-19,000 ft) altitudes. 
The Roland system, jointly-developed and pro-
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duced by France and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, has also been adopted by the United 
States which produces its own Americanised 
version. Here, the two-way street has worked, 
but has not led to standardised equipment, and 
it is to be hoped that the European system will 
be interoperable with the American-produced 
system. 
It should also be recalled that Europe has 
produced the Hawk system under licence and is 
now producing the improved Hawk system known 
as HELIP (Hawk European limited improvement 
programme). The e<>untries participating in this 
co-production are Denmark, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, the Nether-
lands and the United States. 
Enemy aircraft are no longer the only threat 
from the air; defence is also needed against 
enemy missiles and rockets which are not clearly 
visible as targets on radar and are therefore dif-
ficult to locate and track by this means. Various 
defensive systems are being studied, particularly 
for the protection of shipping ànd the long-
distance destruction of nuclear-warhead bearing 
missiles. 
Probably the most effective method is the 
use of systems designed to interfere with the 
self-guidance systems of attacking missiles by 
the use of decoys, jamming, etc. 
Analysis of the problems linked with the 
mastery of air space will be pursued no further. 
The main point to be borne· in mind is the 
importance of the aircraft and space industry on 
which the production of most modern weapons 
systems (missile-based or not) depends, and of 
course aircraft, helicopters, drones, etc. 
5. Naval forces 
It is generally agreed that naval operations 
may be grouped under seven main functions: 
- the nuclear threat from nuclear-propelled 
submarines with a ballistic missile-
launching capability (SLBM). These sub-
marines, which form part of the deter-
rent, are practically invulnerable when 
at sea. Conversely, they may be detected 
and attacked when leaving or entering 
their bases and must consequently be 
p11otected by the full range of naval and 
air means at those times. Such protection 
is a priority task for navies with missile-
launching submarines; 
- operations against missile-launching 
nuclear submarines : detection, tracking, 
possible destruction. Such operations are 
conventional intervention combinations 
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of various types of detection and action 
by surface forces, naval aviation spe-
cialised in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
and attack submarines; 
- the presence of friendly fleets in remote 
sea areas prepared to intervene in the 
event of an incident in their area. In the 
Indian Ocean, for instance, there are 
many units of various nationalities 
because of the strategie importance of 
the sea lanes used by large tankers; 
- operations against these intervention 
forces; 
- protecting maritime lines of communica-
tion; 
- operations against enemy lines of commu-
nication; 
- various other operations, amphibious, for 
instance. 
It is not possible to assign fixed priorities to 
these various groups of action since the oroer of 
priority depends on the nature of hostilities and 
consequently on known or presumed enemy 
reactions. 
At the start of hostilities it is to be expected 
that emphasis will be placed on protecting bal-
listic missile-launching submarines, operations 
against intervention forces and then attacks on 
and/or defence of lines of communication. 
There is no question of studying in detail the 
requirements corresponding to the various tasks 
mentioned above, nor is it necessary, for the tech-
nico-industrial aspect with which we are con-
cerned here may be analysed on the basis of 
operations to attack or defend maritime lines of 
communication, for instance. 
It has been seen that there is little hope of 
the Alliance's forces in Europe being able to 
contain the enemy longer than allowed by stocks 
of weapons, munitions, vehicles, aircraft, equi.p-
ment and goods of ali kinds stockpiled as a 
preventive measure. Such stocks are necessarily 
limited but an attempt must be made to lengthen 
the period of containment thus obtained by 
taking steps to increase them to the maximum 
and bring in reinforcements, from North America 
in particular. An air lift would certainly be 
valid for men and expensive but relatively light-
weight equipment, but the bulk would have to 
come by sea, if possible before the naval war stage 
beg an. 
The total cargo at present transported across 
the Atlantic is 1,600 million tons per year, and 
every day there is an average of sorne 7,000 ships 
on the North Atlantic or in its ports. 
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In a period of austerity, 70 million tons 
would have to be transported each month. 
Furthermore, the abovementioned reinforce-
ments may be estimated at a nùllion men the first 
month plus a million tons of equipment. 1\fore-
over, munitions would represent an additional 
4.5 million tons, plus fuel representing 2.5 mil-
lion tons per month. Taking account of air trans-
port possibilities, 1,500 cargoes would therefore 
have to be guaranteed the first month of the 
crisis and thereafter 500 cargoes per month for 
the support of future operations. 
The picture is one of a large number of 
merchant ships ploughing the seas at a speed of 
at least twenty knots and crossing or trying to 
cross the Atlantic practically on their own. Con-
voys would have to be formed however for slower 
ships and for entering and leaving port, but this 
would depend on available escort ships. Moreover 
the Soviet Union has 320 submarines sorne of 
which would probably be deployed along the most 
likely routes for allied merchant fleets when 
fighting in the North Atlantic became imminent. 
Presumably these submarines would try to sink 
any ship attempting to make the crossing. 
A merchant ship following a zig-zag route 
at twenty knots is not an easy target, even for 
fast nuclear-propelled submarines which now 
constitute one of the greatest dangers for surface 
shipping (and also for submarines). The nuclear 
attack submarine is a large, very high per-
formance vessel. It can vary from 3,000 tons with 
a submerged speed of 25 knots to 5,000 tons with 
a submerged speed of more than 30 knots. 
Such submarines, capable of diving to great 
depths (500 metres or more) will be increasingly 
silent and hence more difficult to detect. These 
hunter-killer submarines are already dangerous 
armed with torpedoes, and they can also be armed 
with suhsonic missiles capable of being launched 
from below the surface into an airborne tra-
jectory. These missiles, with a range of over fifty 
nautical nùles, are a serions threat to any surface 
shipping justifying their use. 
Anti-submarine defence is primarily a 
question of detection by sonar - active towed 
at an average depth of 500 rn or passive for long 
distance detection and lateral listening sonars for 
close detection. 
W eapons used are grenades and anti-sub-
marine torpedoes which may be launched from 
various platforms: surface ships, helicopters, air-
craft. 
Another major danger for ships is that of 
specialised aircraft which indude long-ran<Ye air-
craft operating from more or less distant ;round 
bases or carrier-based aircraft and more parti-
cularly short or vertical take-off aircraft but 
which require a base near the combat area or 
' 
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helicopters, which raise the same problems but 
need only small platforms. 
These aircraft may carry weapons, tactical 
missiles or torpedoes, or serve as markers for the 
use of precision-guided missiles. 
The air defence of surface shipping may be 
ensured by guided missiles with a range in the 
tens of kiLometres and close-in defence by shorter-
range missiles. Finally, immediate defence is 
provided by specialised artillery systems (cone of 
dispersion of a multi-barrelled high rate of fire 
weapon for instance). There are at present few 
means of defence against diving or low-level mis-
siles. Immediate defence has therefore to be 
combined with counter-measures designed to 
divert attacking missiles. 
However this may be, at great distances 
from land, mastery of the sky will still belong to 
aircraft carriers which, with their escort and 
ASW vessels, will always be the best means of 
ensuring freedom of the seas in the areas where 
they operate. 
The last threat cornes from surface ships. 
The most current are of medium tonnage (2,000 
to 8,000 tons), of conventional design and 
construction, with a top speed of 30 to 35 knots 
and a cruising speed of about 20 knots. (Nuclear 
propulsion is possible only for warships of more 
than 6,000 to 8,000 tons, e.g. aircraft carriers, 
because of the weight, volume and cost of a 
nuc1ear generator.) 
Mention should be made of the tendency to 
reduce tonnages and the almost total abandon-
ment of conventional artillery and its replace-
ment by systems of seLf-guiding missiles launched 
at great distances from the target, thus allowing 
fast, smaller ships to launch long-range attacks 
on far more powerful vessels. 
Finally, maritime patrol aircraft with a high 
observation capability make a further contribu-
tion to the close-in means of defending sea lanes. 
These long-range aircraft have very sophisticated 
comp~ter-controlled weapons systems including 
real-tlme data-processing and display functions. 
This brief survey shows that in the naval 
field the same advanced technology is to be found 
as in other fields: 
- aircraft industry techno1ogy; 
- electronics and communications, radar 
and laser systems; 
- computers and data-processing; 
and for ships: 
- nuclear propulsion; 
- thick hulls for submarines; 
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and for detection: 
- active and passive sonar techniques; 
- magnetic detection techniques for sub-
marines and thermal or mechanical wake 
detection. 
Building hulls calls for only a few comments. 
Civil shipbuilding is fairly different from naval 
shipbuilding although there are common problems 
and sorne activirties are similar, but for civil ship-
building very large-tonnage hulls are required 
whereas for the navy they rarely exceed 4,000 to 
5,000 tons. 
In view of the critical situation of civil ship-
building, economically valid solutions have been 
sought although they may not necessarily gua-
rantee the lowest unit cost priee. For instance, it 
is said that the Germans have had to have five 
frigates built by six different shipyards because 
they found it socially necessary. Concentration of 
projects is not therefore always the only solution 
to be envisaged. 
Glossary 
Silicon chips: By grouping a growing num-
Ler of electronic elements on silicon chips, micro-
electronics augment the capacity of electronic 
systems. A chip is a rectangle measuring about 
20 sq.mm. eut out of a silicon dise treated in 
Bibliography : La révolution microélectrique, Biblio-
thèque pour la Science (Distribution Belin). 
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such a way as to obtain the required electronic 
properties. 
LSI (Large-s cale integration) : In 1arge-scale 
integration, sevcrrul million electronic components 
are grouped on a single chip to form circuits, 
sorne of which are simple electric deviees and 
others units of logic operating in accordance with 
Boole's rules of algebra. 
Microprocessor: A data-processing unit can 
thus be built on a single chip, thereby obtaining 
a microprocessor. A microprocessor is generally 
associated with other specialised chips, particu-
larly memories, in a microcomputer system. How-
ever, complete computers have already been built 
on a single chip. 
Storage (Menwries) : Certain applications 
require permanent storage of data which is raœly 
modified (e.g. as for the programmes of pocket 
calcula tors). Read-only memories (ROM) are 
used for such permanent storage. Other storage 
is active. 
Bttbble memories or storage and charge 
couple deviees (CCD) : These are means whereby 
data circulates as if stored in series in a closed 
tube. They thus pass across the disp1ay system. 
Bubble memories are obtained by po~arising tiny 
magnetic bubbles in a thin layer of orthoferrite 
or garnet. Charge couple deviees (COD) arc 
obtained by arranging the surface of a chip so 
as to transform it illlto a grid illC'luding a large 
number of condensers. A 15 sq.mm. chip can thus 
store more than 65,000 data. 
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European aircraft programmes 
Tactical and support aircraft 
Dassault-BréguetjDornier Alpha-Jet trainer/ 
close support aircraft - Orders total 486, 
including 200 for French air force and 175 for 
West German air force. First deliveries to France 
were in May 1978 and first deliveries to Germany 
were in February 1979. Export orders total 74 to 
five countries. 
Dassault-Bréguet Mirage 2000 - About 
$142 million will go for research and develop-
ment and another $ 166 million is budgeted for 
production this year. The third prototype is 
scheduled to fly in May. Twin-engine version 
Mirage 4000 was scheduled for a first flight in 
March 1979. French air force has a current 
requirement for 200. 
Dassault-Bréguct Mirage III and 5 fighters 
- Production continuing slowly on orders for 
new and replacement aircraft, with total orders 
at 1,370 by the end of January. 
Dassault-Bréguet Mirage F-1 fighter -
Production rate continuing at about 5.5 a month. 
Orders still stand at 505. Two-thirds are for 
export. 
Dassault-Bréguet Super Etendard naval 
strike fighter - Being produced at a rate of 
2.5 a month, the first eight of an order for 70 by 
the French navy have been delivered. 
CASA C.101 - Certified 30th December 
1978, Spanish air force is committed to buy 60 
training versions. 
SAAB 37 Viggen fighterjground attack air-
craft - Production of JA-37 is scheduled to 
continue until1987, with delivery of initial lot of 
30 under way to Swedish air force. Firm orders 
for JA-37 total 90 from Swedish Government, 
with an option for an additional 59. Contracts 
for 329 JA-37, AJ-37, SK-37 training, SH-37 and 
SF-37 reconnaissance versions of the Viggen 
signed by Swedish Government. 
SAAB B-31A light attack advanced training 
aircraft - Replaced by a version designated 
SAAB SK-38/ A-38 trainer attack aircraft. 
Development funds for new aircraft are available 
until 1982. Replacement for Swedish air force 
SAAB 105. 
Macchi MB-339 jet trainer - Delivery of 
first lot of aircraft ordered by Italian air force 
has started and will be turned over to air force 
flight experiment centres before deployment to 
training schools in mid-1979. Italian air force also 
has increased its order from original 20 to 100. 
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British Aerospace Harrier VTOL strike 
fighter - Four versions currently in production 
on a common line that will remain open until the 
end of 1983. Delivery of a follow-on order of 
24 single-seat GR Mk.3 aircraft for the British 
Royal Air Force has begun and delivery of air-
craft to the Royal Navy will begin later this year. 
Navy has ordered 34 single-seat Sea Harrier 
FRS-1 aircraft and oneT Mk.54 two-seat trainer. 
A follow-on order for five AV-SAs has been 
received from the Spanish navy. 
British Aerospace HS-1182 Hawk trainer-
Royal Air Force has taken delivery of 96 of an 
order for 175. First four aircraft of an order for 
50 from Finland are in production in Britain, 
with the first due to fly within a few months. 
The remaining 46 will be assembled in Finland 
from components built largely in Britain. A 
further 20 aircraft have been exported. 
Panavia Tornado (MRCA) - First pro-
duction version of the Tornado is scheduled to 
fly in July in England, and the second in August 
in Germany. Nine prototype aircraft and five of 
six preproduction aircraft are in the flight test 
programme, with the sixth preproduction aircraft 
to fly soon. West Germany is to receive 324, 
Britain 385 and Italy 100. 
British AerospacejDas3ault-Bréguet (Sepe-
cat) Jaguar strike fighter - Production of an 
initial order for 40 aircraft for India is under 
way, with the first deliveries anticipated in 
autumn 1979. Assemblv of follow-on aircraft win 
be in India. British R~yal Air Force has received 
its full order of 202 and the French air force has 
received 156 out of its total order for 200. 
British Aerospace BAC-167 Strikemaster 
attack aircraft - Components for 10 aircraft 
have been completed, but assembly is being 
delayed pending signing of a firm contract. To 
date, 145 aircraft have been delivered to nine 
air forces. 
Air lift 
Short Brothers Skyvan - In production at 
a rate of one per month. Total sales to date are 
126. 
Short Brothers SD 3-30 - Eleven operators 
so far have ordered 34 of this twin-turboprop 
commuter airliner, with another two units on 
option. 
CASA C-212 Aviocar - 166 delivered and 
21 on order. The C-21~-200 is expected to be 
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ready for delivery by scheduled certification in 
mid-1979. 
Aeritalia G-222 - Deliveries of 44 aircraft 
to Italian air force continue. Argentine army 
aviation has ordered three and Dubaï one. 
Aérospatiale / Messerschmitt-Bolkow-BlohrnJ 
VFW C-160 Transall - Programme being 
restarted with a French air force order for 28. 
Anti-submarine warfare 
British Aerospace Nimrod - Two conversion 
programmes under way involving all 49 Mk. 1 
ASW Nimrods. Of these, 38 are being converted 
to the Mk. 2 ASW version and the remaining 11 
are being converted to the Nimrod AEW airborne 
early warning aircraft. First conversion expected 
to fly this summer. 
British Aerospace HS-7 48 Coastguarder -
Ocean surveillance version of the HS-7 48 trans-
port is being demonstrated to potential customers. 
Dassault-Bréguet Atlantic ANG - Replaces 
earlier Mk. 4 version. Construction of first pro-
totype began in January. First production model 
flight scheduled for mid-1984. French navy has 
ordered 42. 
Dassault-Bréguet Guardian - Adapted 
from the Falcon 20 for coastal surveillance. 
United States Coast Guard has ordered 40. 
Helicopters 
Agusta A-109 - Sales continue to civil 
customers in United States and elsewhere. Mili-
tary version in production. Approved for IFR 
and offshore operation with pop-out floats. 
Approval of gross weight increases to 5, 730 lb. in 
process. 
Agusta A-129 - Programme started to sup-
ply three prototypes of this anti-tank helicopter 
to Italian army. 
Agusta-W estland - Collaboration und er 
way for a new ASW helicopter in accordance 
with Italian navy and Royal Navy requirements 
Agusta-Bell series- Production of 205, 206 
and 212 families continuing for civil and military 
operators, including 212 ASW version. Pro-
duction also launched for AB-206L-1 Long 
Ranger 2. Collaboration with Bell for new model 
412. 
Agusta-Bo;eing CH-47C - Production of 
Chinook continuing at 1.5-2 units a month. 
Agusta-Sikorsky S-61/SH-3D- Production 
continuing at one unit a month for Italian and 
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foreign operators in naval and utility version as 
well as VIP models. 
Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm B0-105 
Orders total 400, with 370 delivered by carly 
1978. P AH-1 missile-armed anti-tank version 
un der development and vV est German Defence 
Ministry has ordered 212. 
MBB-Kawasaki BK-117 - Civil helicopter 
being developed jointly by MBB and Kawasaki 
for production in both countries has 30 orders. 
First flight planned for mid-1979. Deliveries to 
begin in early 1981, and peak production rate of 
about 100 a month is projected, evenly divided 
between Germany and Japan. 
Aérospatiale SW-315B Lama - Total-pro-
duction as of J anuary was 246, including 39 in 
1978. Production continuing at a slow rate. 
Aérospatiale Super Frelon - Production 
continuing at about one unit a month for export. 
Aérospatiale SA-360 and SA-365 Dauphin 
14-place utility helicopter - Production of the 
single-engine SA-360 continuing with 38 built 
by January. First deliveries of the twin-engine 
SA-365 were in 1978, with 37 built by this 
January. 
Aérospatiale lW estland SA-341 and 342 
Gazelle businessjliaisonjscoutjattack helicopters 
- Being produced at about 15 a month for mili-
tary export customers for advanced scoutjarmed 
attack rôle. By January, 805 of both models had 
been built. 
Aérospatiale AS-350 5-6-place light utility 
helicopter - By J anuary, 54 had been built and 
30 had been delivered, ineluding 20 to the United 
States. 
Westland/Aérospatiale WG-13 Lynx 
Orders for 287 helicopters have been received 
from eight nations and the Arab Organisation 
for Industrialisation (AOI). British Army has 
ordered 100, British Royal Navy 60, French navy 
26, Dutch navy 24, Brazilian navy 9, Danish 
navy 7, Norwegian air force 6, Qatar 3 and 
Argentine navy 2. In addition, the AOI has 
ordered 50, of which the first 20 are being built 
by Westland and 30 will be assembled at Helwan, 
Egypt. A stretched version, designated WG-30, is 
under development. 
W estland/Sikorsky SB-3D - In production 
in five versions. To date, 188 have been delivered 
out of orders for 234. British Royal Navy has 
ordered 56 Sea King Mk. 1 and 38 Mk. 2 versions 
and the Royal Marines have ordered 15 Mk.4 
versions. British Royal Air Force has ordered 16 
of the Sea King Mk. 3 version. Others ordering 
the Sea King include Norway 11, German navy 
23, Indian navy 15, Pakistani navy 6, Belgian air 
force 5, Australian navy 10 and Egyptian air 
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force 6. Troop-carrying version of the helicopter, 
called the Commando, is being built for Egypt 
and Qatar with funding provided by Saudi 
Arabia. Egypt has received 27 out of 28 on order 
and Qatar has received all 4 of its Commandos. 
Westland WG-34 - Design definition 
studies on an advanced three-engine ASW heli-
copter are being performed for British Ministry 
of Defence. 
European missile programmes 
British Aerospace Sea Skua - Anti-ship 
missile in development for the British Royal 
Navy for launeh from ship-based Lynx helicop-
ters. Initial deployment planned for 1980. 
British Aerospace Sea Wolf - Air defence 
system in production for the Royal Navy. 
Improved version, designated M-40, under 
development. 
British Aerospace Rapier - In service with 
the British army and the Royal Air Force regi-
ment in both optically-guided and radar-guided 
Blindfire versions. Standard version ordered by 
the Iranian air force, Australian army, Zambia, 
Oman and Abu Dhabi. 
British Aerospace Swingfire - Long-range, 
wire-guided anti-tank missile in service with the 
British army in a vehicle-mounted configuration. 
Also sold to the Belgian army. Infantry-portable 
version has been sold to Egypt. 
British Aerospace SRAAM - Research and 
development programme for new short-range air-
to-air missile. 
British AerospaceJRaytheon XJ-521 Sky-
fiash - Air-to-air equipped with an EMI 
Limited fuse and Marconi guidance. In pro-
duction for the British Royal Air Force for use 
on air defence aircraft, purchased by Sweden for 
use on Viggen fighters and evaluated by the 
United States. 
British Aerospace Sea Dart - In production 
for the British and Argentine navies. Improved 
version under development. Land-based version 
offered. 
British Aerospace P3T - Sea-skimming 
missile under development for the British Royal 
Navy. Based on technology of the Martel missile, 
but uses semi-active radar guidance. 
British AerospaceJ Australian Ikara - Anti-
submarine missile produced in Australia and 
marketed by British Aerospace. In service with 
the British and Brazilian navies. 
British Aerospace Sabre - Air-launched 
anti-armour and hard target missile being 
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defined, based on technology of the Rapier sur-
face-to-air missile. 
Short Brothers Seacat - Surface-to-air 
shipborne missile, in production and sold to 
navies. Advanced version with a sea-skimming 
capability is under deve1opment. 
Short Brothers Tigercat - Land-based 
version of Seacat with Marconi Blindfire radar 
acquisition system. Sold to six nations. 
Short Brothers Blowpipe - Shoulder-
launched, surface-to-air missile in service with 
the British and Canadian armies and others. 
Modified version for launch from armoured 
vehicles and ships under study. 
Aérospatiale AS-15 - All-weather, air-ta-
surface missile under development to replace 
older AS-12 missile. 
Aérospatiale MM-38 Exocet anti-ship -
Deliveries continuing of both surfaee-to-surface 
and air-to-surface AM-39 versions. Land-
launched, coasta1 defence version, MM-40A, being 
tested by French navy. Orders for all versions by 
about 23 nations stand at about 1,200, the same 
as a year ago. 
Aérospatiale AS-30 air-to-surface - Sche-
duled for first firing by the end of March. New 
laser guidance version under development, with 
production expected to begin around 1980. 
Aérospatiale Pluton - Five French army 
artillery regiments now equipped with this 
tactieal nuclear weapon, an il.crease of one regi-
ment since last year. 
Aérospatiale/MEE (Euromissile) Milan anti-
tank - Aiming for full production of 1,600 a 
month in about a year. British Aerospace Corpo-
ration is now licensed to produce the missile, 
which is already in production in France and 
West Germany. Export customers now total 16, 
an increase of three over last year. 
Aérospatiale/MEE (Euromissile) Roland law-
altitude air defence - Production is approaching 
the 1980 target of 250 a month. All-weather 
Roland 2, which has been adopted by the United 
States, is in production in West Germany for 
German forces. Optically-guided Roland 1 in 
production for French forces. 
Aérospatiale/MEE (Euromissile) Hot an ti-
tank - Production nearing target of 800 a 
month. Production versions have been delivered 
to French and West German armies and nine 
other nations, an increase of three export 
customers since last year. 
Aérospatiale SSBS/MSBS nuclear ballistic 
- \Vork continuing to replace earlier land-
launched versions with SSBS S-3 missile with 
thermonuclear warhead, improved penetration 
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aids and improved re-entry fairing. Four French 
nuclear submarines, each with 16 missile tubes, 
are now operational with MSBS M-20. A fifth 
16-tube, nuclear submarine is being equipped 
with A-20s while a sixth is due to be equipped 
with M-4s by 1984. 
Thomson-CSF/Matra Crotale sur:face-to-air 
- In production :for French navy and export 
customers induding South A:frica, Saudi Arabia, 
Libya and Egypt. Total orders were 2,060 as of 
January. 
Matra R-530 air-to-air - Export deliveries 
continuing to those countries opera ting Mirage III 
and 5 and F-1 :fighters, with 3,300 sold as of 
January. 
Matra Super 530 long-range air-to-air -
Production started in January 1978. French air 
:force has ordered 2,000 to equip Mirage F-1 and 
2000. There have been no new orders since last 
year. 
Matra 550 Magic air-to-air dog:fight - Total 
orders stand at 5,000, incluiling French air :force 
and navy and 10 export customers. · 
MatraJOto Melara Otomat anti-ship - In 
production :for the Italian navy and :four export 
customers, with 400 orders received as of 
January. 
Sistel Marte air-launched anti-ship 
Helicopter-launched version of Sistel's Sea Killer 
Mk. 2 missile is continuing qualification testing 
by Italian navy, which will be completed by mid-
1979. 
Sistel Mariner - Sur:face-launched version 
of Sistel Marte incorporating helicopter-borne 
radar and :fire control system :for operations :from 
very small ships is under development. 
Sistel Indigo-MEl surface-to-air - All-
weather, air de:fence system against low-:flying, 
high-per:formance airerait and mounted on 
tracked vehicles for mobility is being :funded 
through development and production by special 
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Italian army 10-year supplementary budget law. 
Prototype now being tested. 
SAAB B-83 air-to-ground, quick-reaction 
missile - Now under development to be used 
primarily on an eight-missile per aircraft confi-
guration :for the planned SAAB SK-38/J-38 
trainer/strike airerait. 
SAAB RB-05A air-to-sur:face- Production 
run completed late last year :for AJ-37 Viggen 
attack aircraft. 
Bofors RB-70 man-portable sur:face-to-air-
Now operational with Swedish army. New all-
weather version planned. Norway initially has 
ordered a limited number and other countries 
are interested. 
Selenia Aspide air-to-air/surface-to-air/ship-
to-air- In operation with Italian navy in ship-
to-air version, and in production :for Italian air 
:force and army in other versions. 
Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm advanced air-
to-ground - Programme :formerly called Jumbo 
is now under review to determine whether it will 
go into production phase. German Government is 
looking :for partners in :full-scale development 
programme. 
MBB Kormoran air-launched, anti-ship -
Now in series production :for West German navy 
and air :force. Italian Government has shown 
interest in acquiring missile. 
MBB Cobra - Production :for West German 
ground :forces of this anti-tank missile is com-
pleted. Licensed production programmes continue 
in Italy, Turkey, Pakistan and Brazil. 
MBB Armbrust 300 - Shoulder-launched 
anti-tank missile in series production in Brussels 
by joint Belgian-German company. 
MBB Mamba- Anti-tank missile replacing 
earlier Cobra is now in production in West 
Germany and is being co-produced under licence 
in Italy, Turkey, Pakistan and Brazil. 
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Cl 
00 
Name 
Tornado 
(MRCA) 
Concorde 
A-300B2 
A-300B4 
A-300C4 
A-310-100 
A-310-200 
A-310-XOO 
Transall 
ORAO /IAR-93 
JET B-1 
JET B-2 
Alpha-Jet 
Jaguar 
General data 
Manufacturera Primary ~ CD 
and countries mission C5 
Panavia8 Strike-Recon. 2 
Air Deferree 2 
Brit. Aerospace, Supersonic 3 
Aérospatiale, transport 
France 
Airbus Short-bau! 3 
Industrie' 
Medium-bau! 3 
Conv. pax fcargo 3 
Wide-body 2-3 
Wide-body 2-3 
Wide-body 2-3 
Aérospatiale, Mil. transport 4 
France 
MBB, Germany 
VFW, Germany 
Soko (Yugoslavia) 
ClAR (Romania) 
Close support 1 
Aérospatiale, Transport 2-3 
France 
British Aerospace, 
UK 
VFW-Fokker, Transport 2-3 
German y 
MBB, Germany 
Dassault-Bréguet, Trainer /Ground 2 
France 
Dornier GmbH, 
German y 
Support 
SEPECAT Trainer B, E 2 
Strike S, A 1 
Strike 1 
European multinational programmes 
Dimensions and weights Power plant 
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28.21 58.8 18.7 23,000 40,000+ 2 Turbo-Union M2+ Variable geometry. 
45.62 RB.199-34R tf. Ordered by Britain, 
Ital y, German y. 
-
- - 18.7 - - 2 Turbo-Union M2+ Air deferree version ordered 
RB.199-34R tf. by Britain only. 
--
108- 83.8 203.8 37.1 173,800 408,000 4 Olympus M2 In service. 
128 593 Mk. 602 tj. 
--
269- 147.1 175.1 54.2 189,400 313,000 2 GE CF6-50C tf. M86 - 200 for hot fbigh 
345 conditions. 
268- 147.1 175.1 54.2 194,000 347,100 2 GE CF6-50C tf. M86 - 200 with 3,100 
345 n. m. range. 
269- 147.1 175.1 54.2 - - 2 p & w - - 200 with 3,100 
345 JT9D-59A tf. n. m. range. 
205- 144.0 153.1 51.9 165,330 266,750 2 CF6-45B2A M84 U nder development. 
255 or 
205- 144.0 153.1 51.9 167,710 291,010 2 CF6-80A M84 Under development. 
255 or 
205- - - - - - 2 p & w - Study of extended 
255 JT9D-7R4C range version 
or 
2 R-R 
RB.211-524B4 
--
-------
80 131.3 105.2 38.5 61,730 112,435 2 R-R 277 
Tyne R.Ty. 22 tp. 
-----
0 - - - - - 2 R-R Viper - Development 
Mk. 632-41 
--
131 34.2 35.9 12.5 83,820 132,500 2 GE/Snecma M0.84 Proposed joint development 
CFM56 tf. projects. 
162 34.2 35.9 12.5 89,180 153,560 2 GEfSnecma M0.84 
CFM56 tf. 
0 29.11 40.3 13.9 6,944 13,227 2 Snec /Tur. M49 M0.85 German version bas wing 
Larzac 04 tf. hard points. 
0 28.5 53.9 16 16,850 34,000 2 R-R Turbomeca M 1.5 
Adour Mk. 804 tf. 
0 28.5 50.9 16 17,250 34,000 2 R-R Turbomeca M 1.5 
Adour Mk. 804 tf. 
0 28.5 55.2 16 15,432 34,000 2 R-R Turbomeca M 1.5 Export version. 
Adour Mk. 804 tf. 
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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
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man) ; MM. ValleW:, Lenzer (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. 
Adriaensens, Bernini, Cavaliere, Cornelissen (Alternate : 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on scientific, technological and aerospace questions -
reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council 
Welcoming the dialogue with the Council on the policy of member countries in the fields of 
energy, the aircraft industry, space and other areas of advanced technology; 
Convinced that safety problems in respect of nuclear facilities and radiation, and environmen-
tal problems associated with new sources of energy call for solutions which eut across national frou-
tiers; 
Regretting that even the increasingly-serious energy crisis since 1973 has failed to stimulate 
pragmatic arrangements for more joint action, co-operation and the definition of a medium- and 
long-term European energy policy; 
Aware of the enormous sums Western Europe will have to pay for oil and convinced that in 
the near future oil will have to be replaced by alternative sources of energy; 
Welcoming the increase in European collaboration for the production of civil aircraft, especially 
Airbus, and hoping that this success will induce governments to promote more intensive European 
collaboration for the production of a family of fighter aircraft and of helicopters; 
Considering the growing market for European satellites and launchers, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
l. Continue its dialogue with the Assembly but that it enter into more details in its twenty-
fifth annual report regarding Western European policies on scientific, technological and aerospace 
questions, their goals and achievements ; 
2. Promote a major concerted research and development effort and launch a co-ordinated pro-
gramme in: 
(a) energy-saving technologies to be applied in households and industries; 
(b) alternative sources of energy based on new technologies such as non-conventional gas, shale oil, 
liquified coal, and the use of solar, wind and water energy; 
3. Arrange for the next fighter aircra.ft to be a joint European venture by promoting a merger 
of the existing management consortia producing Jaguar and Tornado; 
4. Urge governments to provide the European helicopter industry with orders necessary for unin-
terrupted development and production ; 
5. Promote the series production of Ariane launchers in order to conquer part of the world mar-
ket for European and non-European satellites and their launchings. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur) 
1. Introduction 
1. The Committee appreciates the Council's 
interest and the continuing dialogue on the 
policy of member countries in scientific. 
technological and aerospace questions, especially 
in the fields of energy, aircraft production and 
space. 
2. Western Europe's dependence on outside 
sources of energy is increasing and is therefore 
becoming more dangerous for Europ'ean security. 
It is deplorable that the European governments 
still take so much time to formulate an energy 
policy and that there is still such a divergence 
of views between the European countries with 
large energy resources and those which lack 
them. A report published on 24th April 1979 
by the United States Office of Technology 
Assessment predicts that the free world's 
petroleum production will reach a peak sorne 
time after 1985 ; the supply shortage after that 
peak will then constitute a serious threat to the 
western way of life. 
3. For the first time an optimistic note can 
be struck where the European aircraft industry 
is concerned. The Director General of Airbus 
Industrie has received permission from the 
French Government to increase production at 
the Toulouse assembly plant from the current 
2.3 planes per month to 3 per month by 1980, 
possibly reaching a maximum of 8 to 10 a month 
la ter. 
4. On the state of European co-operation in 
space questions, the Council pointed out in its 
report that during the period 1977-81 the Ariane 
and spacelab programmes were due for com-
pletion, both being programmes of a size never 
before achieved in Europe. If European 
industry continues its progress in the develop-
ment of satellite technology, the success of these 
programmes from 1981 onwards would open for 
Europe the age of operational application 
satellites, especially in the communications field. 
5. AU the aforementioned subjects will be 
dealt with in greater detail later in this report, 
but here your Rapporteur wishes to underline 
the fact that at the end of April 1979 a new 
round of anti-satellite limitation talks started 
in Vienna between the Soviet Union and the 
United States. An early agreement to ban the 
testing of attack satellites, while negotiations 
are in progress, might be acceptable to both 
sides. It might then be possible to ban any 
aggressive action directed towards spacecraft of 
these two countries. The second step might be 
the banning of specifie anti-satellite hardware. 
Protection of reconnaissance spacecraft is not at 
6 
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issue but rather the protection of communica-
tions, early warning, navigation and other 
operational satellites. It is not the intention of 
either side to reach a formai agreement to 
coïncide with the signing of the SALT II 
agreement, but there is a link between the two 
as the ability of the United States to verify 
Soviet compliance with the SALT II agreement 
and a test ban on attack satellites remains a key 
political issue in the United States. 
6. The fourth subject mentioned by the 
Council is the work of the United Nations Law 
of the Sea Conference. The third session was 
reconvened at Geneva on 19th March 1979. 
Of the 158 countries participating in the 
Law of the Sea Conference 119, which are 
members of the group of developing countries, 
are opposed to unilateral United States action 
on the basis of the United Nations resolution 
declaring the deep ocean resources "the common 
heritage of mankind". The same group of 
developing countries would like an international 
treaty to be ready for signature in Caracas in 
the spring of 1980. The United States believes 
deep seabed mining could start before 1985. 
At the moment six United States firms are 
involved in four major international consortia 
now conducting exploratory development of the 
mining of nodules which contain manganese, 
copper, nickel and cobalt ores. The sites involved 
are in the northern Pacifie Ocean, beyond the 
areas of national jurisdiction at depths of more 
than 4,000 m. 
7. At the end of the first sitting of the third 
session on 27th April 1979, the group of 119 
countries made the following suggestions which 
will be discussed when the conference is 
reconvened at the United Nations headquarters 
in New York on 19th July for a further five-
week sitting. The main proposai called for a five-
year moratorium on seabed mining projects. The 
United States Government was not in favour 
of such a moratorium. Furthermore, the group 
of 119 countries proposed that the mining 
industry contribute 35-40 % of its profits to 
help finance third-world participation in seabed 
mining. The United States considered this 
percentage much too high and 20 % was 
suggested instead. 
8. Another proposai was to limit the volume 
of minerais from deep-sea mining on the inter-
national market so as to protect land-based 
producers of such minerais. 
9. Finally, there was a discussion on the voting 
system of the international executive group that 
would control the mining of the seabed minerais. 
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10. A consensus Wll$ reached on four key issues : 
(i) the rights of landlocked states to share in the 
fishery resources of their coastal neighbours ; 
(ii) the responsibilities of countries to enforce 
and obey rules protecting the marine environ-
ment from pollution ; (iii) the definition of the 
outer limits of the continental shelf ; (iv) the 
extent of the zone boundaries within which 
marine ~cience research can be undertaken on 
the continental shelf. 
11. Although there was a broad consensus on 
these four subjects, final decisions will have to 
be taken at the meeting in New York. 
II. Energy problems 
12. In her study on nuclear exports and non-
prolüeration \ Simone Courteix stated : 
"A paradox of our age is that nuclear 
technology, which holds out such great 
hopes if it is considered as a means of 
meeting present and future energy require-
ments in peace, is also an important factor 
in the armaments industries. Here it should 
be recalled that the statutory objectives of 
the Agency (for atomic energy in Vienna) 
are to seek to accelerate and enlarge the 
contribution of atomic energy to peace, 
health and prosperity throughout the world 
and so far as it is able to ensure that 
assistance provided by it is not used in 
such a way as to further any military 
purpose. 
The means used to attain the objectives of 
non-proliferation are mainly the non-
proliferation and other treaties, application 
of IAEA safeguards and the London 
directives adopted by the principal coun-
tries exporting nuclear materials and equip-
ment which were translated into fact inter 
alia by the application of safeguard 
measures applying to the transfer of 
sensitive technologies and measures relating 
to the physical protection of nuclear 
materials and installations, etc. 
In spite of this range of means of fighting 
proliferation, there are growing fears that 
breaches may or will be opened in the 
immediate future. The main reason for this 
forecast lies in the fact that it is expected 
that energy of nuclear origin - which, 
since the oil crisis, has become more com-
petitive and more essential - will be widely 
used in many countries before the end of 
the century and that there will be 
1. Recherches Panthéon - Sorbonne - Université de 
Paris I - Sciences juridiques, droit des relations inter· 
nationales. 
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widespread ownership of large quantities of 
nuclear materials and nuclear fuel cycle 
installations which might in the future be 
diverted towards non-peaceful activities if 
a number of juridical-political and tech-
nological barriers are not erected in time. 
According to certain studies 1, a number 
of countries (twelve to fifteen) may at 
present be considered as on the threshold 
of accession to strategie nuclear power 
insofar as they possess reactors and the 
technical and industrial means of producing 
nuclear weapons. These countries have been 
grouped in three categories according to 
motivation : 
- states in positions of insecurity which 
might be tempted to develop nuclear 
weapons to ensure their defence (Israel, 
South Africa, South Korea, Yugoslavia); 
- states seeking such power for reasons of 
prestige (Brazil, India, Iran, Spain) ; 
- finally, rivais of sorne of the abovemen-
tioned countries wishing to keep up with 
the others (Argentina, Egypt, Pakistan, 
North Korea, etc.) 2." 
She concluded : 
"However, two considerations must be borne 
in mind : first, there is always a time lag 
between a political speech on the need to 
fight proliferation and the requirements of 
international nuclear trade. The reversai of 
a situation in a highly political area, account 
being taken of its economie, social and ecolo-
gical implications, etc., is always possible, 
and events in recent months have proved 
this. Second, since nuclear deterrence con-
tinues to be a decisive factor in the conduct 
of international relations, there is still a 
strong temptation for certain states to 
possess their own bomb. So safeguard 
measures against proliferation may in the 
end only be provisional. The nuclear powers 
will not always be able to be the nuclear 
police of the world while themselves refusing 
to reduce their stocks of arms. Sooner or 
later, general disarmament will be the only 
alternative to nuclear proliferation." 
13. Your Rapporteur agrees with the Council 
on the urgent need to make Europe less 
dependent on imported energy and to give high 
priority to large-scale investments in the energy 
sector. However, full account should be taken 
of the abovementioned considerations together 
with other security considerations which came to 
the fore with the Harrisburg accident. 
1. Those of the International Institute for Strategie 
Studies in London and of the Ford Foundation. 
2. Cf. International Harald Tribune, 13th May 1977, 
page 2. 
14. Addressing the annual meeting of the 
National Academy of Sciences in Washington 
on 23rd April 1979, President Carter remarked 
that the nuclear accident at 'l'hree Mile Island 
near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on 28th March 
1979, had not resulted in harm to the public, 
and that the accident may even have served sorne 
positive purposes. The United States would 
redouble efforts to improve the safety of nuclear 
power and, even more important, the accident 
had reminded the world vividly of the dreadful 
consequences of a nuclear war. 
15. In Europe, the German Minister for 
Economie Affairs, Mr. Lambsdorff, stated in 
April 1979 in an interview with the Inter-
national Herald Tribune that the United States 
and European countries would stay dependent 
on foreign energy resources for the near future 
and that their only chance of reducing their 
vulnerability was to try to diversify in different 
sources of primary energy. 
16. The German Government's position on 
nuclear energy had not changed and no 
important option for primary energy could be 
neglected. The Federal Republic could not be 
without nuclear energy, especially from the 
point of view of competitiveness because it was 
still the cheapest form of energy. Of course, safety 
was the number one point and was more 
important than energy supply, but all the 
necessary safeguards had been made. 
17. The export of nuclear power plants was 
no great problem but the question of repro-
cessing and recycling was. The German position 
had always been that nuclear technology should 
be exported only to signatories of the nuclear 
non-proliferation treaty. Non-signatories such as 
Brazil would still be subject to the controls 
specified in the treaty. 
18. The United States President and the 
German Minister for Economie Affairs as well 
as Mr. Barre, Prime Minister of France, in his 
statement of 7th May 1979, are convinced that 
nuclear power is still essential for filling the 
energy gap. The United States obtains 13 % 
of its energy from seventy operational nuclear 
power plants ; the target, set last year, is to 
increase that figure to 20 %. 
19. The Common Market countries draw about 
10 % of their electricity from nuclear sources 
and are counting on 30% by 1985. The United 
Kingdom, with thirty-three nuclear plants, 
generates 12 % of its power ; West Germany, 
with sixteen nuclear plants, 11 % ; and France, 
with fifteen nuclear plants, 14 %. The French 
Prime Minister said on 7th May : "W e must 
expect a rise of about 30 % in the priee of oil 
in 1979 ; the energy crisis is here ; awareness 
of the problem has not yet gone as deeply as 
might have been thought." He confirmed that 
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France "would not let go of nuclear energy". 
It is expected that nuclear energy will meet more 
than half France's power requirements by 1985. 
20. Even before the Harrisburg accident, 
nuclear energy programmes were slipping 
behind, partly because of slow economie growth, 
partly because of public opposition. The number 
of nuclear reactors planned in OECD countries 
has been eut by more than half in the last eight 
years. This might go further as official state-
ments about risks have been discredited in most 
countries. The political choices have to be clearly 
discussed in order to prevent a public backlash 
against nuclear power. 
21. Your Rapporteur wishes to mention that 
in the framework of the Community it has often 
been pointed out that the similarity of energy 
supply problems encountered by industrialised 
countries requires similar efforts for their 
solution. Early co-operation in research and 
rlevelopment is an important prerequisite for 
opening markets and also for the development 
of uniform criteria and standards. Environ-
mental and safety problems associated with new 
sources of energy, especially pollution of the 
atmosphere and waters and the safety problems 
of nuclear facilities and radiation protection 
problems, require solutions which eut across 
national frontiers, especially in the densely 
populated area of Western Europe. 
22. However, efforts to establish a common 
European policy have not had much success, 
especially in development sectors soon to be put 
to practical applications. In nuclear fusion, 
where practical applications will not be immedi-
ate, a joint integrated research effort could 
therefore be undertaken. 
23. The Council of Ministers of the European 
Community, meeting in Brussels on 27th March 
1979, was again unable to reach a decision on 
the medium- or long-term energy policy of the 
Communities. The only decision taken by the 
Council was that it would start to study the 
Commission's proposais on Community goals in 
the field of energy for the next ten or twelve 
years. However, no other decisions were taken 
nor were the guidelines adopted for a present-
day Community energy policy. Where then is 
the political will to work towards a European 
energy policy ~ If the governments are so con-
cerned by the prospects for 1990 onwards, why 
has no action been taken ~ 
24. In 1979 agreement was reached on particular 
issues such as a programme for uranium prospec-
tion in the nine European countries, physical 
protection of fuel material, a prog-ramme for 
storing radioactive wastes and a two-year pro-
gramme on security aspects, but these partial 
agreements do not constitute an overall pro-
gramme. 
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25. In the framework of the OECD, the Inter-
national Energy Agency has concluded agree-
ments on crisis management, energy conservation 
and development of additional energy resources. 
The agency has given a special impetus to broad 
international co-operation in energy research. 
Sections of programmes which compete with 
European programmes are closely co-ordinated 
with the Commission of the European Com-
munities. The main purpose is collaboration with 
Japan, the United States and important Euro-
pean industrialised countries which are not 
members of the EEC. 
26. Apart from institutionalised collaboration 
many neighbouring countries in Western Europe 
have special projects on bi-, tri- or multilateral 
bases, i.e. Urenco, Eurodif, Franco-German 
collaboration on fast breeder reactors, etc. 
Although ali European countries say they are 
prepared to work towards a common energy 
policy it is disappointing to acknowledge the 
little progress made. 
27. For Europe's security, growing dependence 
on oil supplies remains a critical problem. 
Neither are the strategie oil reserves very great. 
Europe will certainly not have any influence 
on the OPEC countries unless it develops a 
positive energy policy and a new generation 
of energy technology capable of replacing oil. 
Failing this, the money paid into the OPEC 
treasuries will remain a heavy unproductive 
burden on the European budgets. 
28. A major research and development effort 
should be made to promote supplies of new 
natural gas and coal derivatives ; for example, 
natural gas could be obtained from non-
conventional sources like coal-bed methane and 
tar sands. Europe will certainly have to base 
its energy on a new technology such as solar 
energy, non-conventional gas and perhaps even 
shale oil or liquified coal. 
29. On 25th April 1979, the Council stated in 
reply to Recommendation 326 on application 
satellites that, although numerous studies were 
available on the subject of solar power satellites 
for supplying the earth with energy, such 
systems were very expensive. It considered the 
realisation of even only a small prototype at 
least premature. Y our Rapporteur does not agree 
with this comment as, for its security, Europe 
must reduce its dependence on the OPEC 
countries, and account must also be taken of the 
enormous sums which are yet to be paid for 
oil and the near certainty that one day in the 
not too distant future oil will have to be 
replaced by an alternative source of energy. 
ID. European aircraft industry 
30. Answering Written Question 189 put by 
Mr. Valleix, the Council stated on 21st March 
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1979 that in the civil field there were advantages 
to be gained by co-operation between European 
airframe, aeroengine and component manufac-
turers and it noted that progress had already 
been achieved with such products as Concorde 
and the Airbus A-300. Actually the European 
consortium, Airbus Industrie, has raised its 
market share from 6 % to 19 % in a single 
year. Last year it sold 132 units of the A-300 
and introduced a smaller version, the A-310, 
designed to compete directly with Boeing's 767. 
Airbus Industrie's increased share in the world 
market meant that Boeing's share of world 
orders for commercial aircraft feil from 59 % 
to 57% in 1978 ; Lockheed's market share fell 
from 7 % to 6 % and McDonnell Douglas lost 
most, sliding from 28 % to 17 %. The re are, 
therefore, certainly advantages to be gained 
by co-operation between European manu-
facturers. 
31. The American firm Merrill Lynch, Pierce 
l!,enner and Smith, which is an authority on 
economie analysis and forecasts in aircraft 
industries, is of the opinion that between 1979 
and 1990 the world market for civil transport 
aircraft might be sorne 6,300 transport aircraft, 
costing about $24,000 million. Airbus Industrie 
might get 14.3% of this market, McDonnell 
Douglas 20.7% and Lockheed 9.4% ; by far 
the largest share, 55.6 %, will remain with 
Boeing. For Boeing this would mean sorne 3,900 
aircraft, and for Airbus Industrie sorne 800 
aircraft. 
32. However, as the Council rightly remarked, 
collaboration between European manufacturers 
does not mean the exclusion of the American 
industry. In fact the latter has much to gain 
from the success of Airbus Industrie : General 
Electric has long supplied engines for the Airbus 
and recently Pratt and Whitney moved in to 
share the market. United States industry also 
manufactures the electronic gear of the Airbus. 
33. The first firm order for the AiTbus A-310 
came from Swissair, which belongs to the KSSU 
group whose aircraft have Pratt and Whitney 
engines, whereas the Atlas group, to which Air 
l!,rance, Lufthansa and Alitalia belong, will 
order the A-310 with General Electric engines. 
34. Two versions of the new Airbus A-310 are 
being offered: a short-range version capable of 
transporting 240 passengers over 3,880 km and 
a medium-range version capable of transporting 
the same number of passengers over 5,580 km. 
35. After the first firm order from Swissair, 
major orders for the A-310 transport aircraft 
came from Lufthansa, KLM and Air France. 
Lufthansa ordered twenty-five A-310 aircraft 
and took options for an additional twenty-five ; 
KLM ordered ten and took options for another 
ten ; Air France ordered five and took options 
for another ten. These sales raij!e the number 
of firrm orders for the A-310 to fifty-two ; there 
are fifty-five options. 
36. With regard to military aircraft the 
Council informed the Assembly on 21st March 
1979 that much work was already being done 
nationally on the concepts for the next genera-
tion of fighter aircraft. lt stated that the 
technical, financial and military problems to 
be overcome were very great but that there 
was every indication that those concerned were 
fully aware of the importance and desirability 
of finding a European solution. In your Rap-
porteur's opinion the most logical conclusion 
would be to combine the two companies now 
working on co-operative projects, i.e. Panavia, 
where the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy 
are co-operating on the airframe side and Rolls 
Royce, Fiat and MTU on the engine side, and 
Sepecat, which is responsible for the Jaguar 
production where Rolls Royce is working with 
Turbomeca on the engine side. If the next 
fighter aircraft is to be a joint European 
venture, the three major countries should 
participate at an early stage and the three air 
staffs should work together. 
37. The Mirage 4000 is being developed in 
France, the TKF-90 in Germany, and the 
AST-403 in the United Kingdom; the staffs of 
the respective air forces should therefore study 
all three prototypes. 
38. Governments should not forget that if 
France and the United King dom had acted 
together the Americans would never have 
succeeded in selling the F-16. However, because 
of competition between France and the United 
Kingdom the Americans found a way of selling 
the F-16 in spite of the fact that this aircraft 
did not meet NATO requirements. 
39. Overriding everything is the need to 
establish a strong European base from which 
part of the world market may be conquered. 
It is true that the United States spends ten 
times more on research than any European 
country and that the American effort is four 
times greater than that of ali the European 
countries together. Nevertheless, it should not 
be forgotten that even with its limited research 
and development resources Europe was able to 
produce Concorde, Harrier and the first swing-
wing aircraft - the equivalents of which the 
Americans have not produced. 
40. Governments should make an extra effort 
in the helicopter field. Industrialists have 
already set up a consortium, which has now 
been in existence for six years, but if their 
work is to be successful they need government 
projects to work on. 
41. Euromissile, which directs the industrial 
and commercial aspects of the armed systems 
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Milan, Hot and Roland, their derivatives and 
sea-to-sea missiles, should be the permanent 
consortium in charge of missiles. 
IV. Space questions 
42. Many problems facing the European Space 
Agency stem, on the one hand, from the 
difficult economie situation in Europe which 
restricts the funds member states can allocate 
to space activities and, on the other, from the 
need to take major decisions concerning new 
space activities. 
43. In its reply to Recommendation 326 on 
application satellites the Council stated that the 
agency had funds available in its own general 
studies budget to finance preparatory work on 
the desirable aim of formulating a coherent 
space programme setting long-term goals for 
Europe. However, to the best of your Rap-
porteur's knowledge, ESA's mandatory 1978 
budget has not yet been approved, let alone the 
1979 budget. Its approval requires the unanimity 
of the member states but this could not be 
obtained because of the attitude of the Italian 
Delegation which is not satisfied with the 
industrial return or the method of calculating 
contributions. The mandatory 1978 budget 
includes the general budget and the scientific 
programme budget. Practical arrangements have 
heen made to minimise the consequences of this 
lack of decision for the daily work of the 
Agency. Nevertheless this situation has created a 
difficult atmosphere which could hamper ESA's 
ability to tackle the substantive problems of 
European space policy and programmes. 
44. As far as the Ariane programme is con-
cerned it is planned to have Ariane available 
and proven at the end of 1980. Although the 
first flight trial has been delayed to November 
1979, the planned date of the last trial has been 
kept at October 1980 ; moreover a six months' 
margin exists between the last development 
firing, scheduled for October 1980, and the first 
operational launch, scheduled for April 1981. 
45. For the operational phase the ESA member 
states approved the manufacture of six opera-
tional launch vehicles in addition to the four 
prototypes. The question now is whether a new 
series of five launchers should be ordered to 
enable ESA to meet requirements up to 1983. 
The Council of the Space Agency decided, 
during its meeting on 3rd and 4th April 1979, 
to manufacture a sixth launcher to put into orhit 
an InteLsat V telecommunications satellite. 
46. Also under discussion is a modification to 
the first and third stages of Ariane and the 
addition of solid boosters which will increase 
the launcher's Lift capability from 1,700 kg to 
2,300 kg. ESA would therefore be able to offer 
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a launcher of higher performance and thus 
improve its chances of selling Arirane for 
programmes in both member states and non-
member states. ESA does not intend to produce 
two types of the launcher in parallel but will 
offer only the new version with the modified 
first and third stages. 
47. The arrangement for Ariane stipulated the 
priee calculated in 1973 (380 million accounting 
units) \ recognising that inflation had to be 
taken into account. Furthermore, the participat-
ing states committed themselves to contribute to 
a margin of 20 % for technical contingencies. 
France guaranteed to cover any additional 
expenditures up to a limit of 35 %. It is expected 
that the cost to completion of the programme 
will remain far below the total accepted by the 
participating states. 
48. Financial diÏÏiculties have also arisen with 
regard to spacelab. The original cost was 
estimated at 570 million accounting units, which 
meant the nominal cost plus a margin of 20% 
for technical contingencies. Now the global cost 
is estimated at sorne 680 million accounting units 
or 140% of the initial cost, which amounts to 
3,700 million French francs. The increase in 
the cost of spacelab has not yet been approved 
by ail member countries although they have 
been kept informed about the situation of the 
programme and the technical contingencies. 
Italy, for instance, which until now has financed 
18 % of the programme, has already announced 
that it wishes to make only a symbolic con-
tribution to the extra 20 % of the cost. This 
will probably mean that other member countries 
will be invited to pay more. 
49. NASA is committed to order a second 
spacelab. A definite order should be placed at 
the end of 1979 with delivery planned in the 
1982-83 time frame. Until then ESA is obliged 
to give NASA ail necessary logistic aid so that 
it can use its options freely. This means however 
that 1,400 people working on spacelab for 
ERNO in Bremen will have to be kept on the 
payroll. NASA may still wish to modify spacelab 
should this be necessary to make it compatible 
with the shuttle. The difficulties of integrating 
the various components of spacelab might have 
been underestimated by the manufacturer. The 
engineering model of spacelab, which should 
have been ready by mid-1979, is now ten months 
behind schedule and may be ready in mid-1980. 
The first flight, with two payload specialists, is 
planned for August 1981 and the second Ïlight 
for J anuary 1982. The first spacelab should be 
delivered to NASA in August 1980 in order to 
leave NASA one year to fit it into the shuttle. 
In view of the fact that the shuttle programme 
1. 1 accounting unit = $1.25. 
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is also running behind schedule, the delay with 
spacelab should not have serious consequences. 
50. The shuttle has been delayed because of 
engine development problems which meant that 
the space shuttle's main engine programme had 
to be rescheduled. One incident resulted in sorne 
engine damage which had repercussions on the 
financial situation of the programme. The target 
date for the fi:rst launch is still 9th November 
1979, but it will probably not take place until 
early 1980. The American Congress has approved 
NASA's request for $185 million supplementary 
appropriations to carry the shuttle programme 
through fiscal year 1979. For fiscal year 1980, 
NASA might be obliged to request a considerable 
supplementary appropriation. 
51. Where hardware is concerned NASA is 
convinced that solutions are currently available 
to nearly ail problems that still exist. 
52. On both sides of the Atlantic the space 
organisations have encountered financial dif-
ficulties due to overspending of the budgets for 
development programmes. 
53. Of great importance is a well-defined future 
programme on the use of spacelab and the 
shuttle. The performance of spacelab should be 
improved in three respects : it should be given 
more electrical power, its flight should be longer 
than originally forœeen - thirty days as a 
target instead of seven - and the time necessary 
to fit out spacelab for its second and subsequent 
flights should be reduced. 
54. A study on the use of spacelab from 1983 
onwards should therefore be undertaken in order 
to define the evolution of co-operation between 
member states and the prospects of future 
co-operation with the United States. 
55. Your Rapporteur submitted a second report 
on application satellites 1 on 26th October 1978 
and will therefore not deal with this subject in 
detail again. He will merely give sorne extra 
information on developments since that time. 
56. The Meteosat programme is producing 
satisfactory results and is integrated in the 
telecommunications network of the W orld 
Meteorological Organisation. It involves global 
acquisition and distribution of weather data. 
Images sent from Meteosat can be seen on 
German television every evening at about 7 p.m. 
The meteorological services of the ESA member 
states are presently considering the possibility 
of ensuring the continuity of the service by the 
creation of a new entity, EUMETSAT, which 
would be in charge of providing an operational 
system of European meteorological satellites. 
,-1. Document 784. 
57. Meteosat II will be launched on the third 
qualification launch of Ariane in 1980. 
58. Existing weather satellites are also widely 
used for defence purposes. Arrangements are 
kept under continuous review by the NATO 
Military Committee Meteorological Group inde-
pendently of the ESA work in this field. 
59. Further to his abovementioned report, your 
Rapporteur put a question to the Minister of 
Research and Technology of the Federal 
Republic, Mr. Hauff, on the future of commu-
nications satellites and the international market 
for such satellites. On 29th November 1978 the 
Minister gave the following answers : 
"As indicated in Bundestag document 
8/1595 of March 1978, recent studies show 
that in the eighties the world market will 
amount to DM 17-30,000 million. An 
estimate made in December 1977 by the 
Centre for Aeronautical and Space Research 
and Tests at the request of the Ministry 
of Research and Technology gave a figure 
of DM 24,000 million, of which 40 % for 
satellites and ground installations (anten-
nae) and 20% for launchers. Europe's 
possible share of the world market has been 
estimated at 30% or DM 7,000 million. 
Should Germany obtain a share of not less 
than 25 % of the European market, this 
would represent a figure of about DM 2,000 
million for the eighties. Large user receiving 
stations, needed for direct broadcasting, are 
not included in these estimates. 
When assessing the openings afforded by 
these market prospects, the strong demand 
for experimental use of Symphonie and 
the interest shown in direct broadcast 
satellites must be considered positive. Con-
versely, the delay in completing satellite 
systems, for political and financial reasons, 
particularly in Brazil, Iran and the Arab 
states, must not be overlooked. 
Where conventional broadcast satellites are 
concerned, European industry is hardly in 
a position to compete with American 
industry which practically dominates that 
market, even if the adoption of the ECS 
operational satellite system in Europe 
consolidates European industry. On the 
other hand, direct broadcast satellites have 
a great future. According to estimates by 
the German Centre for Aeronautical and 
Space Research and Tests mentioned above, 
in the eighties broadcast satellites will 
represent almost as high a proportion of 
the market as other communications satel-
lites. German industry being weil placed at 
the outset because of the extent of its 
research, priority will be given to broad-
cast satellites. 
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The success of this undertaking will depend 
on industry making strong efforts to align 
its priees with those of the Americans and 
pursue an active sales policy. 
German research and development have 
gained an international position where com-
munications satellites are concerned : 
- The Franco-German Symphonie com-
munications satellite programme on the 
experimental transmission of television 
broadcasts, telephone conversations and 
data, whose two satellites were launched 
in 197 4 and 1975 and have since played 
a successful part in world-wide tests, 
has demonstrated a capability to develop 
satellites of this type and place them 
in geostationary orbit. 
- The Federal Republic was responsible 
for the major part of the ESA Telecom 
programme, both technically and 
financially. In March 1978, work started 
on the ECS communications satellites 
for setting up a European operational 
satellite system to transmit communica-
tions on a large scale and broadcast 
television programmes. The OTS orbital 
test J;~atellite was launched successfully 
in May 1978. A comprehensive test pro-
gramme is under way. 
- The ESA Marots (more recently Marees) 
maritime satellite programme is to form 
part of the planned world-wide Inmarsat 
system. At the same time, maritime 
stations and radio distress installations 
have been developed in Germany. 
- Where direct broadcast satellites are 
concerned, for severa! years the emphasis 
has been on modular-type operational 
models intended for satellite platforms, 
payloads and receiving installations 
with the result that German industry is 
now weil placed to develop and produce 
satellite systems of this type. Thanks to 
the encouragement of the Federal 
Ministry of Research and Technology, 
German industry has recently had con-
siderable success on the international 
market: 
- German industry ~s developing and 
producing the attitude control system 
and solar panels for the seven new-
generation Intelsat V satellites consti-
tuting the world-wide Intelsat satellite 
system. It has thus obtained the 
largest subcontracting contract out-
side the United States. 
- The German electronics industry has 
provided wave propagation tubes, 
inter alia for the American SBS 
(satellite business system), the NASA 
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TDRSS (data-transmission satellite 
system) and the Canadian ANIK-B 
communications system." 
60. In addition to these replies your Rappor-
teur would mention that at its meeting on 3rd 
and 4th April 1979 the ESA Council authorised 
the Director General to sign an agreement with 
Interim Eutelsat, the organisation which is to 
be in charge of the exploitation of the telecom-
munri.catiorus, concerning the TCS system. (The 
approval for the signature of a similar agree-
ment concerning Marees A and B had been given 
previously.) The ECS programme includes five 
satellites, four of which will be launched by 
Ariane from 1981 onwards. The total cost of the 
programme is estimated at 306.8 million account-
ing units, of which 220.6 million will be financed 
by ESA and 80 million by Interim Eutelsat. 
Interim Eutelsat will also have to finance 
between twenty-five and thirty earth stations in 
order to exploit the ECS system. 
61. The ESA decision-making bodies also 
agreed to sustain the programme to manufacture 
a third maritime communications satellite 
Marees C, until 1st September 1979 when th~ 
situation has to be reviewed. 
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62. It is encouraging to see the perspectives 
which are open to European industry in the 
space field and it is hoped that they will be 
fully explored. 
?3. ~t must nevertheless be recalled that space 
1s stül a very large venture which generally 
exceeds the capacity of one nation. It seems 
therefore essential that the European co-opera-
tion w hich ha:'! been the basis for the success 
of the present ESA programmes be augn~ented 
in the future and that the prospect of illusory 
short-term benefits will not lead European conn-
tries to develop national programmes at the 
expense of co-operative programmes which could 
at the end of the day only benefit non-European 
industry. 
64. Finally, further to his first report on 
application satellites, your Rapporteur is pleased 
to be able to say that Belgium, the Netherlands 
the United Kingdom and Spain have no~ 
ratified the ESA Convention and that only 
France has still to ratify it. Once France has 
done so ESA will no longer have to operate 
under the old ESRO Convention but will be 
able to follow the new ESA Convention. 
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Amendments 1, 2 and 3 
Scientific, technological and aerospace questions 
Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Valleix 
18th June 1979 
1. Mter paragraph 2 of the draft recommandation proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
"Examine the possibilities of aU-European co-operation in energy matters ;". 
2. Mter the new paragraph, add a second new paragraph as follows : 
"Start a detailed and continuing dialogue with the oil-producing countries with a view to adjusting 
production capabilities and requirements ;". 
3. In the original paragraph 3, leave out from "by promoting" to the end of the paragraph. 
Signed : V alleix 
1. See 4th Sitting, 19th June 1979 (Amendment 1 amended and agreed to; Amendment 2 agreed to; Amendment 
3 withdrawn). 
169 
6" 
Document 806 
Amendment 4 
Scientific, technological and aerospace questions -
Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 4 1 
tabled by Lord Northfield 
18th Jnne 1979 
4. At the end of pa.ragra.ph 2 of the draft recommandation proper, add a new sub-pa.ragraph as 
follows: 
"(c) co-operation on the safety and environmental impact of nuclea.r facilities, pa.rticularly where 
they create transfrontier dangers;". 
Signed : N ortkfield 
1. See 4th Sitting, 19th June 1979 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Parliaments and defence procurement 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 11 
by Mr. Maggioni, Rapporteur 
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22nd May 1979 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committce. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Eoper (Chair-
man) ; MM. Bonnel (Alternate: Verleysen), Eoberti 
(Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. ..tl.hrens, Baumel, Bechter, van 
den Bergh, Boldrini, Boucheny, Critchley, Dejardin 
(Alternate : Lambiotte), Fosson, Grant (Alternate : 
Banks), Handlos (Alternate : Büchner), Hardy, Konen 
(Alterna te : Bpauts), de Koster, Lemmrioh, Maggioni, 
Ménard, Pawelosyk, Pecchioli, Péronnet (Alternate : 
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N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italios. 
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F. Budgetary control 
G. Political difficulties and attitudes 
1. Criteria on which procurement decisions are based 
2. Attitudes and steps taken by parliament towards standardisation 
and for interoperability 
III. Conclusions 
APPENDICES : 
1. Questionnaire addressed to Ministries of Defence 
II. Questionnaire addressed to Chairmen of Parliamentary Defence Committees 
III. Recommandation 197 
IV. Recommandation 9 
* * * 
Introductory Note 
The Rapporteur gratefully acknowledges the assistance in the preparation of this report and 
appendices of Miss Franca Gusmaroli, of the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome, who was appointed 
by the Clerk as an outside expert at the request of the Rapporteur. The invaluable contribution made by 
the parliamentary defence committees and Ministries of Defence in the NATO countries is mentioned in 
pa.ragraph 11 of the explana.tory memorandum ; the Rapporteur expresses his thanks to all those chairmen 
and officiais who prepared replies to his questionnaires. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on parliaments and defence procurement 
The Assembly, 
Having studied the report of its Committee on Defenœ Questions and Armaments analysing 
the rôle of national pa.rliaments in the national defence equipment procurement process ; 
Considering that national pa.rliaments and their defenœ committees, with the exception of 
those of Germany and the Netherlands, are usually inadequately informed on defenœ matters; 
Believing tha.t parliaments exercise insuffi.ciently their prerogative to control defence procurement 
policy; 
Reca.lling the terms of its Recommandation 197 on military security and parliamenta.ry_ 
information; 
With a view to furthering joint production and standardisation of defence equipment in the 
armed forces of the countries of Western Europe or in the Alliance, ta.king due account of the 
military and economie requirements of the Alliance as a whole, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
Invite member governments: 
A. To ensure that their pa.rliaments, or where appropriate their parliamenta.ry defenœ, budget, 
or other committees concemed : 
1. Are fu1ly informed in good time, within the limita imposed by considerations only of 
external security, not of political or administrative convenience, on aU aspects of defenœ 
policy, at both the national and allied levels, especia1ly on matters affecting the assessment 
of the military threat and the choice of defenœ equipment ; 
2. Are enabled to exercise sufficiently close control of the defence budget and appropriations 
and of aU stages of the defenœ procurement process, so as to improve defenœ ca.pability 
and increase standardisation and interoperability of equipment ; 
3. Are enabled to compile systematicaUy information on current research and development 
projects in the national and European defence industry ; 
B. To ensure that full information on national defence equipment projects in the planning stages 
is available to allied govemments, and to take full account of alternative defence equipment projects 
available in allied countries ; 
C. To provide as far as possible a common structure for the national defence budgets, national 
defence equipment procurement processes, and, finally, the procedure for supplying classified infor-
mation with a. view to instituting in the foreseeable future a. European policy of common procurement 
of new weapons systems. 
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Dra(t Resolution 
on parliaments and defence procurement 
The Assembly, 
Having studied the report of its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments a.na.lysing 
the rôle of national pa.rlia.ments in the national defence equipment procurement process ; 
Considering tha.t national pa.rlia.ments and their defence committees, with the exception of 
those of Germa.ny and the Netherlands, are usua.liy inadequa.tely informed on defence matters; 
Believing tha.t pa.rlia.ments exercise insufficiently their prerogative to control the choice of 
defence equipment ; 
Recaliing the terms of its Recommandation 197 on military security and pa.rlia.mentary 
information; 
With a view to furthering joint production and standardisation of defence equipment in the 
a.rmed forces of the countries of Western Europe or in the Alliance, taking due a.ccount of the 
military and economie requirements of the Alliance as a whole, 
CALLS UPON THE P .ARLIAMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES 
To a.ssert their democratie right and fulfil their democratie duty, where appropriate through 
their defence, budget, or other committees concerned : 
l. To be fully informed on ali aspects of defence policy, a.t both the national and allied leve), 
especia.liy on ma.tters a.ffecting the a.ssessment of the milita.ry threat and the choice of defence 
equipment; 
2. To exercise sufficiently close control of the defence budget and appropriations, of the long-
term defence programmes, and of ali stages of the defence procurement process, so as to improve 
defence capa.bility and increase standardisation and interoperability of equipment; 
3. To compile systematica.liy information on current research and development projects in the 
national and European defence industry ; 
4. To coliaborate in the compilation and exchange through the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments of the WEU Assembly of information concerning alternative defence equipment 
projects available in allied countries using where appropria.te the good offices of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments of the Assembly of Western European Union. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Maggioni, Rapporteur) 
1. Introduction 
1. In recent years the increased sophistication 
of modern weapons has led to a significant rise 
in expenditure for the procurement of new 
weapo~ systems. It has been calculated that dis-
regarding cost increases due to inflation the 
real cost of major systems i.s rlising at an average 
rate of about 6 % per year 1 • The increase both 
in development and production costs has led to 
difficulties for the arm.s industry which in their 
turn have been translated into an increase in 
the final cost of SYJ~tems available on the market. 
It is thus easy to under'Stand why the members 
of the Atlantic Alliance have shown growing 
interest in reducing development costs and secur-
ing the advantages of long production runs. This 
means looking for ways of sharing development 
costs and/or arranging joint production with 
other countri~. 
2. This is the crux of the problem from the 
arms industry point of view. From the point 
of view of each country's military leadership 
co-production offers the advantage of standardis-
ation and interoperability. It should be borne 
in mind that militarily speaking the problem 
is not simply one of costs but also of providing 
the armed forces with jointly produced weapons 
systelll$ which can maximise operational and log-
istic flexibility. 
3. At this point there remains the political 
problem, that is the third and undoubtedly the 
most important factor involved when a western 
democracy seeks to equip itself with a new 
weapons system. For years now the Committee 
has concerned itself with arms procurement 
policy, examining the problem from many dif-
ferent viewpoiints, both in industrial and in 
military terms. It is sufficient here to recali 
the symposium on a European armaments policy 
organised in March 1977 (and its successor 
planned for October 1979), and most recently 
the Committee's report of the same title 2 sub-
mitted during the November 1978 session of the 
Assembly. 
4. In the present case your Rapporteur was 
Mked to examine the extent to which parliaments 
of the WEU and certain other allied countries 
investigate and control expenditure on defence 
procurement, and their ability to influence policy 
1. Roger Faeer, Weapons Proeurement in Europe -
Capabilities and Choiees- Adelphi Papers No. 108, llSS 
London, 1975. 
2. Document 786, 31st Oetober 19781 Rapporteur: Mr. 
Critehley. 
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in the direction of standardisation and joint 
production. 
5. Considering the triangle of milatary men, 
industrialists and politicians involved in the 
arms procurement process the greatest difficulty 
met by parliamentarians is the fact that it :is 
impossible for them to make a clear and correct 
evaluation of the expenditure options they are 
calied on to approve. In western democracies 
these options are the responsibility of various 
sectors within the administration. On questions 
of "military policy" these work withlin a general 
political framework where by law the only control 
is that exercised by parliament. 
6. In democracies final authority on arms 
purchase should belong in constitutional terms 
to parliament, inasmuch as parliament controls 
and approves the decisions taken by the govern-
ment. Clearly th:is parliamentary control cannot 
be based on criteria which are purely and exclu-
sively technical. It is of course possible for experts, 
if not parliamentarians themselves, to determine 
whether a given aircraft, ship or missile is tech-
nicaliy valid, to evaluate whether or not it is 
capable of carrying out the task)s for which it was 
designed. But how can parliamentarians judge 
whether it is right to allocate a certain expend-
iture to carry out these tasks when they are only 
vaguely aware of the nature of the tasks them-
selves? 
7. If they have to give a reasoned and respons-
ible evaluation of the technical proposais they 
first have to decide what kfind of defence they 
are seeking ; what are to be the limitations 
of this defence and what are to be it.s priorities. 
Secondly, parliamentarians must have the maxi-
mum of information available to them, at ali 
times. The only way to satisfy the first require-
ment is through a correct defence policy debate 
between the parties in parliament, a debate 
which can take place at any stage in the procure-
ment process or, as usually occurs, at the point 
at which parliament is calied on to approve the 
funds aliocated by the administration for its 
policies. This occurs in ali the countries exam-
ined in this report. Nonetheless, for a series 
of reasons which vary with the specifie features 
of national political systems this debate is not 
everywhere of the same importance. 
8. What is certain is that where there is 
little debate and where objectives are imprecisely 
defined a power vacuum is created which is then 
exploited and filied from outside. Those who fill 
the vacuum lack political cover ; they have no 
precise frame of reference to which to refer ; 
they are thus highly vulnerable and find it 
impoasible to make the more courageous decisions 
they would like to be able to take. In the absenoo 
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of political decisions naturally enough bureau-
cratie routine cornes to prevail. ln this case 
the military establishment becomes dissatisfied 
with the ~bsence of clear potitical directives 
and unwilling - for reasons of soorecy which 
cannot always be justified - to discuss military 
questions in depth. The result is that the military 
content themselves with the management of the 
funds bureaucrat!ically assigned to the deferree 
sector, without this management of funds being 
subjected to full parliamentary control. 
9. The second requirement - that parlia-
mentarians should have available to them 
sufficient information to make a correct evalua-
tion - can be met through improved collabora-
tion between the parliament and the administra-
tion, through independent bodies set up by par-
liament and through the initiative of individual 
members of parliament. Here too the quantity 
of information available varies from country to 
country according to the political relations 
exlisting between the government parties and 
those of the opposition and in line with the 
specifie features of the national cultural and 
political scene. 
10. From these premises the aim of this report 
is not so much that of criticising and evaluating 
national pract!ice case by ca::;e as that of under-
standing and explaining how, when, and with 
what powers, both in theory and in practice, the 
parliaments of the various countries examined 
intervene in the process of procuring new 
weapons and finally that of determining the 
influence they exert in th!is way over joint 
production projects and standardisation. 
11. Given the lack of an adequate literature 
on the subject the Rapporteur decided that it 
was both useful and necessary to prepare two 
detailed questionnaires so as to acquire detailed 
information on the specifie situation lin each 
NATO country (except Iceland which has no 
armed forces). The first of these questionnaires 
was addressed to the Minister of Deferree, and 
replies for the most part have been prepared by 
the staff in each Ministry of Deferree, directly 
involved in the arms procurement process. The 
second went to the chairmen of the deferree 
committees of the various parliaments, institu-
tionally responsible for approving deferree 
expenditure, or at least expressing an opinion 
on expenditure proposed by the government. 
Replies in many cases have been prepared by 
committee staffs. 
12. In drawing up the two questionnaires 1 the 
aim was to reconcile various conflicting require-
ments. F!irst of ail it was necessary, for certain 
countries where all information was lacking, to 
ask as much as possible about everything, 
including elementary points. Thus in the Italian 
1. Attached at appendix. 
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case, for example, the answers obtained provide 
precious information not available elsewhere. At 
the same time however the Rapporteur had to 
avoid a.sking other countr:ies for information 
already available in studies and articles. 
13. It was decided to group the questions in 
an order which as far as possible reflected the 
stages in which the decision-making process is 
logically decided. Finally emphasis was given to 
those stages during which, in practice, parlia-
mentary control is most important. 
14. The starting hypothesis was that as in 
practice the evaluation of the international situa-
tion is the responsibility of politicians, it is 
politicians who in each country should decide 
the objectives to be achieved, and thus determine 
military policy. Given this policy the military 
authoritie$, on the basis of technological research 
by the national arms industry and at interna-
tional level, .should determine the military means 
best adapted to achieve these ends. It is at this 
point in the process, before an order has been 
placed, that parliamentary control should be 
exerted. This report thus aims to determine 
whether in practice thiis parliamentary control is 
exerted a posteriori or a priori; whether by law 
parliament is given equivalent information about 
possible alternative options and finally whether 
parliaments have the power to exert their control 
through legislation, and through speclific initia-
tives aimed at exerting control and acquiring 
information. 
15. The questionnaires attempted furthermore 
to formulate the questions in such a way as 
not to tie these too closely either to decisions on 
specifie weapons systems, or to speci:ffic national 
situations. At the same time they attempted to 
avoid the opposite risk, namely that of generalis-
ing from points necessarily tied to spMific 
national situations or to the characteristlcs of 
specifie weapom; systems. 
16. The qu~ionnaire on the deferree equipment 
procurement process addressed to national 
deferree ministries consists of seven sections : 
A. Elementary information on the bodies 
responsible for procurement. 
B. Information on the initial stage in the 
process, that is the formulation of the 
military need for a new weapons system. 
C. Information on the second stage, namely 
the formulation of operational equip-
ment requirements for the system. 
D. Information on the development of the 
system as specified in the earlier stage 
of the process. 
E. Information on the pre-production 
phase following the development of a 
prototype. 
F. Information on allocation of funds. 
G. Conclusions concerning how far the 
theoretical procedure described above 
corresponds to reality as weil as the 
political problems which arise in 
practice. 
17. These phases should not be considered 
chronologically, rather they should be seen in a 
relatJionship of cause and effect (e.g. the alloca-
tion of funds, re~>earch and development). Th us 
each phase originates in the preeeding phase 
while at the same time influencing the latter. 
18. In each of the phases covered by sections 
B, C, D, E and F the information requested 
concerna the workings of the arm\S procurement 
process; the bodies involved in this process; who 
is responsible for what ; whether there is liaison 
between the diiferent sectors of the administra-
tion ; what are the links with the arros industry 
and with those international allied bodies 
responsible for relations between the administra-
tions and arros industries for the allied countries; 
what form is taken by relations with parliament, 
and lastly which are the factors which influence 
the decisions which have to be taken so as to 
pass from one stage to the next. 
19. The second questionnaire, addressed to the 
defence committees in the various national par-
liaments, consists of four sections : 
A. General information on the rôle of par-
liament in the arros procurement process 
(which parliamentary bodies are 
involved in this process ~ How do they 
intervene ~ What are their powers ?) . 
B, C, D, E. Detailed information on the 
rôle of parliament during the various 
stages of the arros procurement process. 
F. Information on parliamentary control 
over budget expenditure including 
funds for new weapons systems. 
G. Political attitudes towards Euro-
American problems and relationship of 
these to European collaboration in the 
arros field. 
20. It was believed that it was of fundamental 
importance to investigate parliament's rôle before 
going on to examine the principal question posed 
in this report, namely that of how parliament 
might exert an influence over joint production 
projects and thus over standardisation. The aim 
of the second questionnaire was thug to determine 
how, when and with what process national par-
liaments intervene in the process covered by the 
first questionnaire. 
21. Both questionnaires were sent to the 
fourteen members of the Atlantic Alliance 
(excluding Iceland which does not poasess armed 
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forces) ; three southern European countries 
(Portugal, Greece and Turkey) failed to reply. 
Thus in practice the report covers the seven 
WEU member states : France, Italy, Germany, 
Great Britain, Belgium (the Belgian Chamber of 
Deputies has not repliied), Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands and four other NATO members: 
Canada (the Canadian pa-rliament has not 
replied), the United States (no reply from the 
Senate), Denmark and Norway. 
II. Analysis of replies received to the 
questionnaires 
A. General - Organisation of Defence Ministries 
1. Bodies concerned with decision-making 
22. 'fhe main bodies involved and the majority 
of decisions taken in the arros procurement 
proce\Ss belong to national defence ministries (or 
national departments of defence) and vary 
according to the importance of the system to be 
purchased or the deciSions to be taken. It is 
unnecessary to give a detailed country-by-
country description of the workings of national 
procurement systems ; significant general charac-
teristics only will be described. 
23. In general, and leaving aside the Minister 
or Secretary of Defence, it is possible to identify 
within national defence ministries procurement 
bodies both of a technical-military and of a 
technical-administrative nature. Within these two 
broad "ategories the number, names, composition 
and sl.ze of these bodies vary from country 
to country. Each country has its own procure-
ment system and its own regulations. In general 
however these bodies fall into one of three main 
sub-categories : decision-making bodies, con-
sultative bodies and control bodies (the latter 
are absent in the organisational chart provided 
by the Luxembourg ministry). In this small 
European country the arros procurement process 
is on a very small scale due to the small size of 
Luxembourg's armed forces - 700 men grouped 
into one infantry battalion and one independent 
company. 
24. Amongst the decision-making bodies 
belonging to the technical-military area there 
are such bodies as the chiefs of staff respon-
sible for evaluating the procurement problem 
from an operational, technical and financial 
point of view. Amongst the decision-making 
bodies belonging to the technical-administrative 
area there are bodies such as the various 
secretariats and general directorates responsible 
for making this evaluation from an economie, 
technical and industrial viewpoint while at the 
same time taking aU necessary legal and 
administrative measures involved in the contract-
ing procedure. 
DOOUMENT 807 
2. Interministerial arrangements 
25. Whereas certain countries such as France 
and Italy listed exclusively bodies belonging to 
their respective defence ministries, other conn-
tries referred to other sectors of the national 
administration thus giving a fuller picture of 
interministerial co-operation in the procurement 
process. In Britain, for example, unlike other 
European countries, a special body known as the 
Procurement Executive has been set up so that 
the various authorities responsible for the pro-
curement of military matériel come under the 
responsibility of a single ministry. 
26. Belgium lists those bodies including the 
Ministry for Economie Affairs and the Ministry 
of Finance as well as the following inter-
ministerial bodies : the Council of Ministel');l, the 
Ministerial Committee for EconomQc and Social 
Co-ordination, and lastly the Interministerial 
Committee for the Budget. 
27. In Norway, if there is a choice between 
indigenous production or procurement domesti-
cally or abroad, there may be discll&'lions with 
other ministries such as the Ministry of Industry. 
A similar procedure may be w;ed when participa-
tion in bilateral or multinational production is 
contemplated. In the Netherlands an ad hoc body 
is set up to deal with the procurement of any 
exceptionally expensive weapons system. This 
may include representatives of the Ministl'lies of 
Economie Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Social 
Affairs and Finance. 
28. Among the bodies responsible for the 
procurement process Denmark cites the Minis-
tries of Trade (compensatory affairs) and of 
Finance (budget control) ; an interministerial 
consultative body on defence questions (the 
Defence Matériel Board) which includes repre-
sentatives from the Ministries of Defence, Trade 
and Finance, from priva te industry (on account 
of its involvement in production) and from the 
trades unions. Finally, Denmark cites the Par-
liamentary Finance Committee responsible for 
the final decision to allocate funds to a new 
weapons system. (Denniark is the only European 
country to cite a parliamentary body. The United 
States does likewise.) 
29. Finally it should be noted that the United 
States lists among the most important bodies 
involved in this work not only the Military 
Departments, the Department of Deferree, the 
Budget Office, the Cabinet and the President but 
also Congress. Congres,s plays a greater rôle than 
the national parliament of any other Alliance 
member in deciding the respective size of the 
three armed services and in distributing the funds 
required for the use, maintenance, development 
and procurement of their military equipment. 
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3. Relations with parliaments 
30. In western democracies not only govern-
ment bodies but also parliament should play an 
important rôle in the arros procurement proceffl, 
if only because it :is parliament wlrich debates 
and approves the funds allocated in the budget 
to military equipment. From the answers received 
to the questionnaires it emerges that in the 
majority of Atlantic Alliance members this rôle 
is mainly carried out by parlliamentary deferree 
committees and to a lesser extent in plenary 
session or in other standing ad hoc committees. 
31. In the United States two further com-
mittees- the House Committee on Government 
Operations and the Senate Committee on Govern-
mental Affairs- can also affect supply decisions 
presented by the government. 
32. In Germany, the Deferree and Budget Com-
mittees of the Bundestag participate in this 
process (the rôle of the Bundesrat is practically 
nil). During the debate on the defence budget 
other committees and other political groupa of 
the Bundestag can allso intervene, the former to 
discuss the departmental budget schedules of 
interest to them; the latter to propose amend-
ments. Even in the single-chamber Danish par-
liament, deferree equipment procurement is 
princiipally under the supervision of two com-
mittees - the Deferree Committee and the 
Finance Committee. 
33. In the Netherlands, parliamentary involve-
ment in the procurement process is restricted to 
the Second Chamber. In Canada and the United 
Kingdom on the other hand the debate on the 
supply of defence equipment is limited to the 
House of Commons, even if the House of Lords 
can, and occasionally does, consider defence 
matters. 
34. In the Briüish House of COIIIlmons these 
questions are dealt with by the Expenditure 
Committee and more specifically by the Sub-
Committee on Deferree and External Affairs. 
The Committee of Public Accounts also may 
occasionally deal retrospectively with an equip-
ment purchase in its capacity as a scrutineer of 
past expenditure. 
35. The French Senate refers not only to the 
work of the Deferree Committee, but also to the 
possibility that two further informai groups may 
be involved in weapons procurement, namely a 
group within the Foreign Affairs and Defence 
Committee and a second group in the Budget 
Committee. The rapporteurs on the budget 
participate in both of these groups. 
36. The Belgian Senate emphasisea that as the 
procurement of expensive deferree matériel 
involves more than just defence, the Economie 
and Foreign Affaira Committees may also 
intervene. 
37. In the Italian Chamber of Deputies there 
is not only the Deferree Committee but also 
the recently constituted Committee of Enquiry 
on Military Supplies and the permanent Sub-
Committee on Military Planning. 
38. The number of these bodies should not be 
allowed to give a misleading impression concern-
ing the rôle effectively played by parliamenta in 
the arms procurement process. On the contrary 
(to anticipate what emerges from the analysis 
of the answers to the questionnaires), unlike the 
United States Congrerss, European parliaments 
with very few exceptions are not involved in the 
various phases of the process through which new 
weapom:; systems are procured, rather their rôle 
tends to be restr!icted for the most part to 
requests for information ; the control exerted in 
practice is limited to the debate and vote on the 
budget. 
39. In Italy not only does parHament exert 
control through the annual deferree budget debate 
but also through the recently-passed ten-year 
laws for the modernisation of the three armed 
services. In France parliament may intervene on 
other occasions: during the vote on the military 
programme law, which gives figures for the 
funds allocated for the purchase of military 
materials over a five-year period, and during 
the annual presentation of the report on progress 
made towards putting this law into effect. Again 
these various kinds of action referred to by the 
parliaments in their replies should not conceal the 
real practical importance of p•arliament in arms 
procurement. 
40. In any case, despite the various means of 
acquiring information which the committees 
have at their disposai (parliamentary questions, 
motions, enquiries, investigations, hearings, etc.) 
the majority complain of a lack of real consulta-
tion by the executive, and an inability to exert 
real control over the various stages of the 
procurement process, often due to the lack of 
necessary information. It will be possible to 
investigate this question in greater detail when 
we examine the various stages in the procurement 
process. Here it is sufficient to state that the 
mü\St satisfied parliamentarians seem to be those 
from the Netherlands and Germany. 
4. Parliamentary access to information 
41. In general there are no direct relations 
between the executive and the parliament ; rather 
these pass via the Minister of Defence who is the 
only minister responsible to parliament on these 
questions. In the majority of countries, with sorne 
detailed procedural differences, the Minister 
testi:fies to the deferree committees in the national 
parliament and replies to written and oral 
questions. Parliamentarians may also require (or 
in sorne cases only request) that he should pro-
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vide them with ali the information they need, 
including, at the Minister's discretion, classified 
materÏial if this should be necessary. 
42. In France and Belgium classified informa-
tion below "secret" level may be requested by 
individual parliamentarians, but they may not 
always obtain it. Information is however only 
given in certain cases and ad intuitu personae. 
Under the terms of a procedure which has never 
been institutionalised or codified it is the rap-
porteurs in the committees rather than the com-
mittees as a whole who receive this information ; 
at the same time the clrairmen of the French 
Foreign Affairs and Deferree Committees have 
free access to telegrams of the foreign affairs 
and deferree ministries including those dealing 
with relations between ministers. 
43. Italian parliamentarians may obtain infor-
mation only with the approval of the highest 
national security authority (the President of the 
Council of Ministers). Like their Luxembourg 
colleagues their names do not appear on the list 
of those entitled to receive classified material 
nor does it appear that in practice such a 
concession has ever occurred. 
44. In Germany all parliamentarians have 
access to national classified matters up to "top 
secret" level, provided that they show a plausible 
reason for requesting it. For NATO classified 
matters a written security clearance i·s required. 
45. In Canada the Minister is obliged to testify 
before both standing and ad hoc committees, to 
reply to questions and to provide such informa-
tion as required, including the release of 
classified information. 
46. In Norway the right to demand classified 
information is restricted to members of the 
Deferree Committee whereas in the Netherlands 
and Denmark, while parliamentarians have no 
such right, in practice they always receive this 
information up to "secret" level. 
47. In the United Kingdom, even if parliamen-
tary committees may receive information up to 
"secret" level, sorne members of the Deferree and 
External Affairs Sub-Committee seem dis-
satisfied with the information they obtain from 
the Ministry of Defence. 
48. In the United States Congress, during the 
discussion of the deferree budget, committees may 
often demand that military personnel or a 
minister's staff testify on specifie programmes. 
Individual members of Congress have access to 
information, including classified information, if 
they show their "need to know" so asto carry out 
their functions. Requests go through the 
chairmen of the committees investigating specifie 
questions. For security reasons, such hearings 
are often taken in closed aession. 
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5. Links with indusfry 
49. Both the governmental and the non-
governmental bodies cited so far obviously 
maintain close relations with their own national 
industry which is concerned with the supply of 
defence equipment. Here one should immediately 
note the specifie situation of Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, N orway and Denmark. 
50. These countries possess relatively little 
production capacity in the armaments sector 
(exceptions being the Belgian Fabrique National, 
Denmark's naval dockyards, and sorne electronics 
firms). Major weapons systems acquired are thus 
both developed and produced abroad or alterna-
tively developed abroad and then produced under 
Licence either internally or in collaboration with 
other allies. These countries' industries thus 
produce largely components which have usually 
been developed abroad. 
51. I-Auxembourg does not have an arms 
industry at all in the true sense of the word. 
There are a few companies which mainly produce 
protective materials with military applications, 
but they do not produce mi1itary components 
for the Luxembourg army. 
52. In the remaining countries, private, semi-
public and public industry is involved in 
tlie procurement process from the initial research 
stage ; in the United States there is close col-
laboration between private industry and military 
researeh centres even in the research stage. 
53. In general, relatJions with industry are the 
responsibility of specifie bodies in defence 
ministries with the Ministry of Industry playing 
a consultative rôle. 
54. It is unnecessary to point out the peculiar 
nature of the relationship between government 
and industry in countries such as the United 
Kingdom or Italy in which the arms industry is 
mostly nationalised. 
6. Links with multinational allied bodies 
55. Finally the various ministerial bodies 
responsible for arms procurement maintain a 
series of ties not only with other sectors of the 
administration, with parliament and with 
national industry, but also with multinational 
bodies both inside and out.side the Atlantic 
Amance in which their respective countries 
participate. These bodies provide an institutional 
framework for those transnational contacts 
essential for weapons standardisation and for 
interoperability. We thus see representatives of 
the chiefs of staff and national armaments 
directors participating in the NATO Conference 
of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) ; the 
WEU Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) ; 
the independent European programme group 
(IEPG) ; and Eurogroup, and in the meetings of 
180 
army representatives of the WEU countries 
(FIN ABEL). 
56. In its reply the United States emphasised 
the work of its Ambassador to NATO, whereas 
Oanada confirmed that the policies worked out 
in these bodies are important factor'S in the 
national defence programme and expressly refer-
red to conflicts between the requirements 
expressed in multilateral bodies referred to 
above and the safeguarding of specifie national 
interests, for example, the needs of the domestic 
economy. According to the Canadian reply these 
conflicts are considered and resolved at the 
government commltative and deciision-making 
levels. 
7. Decision-making procedure 
57. Despite the differences between the systems 
and procedures used by the various national 
administrations, an analysis of their replies gives 
a general picture of the weapons procurement 
process with variations from country to country 
and from weapons system to weapons system. 
The process may be summarised as follows : 
definition of needs ; ideas for solutions ; 
feasibility studies ; preliminary marketing 
research ; definition of the operational equipment 
requirements ; marketing research ; definition of 
the technical-financial parameters of the pro-
blem ; evaluation of alternatives ; selection ; 
technical-operational opinions ; global opinion 
within context of joint planning and relevant 
technicaljfinancial programming ; preliminary 
approval ; procurement order ; draft contract ; 
opinions on economie, legal, administrative and 
industrial questions ; drawing up of develop-
ment contract ; development of prototype ; 
delivery of prototype ; technical testing ; final 
approval ; advertising for tenders ; drawing up 
of production or purchasing contract ; allocation 
of funds ; registration of contract ; delivery of 
weapons system to the bodies responsible for 
technical testing ; technical and operational 
testing ; entry into service. 
58. In the questionnaires the stages described 
above are divided into five phases (B, C, D, E, F) 
so as to facilitate a detailed investigation into 
parli'ament's rôle in each of these and in parti-
cular so as to determine whether parliamentary 
intervention favours increased standardisation 
and interoperabnity in NATO armaments and 
if so at which stage this occurs. 
B. Definition of the military need for a new weapons 
system 
1. General 
59. The aim in this section was to summarise a 
whole series of actions which for convenience 
were listed as the first four of the items 
enumerated in paragraph 57. In other words 
Stage B (the "preconceptual" stage) begins with 
long-term deferree policy planning, which occurs 
over ten or fifteen years (this varies from country 
to country). During this stage long-term discus-
sions are held on military equipment, on whether 
or not to keep equipment which is already opera-
tional, and on the quantitative and qualitative 
structure of national armed forces. 
60. Given that many dàfferent variables are 
involved in long-term analysis this phase involves 
feasibility studies. These, along with preliminary 
market availability studàes, are usually con-
ducted by national chiefs of staff. 
61. In the majority of countries the formula-
tion of needs is a continuoUIS process. The excep-
tions to this rule are Italy and Denmark where 
needs are formulated at regular i'lltervals. Needs 
are formulated separately by the three armed 
services ; where there are problems involving 
joint responsibilitàes there ex~ various forms of 
inter-force co-ordination. 
62. Once military needs have been defined 
they are transformed into objectives to be 
attained (equipment policy). These may IÎnvolve 
research and development if the equipment 
required is unavruilable on national or foreign 
markets, or alternatively through an order for 
supply if the equipment is available. This may 
involve production within the ordering country, 
production under licence of the whole or part of 
a given weapons system, joint production, or 
purchase abroad. By the end of this stage funds 
have already been assigned to each stage. The 
responsibdlity for the decision depends on the 
importance of the weapons system in question 
and may involve the President of the Republic, 
the Minister of Defence or the chiefs of staff. If 
research and development or the order for equip-
ment involve international collaboration the 
decision is usually submitted, even at this early 
stage, for approval by the Mghest authorities. 
2. Inputs from allied bodies 
63. This section attempted to investigate 
whether and to what extent the bodies responsible 
for procurement give importance in this 
"preconceptual" phase to the co-ordination of 
their needs through the various multilateral 
allied bodies thus leading to decisions which are 
as homogeneous as possible and which satisfy the 
need for weapons standardisation. 
64. The conclusion is far from optimistic. In 
this phase the factors given most weight are 
strictly national considerations. The need for 
standardisation and interoperability is taken 
into account "as far as possible". This impression 
arises primarily from the replies to the questions 
which asked which factors influence the formula-
tion of new military needs (the threat, an 
adversary, changes in tactical or strategie 
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doctrine, the formulation of needs by allied 
bodies, the results of research and development, 
the effects on industrial production and employ-
ment). 
65. For various different reasons and with 
different nuances the answers received from 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark and the United 
States constitute an exception to the general 
rule. According to the Belgian reply all the 
factors mentioned, from the perception of threat 
to the evolution in technology resulting from 
research and development, depend on the work 
done by allied bodies. Denmark and Luxem-
bourg, which possess no significant arms 
industry and have no specifie economie interests 
to protect, emphasise the importance during the 
formulation of their military needs of the needs 
formulated by the CNAD, the IEPG, FINABEL 
and Eurogroup, the aim of these being to 
encourage weapons standardisation. Finally the 
United States cites Defence Department 
Directive 2010.6, paragraph IV D2, which 
directs each of the services to seek agreements 
within NATO on their military needs. 
66. Of the other countries the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom give priority to changes 
in tactical and strategie doctrine formulated at 
a NATO level (long-term defence plan- LTDP) 
whereas Italy and Canada give priority to the 
perception of threat. As far as changes in 
doctrine are concerned it is interesting to note 
how different allies give differing explanations 
of the same phenomenon. Whereas nearly all the 
replies state that national strategie and tactical 
doctrine is co-ordinated, discussed and for-
mulated at NATO level, Italy insists on the 
national characteristics of its doctrine which 
may be influenced by "possible adjustments or 
modifications formulated in allied bodies". 
3. Rôle of parliament 
67. Whereas governmental bodies give little 
attention to standardisation at this stage it is 
useful to examine the rôle of parliamentary 
bodies (if these have a rôle to play). The 
majority of countries state that parliament is 
not involved in the formulation of needs. At 
most, parliament is informed of the situation, 
with all the limitations usually imposed by the 
administration on parliamentarians interested in 
this field. In Belgium and Italy, on occasions, 
the parliaments have been informed when 
negotiations between the government and 
national industry concerned were already in 
progress. It has even happened that trade 
unionists have been informed of a certain project 
in a particular industry before parliamentarians 
even knew of its existence. In fact, deferree 
research seems to be very sensitive to security 
and, in the majority of European countries, it 
seems that there is no parliamentary scrutiny 
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at the research stage and it is possible to believe 
that many expensive projects not properly con-
trolled are hidden under research and develop-
ment heads. 
68. Nonetheless the information received by 
national parliaments is not limited to what 
defence ministers decide or are able to tell them 
- although the French Defence Committees 
replied that they based their work almost 
exclusively on information received from the 
government. The committees possess their own 
independent means of gathering information : 
public and private research institutes ; foreign 
sources of information ; hearings of experts ; 
visits to industrial plants ; private somces of 
information ; participation in international par-
liamentary assemblies (WEU and the North 
Atlantic Assembly). ln the United States the 
House Armed Services Committee includes a 
Standing Sub-Committee on Investigations which 
together with other committees which can be set 
up under special circumstances may undertake 
major investigations into any question includ-
ing the definition of the need for a new weapons 
system. 
69. The means of acqmrmg information 
independently are not in other words lacking : 
it is nonetheless interesting to see whether these 
are used in practice during the "preconceptual" 
phase in the arms procurement process. The 
Belgian Senate Committee states that "theoreti-
cally" it is capable of informing itself but 
complains about delays and incompleteness in 
the information provided. The same applies in 
France. The German Defence Committee believes 
that at this stage standardisation falls under the 
competence of the respective executive bodies. 
A very different reply from the United States 
House Armed Services Committee states that 
it is always informed when a new military need 
is translated into a real objective to be pursued, 
that is, at the end of the stage at which needs 
are formulated. What is more, whenever United 
States armed forces stationed in Western Europe 
are to be equipped with the weapons system, the 
American Congress is obliged by law to take 
into account - even at this early stage - the 
standardisation or at least the interoperability 
of this system with equivalent systems used by 
other allied countries. 
C. The formulation of operational equipment 
requirements 
1. General 
70. This section includes those phases (described 
in paragraph 57 of section A of this report) 
which go from the definition of the operational 
equipment requirements to the preliminary 
approval of the order. The general technical 
directorates and other technical bodies respon-
sible to the chiefs of staff define the military 
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characteristics of the equipment in line with the 
needs formulated during the preceding stage 
in the process. In the United Kingdom as we 
have already noted) unlike the situation in other 
countries, these responsibilities are concentrated 
in the procurement executive. 
71. The formulation of operational equipment 
requirements is also a continuous process, which 
proceeds as new needs are formulated by the 
chiefs of staff. The French reply states that 
the results of research may at times lead to equip-
ment being proposed to the chiefs of staff before 
the latter have formulated a need for that equip-
ment. 
72. At the end of this stage the weapons system 
corresponding to the requirements is given 
preliminary approval by the chief of army, navy 
or air force staff or by the chief of defence staff 
(at times, as in the United Kingdom and the 
United States, by the Secretary of Defence). 
2. Inputs from allied bodies 
73. As far as the factors which influence the 
definition of requirements are concerned, it is 
clear that in this phase changes in tactical and 
strategie doctrine are less important than at the 
earlier stage. At the same time the perception of 
threat, the results of research and development 
and the formulation of needs in allied bodies 
are aU of much greater significance ; indeed this 
will be recognised as the crucial stage for stan-
dardisBJtion. Once a project is in its full develop-
ment stage it is more difficult to work towards 
standardisation or interoperability. Hardly any 
of the replies give particular attention to this 
stage. 
74. Apart from the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Belgium and Luxembourg, which for different 
reasons tend not to distinguish between phases 
B and C, the other countries say very little about 
this phase. The exceptions are France, the United 
States and Germany. According to France not 
only the various CNAD working groups but also, 
in recent years, Panel II of the IEPG have 
provided an important framework for consult-
ation which helps to provide a precise definition 
of the European allies' needs as weil as better 
knowledge of them. 
75. The United States, as well as referring 
to Defence Department Directive 2010.6 on the 
need to seek agreement on standardisation within 
NATO- mentioned above- states that NATO 
standardisation and interoperability requirements 
shall be considered where mission needs can only 
be satisfied through an equipment modification 
or new development. Finally there is a reference 
to Defence Department Directive 5000.2, in 
which it is stated that, where feasible, mission 
needs will be satisfied through the use of exist-
ing military or commercial items. In Germany 
the study groups which draw up operational 
equipment requirements have to consult with 
NATO partners and they should lead - after 
proper analysis - to initial ideas for solutions 
and to their concretisation in the form of tactical 
requirements. 
3. Rôle of parliament 
76. As for the information received by parlia-
ment during this stage, and parliament's ability 
to exert effective control, the same considerations 
apply asto Stage B. 
77. The Belgian Senate Committee states that 
the government keeps it informed when it is 
about to take decisions concerning the purchase 
or renewal of military equipment, but it is 
impossible to say at what stage this information 
is received because it is provided when the 
Minister of Defence or the committee feels that 
it is necessary. The Italian Senate Defence Com-
mittee states that it "can be informed" through 
the leggi promozionali, but expresses a wish for 
improved international contacts so as to give 
better evaluations. The same occurs in France 
where parliament is consu1ted when the project 
for a new weapons system has been given final 
approval and the order is placed. Finally, in the 
United Kingdom, committees obtain information 
only when specifically called for. 
78. As stated in paragraph 40 of section A of 
this report, the most satisfied Defence Commit-
tees outside the United States seem to be the 
Netherlands and German bodies. The Netherlands 
Committee states that it exerts sorne form of 
control over ail the various stages in the arms 
procurement process, right from the initial stages 
B and C. Each year the government presents 
parliament not only with the budget but also 
with an extremely detailed explanatory note of 
sorne hundreds of pages. This note contains, 
inter alia, views on the necessity of new equip-
ment even if the budget itself makes no provision 
yet for expenditure on such a project. If it con-
cerns important investments, the Defence Com-
mittee receives an extremely complete "material 
situation report" which includes the motivation 
given for the need, operational requirements, the 
budgetary consequences, the evaluation of the 
varions alternatives, etc. What is more, the 
government always informs the committee of its 
final procurement decision. Finally, between this 
government decision and the signature of the 
contract, the Netherlands parliament has at least 
a fortnight in which to hold a parliamentary 
debate, if necessary. 
79. The Bundestag also states that it is 
informed, if not always consulted, at every stage 
in the process. It points out that when the ques-
tion of Euro-American collaboration arose on 
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A W ACS, it put its own point of view on stan-
dardisation and interoperability. For the United 
States the same considerations apply as in section 
B. 
D. Development of the prototype 
1. General 
80. This phase begins with the procurement 
order which usually cornes from the Ministry of 
Defence and concludes with final approval which, 
in the case of systems yet to be developed, is 
subsequent to the delivery of the prototype. If 
the equipment to be purchased has already been 
developed by national or foreign producers, Stage 
D and the following Stage E (production) merge 
into a single stage. This occurs particularly often 
in those countries which as we have already noted 
have no important arms industry, namely 
Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Luxembourg. 
Given that the weapons systems involved are 
of minor importance, in these countries the 
decision to begin work on the development of 
a prototype is the sole responsibility of the 
director of the company concerned. 
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81. Development work is conducted by the arms 
industry together with ministry bodies in the 
technical-military area (as defined in paragraph 
23 of section A of this report). The development 
order is always given by the service concerned, 
although it cannot be excluded that at times 
account may be taken of previous development 
work conducted independently by the company 
concerned. This has only a marginal influence 
on the financial burden of research and develop-
ment which is usually borne by the service 
concerned and which falls under a different 
budget heading from individual weapons pro-
grammes (the exceptions being Denmark, the 
Netherlands and to sorne extent Canada). 
Company financial contributions to develop-
ment costs are usually if not always the excep-
tion, and occur either when there is a private 
contract with a single company or, as in the 
example cited in the Canadian case, when a 
foreign country is believed to have an interest 
in the system under development. When industry 
does its own development work it may be decided 
to pursue this work with full or partial govern-
ment funding. The American regulations afford 
greater possibilities to private industry in that 
Defence Department Directive 5000.2 requires 
that mission needs should be satisfied through 
the use of existing military or commercial items. 
82. Once the prototype has been developed the 
armed forces technical services are responsible 
for supervision, testing and acceptance. In pro-
jects in which other allied countries are involved 
a special agency is set up for trials, tests and 
final acceptance. 
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2. Inputs from allied bodies 
83. In general, the earlier there are multi-
lateral contracts, the greater is the possibility 
of multinational collaboration aimed at facilitat-
ing standardisation. The beginning of develop-
ment work represents an important threshold 
after which attempts at co-production become 
more difficult. This is why the questionnaires 
give great weight to the question of how far 
government bodies and parliamentary commit-
tees are aware of allied countries' development 
projects. 
84. The majority of countries stated that they 
were aware of allied projects. Canada however 
complained of the inadequacy of available 
information and Italy, stating that this inform-
ation was received, added that it was "neces-
sarily" limited. 
85. The United States again referred to 
Deferree Department Directives 2010.6 and 5000.2 
cited earlier. These require the bodies with 
responsibility in this field to collaborate with 
allied countries at the highest possible level 
before reaching a decision, and to study aU 
systems and their components under develop-
ment in allied countries. Finally the directives 
require that the Deferree System Acquisition 
Review Council, which is responsible for the 
review of all procurement programmes, should 
ascertain that this co-ordination has taken place. 
Even the United States Deferree Department 
however confirmed the practical difficulties 
involved in obtaining information on allied pro-
jects. 
86. Industrial information may be exchanged 
between allies both in the IEPG and the CNAD 
(where the United States and Canada are also 
present). These bodies were set up not only 
to explore possibilities for future co-operation but 
also to ensure that standardisation and inter-
operability would be taken into account in all 
circumstances. In practice this has only occurred 
on a limited number of occasions. In other cases 
there has been consultation before the beginning 
of development work but this has been outside 
the framework provided by these multilateral 
bodies and has involved the countries or country 
with which an agreement has already been signed 
for collaboration in the development of a specifie 
system. 
87. The majority of countries stated that in 
these multilateral allied bodies the need for 
standardisation and interoperability is taken into 
account before the beginning of development 
work "when this is possible". 
3. Rôle of parliament 
88. The impression to be derivcd from rela-
tions between government and parliament before 
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and during development leaves equally little 
room for optimism. 
89. The Italian Ministry denies the existence 
of any kind of relationship with parliament at 
this stage with the exception of the leggi pro-
mozionali the debate on which serves to make 
parliament aware of the ten-year plans for the 
armed forces. The Italian Senate Committee 
states that it learns about these plans in this 
way. At the same time the committee states 
that it is able to intervene only when planning 
is far advanced, rather thau during the defi-
nition of operational equipment requirements, 
and cites the examples of the MRCA and of 
AWACS. 
90. The two French Committees deny that they 
are consulted when a new weapons system enters 
the development stage. The Netherlands, German 
and United States Committees reconfirm the 
positive view they expressed in sections B and 
c. 
E. Production and pre-production 
1. General 
91. This stage begins - in those cases where 
it has not already been decided to purchase 
abroad or to purchase a licence abroad - with an 
invitation to bid and the award of a contract. 
Naturally in those cases in which only one com-
pany is capable of producing the equipment 
there is no competitive bidding. Once the winning 
bid has been chosen the contract is signed. Pre-
series and production in series follow immedi-
ately. Here too, as in the development stage, the 
product has to be subjected to technical trials so 
as to be accepted by the technical services of the 
armed forces. Immediately afterwards the equip-
ment is assigued to operational service. 
2. 1 nputs from allied bodies 
92. At this stage, too, we have attempted to 
understand whether and to what extent the need 
for standardisation is taken into account and 
whether there exists any form of cousultation 
with national parliaments. At this stage, the last 
in the procurement process, it is very unlikely 
that parliamentary action could help favour 
standardisation. 
93. At this stage, too, the factors which 
influence the decision taken seem to be very 
closely tied to specifie national situatious: the 
obsolescence or otherwise of. existing equipment, 
considerations as to whether or not it is 
opportune to begin the production of equipment 
on an ad hoc basis, the economie advantages to be 
gained from the decision to limit production to 
national companies or to give them a large share 
in production, the relative costs of different 
sources of supply, etc. 
94. What occurs before the beginning of pro-
duction is not so much consultation with allied 
countries as consultation between different 
sectors of the national administration. 
3. Rôle of parliament 
95. As is easily understood the majority of 
replies on parliamentary intervention during the 
production stage were oompletely negative. Any 
information given on the production situation is 
usually given during the debate on defence 
expenditure. Here too however a number of com-
mittees reconfirmed what had already emerged 
from earlier replies, namely that very often par-
liament is given insuffioient information during 
the intermediate stages of a programme and that 
there is usually a lack of information concerning 
the situation in other countries, even though there 
exists a widespread political awareness of the 
need for joint programmes. Given this situation 
what actually occurs is that in ali countries and 
in every case parliament is informed during the 
budget debate. At the same time an explanatory 
note is supplied containing opinions and evalua-
tions of the alternative options. 
96. The Netherlands and the United States are 
the only countries to refer to parliamentary inter-
vention during the pre-production and production 
stage. When the Starfighter and Neptune air-
craft had to be replaced the Netherlands parlia-
ment, at the last moment, requested a further 
parliamentary debate on the question, in view of 
its importance. In the United States the Congress 
Committees are also consulted before pr.e-
production and production in series. They thus 
exert their control at the end of every stage in 
the procurement process. As :llar as interallied 
co-operation is concerned every year these com-
mittees receive the so-called Culver-Nunn report 
on United States activities in the field of NATO 
standardisation. 
F. Budgetary control 
97. For convenience ali financial questions 
relating to the varions stages in the procurement 
process have been grouped together in this last 
section, although not last in chronological terms. 
98. The government body responsible for allo-
cating funds for equipment to be purchased 
during the varions stages of research, develop-
ment and supply is the army, navy or air force 
staff and for inter-service projects the defence 
staff. 
99. Parliament is involved in the allocation of 
funds during the debate on the defence estimates. 
During the annual debate on the budget in par-
liament defence committees may propose amend-
ments. If these are approved they may lead to 
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significant changes in the content of the budget 
presented by the administration. 
100. In Denmark onlv the Finance Committee 
is involved in the final decisions with regard to 
allocation of funds for a project. But in the case 
of high-cost programmes extending over several 
years other committees may also intervene. 
101. In the United Kingdom parliamentary 
approval is not given project by project; rather 
a total is approved for ali projects in progress 
whether they are in the research and development 
or the production stage. These overall figures are 
accompanied however by an e.xplanatory note 
which allows them to be understood in detail. As 
noted above, in the absence of a defence commit-
tee proper, these figures are considered by the 
Expenditure Committee, which does not approve 
the budget as in other parliaments. The estimates 
are merely considered, usually without any 
debate on the floor of the house. The balance of 
power between government and parliament has 
got out of hand and parliament in particular is 
unable to scrutinise the enormous defence 
expenditure. 
102. In Belgium the budget is debated item by 
item and paragraph by paragraph. In Italy the 
budget debate, unlike the debate on the leggi pro-
mozionali, may involve discussion of an indi-
vidual programme. In practice however there is 
never an item-by-item debate, even if this is 
theoretically possible. The existence of the leggi 
promozionali leads to increased flexibility in a 
budget which it is difficult to expand due to the 
fact that the rise in fixed e.xpenditure leaves little 
room for manoeuvre. In France the budget is 
divided into chapters and paragraphs and is 
debated en bloc rather than programme by pro-
gramme; voting is on a chapter-by-ehapter basis. 
In the Netherlands the budget is first debated en 
bloc and then item by item. On occasions it may 
also be discussed programme by programme. In 
Germanv there is the opposite procedure. The 
debate i~ initially chapter by chapter, then item 
by item, within each chapter. Finally the budget 
is debated en bloc. 
103. In the United States, Congress begins by 
establishing the objectives of the whole budget 
(first budget resolution). It is then decided 
within this broad out1ine what proportion of 
expenditure should go to defence. These alloca-
tions of funds are then re-examined and approved 
by the committee and in plenary session. Finally 
in the second budget resolution Congress re-
examines the whole budget in the light of the 
allocations approved or modified. Congress may 
debate the budget as it sees fit: by chapters, by 
single items or by programme. In general the 
latter solution is preferred. The budget is only 
discussed en bloc during the first and second 
budget resolutions. 
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104. The only country in which important 
modernisation projects for the armed forces are 
not included in the annual budget is Italy where 
these projects are included in ad hoc ten-year 
laws (re-debated each year), the so-called leggi 
promozionali. In other countries even research 
programmes extending over several years are 
voted year by year. In Luxembourg the most 
important pluriannual programmes cannot run 
for more than two or three financial years. In 
Denmark, when at the end of the financial year 
there is a conflict between pluriannual develop-
ment programmes and the annual budget, a 
small supplementary budget item is added. 
105. In the United States, Congress allocates 
funds for defence at the beginning of each finan-
cial year. The Defence Department then re-
allocates these funds to the three services. Con-
flicts between procurement programmes which 
span severa! years and the requirement for 
annual appropriations is resolved by budgeting 
for the full cost of each procurement item when 
funds are first requested for the item. In this 
way Congress is irnmediately aware of the total 
cost of a programme when it is asked to appro-
priate funds for it, and the manager has an 
incentive both to estimate better and to manage 
better since his resources are limited once 
appropriations have been approved. 
G. Political difficulties and attitudes 
1. Criteria on which procurernent decisions are 
based 
106. Having examined the answers given con-
cerning the varions stages in the arms procure-
ment process in the countries under consideration 
and having studied the answers given to section G 
of the two questionnaires your Rapporteur 
arrived at a series of conclusions. 
107. Section G of the first questionnaire shows 
the criteria on which decisions on new arrns 
systems in the varions countries are based. The 
British, Danish and United States Defence Min-
istries refer to economie, industrial and political 
as weil as strategie considerations, without 
specifying the relative importance of each of 
these factors or making any explicit reference to 
the need for standardisation or interoperability. 
108. The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg 
and Canada are agreed that for economie and 
industrial reasons the smaller countries have a 
greater interest in standardisation whereas for 
distinct economie reasons interoperability is 
mainly of interest to the larger countries with 
fully developed defence industries covering the 
whole range of products. In these countries the 
need to keep the national defence industries alive 
and to ensure a continued supply line in time 
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of conflict (as emerged from the United States 
reply) may influence the decision to procure a 
given weapons system to a considerable extent. 
In the srnaller-sized countries whose armaments 
industries cannot fulfil ail their equipment needs, 
the accent lies more on consideration of co-pro-
duction and compensation such as co-production 
and/or other compensating orders. In the smaller 
countries, too, the need for standardisation and 
interoperability may be more strongly felt due 
to the relatively modest quantities of equipment 
required and to the need for operational co-oper-
ation with the allies. 
109. In both cases the aim is to protect national 
interests. This was clearly stated by the Belgian, 
Norwegian and Italian Defence Ministries. 
According to the Belgians once a short list of 
possible systelllil has been drawn up on the basis 
of operational needs the final decision depends 
mainly on economie considerations. This concept 
is confirmed by the reply from the Belgian 
Senate which confirrns that parliament is mainly 
concerned with budgeting problems and with 
gaining sorne form of economie compensation for 
the worsening of the economie crisis and the 
increase in unemployrnent. The Italian Ministry 
of Defence, unlike the other allied countries, 
refers to the existence of national economie and 
financial interest in contrast with the need for 
standardisation. Among the factors influencing 
procurement decisions Italy refers to the need 
to reduce defence expenditure as far as possible, 
to stimulate its national arms industry and to 
weigh as little as possible on the liabilities side 
of the balance of payments. Finally, according 
to the Italian replies, the great powers should 
concern themselves more with strategie oper-
ational questions. 
2. Attitudes and steps taken by parliaments 
towards standardisation and/or interoperab~1ity 
110. These criteria cited by Defence Ministries 
are matched by a number of political worries 
which emerged from replies given by the parlia-
mentary defence committees although the former 
did not always coïncide with the latter. In 
general the European parliaments replied that 
they have made continuons efforts at requesting 
their governments to insist on promoting NATO-
wide standardisation either through intensifying 
two-way street procurement (as suggested by the 
Bundestag Defence Committee) or through 
improved industrial co-operation at a European 
level (as indicated by the Defence Cornmittee 
of the Italian Chamber of Deputies). Reference 
was also made to "American industrial imperial-
ism", seen as an obstacle to concrete moves 
towards standardisation, and to a "hopefully 
reduced need" to deploy American troops in 
Europe (as indicated by the Italian Senate 
Defence Committee). 
111. European parliaments were far from 
explicit in their replies to the questions con-
cerning the legislative steps they had taken or 
which were under discussion in their parliaments 
and which might be said to improve arros stan-
dardisation in Europe. The only exception was 
the reply from the German Bundestag which 
refers to an interesting initiative taken by the 
Chairman of the Deferree Committee who 
addressed a letter in this connection to the Chair-
man of the United States Senate and House 
Deferree Committees. 
112. Given that several parliaments complained 
about the lack of sufficient information on allied 
weapons projects in the research and develop-
ment stage and in view of the fact that your 
Rapporteur believes that greater knowledge here 
might enable the parliaments of the allied 
countries to intervene more actively in favour 
of standardisation and/or interoperability, he has 
reached the conclusion that the WEU Deferree 
Committee could play an important co-ordinat-
ing rôle by guaranteeing the exchange of 
information between parliamentarians in the 
member states once the various national parlia-
mentary bodies have succeeded in obtaining 
adequate information from governments, 
industry and other sources concerning projects 
under way in their own countries. 
W. Conclusions 
113. :B'rom our analysis of the replies it is 
possible to draw a number of conclusions. All 
the parliaments receiving questionnaires have 
stated that they possess sovereignty and final 
authority over deferree procurement and that in 
the majority of cases they exercise this power 
only during the annual debate and vote on the 
budget. However, the degree to which this 
constitutional principle is translated into reality 
differs very substantially from country to 
country. 
114. Once account is taken of the special nature 
of deferree problems (which include delicate issues 
such as national security aspects, technical com-
plexity of weapons systems and the long-term 
nature of many of the deciJsions) h may be noted 
that the degree of control exerted is a function 
of the quantity of information available to par-
liaments on their respective government procure-
ment policy and on discUJSSion in progress at an 
Alliance level. As was described in section A of 
the draft report there are different kinds of 
informatiJOn available to parliamentarians. Infor-
mation may be obtained from public government 
sources of varying levels of classification, it may 
be obtained independently by individual parlia-
mentarians or by parliamentary committees or 
from public or private research bodies. 
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115. The problem of security has yet to receive 
a satisfactory solution in all the European conn-
tries. The Rapporteur refers here to the report 
presented on behalf of this Committee by 
Mr. Goedhart concerning military security and 
parliamentary information 1 • From thls report it 
emerged that parliamentarians with no access to 
cla'SSified information are only able to make a 
very limited contribution to the work of parlia-
mentary control. 
116. Your Rapporteur would thus propose that 
the allies agree on common criteria (in addition to 
existing NATO procedures for the classification 
of military information) enabling a distinction to 
be made between national military information 
which should be made available to public opinion, 
information which should only be circulated in 
restricted circleiS (e.g. to parliamentarians) and 
secret information and suggesting agreed pro-
cedures and precautions so as to ensure the 
maximum access to information compatible with 
an adequate degree of security . For instance, 
the doctrine of showing the "need to know" 
which is applied in the United States and Ger-
many is one which should be applied in other 
countries. This could avoid an unpleasant situa-
tion in which parliamentarians in one country 
receive insufficient information vis-à-vis their 
parliamentary colleagues in other allied conn-
tries. What is more it is even possible to find this 
kind of "first" and "second class" parliament-
arian within the same national parliament. 
117. The information which parliamentarians 
most need in order to exercise effective control 
over the purchase of military equipment so as 
to optimise deferree policy and to ensure weapons 
standardisation and interoperability in Europe 
includes: 
(a) the criteria on the basis of which 
national military staff determine the 
threat and thus the need for a parti-
cular weapons system ; 
(b) the evaluation given by multilateral 
allied bodies of the military threat and 
thus of military needs; 
( c) projects at the research and develop-
ment stage involving national and 
allied companies capable of meeting the 
needs identified at a national and 
an interallied level. 
118. From the replies recetived to the question-
naires it emerged that generally speaking the 
information received is insufficient to guarantee 
parliamentarians an incisive influence over 
deferree policy formulation in general and arms 
procurement in particular. The exception to this 
rule is the United States. 
1. Document 511, 12th May 1970, on the basis of which 
the Assembly adopted Reco=endation 197. 
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119. The American legislator exerts a greater 
control thau his European counterpart over his 
country's arms procurement policy. In the United 
States, Congressional approval is required for 
such broad issues as the total defence budget, 
total force levels and structure, the adoption 
of major weapons systems and the approval of 
any strategie arms limitation agreements right 
down to the armed forces' hymnalls. As far as 
defence policy is concerned the American Con-
gress exerts a major influence over the decision 
on types of airerait and ships more thau any 
other commodities, mainly because of the high 
cost of the$e items. 
120. What happens in Western Europe on the 
other hand is that while party political pressures 
have over the years affected the size of national 
defence budgets, parliamentary pressures never 
seem to have clearly affected, either positively 
or negatively, any government's major procure-
ment preferences or any decision to alter the 
shape and deployment of the armed forces. 
121. It ~ arguable how far it could ever be 
possible to graft the AmeriC'an system with its 
special relationship between the executive and 
the legilslature onto European political systems 
which are themselves very different from one 
another. Nonetheless co-operation between the 
American armed forces and Congress has pro-
duced on severa! occasions positive results as weil 
as helping to prevent Congress from cutting 
appropriations requested by the President. It has 
occurred that at the same time as one of the 
three services learned that an important project 
was about to fall to the budget-cutter's scalpel 
in the Pentagon, it began a campaign in Congress 
even before the announcement of the President's 
budget. 
122. A similar mechanism may sometimes be 
observed in a number of European countries. In 
the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and 
Germany, for example, Defence Ministries are 
aware of the usefulness of keeping parliament 
weil informed so as to have it as an ally to 
help withstand the expenditure-cutting enthu-
siasms of othcr economy-minded ministries. 
'Vhere parliamentary committees are very power-
fui, the military and government authorities have 
become accustomed to consulting parliament at 
early stage~S of defence planning, so that break-
downls in understanding between parliament and 
the Ministry of Defence are avoided. 
123. In other countries where parliamentary 
enquiry into defence spending is more of a 
formality thau a reality, reduced communication 
between parliament and the administration has 
been justif.ied by the politreal situation (e.g. by 
the presence of strong communist parties in par-
liament). Recently however there ha$ been a 
tendency towards improved collaboration between 
government and parliament due to the fact that 
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opposition parties present in parliament have 
tended to reduce their hostility towards their 
countries' presence in an integrated western 
alliance. Besides the quantity and the quality 
of the information necessary for parliamentary 
control, the time factor is just as important : 
that is the moment during the defence equipment 
procurement in which information i$ made avail-
able. Many defence committees of European par-
liaments seem to deal with these questions only 
post facto, even though it is very important 
to receive infOI'!Jllation in the preliminary stages. 
An interesting approach for the solution of this 
problem could be to examine in more detail 
the pluriannual defence programmes. It is impos-
sible to control defence projects on an annual 
basis when the cycle from planning to entry into 
service extends over ten to twelve years. In sorne 
parliaments, as in Norway, Italy and France, 
long-term defence programmes are discussed, but 
ail too often, parliaments limit themselves to 
being only vaguely informed of them, while they 
should instead be able to examine them in detail 
through the help of the very competent staff of 
the committee. Also interesting in this case is the 
example supplied by the American Congregs 
which prepares numerous reports published by 
the General Accounting Office, the Congressional 
Budget Office and the Library of Congress. 
124. Finally as far as concerns the possibility 
of parliaments using their power of control to 
shift procurement policy towards a higher degree 
of arms standardisation and interoperability your 
Rapporteur believes that this would be easier: 
(a) if procurement procedures, budget 
structures and voting procedures were 
made as similar as possible ; 
( b) if there existed a common European 
policy on weapons procurement with a 
special European armaments agency 
set up for this purpose ; 
( c) if it were possible to exert parliament-
ary control at a European level. 
125. To this end parliamentarians should receive 
sufficient information on weapons systems (other 
thau those available at a national level) avail-
able from allied countries and on the needs, ana-
lyses and evaluation carried out at an allied level 
so as at least to be able to intervene in national 
procurement during its initial stages and not 
simply through the budget vote. 
126. In the case of co-productions - which are 
desirable on account of the improved standard-
isation and interoperability to which they lead 
- parliamentary control has to be continuous 
so as to ensure that parliaments do not suddenly 
find themselves with their hands tied behind 
their backs. I refer here to the possibility of 
parliaments being faced with international agree-
ments for co-production of a given weapons 
system already signed by their respective govern-
ments. At times it may occur, as has occurred 
in the past, that rising costs (with respoot to 
those planned for during the initial stage of the 
project) lead to loss not only of parliamentary 
but also of government control, for the simple 
reason that the project has reached a stage at 
which it is very difficult to reopen a question 
already settled by international agreement. 
127. Thus your Rapporteur believes that while 
waiting for the setting up of an international 
arms procurement body subjected to international 
parliamentary control - a move to be taken 
as soon as possible -national parliaments should 
begin to exert greater control over their own 
national procurement policies through greater 
parliamentary involvement not only in defence 
but also in industrial policy (at least in those 
countries where the arms .industry depends pri-
marily on government spending). This might 
lead to a greater involvement of the committees 
for industry and trade as well as the defenee 
and budget committees. Nonetheless your Rap-
porteur is convinced that the problem is not so 
much that of increasing the number of parlia-
mentary bodies for control over the procurement 
process as to make better use of existing bodies 
and procedures. 
128. From the foregoing survey the Committee 
draws the following conclusions : 
- the extent of parliamentary inform-
ation and influence on defence matters, 
especially defence equipment procure-
ment matters, varies considerably 
between parliaments in different conn-
tries of the Alliance, and even between 
parliaments in the WEU countries ; 
- in sorne parliaments, perhaps in the 
majority of parliaments, the defence 
information made available by the gov-
ernment is insufficient to permit an 
informed debate and proper parliament-
ary participation in the formulation of 
defence policy ; 
- in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom, there is sufficient 
mutual confidence between government 
and opposition parties concerning basic 
defence policy to permit a universal 
parliamentary demand for information, 
which appears to be satisfied to a con-
siderable extent in Germany and in the 
Netherlands, but not yet in Italy or the 
United Kingdom. In Belgium and 
Luxembourg, there appears to be little 
tradition of active parliamentary 
investigation of general defence policy. 
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In France, the :state of relations between 
government and opposition parties does 
not permit agreement on the need or 
desirability of information being pro-
vided to parliamentarians other than 
the chairmen or rapporteurs of the com-
mittees concerned ; 
- in only a few cases, namely the N ether-
lands and Germany, are parliaments 
able to exercise sufficiently close finan-
cial control of defence expenditure to 
influence the defence equipment pro-
curement process and the choice of 
equipment; 
- in most cases parliaments are not 
informed, and in sorne cases govern-
mental defence equipment procurement 
authorities appear to be inadequately 
informed about the ava.ilability of com-
peting defence equipment projects in 
other allied countries, which in many 
cases might advantageously be selected 
for joint production and standardisation 
in preference to a nationally-developed 
project. 
129. The Committee's proposals to remedy these 
observed short-comings are set forth in the draft 
recommendation addressed to the Council, and 
through it to member government.s, and in the 
draft resolntion addressed to the parliaments of 
member countries. The texts of Recommendation 
197, referred to in the preambles, and of Recom-
mendation 9, referred to in Recommendation 197, 
are attached at Appendices III and IV. As far as 
paragraph 3 of the latter text is concerned the 
Committee proposes that the defence or other 
appropriate committees in national parliament.s 
should institute a systematic procedure for 
obtain.ing from their own governments inform-
at<ion about future national defence equipment 
projects in the planning stage, with a view to 
exchanging this information with the correspond-
ing committee of the national parliaments in 
other member countries. The Committee suggests 
that such exchange could be conveniently 
arranged at special meetings which ,it would 
convene from time to time, to be attended by 
a few members of the defence or other appro-
priate committee in each of the national parlia-
ments of the member countries. 
130. The Committee concludes further that there 
is a need to unify as far as possible the equip-
ment procurement and budgetary procedures 
employed in the Ministr.ies of Defence of the 
member countries, with a view to creating in 
the future a European defence procurement 
agency. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Questionnaire addressed to Ministries of Defence 
Introduction 
The Rapporteur has been asked to inves-
tigate the extent to which parliaments of allied 
countries investigate and control expenditure on 
defence procurement, and their ability to 
influence policy in the direction of standardis-
ation and joint production. 
The Rapporteur is addressing this question-
naire 1 to the Ministries of Defence of the 
countries of the Alliance. It is designed to elicit 
information, comparable between countries, to 
enable the Rapporteur : 
(a) to describe clearly the equipment pro-
curement process, from initial research 
to entry into service, in each country ; 
(b) to identify in some detail : 
(i) the manner in which the national 
process fits into the allied process, 
or the points at which and the 
extent to which allied needs and 
requirements, and the resources of 
allied countries, are taken into 
account in the national procure-
ment process ; 
(ii) the extent of parliamentary con-
sultation or of parliamentary con-
trol that is practised or required 
at each stage of the procurement 
process, and the extent to which 
parliament is made aware of allied 
needs and requirements, or of the 
resources of other allied countries. 
The Rapporteur would much appreciate the 
co-operation of Ministries of Defence in com-
pleting this questionnaire. Copies are also avail-
able in French. 
Note on security classification 
It is assumed that most of the information 
requested in this questionnaire will be "unclas-
sified" ; the Rapporteur will feel free to use 
in a published report ali information that is 
not given a specifie security classification by the 
country replying. 
* 
**' 
A. General 
A.l List the principal consultative and decision-
making bodies involved in the defence procure-
1. A separate questionnaire, a copy of which is 
attached for information, is being addressed to the chair-
men of the parliamentary defence committees in the same 
countries. 
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ment process, and include an organisational 
chart showing, in particular, the relationship 
between the bodies. 
A.l.l Describe the functions of these bodies 
(political, technical, operational). 
A.1.2 Describe broadly the composition and size 
of these bodies (ministerial, military staffs, 
technical, representatives of industry). Show 
which are tri-service bodies, and which separate 
bodies exist for each of the three armed services. 
A.1.3.1 Describe the links between the above-
mentioned bodies themselves. 
A.1.3.2 Describe the links between the above 
bodies and other branches of the administration 
(Ministries for Foreign Affairs, Finance, Econo-
mies, etc.) . 
A.1.3.3 Describe the links where they exist 
between the above bodies and the national 
parliament. 
A.l.3.3.1 In this connection state what right if 
any individual members of parliament or par-
liamentary committees have to obtain classified 
defence information from official sources. 
Never? At the discretion of the Minister? 
Other? 
A.1.3.4 Describe the links between the above 
bodies and the armaments industry, private and 
public sector. 
A.l.3.5 Describe the links between the above 
bodies and multilateral allied bodies concerned 
with arms procurement [NATO Conference of 
National Armaments Directors (CNAD) ; inde-
pendent European programme group (IEPG) ; 
Eurogroup Conference of National Armaments 
Directors (EURONAD); FINABEL; WEU 
Standing Armaments Committee (SAC), other ... ]. 
B. Formulating the military need for new 
weapons systems 
(By "military need" is meant a general 
indication of the kind and type of equipment 
required, quantities and date in service.) 
B.l Which bodies are responsible for formulating 
the military need for a new weapons system ? 
(Describe composition and nature, or refer, if 
applicable, to bodies already described under A 
above.) 
B.l.l.l Describe the relationship between the 
bodies involved. 
B.l.1.2 Describe the relationship between the 
bodies involved and the national parliament. 
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B.l.l.3 Describe the relationship between the 
bodies involved and the armaments industry, 
private and public sector. 
B.1.1.4 Describe the relationship between the 
bodies involved and multilateral allied bodies 
(speci:fy CNAD, IEPG, EURONAD, FINABEL, 
SAC, other ... ). 
B.1.2 Is the :formulation of new military needs 
a continuous process, or carried out at regular or 
irregular intervals, and how long does it usually 
take Y 
B.1.3 Is the process inter-service, or is it con-
ducted separately by the three services~ 
B.2 Factors leading to the formulation of new 
military needs. Describe the relative importance 
o:f the :following : 
B.2.1 The threat :from an adversary (intelligence). 
B.2.2 Changes in tactical or strategie doctrine 
(speci:fy whether :formulated nationally or in 
NATO). 
B.2.3 Formulation of needs in allied bodies 
(speci:fy CNAD, IEPG, EURONAD, FINABEI.J, 
SAC, other ... ), the requirements o:f standardis-
ation ; interoperability. 
B.2.4 Results of basic or applied research or of 
development. 
B.2.5 The e:f:fects o:f the military need on indus-
trial production and employment ( distinguish 
between the state and priva te sector). 
B.3 How is the :formulation of a new military 
need :finalised, and what authority is respon-
sible? 
C. Formulation of operational equipment 
requirements 
(By "operational equipment requirements" is 
meant a detailed military description of equip-
ment su:f:ficient to guide the design, development 
and production phases.) 
Describe the procedure :for :formulating 
operational equipment requirements (under the 
same heads and sub-heads as those :for the 
military need under B.1 to 3 above) designating 
the answer C.1, C.1.1.1, etc., to C.3. 
D. Prototype development stage 
D.1 Initiating authority. What body(ies) or 
person(s) are :finally responsible :for ordering 
work to begin on development of a prototype ? 
D.2 Factors involved in development decision : 
191 
DOCUMENT 807 
D.2.1 Is prototype development ordered only in 
respect of a military need and operational equip-
ment requirement :formulated as in B and C 
above ~ 
D.2.2 May continued development be ordered 
o:f a project started independently by private 
industry Y 
D.2.3 Is parliament consulted or parliamentary 
approval required in any way be:fore develop-
ment begins, if so in what way ? 
D.2.4 Are multilateral allied bodies always con-
sulted, informed, or is their approval sought, 
be:fore prototype development is authorised 
(speci:fy CNAD, IEPG, EURONAD, FINABEI.J, 
SAC, other ... ), and is the need :for standardis-
ation, interoperability taken into account at this 
stage? 
D.2.5 Are other comparable projects under 
development in allied countries always taken 
into consideration bilaterally be:fore national 
development is initiated ? Is su:f:ficient infor-
mation available :from other countries concerning 
projects under development Y 
D.3 Finance: 
D.3.1 Is the cost of research and development 
accounted :for separately as such in the de:fence 
budget, or as part of the total cost of procuring 
the equipment concerned ? 
D.3.2 When research and development contracts 
are placed with private industry, is the whole 
cost borne by the state, or may the contractor 
:finance part of the cost ? 
D.4 Supervision, test, evaluation and acceptance. 
What bodies are responsible : 
D.4.1 For supervising progress of prototype 
development ? 
D.4.2 For technical testing of the completed 
prototype? 
D.4.3 For operational testing of the completed 
prototype? 
D.4.4 What body or person is responsible :for 
:final acceptance o:f a prototype at the end o:f 
the development phase ? 
D.4.5 What multilateral allied bodies participate 
in each of the :four :foregoing :functions (speci:fy 
CNAD, ~IEPG, EURONAD, FINABEL, SAC, 
other ... ) . 
E. Production and pre-production stage 
E.1 Initiating authority. For new equipment 
what body(ies) or person(s) are :finally respon-
sible for ordering (a) pre-production ; (b) :full-
scale production or (c) procurement abroad? 
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E.2 Factors involved in production decision. In 
what bodies and through what procedure or at 
what stage are the following factors or alterna-
tives taken into account before production or 
procurement abroad is ordered : 
E.2.1 Availability of nationally developed and 
accepted prototype. 
E.2.2 Views of multilateral allied bodies (specify 
CNAD, IEPG, EURONAD, FINABEL, SAC, 
other ... ) and need for standardisation, inter-
operability. 
E.2.3 (Bilateral) availability of fully-developed 
prototype or in-service equipment in an allied 
country for (a) production un der licence ; (b) 
joint production (bilateral, multilateral) ; (c) 
procurement abroad. 
E.3 Consultation outside Ministry of Defence. 
Before (a) pre-production, (b) full-scale produc-
tion or procurement is ordered : 
E.3.1 What other branches of government are 
consulted? 
E.3.2 To what extent and how is parliament 
consulted, or parliamentary approval required Y 
E.4 What body or person is responsible for 
acceptance testing of series production 1 Are 
bilateral or multilateral allied bodies involved 
(specify) Y 
F. Budgetary control 
F .1 What body is responsible for allocating funds 
to equipment projects in the various stages of 
research, development, test and procurement Y 
F.2 To what extent and in what way is par-
liament involved in decisions to make budgetary 
allocations to specifie projects Y 
F.3 Is there any conflict between pluriannual 
research, development and procurement pro-
grammes and the normal basis of the defence 
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budget (yearly, two-yearly, etc.) Y If so how is 
the conflict resolved ? 
F .4 Do multilateral allied bodies express views 
on the allocation of resources within the defence 
budget (a) as between main heads "personnel", 
"equipment", etc. ; (b) as between specifie equip-
ment projects (specify bodies concerned: NATO 
defence review ; CNAD ; · IEPG ; EURONAD ; 
other ... ) Y 
G. Conclusions 
G.1 In practice, considering the major weapons 
systems today in use by your country (battle 
tanks, fighter bombers, air superiority fighters, 
frigates, destroyers, major battleships, heavy 
helicopters, missile sYstems, etc.), how often has 
the theoretical procurement procedure been 
followed? 
G.l.1 Have there been important exceptions to 
the general rule Y In which cases ? Why ? 
G.1.2 Which specifie projects, if any, have been 
affected or largely determined by decisions in 
multilateral allied bodies (specify) or in bilateral 
negotiations, and by the need for standardisation 
and interoperability ? 
G.1.2 Which specifie projects, if any, have been 
affected by parliamentary decisions Y 
G.2 In the decision to procure a given weapon 
system with specified requirements, is particular 
importance attached to economie and industrial 
considerations as well as to political and strategie 
needs ? In your opinion, is the relative weight of 
these factors, and the need for standardisation 
and interoperability different for superpowers 
than for medium- and small-sized countries Y If 
so, where does the difference lie Y (For example, 
in the Belgian, Danish, Norwegian and Dutch 
decisions to purchase the F-16, which of these 
considerations do you believe to have been most 
important?) 
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APPENDIX II 
Questionnaire addressed to Chairmen of Parliamentary Defence Committees 
Introduction 
The Rapporteur has been asked to investigate 
the extent to which parliaments of allied 
countries investigate and control expenditure on 
defence procurement, and their ability to 
influence policy in the direction of standardis-
ation and joint production. 
The Rapporteur is addressing this question-
naire 1 in the first place to the chairmen of the 
parliamentary defence committees of the conn-
tries of the Alliance. It is designed to elicit 
information, comparable between countries, to 
enable the Rapporteur to describe the extent to 
which different parliaments or their commit-
tees: 
(a) control, supervise, or involve themselves 
in the defence procurement process and 
its varions stages ; 
(b) debate varions aspects of defence pro-
curement policy and the broader poli-
tical and strategie issues which affect 
it; 
( c) obtain the necessary information from 
national and other allied sources. 
The Rapporteur would much appreciate the 
co-operation of chairmen of the parliamentary 
defence committees and of their staffs in com-
pleting this questionnaire. Depending on the 
particular circumstances and usages in different 
parliaments, chairmen may feel it appropriate 
to forward copies to chairmen of other commit-
tees (budget, finance ... ) or to other persons in 
their parliament. Further copies of the question-
naire are available from the Office of the Clerk 
of the WEU Assembly, and copies are also 
available in French. 
Note on security classification 
It is assumed that most of the information 
requested in this questionnaire will be "unclas-
sified" ; the Rapporteur will feel free to use in 
a published report ali information that is not 
given a specifie security classification by the 
person replying. 
* 
** 
1. A separate questionnaire, a copy of which . is 
attached for information, is being addressed to the Min-
isters of Defence of the same countries. 
1 
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A. General 
A.l Is your parliament consulted on, or is it able 
to exercise control over, the varions stages of the 
defence equipment procurement process, or is 
supervision limited. to the discussion and appro-
val of the defence budget as a whole ? 
A.l.l Through what internai bodies does your 
parliament exercise such supervision (specialised 
or ad hoc committees or sub-committees working 
in this field) ? What are their powers (do they 
refer back to parliament, have they legislative 
powers or are they simply commissions of 
enquiry ) 1 How often do they meet ? 
A.1.2 List any recent reports of parliamentary 
committees dealing with defence procurement. 
(Please enclose copies of such reports with reply.) 
A.2 Quite apart from its powers of supervision, 
how far does parliament play a rôle in gathering 
information and in informing the public on 
questions related to defence equipment procure-
ment ? How is this done ? 
A.2.1 Do individual members of parliament have 
the right to put questions to ministers on defence 
procurement matters 7 
A.2.2 Does parliament possess its own indepen-
dent methods of investigating these questions 
(hearings, commissions of enquiry, task forces, 
etc.) ? If so what do these consist of Y How many 
such commissions are there ? What subjects have 
they dealt with over the last five years? 
A.2.3 What are the rights of (a) individual 
members, (b) parliamentary committees, to be 
provided with classified defence information Y 
N ev er 7 Or in certain circumstances ? 
A.2.3.1 May a committee (a) require, or (b) only 
request (i) a minister ; (ii) senior officiais, (iii) 
senior officers of the armed services, to give 
evidence to a committee in closed session ? May 
they refuse ? How frequently is this right 
exercised? 
A.2.3.2 May a committee demand the com-
munication of classified information in writing ? 
May it be refused ? How frequently is this right 
exercised? 
A.2.4 Does parliament, do its committees, rely 
solely on national government sources for 
information ? Or is use made of other bodies 
(a) for information, (b) for independent evalu-
ation of government proposais or projects ? 
A.2.4.1 Is use made of private research institutes, 
industrial establishments or other independent 
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sources Y If so, which and how frequently or on 
what occasions Y 
A.2.4.2 Is information obtained directly from, or 
are ties maintained with : bodies outside the 
country ? governmental bodies in allied conn-
tries ? private industry or research establishments 
in allied countries? organs of NATO or other 
allied bodies Y parliamentary bodies in other 
allied countries ? international parliamentary 
assemblies with defence responsibilities (North 
Atlantic Assembly, WEU Assembly) ? 
A.2.4.3 Is parliament informed of the need for 
standardisation and interoperability of defence 
equipment? Is it informed of NATO require-
ments or recommendations ? Is it informed of 
the development or production of equipment 
projects in other allied countries that would have 
a bearing on national development or production 
proposais Y 
A.3 Are (regular, occasional, ad hoc) debates held 
on changes in the nature of the threat, in 
strategie and tactical doctrine, in the doctrine of 
the Atlantic Alliance, etc., specifically as they 
affect defence procurement, or in the general 
context of defence and foreign policy ? 
A.3.1 Please attempt to assess the amount of 
parliamentary time devoted (a) to general 
defence de ba tes ; (b) to defence procurement 
policy. (Number of hours in past year ; pro-
portion of total parliamentary time.) 
B. Formulating the military need for new 
weapons systems 
C. Formulation of operational equipment 
requirements 
D. Prototype development stage 
E. Production and pre-production stage 
(Please refer to corresponding sections B to 
E of attached questionnaire as addressed to 
Ministers of Defence.) 
B, C, D, E.l To what extent is parliament 
informed or consulted, or its approval sought in 
each stage B to E of the procurement process ? 
To what extent is it made aware of the process 
and kept informed on the progress of individual 
equipment projects within it ? In particular : 
B.3 Is parliament or its committees consulted, or 
informed, when a new military need is finalised 
or, C.3, when new operational equipment require-
ments are finalised ? Is parliament made aware 
of the views of NATO or other allied bodies 
concerning operational requirements of specifie 
projects, and can parliament take account of the 
need for standardisation and interoperability at 
this stage? 
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D.l Is parliament or a committee consulted or 
informed when development of a new prototype 
is put in hand Y Is it made aware of any other 
allied proposais or projects at this stage or of the 
possibilities of joint development with allied 
countries? 
D.4.4 Is parliament involved in any way in the 
final acceptance of a prototype at the end of the 
development phase Y 
E.l Is parliament or a committee consulted or 
informed when (a) pre-production, (b) full-scale 
production or (c) purchase from abroad of new 
equipment is decided ? Is parliament made aware 
of allied requirements or of alternative allied 
equipment available at this stage ? Or of the 
possibilities of joint production with allied conn-
tries? 
F. Budgetary control 
F .1 Over what kind of defence budget does your 
parliament exert control ? 
F.l.l The PPBS (planning, programming, bud-
geting system) ? 1 
F.1.2 Apart from the annual defence budget, do 
there exist pluriannual expenditure plans? In 
respect of individual equipment projects Y 
F.1.3 Is the defence budget sub-divided into 
separate items and chapters according to sorne 
common scheme discussed at NATO level? 
F .2 What procedures does your parliament use 
when it approves the defence budget ? 
F.2.1 Does parliament exert any influence over 
the drawing up of the defence budget and, in 
particular, over the funds allotted for arms 
procurement ? If so, how is this done ? 
F .2.2 Is the defence budget debated en bloc or 
chapter by chapter ? Within each chapter, are 
single allotments also debated Y 
1. The planning, programming, budgeting system 
(PPBS), originated in the United States, has been adopted 
in many NATO countries. It is a budget-planning system 
designed to identify the costa and benefits of the varions 
options. To this end the budget is drawn up according 
to functional criteria. From the point of view of 
methodology the PPBS operates in three phases : 
(i) the planning phase concerned with definition of 
the chief objectives (usually a ten-year span) ; 
(ü) the programming phase concerned with drawing 
up medium-term progra=es (usually of five 
years) designed to make the best use of available 
resources as specified through systems analysis 
techniques ; 
( iü) the budgeting phase, when the annual budget 
necessary for implementing the programmes is 
drawn up in functional terms, and a critical 
examination of the whole procedure is undertaken. 
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F .2.3 Does it ever occur that the budget is 
debated by individual programme rather than 
chapter by chapter, or that single tactical or 
strategie missions are debated ? 
F.2.4 Are funds for procurement normally 
included in the defence budget or are they mainly 
a matter for ad hoc legislation ? 
F.2.5. What effect, if any, does this ad hoc 
legislation have on overall defence expenditure? 
F .3 Are opinions or decisions of parliamentary 
bodies on budgetary matters binding or have they 
a purely consultative value? 
G. Political attitudes : United States-European 
relations 
G.l (For European parliaments only) : 
G.l.l Are the following attitudes at aU wide-
spread among members of your parliament : 
G.l.l.l Suspicion of American "gadget" solutions 
and technological panaceas ? 
7. 
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G.l.l.2 Suspicion of "American industrial imperi-
alism"? 
G.1.2 Has your parliament in any way discussed 
ways of reinforcing the European options ? 
G.1.3 Which legislative steps, if any, have been 
taken or are under discussion in your parliament 
which might be said to reflect any of the fore-
going attitudes ? 
G.2 (For United States Congress only) : 
G.2.1 How does Congress assess the need for 
better United States-European co-operation in 
the field of arms procurement Y 
G.2.2 Which legislative steps have been taken or 
are under discussion to effect this ? 
G.3 (For ail parliaments) : 
What attitudes are currently manifest in your 
parliament concerning the need for continuing 
American military presence in Europe and the 
problems of arms procurement ? 
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RECOMMENDATION 197 1 
on military security and parliamentary information 2 
The Assembly, 
Considering tha.t both the requirements of democra.cy and a. policy of deterrence ca.ll for the 
fullest publicity for defence arrangements compatible with their effectiveness, and tha.t members of 
pa.rliaments must have sufficient access to cla.ssified defence information to comprehend policy and 
justify expenditure ; 
Considering further tha.t the integration of national defence efforts in the Alliance ca.lls for 
this dual information effort to be conducted by both national and NATO authorities; 
Commending the arrangements in the German Bundestag for informing members about defence 
matters as a model for aU pa.rlia.ments, but a.ware that particular conditions and traditions in the 
other pa.rliaments make fully uniform arrangements impractica.ble; 
Awa.re that it is the only pa.rlia.menta.ry body constituted by an international trea.ty of collec-
tive self-defence, and tha.t consequently it is responsible for keeping under constant review the 
arrangements made for discha.rging this obligation, whatever the organisation to which the Council 
may have delegated executive responsibility; 
Reca.lling tha.t the Council in its second a.nnual report apprecia.ted the Assembly's desire "to 
consider broader aspects of defence tha.n those to which the Council must limit themselves, and to 
deba.te these a.ctivities against the background of a. general policy" ; 
Reca.lling further the procedure introduced by the Council in 1957, in response to Recomman-
dation 9 of the Assembly, whereby it communica.tes to the Assembly the texts of sta.tements on 
defence matters made by member governments to their parliaments ; 
Regretting tha.t the procedure a.greed between the Council and the North Atlantic Council in 
February 1958 should have led to a. general ruling by the latter that the NATO a.uthorities may 
communicate only unclassified information to members of parlia.ment ; 
Believing that this ruling, whereby the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
receives less information from NATO a.uthorities tha.n from the national a.uthorities of countries of 
the Alliance, seriously restri~ts the ability of the Assembly and its Committee to discharge their 
duties, 
REooMMENns To THE CoUNOIL 
1. Tha.t it urge on a.ll governments of the Alliance the a.dva.nta.ges of a. delibera.te policy of 
maximum publicity for defence matters and full information of members of pa.rlia.ment, a.t both 
national and NATO level; 
2. That the procedure introduced in response to Recommandation 9 of the Assembly be fully 
implemented ; 
3. Tha.t the member governments be urged to a.pproa.ch the other NATO governments with a 
view to securing a. ruling from the North Atlantic Council a.uthorising the NATO Secreta.ry-Genera.l 
and military comma.nders to exercise their discretion in determining on a. case by case basis what 
classified information should be made available to members of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1970 during the First Part of the Sixteenth Ordinary Session (3rd 
Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Goedhart on behalf of the Committee on Defenoe 
Questions and Armaments (Document 5ll). 
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APPENDIX IV 
RECOMMENDATION 9 1 
on the communication of information to the Assembly 2 
The Assembly, 
Having regard to its duty recognised by the Council in its second annual report "to consider 
the broader aspects of defence than those to which the Council must limit themselves and to debate 
these activities against a background of a general policy" ; 
Considering the statement made by the British Government on 21st December 1956, that in 
order to provide more extensive information for the Assembly "there is scope for improvement, to 
begin with, in the exchange and pooling of information availab]e in the seven national parliaments"; 
Considering that in its second report to the Assembly the Council have endorsed the British 
position and expressed the view that "as the governments would not normally be expected to give 
more detailed information to the Assembly than they are prepared to give to their own members of 
parliament", "the exchange and pooling of information made available by governments to national 
parliaments might be useful", 
REUOMMENDS TO THE CoUNOIL 
That they communicate, beginning on 1st September 1957, to the Assembly on the fust day 
of every second month the text of information concerning defence matters communicated by the 
governments of the seven member states to their national parliaments and to the committees of 
those parliaments, in accordance with the proviRions of Article VII (c) of the Charter. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th May 1957 during the First Part of the Third Ordina.ry Session (4th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the report tabled by Mr. Teitgen on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments (Document 40). 
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Amendment 1 
Parliaments and defence procurement 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Schlingemann 
19th June 1979 
1. After paragraph C of the draft recommandation proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
"D. To agree to the Assembly of WEU, at its seat in Paris, having access to national data banks, 
documentation centres and other sources of information on defence-related political matters." 
Signed : Schlingemann 
1. See 6th Sitting, 20th June 1979 (Amendment withdrawn). 
198 
Document 808 
Application of the Brussels Treaty 
Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 8 
by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
22nd May 1979 
on the application of the Brussels 1.'reaty- reply to the twenty-fourth annual 
report of the Council 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur 
1. Introduction and relations with the Council 
II. Aetivities of the Council 
(a) Defence activities 
(b) British forces stationed on the mainland of Europe 
(e) Amendments to the lists of prohibited weapons 
III. Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(a) Non-application of controls 
(b) Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
IV. Standing Armaments Committee 
V. Conclusions 
1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 0 with 
1 abstention. 
2. Mem'bers of the Committee : Mr. Roper (Chairman) ; 
MM. Bonne! (Altemate: VerZeysen), Ro'bertt (Vice· 
Chairma.n) ; MM. Ahrens, Baume!, Beehter, van den 
Bergh, Boldrini, Boucheny, Critchley, Dejardin (Alter· 
nate: Lam'biotte), Fosson, Grant (Alternate: Ban"ks), 
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Handlos (Alternate: Büchner), Hardy, Konen (Alter· 
nate: Spautz), de Koster, Lemmrioh, Maggioni, Ménard, 
Pawelozy'k, Peeehioli Péronnet (Altemate : 86nès), 
Hermann Schmidt, Seholten, Tanghe, Whitehead. 
N.B. The names of those ta'king part in the vote are 
printeà in italios. 
DOOUMENT 808 
Draft Recommendation 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty·fourth annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
Noting with sa.tisfaction that the Council, aware that the Assembly is "the only European assembly 
with responsibilities in the field of defence", is continuing the dialogue with it "on questions relating to 
the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, including those dealt with by member governments in 
other international fora"; 
Welcoming the mea.ningful dialogue established with the Council in most cases, in particula.r through 
recommandations and replies, and noting in this connection that the Council will invite the Secretary-
General of NATO to provide information "in particula.r when the questions raised relate to matters within 
the competence of the integrated command structures of NATO"; 
Considering that the essential commitments under the modified Brussels Treaty - automatic 
mutual military assistance and the maintenance of appropriate levels of forces - retain and must continue 
to retain all their initial value ; 
Noting that the Council considera the Standing Armaments Committee to be "a. useful instrument 
for thought and analysis" but tha.t the organisation of "European co-operation in the field of armaments 
production ... is the aim of the independant European programme group in its work", 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE ÜOUNOIL 
1. Withdra.w its refusa.! to publish in its annua.l report the true level of British land forces stationed 
on the mainland of Europe in accordance with the commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. II of the 
modified Brussels Treaty ; 
2. Communicate to the Assembly the juridical section of the study on the European armaments 
industry made by the Standing Armaments Committee ; 
3. Con.sider the possibility of incorporating appropriate studies proposed from time to time by the 
Assembly among the new tasks which the Council is considering entrusting to the Standing Armaments 
Committee; 
4. lnclude in future annual reports a section on the work of the independant European programme group. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur) 
1. Introduction and relations with the Council 
1. The Committee welcomes the fact that in its 
twenty-fourth annual report the Council recog-
nises at the outset that the Assembly is "the only 
European assembly with responsibilities in the 
field of defence" and that it is continuing "the 
dialogue with the Assembly on questions relating 
to the modified Brussels Treaty, including those 
dealt with by member governments in other inter-
national fora". Indeed, the Council's replies to 
recommendations and questions from the Assem-
bly have continued to make a substantial con-
tribution to the discussion thus started on major 
political and defence questions. To quote only 
one example among severa!, in its reply to 
Recommendation 313 the Council did not hesi-
tate to declare, as the Assembly had requested, 
that it supports "unequivocally the independence, 
territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia 
and its continued non-aligned status". 
2. In Recommendation 320, the Assembly 
recalled the procedure whereby NATO may in 
appropriate cases provide material for replies 
to Assembly recommendations. In its reply, the 
Council confirmed that it requested "the Secre-
tary-General of NATO to provide information 
whenever they consider this to be necessary and, 
in particular, when the questions raised relate 
to matters within the competence of the inte-
grated command structures of NATO". But in its 
reply to Recommendation 313, already mentioned, 
in which the Assembly considered adjusting 
NATO command arrangements in the Mediter-
ranean, the Council merely considered "that 
command arrangements are primarily a matter 
for NATO" without having resorted to the pro-
cedure which, as the Council recognises, would 
have first allowed it to obtain NATO's opinion 
on the question of integrated commands. 
3. During 1978, the year covered by the annual 
report, the Committee had an opportunity of 
meeting the Council or its agencies on two 
occasions. In Bonn on 5th June, the Committee 
met the Council at ministerial level for an 
informai talk during which the joint production 
of armaments, the MBFR negotiations and arms 
exports were discussed. The tenth meeting of the 
Liaison Sub-Committee on the joint production 
of armaments - the official title of a joint 
meeting between the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee including governmental representatives 
specialising in armaments production, on the one 
hand, and the Committee on the other - was 
held in Paris on 30th October 1978. 
4. Last year, in its report replying to the 
annual report of the Council, the Committee 
regretted the tardy communication of the annual 
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report. Again this year the last chapters did not 
reach the Office of the Clerk until 26th March. 
However, the twentieth and twenty-first annual 
reports were communicated to the Office of the 
Clerk at the end of February 1975 and 1976 
respectively when the Council and its secretariat 
appear to have applied the "appropriate admin-
istrative procedures to ensure that the prep-
aration of its annual report is carried out on a 
current basis" advocated by the Assembly in 
Recommendation 183. Communication of the 
annual report of the Council in February allows 
Assembly committees to carry out the in-depth 
study which it deserves. 
ll. Activities of the Council 
(a) Defence activities 
5. In its second annual report, communicated 
to the Assembly in 1957, the Council reminded 
the Assembly "that the seven WEU powers con-
sidered that their mutual defence obligations 
could and should be fulfilled through NATO ... 
they consider that the activities of the Council 
in the field of defence questions and armaments 
relate to: 
(a) matters which the contracting parties 
wish to raise, especially under Article 
VIII; 
(b) the level of forces of member states 
(Protocol No. Il) ; 
( c) the maintenance of certain United King-
dom forces on the continent ; 
( d) the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments; 
( e) the Standing Armaments Committee." 
6. In Written Question 191, Mr. Roper asked 
whether the CoU11cil still took this view, if so 
what matters under (a) above had been raised 
by member governments since 1957 and whether 
the Council would include a statement in future 
annual reports concerning any matter so raised. 
In its reply, which took three months to prepare, 
the Council "confirm the statement made in their 
second annual report regarding the range of 
activities assigned to them in the field of defence 
questions and armaments". It then quotes as 
having been raised in accordance with Article 
VIII 1 : the consequences of France's withdrawal 
from the integrated military structure of NATO, 
1. Article VIII, paragraph 3, reads as follows: "At 
the request of any of the high contracting parties the 
Council shall be i=ediately convened in order to permit 
them to consult with regard to any situation which may 
constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat 
should arise ... ". 
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examined in 1967, and disannament and the 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, discussed 
in 1968, 1969 and 1970. The Council concluded 
its reply by declaring that "with due regard for 
the confidential nature of their deliberations, 
the Council will continue to infonn the Assembly 
in the appropriate manner of any questions 
raised by the member governments in this 
context". A part from matters relating to the 
Agency for the Control of Annaments and the 
Standing Annaments Committee, the Council 
apparently did not have to discuss any matters 
relating to defence raised by member states in 
1978, the year covered by the present annual 
report. Since the accession of the United King-
dom to the European Community, in fact, and 
the start of nine-power political consultations, 
there do not seem to have been any such discus-
sions in the Council. 
7. Although the Council asserted in 1957, and 
has reiterated on many more recent occasions, 
"that the new arrangements [rthe transfer to 
NATO of the European union defence machin-
ery] would in no way affect the obligations they 
had assumed towards each other under the Brus-
sels Treaty", since 1973 only the Assembly, and 
not the member states, seems to have drawn 
the attention of the Council to matters relating 
to general defence policy. The Committees there-
fore conclude that it is the Assembly's duty to 
make sure that it regularly infonns the Council 
of all important matters concerning the defence 
of Europe which may involve the application 
of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
(b) British forces stationed on the mainland of 
Europe 
8. Under Protocol No. II of the Brussels 
Treaty, the United Kingdom is committed to 
maintain on the mainland of Europe forces 
"assigned to SACEUR", the number now fixed 
by the Council being 55,000 men plus the Second 
Tactical Air Force. This task of the Council, 
which is in fact to decide on the level of the 
British commitment, is undeniably one of its 
most important tasks at the present time. 
9. Since 1972, in response to Recommandation 
213, the Council has mentioned in its annual 
report "the total level of British forces on the 
continent of Europe". According to the present 
annual report, on 31st December 1978 the figure 
was 59,883 men plus the Second Tactical Air 
Force. But in 1976, in the Council's replies to 
Written Question 170 and Recommandation 284, 
the Assembly learned that the figures thus given 
in the Co un cil 's reports in no way correspond 
to the British commitment under Article VI of 
Protocol No. II because this commitment "relates 
not to the totallevel of United Kingdom forces 
on the mainland (which includes personnel in 
Berlin and Gibraltar), but only to those which 
are assigned to SACEUR". Although the Corn-
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mittee has demonstrated that the real level of 
British forces corresponding to the commitment 
was to be found in published documents, the 
Council has refused to give this figure in the 
annual report or to confinn whether or not the 
commitment was being fulfilled. 
10. The situation with regard to the level of 
British land forces is at present as follows : 
Total number of 
British forces on 
the mainland 
(according to the 
annual report of 
the Council) 
Minus forces re-
deployed in Nor-
thern Ireland 
( annual report of 
the Council) 
Minus the British 
garrison in Berlin 
(1979 white paper 
on defence) 
Minus troops sta-
tioned in Gibraltar 
(1979 white paper 
on defence) 1 
Total level of Bri-
tish forces in Ger-
many, supposed to 
correspond to the 
commitment ap-
proved by the 
Council 
Level of the com-
mitment approved 
59,883 men 
3,243 men 
3,100 men 
500 to 1,000 men 
53,000 to 52,500 men 
(plus the Second Tac-
tical Air Force) 
by the Council 55,000 men (plus the 
Second Tactical Air 
Force) 
11. In its reply to Recommandation 320, in 
which the Assembly again asked that this com-
parison be published, the Council claimed that 
"comparison between the figures in the report 
and those in the British white paper on defence 
is misleading, as the figures are for various 
reasons not comparable... The Council must 
repeat that, in view of the security requirements 
of the governments concerned, additional infonn-
ation such as the Assembly has requested would 
not be suitable for inclusion in future annual 
reports to the Assembly". If the figures quoted 
by the Committee in the previous paragraph are 
not comparable, any difference, apart from the 
forces in Berlin and Gibraltar referred to by 
the Council, might possibly concern the British 
troops assigned to logistic support in Gennany 
which are supposed to remain under national 
1. Estimate corresponding to one infantry battalion 
plus units of engineers. 
command. Since the total level of British forces 
in Germany is known, however, details about 
those supposed to remain under national com-
mand and those assigned to SACEUR cannot 
compromise security. That is why the Commit-
tee challenges the Council's interpretation and 
repeats its request for the real level of the 
United Kingdom's commitment to be published. 
(c) Amendments to the lists of prohibîted weapons 
12. Since the modified Brussels Treaty was 
signed in 1954, the Council has amended a dozen 
times the list given in Annex III to Protocol 
No. III which defines the conventional weapons 
which the Federal Republic of Germany under-
takes not to manufacture on its territory. No 
amendment to this list was communicated by 
the Council in 1978, the period covered by the 
present annual report. 
13. In Recommandation 320, adopted last year 
on the Committee's report replying to the annual 
report of the Council, the Assembly recommended 
that the Council "3. Delete the reference to naval 
auxiliary vessels from the list of conventional 
armaments which may not be produced on Ger-
man territory". In its reply, the Council stated 
that: "Annex III to Protocol No. III to the 
modified Brussels Treaty can be amended by the 
Council under the conditions and according to 
the procedure laid down in the treaty itself, 
in Article II of Protocol No. III. If the required 
conditions were fulfilled, the Council would have 
recourse to the procedure laid down in the 
treaty". But the procedure in question provides 
for the modification of the list concerned if a 
recommendation "is made by the competent 
supreme commander of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, and if the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany submits a request 
accordingly ... ". 
14. Informed of the contents of paragraph 3 
of Recommendation 320, the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe, in his letter to the Chair-
man of the Committee dated 27th July 1978, 
declared : "I welcome the recommendation of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
to delete the restriction on the construction of 
permanent auxiliary vessels imposed on the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The lift-
ing of these restrictions would not only better 
serve the needs of the FRG navy but also would 
be of considerable benefit to the Alliance. In 
view of the recommendation by the Assembly 
of WEU, I am prepared to support a request 
to the Council by the Federal Republic of 
Germany to delete the restrictions on the con-
struction of naval auxiliary vessels of more than 
6,000 tons displacement." 
15. The Committee is pleased to note that should 
Germany submit a request for this restriction 
to be deleted, it would have the support of 
SACEUR. 
7** 
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W. Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(a) Non-application of controls 
16. Regarding the control of armaments in 
member states in accordance with the treaty, the 
present annual report shows no change in the 
situation. The Committee has always underlined 
the inadequate application of Protocols Nos. III 
and IV of the modified Brussels Treaty on the 
control of armaments. Like previous reports, the 
present annual report of the Council refers to 
fields where the Agency does not exercise its 
activities : 
"The situation described in previous annual 
reports, regarding certain armaments, 
remained unchanged in 1978. 
In present circumstances, the Agency's 
activities do not extend to atomic weapons 
or, in one member state, to what that state 
calls "strategie forces". Nor does the Agency 
apply any controls to biological weapons. 
The control activities dealt with in this 
chapter do not, therefore, concern these 
categories of armaments. 
In the case of chemical weapons, only non-
production controls take place ; no quanti-
tative controls are made since none of the 
member states have declared possessing such 
armaments." 
17. The annual report subsequently adds: 
"(d) As the convention for the due process 
of law 1 has not yet entered into force, the 
control measures carried out by the Agency 
at private concerns had, in 1978, as in 
previous years, to take the form of 'agreed 
control measures'. 
One consequence of this situation is that, in 
order to obtain the agreement of the firms 
concerned, the Agency has to give a few 
weeks' notice. This agreement has never been 
withheld." [Previous reports referred to 
"sorne six weeks' notice".] 
J 8. The Committee has noted many cases of 
shortcomings in the application of controls 
referred to in earlier reports by the Council 2, 
two of which are worthy of mention : the 
"strategie" forces not covered by the Agency's 
work include not only the nuclear warheads of 
French strategie forces but also their means 
1. Convention concerning measures to be taken by 
member states of Western European Union in order 
to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
to carry out its control effectively and making pro-
vision for due process of law, in accordance with Pro-
tocol No. IV of the Bru~sels Treaty, as modified by 
the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 
(signed in Paris on 14th December 1957, but ratified 
by only six states : Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). 
2. Document 700, paragraph 20 et seq. 
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of delivery - nuclear submarines, strategie 
missiles, Mirage IV aircraft. With regard to the 
control of the non-production of chemical 
weapons in Germany, in the absence of the 
guarantees provided for in the convention men-
tioned in the previous paragraph, the Agency 
is not authorised to take samples, essential for 
any control worthy of the name. 
(b) Activities of the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments 
19. Although the attitude of governments, or of 
sorne of them, limits the Agency's scope, it is 
active and efficient in the fields open to it. 
In its report, the Council says that in 1978 the 
Agency "was able to make certain improvements 
to the questionnaire to member countries, to the 
despatching arrangements and in the preparation 
of combined ACA/SHAPE inspections ; in addi-
tion, in planning the inspection programme 
account was taken of measures completed or in 
hand, to reorganise the armed forces of certain 
countries". This is most welcome news. The 
number of inspections carried out each year by 
the Agency shows that generally speaking there 
has been no reduction in its activities, as may be 
seen from the following table : 
Numbers and types of inspections 
carried out by the Agency for the Control of A.rmaments 
"C "' "' ..., ~"' ~~ R~ ~ ~ ~ 1 "'~'~ ,..... Q) "' ~ ~~ .. ,..... g~ ~~ ~P.~~ ~ 0 Q) Q)! iil P..:JJ ~ ~·~ ~ § ~ 1'1 i3 "' ~gj "'1'1 c:>"' Q)& 0"'"' ~Q) a:3im ]~& s Q) s "' 0 s :Jj~ a "'s 
-"C ..,c:> 
., .... &-o oS.S ~~ '0 '§ Ol '0 p ~- '0 g ~- 8'0 ~ b 1'1 brg g.e Ol~ ~"C. 0 1'1 l'!.., 0 1'1 ~ '-'i:l i:l e êlb b:; 
8 0 , .... 0 p.. 0 ..,0 8 P..E,§ §,_, 0 i o.., c:> ~c:> ..., c:> c:> 
"' "' 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
--
1961 29 15 12 66 7 63 
2 26 20 Il 57 7 65 
3 35 13 13 61 10 74 
4 39 19 13 71 9 80 
5 26 16 Il 53 7 60 
6 * * * * * 78 
7 * * * * * 70 8 * * * * * 79 9 * * * * * 77 
--
a b a b a b a b a b a b 
1970 * * * * * * * * * * 82 72 1 * * * * * * * * * * 82 72 2 * * * * * 66 3 * * * * * 66 4 * * * * * 71 5 * * * * * 72 6 * * * * * 71 7 * * * * * 70 8 * * * * * 68 
Note a, b : from 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its sum· 
mary table of inspections, thenceforth counting inspections of severa! small grouped ammu-
nition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of inspections in fact 
reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported 
both sets of figures (old and new style- a and b) for the years 1970 and 1971. 
Sources : Figures for total control measures (ali categories) given in column 6 are derived 
from published annual reports of the Council. With regard to the varions categories of 
controle (columns 1 to 5), figures for 1961-65 are also derived from the published annual 
reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the Com-
mittee. Those for 1970 to 1977 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council 
in response to Recommandation 213, but permission to publish them has been withheld. Minor 
discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and are without 
significance. 
• Confidential information available to the Committee deleted from the published report. 
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20. The Committee finds particularly useful the 
lists of armaments currently being produced 
given in Section E : "State and problems of 
control in certain particular fields", which is a 
summary of ali present armaments production 
programmes in member countries. A comparison 
of the present list with that of last year shows 
that the production of Roland, Hawk (Helip) and 
Rapier surface-to-air missiles has now come 
to an end ; the Committee wonders whether this 
information is accurate. 
Technical information visits and other means of 
improving the efficiency of the experts 
21. The annual report mentions visits by Agency 
experts to enable them to keep their knowledge 
up to date. For instance, in the biological and 
chemical fields visits were paid to establishments 
in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. But 
there have been press reports about the closing 
and dismantling of the toxic nerve gas pro-
duction plant at Nancekuke in Cornwall during 
the week of 12th March 1979, when the British 
Government organised a visit of the factory by 
experts from twenty-one countries, including 
Romania and Yugoslavia, to show that it was 
actually being dismantled. The Committee con-
siders that the WEU Agency might have been 
invited to take part. 
22. In conclusion, the Committee believes it may 
be asserted that the controls provided for in the 
modified Brussels Treaty are being applied on 
the mainland in respect of aircraft and non-
strategie missiles capable of carrying nuclear 
bombs and warheads. No controls are applied in 
respect of the French strategie force and the 
other European mainland countries have no 
strategie forces. Nuclear bombs and warheads in 
United States custody are not subject to control 
by the Agency. The Council partly confirmed 
this situation in reply to Written Question 142 
put by the Rapporteur on 27th May 197 4. As 
stated in the annual report : 
"When drawing up its programme of control 
measures, the Agency again worked on the 
basic assumption, which is supported by the 
observations of previous years, that the 
undertakings and declarations of member 
countries are being honoured." 
The 1976 annual report added: 
"Clearly, if any doubt existed on this point, 
control measures would have to be 
increased." 
23. The Committee has already noted that the 
usefulness of the few controls now being applied 
is disputed, particularly in the case of the non-
production of certain c~nventional armaments 
on German territory. Annual reports no longer 
state that non-production controls are the 
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Agency's "primary task" as was the case in 
earlier annual reports. 
Production of satellite launchers in Zaïre 
24. Last year, in its corresponding report, the 
Committee referred to the activities of the West 
German firm OTRAG (orbital transport and 
rockets) which is testing cheap liquid-fuelled 
satellite launchers. The Committee said press 
reports about possible military implications were 
absurd and is pleased to note that in reply to 
Written Question 181 put by Mr. Boucheny 
the Council confirms this interpretation. 
25. However, for the time being OTRAG is still 
in Zaïre although it announced in March 1978 
that it was moving to Brazil. According to the 
press\ the firm has set up offices in Paris, is 
considering building two additional test sites 
in America and South-East Asia and had been 
in contact with Brazil. On 16th November 
OTRAG announced that it intended to place its 
operations under United Nations control 2, and 
on 27th April 1979 the official Zaïre press 
agency stated that the Zaïre Government had 
directed OTRAG to hait its activities in the 
country. Up to June 1978, OTRAG is believed 
to have fired three launchers in Zaïre. The 
German Government has asserted that it has no 
link with OTRAG and that in any event Ger-
many's renunciation of the production of certain 
conventional weapons applies only to its own 
territory ; the controls provided for in the 
modified Brussels Treaty have no application 
outside the territory of member states. 
IV. Standing Armaments Committee 
26. In its reply to Recommandation 325 on a 
European armaments policy, the Council said 
the Standing Armaments Committee was "a use-
fui instrument for thought and analysis which 
can be used to good purpose by the governments. 
Like the Assembly, the Council consider that 
the resources of the SAC should continue to be 
fully employed and when the current study has 
been completed they will consider the possibility 
of giving it new tasks in areas where its resources 
can be used without duplicating the activities 
of other bodies". On the organisation of "co-oper-
ation in the field of armaments production", the 
Council in the same reply considered that "this 
is the aim of the independent European pro-
gramme group in its work". 
27. In the same reply, the Council added that 
the Assembly's suggestion that the restructuring 
of the European armaments industry be done 
1. Guardian, 16th October 1978. 
2. International Herald Tribune, 17th November 1978. 
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under the aegis of the European Community 
"would therefore imply a wide interpretation of 
the field of application of the Treaty of Rome ; 
such an interpretation has already been opposed 
by a number of governments". 
28. The Council's interpretation of the respons-
ibilities of the SAC and of the IEPG is moreover 
taken up at national level in the reply by the 
French Prime Minister, Mr. Barre, on 18th 
January 1979 to a question put by Mr. Jeam-
brun: "The Standing Armaments Committee of 
WEU is ... an excellent instrument for reflection 
and analysis as borne out by the first results 
of the study it made ... on the situation of arma-
ments industries in WEU member countries". 
Mr. Barre continued : "The independent Euro-
pean programme group, which brings together 
ail the European members of the Alliance, is 
more particularly responsible for organising 
co-operation for the joint development and pro-
duction of specifie weapons systems or equip-
ment." 
29. In Recommendation 320, adopted on the 
Committee's report last year, the .Assembly pro-
posed that the Council "set up a European centre 
for defence studies at the disposai of inter-
governmental defence bodies and the Assembly 
making use of the resources of the WEU Agency 
for the Control of Armaments and its Standing 
Armaments Committee". In its reply, the Council 
could not accept the suggestion, specifying that 
"furthermore, the written material held by the 
ACA and the SAC relates exclusively to the 
highly technical matters within their particular 
competence, and the staffs of these two bodies 
are selected precisely for the specialised duties 
which they have to perform". However, in view 
of the Council's intention to use the SAC as 
"an instrument for thought and analysis" and 
give it "new tasks", the Committee sees no 
reason why such expert knowledge, not used 
to the full at present, should not be made avail-
able to Assembly Committees or to governments. 
The Committee therefore proposes that any 
studies that the Assembly might propose should 
be borne in mind by the Council for the new 
tasks which it is considering entrusting to the 
SAC. For example, the Committee recalls that 
in 1971 it proposed that five studies be under-
taken by experts to be appointed for the purpose, 
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including "a concerted long-term programme for 
standardised armaments procurement" 1 - that 
study still remains to be undertaken, and the 
subject is weil within the competences of the 
SAC. Again past reports of the Committee on 
related subjects have relied on the assistance of 
outside experts, but the expertise of the SAC, 
had it been available, could weil have proved of 
equal or greater value 2• 
30. In the abovementioned reply to Recommend-
ation 325, the Council did not accept the Assem-
bly's proposai that the IEPG submit a report 
on its activities to the Assembly. The Council 
prefers that "WEU .Assembly delegates... be 
briefed through national channels on IEPG 
activities". However, in view of the IEPG's 
responsibilities as envisaged by the Council (see 
paragraph 26), which correspond approximately 
to the rôle which the Council initially planned 
for the SAC in its decision of 7th May 1955 
setting up that body, the Committee proposes 
that the Council report on the activities of the 
IEPG in future annual reports. 
31. At the meeting of the Liaison Sub-Com-
mittee on the joint production of armaments 
referred to above, the Committee was most 
interested to hear what progress had been made 
in the part of the study dealing with the juridical 
aspects of the European industry now being 
made by the SAC. According to the annual 
report, this part of the study was transmitted 
to the Council on 24th April 1978. The Com-
mittee proposes that the text of this interesting 
study now be published. The SAC is pursuing 
its work on the economie part of the study. 
V. Conclusions 
32. The Committee's main conclusions are set 
out in the draft recommendation. The first two 
paragraphs of the preamble are based on para-
graphs 1 and 2 of the present explanatory 
memorandum. The third paragraph of the 
preamble and paragraph 1 of the operative text 
are commented on in paragraphs 8 to 11 of the 
explanatory memorandum and the fourth para-
graph of the preamble and paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 
of the operative text in paragraphs 26 to 31 of 
the explanatory memorandum. 
1. Document 559, 16th November 1971, A conference 
on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts, 
Rapporteur Mr. Rivière. 
2. Document 689, lst Deeember 1975, European and 
Atlantic co·operation in the field of armaments, Rap-
porteur Mr. Lemmrich; Document 738, lOth May 1977, 
A European armaments policy, Rapporteur Mr. Dankert ; 
Document 786, 31st October 1978, A European arma-
ments policy, Rapporteur Mr. Critchley. 
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Amendments 1 and 2 
Application of the Brussels Treaty -
18th June 1979 
Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 1 
tabled by Mr. van Waterschoot 
l. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
"2. Keep the Assembly informed, by whatever means it considers appropriate, of the results 
already achieved in the study underta.ken by the SAC, of the progress made and of the goals towards 
which its work is directed ;". 
2. Leave out paragra.ph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
"3. Take the fullest account of the Assembly's recommendations in defining any new task 
a.llotted to the SAC ;". 
Signed : van W aterschoot 
1. See 4th Sitting, 19th June 1979 (Amendment l agreed to; Amendment 2 amended and agreed to), 
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The balance of force 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Pawelczyk, Rapporteur 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the balance of force 
Aware that different political assumptions used in interpreting information can lead to widely 
differing assessments of adversary capabilities and of the balance of force ; 
Believing that the overall East-West economie and military balance is favourable to the West, 
but that the Warsaw Pact's superiority in several fields on the central front, combined with the Soviet 
military doctrine of "daring thrusts" against NATO forces, can be perceived as a substantial 
threat by the NATO countries ; 
Regretting the slow progress of the MBFR negotiations, and the failure so far to elucidate 
differences in the conflicting assessments of present force levels, but noting with satisfaction that 
there is some advance towards agreement on the concepts of parity and common collective ceilings ; 
Believing that European security can be based only on an approximate balance of forces in 
the area, and that security will be enhanced if, once a balance is achieved, the collective ceilings on 
each side are lowered, and associated measures are introduced to increase confidence through impro-
ved warning and verification facilities, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNOIL 
Urge member govemments : 
l. To take account of both Soviet and western perceptions of objectives, military capabilities and 
resulting threats, and to reject worst-case analysis as the only basis of assessment; 
2. To concentrate allied defence improvement plans accordingly on maintaining military capabili-
ties required for credible deterrence; 
3. To pursue vigorously the MBFR negotiations, and encourage the mutual exchange of more 
detailed information, with a view to securing agreement on : 
(i) the assessment of present force levels in the area; 
(ii) initial reductions designed especially to redress imbalances; 
(iii) the introduction of associated measures to stabilise mutual security by providing better warning 
and verification facilities. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Pawelczyk, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. The Rapporteur Wa$ asked to examine cri-
tically the balance of force as presented by 
worst-case analyses from the standpoint of both 
NATO and Warsaw Pact military commandera. 
He was to take account of the sources which 
control the release of information publicly avail-
able and their probable tendeneies in interpreting 
unpublished intelligence data. The report was 
to consider these matters in the conte.xt of the 
MBFR negotiations. 
2. In an attempt to follow these terms of 
reference the Rapporteur has sought to compare 
published W arsaw Pact statements and writings, 
where these are available, with those from NATO 
sources, when considering various aspects of the 
balance of force. 
3. A recent perceptive study 1 of the estima t-
ing process withrin the United States intelligence 
community is prefaced by a quotation from Lewis 
Carroll's "Through the Looking Glass" : 
" '1 was wondering what the mouse-trap was 
for,' said Alice. 'lt isn't very likely there 
would be any mice on the horse's back.' 
'Not very likely, perhaps,' said the Knight; 
but, if they do come, 1 don't choose to have 
them running ali about.' 
'Y ou see,' he went on after a pause, 'it 's 
as weil to be provided for everything. 
That's the reason the horse ha$ ali those 
anklets around his feet.' 
'But what are they for~· Alice asked in a 
tone of great curiosity. 
'To guard against the bites of sharks,' the 
Knight replied. 'lt's an invention of my 
own .. .'" 
This is perhaps an extreme example of a worst-
case an'alys$, but not more alarmist than sorne 
statements by a few individual generais in the 
West who have düfered from their governments. 
These the Committee had in m.ind in embarking 
on the present report. 
1. The balance of forces between NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact as declared by each side 
1. Uncertainties in comparing forces 
4. For sorne time, the West has been openly 
and resolutely involved in discussions on the East-
West balance of forces. 
1. United States Intelligence and the Soviet Strategie 
Threat, Laurence Freedman, The Macmillan Press, 
London. 
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5. Sorne politicia~ and military authord.ties 
say that there is a balance of forces. Others claim 
that the West as a whole still has military 
superiority, and a growing number asserts that 
the balance swings in favour of the East. Why 
such contradicting views and what is the true 
position 1 The questio~ thus arising are : 
- Wlrat is a coonparison of forces 1 
- On what is it based 1 
- What can or cannot be expected of it 1 
6. The defence potential includes all active 
combat-ready armed forces that can be used by 
a state and their operational availability in a 
given area at a given time. 
7. The m.ilitary poten1Ji.al is an essential factor, 
particularly when comparing forces, since it 
directly concerns the armed forces. 
8. To have a basis for comparing forces, the 
units, troops and equipment of the armed forces 
of both sides must be determ.ined quantitatively 
and, as far as possible, in terms of their principal 
qualitative aspects. However, few qualitative 
factors can be quantified and this seriously lim.its 
the list of comP'arative data and the comparison 
itself. 
9. Such factors include : 
- troop morale ; 
- level of traJining of troops ; 
- ability to mobilise, deploy and bring in 
reserves; 
- geographical conditions; 
- tactical and strategie doctrine ; 
- unit mobility ; 
- precision of weapons in terms of their 
relli.ability under enemy fire ; 
- maintenance of equipment, etc. 
10. These various factors are included in the 
notion of capaoolity. 
11. The list of data includes another group 
of factors which cannot be included in a data 
bank, i.e. those which come under the general 
heading of "intentions", which ~nclude: 
- for the poS~Sible aggressor : shaping 
public opinion and political decision-
making ; covert preparations for war ; 
the political and military play of part-
ner states ; conwncing soldiers and 
civilians of the legitimacy of war ; 
- for the country under attack : the ques-
tion of the precise moment at which the 
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threat is recognised and defined as an 
aggression ; the time and scale of the 
political decision, for instance in respect 
of mobilisation and defemrlve measures ; 
political and military co-operation with 
allies ; the will to resist of the popul-
ation, governments and soldiens of allied 
st•ates. 
l 2. Despite the numerous restrictions listed 
above, it is nevertheless possible, reasonable and 
necessary to make a comparison of forces, but 
without forgetting the overall restrictions apply-
ing inevitably to an assessm.ent of the results 
of political aims and the ensuing defence plans. 
13. With regard to NATO and Warsaw Pact 
declarations on the balance of forces, this means 
that a full and realistic estimate of the balance 
of forces of the two ~ides must include : 
- a comparison of the strength of the 
armed forces dn terms of troop levels, 
avaHable weapons systems, armaments, 
reserves and all data which can be 
translated into figures for the forces 
of both sides ; once ascertained in 
accordance with compatible criteria, 
these figure~!! constitute "the quantita-
tive comparison of forces" ; 
- a comparison of unquanti:ffiable factors 
which on each side determine opera-
tional availability, combat potential and 
fighting ability of the armed forces, 
including instruction, trruining, reliabil-
lity of troops or the technical perform-
ance of weapons systems, not to forget 
the factors listed above under the head-
ing of "intentions". This qualitative 
comparison of forces must be comple-
mentary to the quantitative compari$on 
since not everything can be expressed 
solely in terms of figures ; 
- the setting of these two comparisons in 
the context of given conditions influenc-
ing the conduct of hostilities including 
geo-strategic conditJions, ethnological 
considerations, technical and scientific 
potential, the potential of technical and 
economie weapons, and many others. 
14. Thus, an assessment of the balance of forces 
embraces many factom. Most publications con-
fine their examination to a few data ste:rnmdng 
mainly from the quantitative comparison of 
forces. 
2. Availabilities and critical assessment of sources 
of information 
(a) NATO publications 
15. Contrary to the practice observed in War-
saw Pact countries, many publications in NATO 
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member ~tes cover the qualitative and quan-
t!Ïtative comparison of forces and describe in 
detail the military potential of their countries. 
These publications may be divided into three 
groups as follows : 
( i) official Ministry of Defence publica-
tions known as white papers, annual 
Defence Department report (United 
States) or programme law (France) ; 
(ii) statements or publications by politi-
cians and military authoriti.es ; 
(iii) The Military Balance, publi$hed by 
the IISS in London, a study of the 
world's armed forces prepared at 
international level. 
16. The first group is of a documentary nature 
(progress reports, for instance). Whereas in most 
countries these publications are used for reaching 
political decisions in parliament, the programme 
law also provlides a detailed basis for planning 
the development of French forces. In support 
of the measures presented, these documentary 
publications contain qualitative and quantitative 
comparisons of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces 
and their specifie armed forces. Many of rthese 
documents also give an overall picture of 
hostilities. 
17. The Pentagon's annual Defence Depart-
ment report gives a good overall view of the 
balance of strategie ·and nuclear forces, although 
it refers only to United States, Chinese and 
Soviet strategie nuclear weapons ; it is therefore 
a.n effiThmate of the strategie potential of both 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact for: 
- the Soviet Union controls the whole 
strategie nuclear potential of the 
Warsaw Pact ; 
- the United States, with a few exceptlions, 
represents the strategie nuclear poten-
tial of NATO ; 
- the British share is relatively small ; 
- the French strike force cannot just be 
taken into account in the balance of 
forces since it is essentially an instru-
ment of French political strategy and 
it is impossible to foresee at what 
moment it might be used, nor to what 
extent and with what degree of co-
ordination with the allies. 
18. Generally speaking, current American 
publications affirm that there is essential equi-
valence, the quantitative and qualitative advan-
tages and disadvantages of both sides being more 
or less equivalent. 
19. Because of the abundance of docu.lnentation 
on the balance of forces, statementa by politicians 
or military authorities are limited to specifie 
aspects or assessment. On the whole, such public-
ations express the personal opinion of the author 
without in<licating the official position of the 
governments or generais concerned. The only 
exceptions are the major ~rategic decisions taken 
by politàcal leaders or changes in the politico-
military course introduced by a new government 
(for instance, the strategie discussion in the 
United States). 
20. The IISS Mi1itary Balance is the only 
known international publication to give a quanti-
tative comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact 
forces. The IISS has been producing its estimates 
for twenty years now, and has achieved inter-
national recognition ; it~ estimates are widely 
quoted in the press, even by W arsaw Pact wl'li.ters 
who have no comparable public source available 
in their own countries. The Military Balance is 
understood to be prepared from published sources 
only, but a questionnaJ.re is circulated to many 
countries, and in general countries are invited 
to comment on assessment of their own forces. 
For leve~ of Wa:rsaw Pact forces, estimates 
provided by several NATO countries are com-
pared - sorne of these sources provide consis-
tently higher estlimll!tes of Soviet forces thau 
others. 
21. The Military Balance provides a more 
reliable estimate of force levels than do the 
unclassified figures published by various NATO 
government.s, the latter vary among themselves, 
but the Committee has no means of comparing 
the IISS estimates wdth the unpublished classified 
estimates used for planning purposes ~n Minis-
tries of Defem.ce. The German Ministry of 
Defence believes the IISS underestimates W arsaw 
Pact forces and equipment. 
Oomparison of estimates of the balance on the 
central front from three sources in 1976 (latest 
year for which the German defence white paper 
is available) Ratio of NATO: WP forces 
United IISS Military German King dom Balance defence defence (nothern and 
white paper 
white paper central fronts 
combined) 
Tanks 1 : 3.1 1 : 2.7 1 : 2.7 
Combat 
aircraft 1 : 1.4 1 : 2.3 1 : 2.0 
(b) W arsaw Pact publications 
22. ln the Warsaw Pact countries, so far there 
seem to be no pubLications giving comparative 
qualitative and quantitative data on NATO and 
W arsaw Pact forces on the lines of the IISS 
Military Balance. There are no official publica-
213 
DOOUMENT 809 
tions by Defence Mi~tnies (white papers) such 
as exist in the NATO countries. Publications in 
the press or specialised magazines giving a 
partial comparison of forces appear in the 
W arsaw Pact countries for propaganda, educa-
tional or information purposes. These are admit-
tedly claimed to be official statements but bear 
no resemb1ance to the objective assessment made 
by the Soviet leaders which provides the basis 
for decisions. If a comparison is to be made 
of publications tissued in the East and the West 
account must first be taken of these facts. 
23. Specifie data on forces are given only for 
western and neutral countries with no reference 
to the corresponding forces of the W arsaw Pact. 
Consequently, according to public W arsaw Pact 
sources, it is impossible to know the government's 
views on the quantitative compa~on of forces. 
Conversely many indications may be drawn froon 
these publications where the qualitative compa-
rison of forces is concerned ; principally, they 
cover the strategie intentions and military capa-
bility of the Warsaw Pact and the so-called opd.-
nions and alleged capability of the enemy. These 
two considerations are sometimes combined for 
propaganda purpose$, e.g. : 
- strengthening Soviet intentions or 
developments favourable to the Soviet 
Unlion by mea.ns of verbal attacks on 
western countries or political powers ; 
- justifying the need to extend and 
develop the Warsaw Pact's military 
potential; 
- justifying the W arsaw Pact 's internai 
and external activities ; 
- strengthening the confidence of the 
population of the Warsaw Pact or other 
groups. 
24. In these publications, statements by the 
same author may vary according to the ad.m 
sought in the public declarations. 
25. In any event, interpretations given by 
Warsaw Pact bodies reveal trends and broad 
lines which frequently betray an overall basic 
assessmeni of the strategie balance. Indications 
may thus be obtained on the following points : 
- the estimated strategie situation in the 
light of the social, econoonic and 
military forces as compared with the 
Soviet Union and iis allies ; 
- an idea of the (presumed) intentions 
and capability of the enemy ; 
- declarations on the fundamental import-
ance of the md.litary capability in the 
political and social conflict and on the 
task)s of forces and their components ; 
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- data on (presumed) military capability 
of the Warsaw Pact countries and the 
need to continue to develop it ; 
- concepts regarding a possible future 
war. 
26. Of the many factors mentioned above, only 
statements by leading authorities have been 
selected, e.g. : 
- Deferree Ministers of W arsaw Pact 
states; 
- chiefs of staff ; 
- heads of political bureaux ; 
- divisional commanders or generals hold-
ing equivalent posts ; 
- senior officers of the Warsaw Pact 
allied commands ; and 
- a few experts in specifie fields. 
27. Soviet military views constitute the 
"socialist military doctrine", compulsory 
throughout the W arsaw Pact. At the very most, 
there are minor national particularities due to 
geographical position, the specifie structure of a 
country's capability or the tasks ass:igned to a 
country in the framework of the Warsaw Pact. 
28. To avoid unnecessary repetition, mention 
will be made only of publications of the Soviet 
Union, the German Democratie Republic and 
Poland among the W arsaw Pact countries. In 
addition to constituting the main strength, they 
also represent Central Europe, an area of 
geographical and political importance. 
29. Several of the ideas adopted already date 
back several years, but as they emanate from 
leading authom, it may be considered that they 
are still perfectly vahld. 
3. Selection and description of publications 
(a) NATO publications 
30. NATO publications, or more precisely 
those of NATO member states, deal fimt and 
foremost with security policy and military 
strategy with a view to maintaining the integrity 
of the Alliance. 
31. Similarly, statements, by politicians in 
particular, refer to maintaining a free democratie 
order, but there is no question of well-de:ffined 
common ideological or scientific bases which 
would provide a starting point for or initiate 
political decisions on security policy and military 
strategy. This also applies to publications on 
comparisons of forces. 
32. With the exception of the German white 
paper, the fullest and most detailed data are 
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given in American publications, particularly the 
annual Deferree Department report, although the 
latter is mainly concerned wtirth a world-wide 
comparison of United States and Soviet forces. 
33. Information given in United Kingdom and 
Italian white papers, for >instance, is far less 
abundant and less precise. 
34. French publications, and primarily the 
programme law, make no comparison of forOOI!I. 
The main publrications selected are therefore 
American. 
(b) W arsaw Pact publications 
35. (i) An assessment of the strategie situation 
forms part of the normal rôle of the politi.cal and 
military supreme command in the Soviet Union 
and its aliied states. It includes the representa-
tion and ass~sment of all major forces and 
capaMlities - in current conditions at world 
level - and provides the framework for military 
strategie planning. 
36. Such an assessment does not ensue 
objectively but scientifically, i.e. from the stand-
point of classes. 
37. This means first that the legitimacy of 
one's own interests and of the intentions 
expressed must never be called in question. In 
every publication, the antagonism between 
socialism and capitalism/imperialism is the start-
ing point of every thought. A systematic and 
moral premise is that socialism is the benefactor 
of mankind, and therefore does not need to be 
justified but develops automaticaliy, whereas 
capitalism/imperialism is an obsolete form of 
society which wishes to defend its lost position 
by means of force. 
38. Socialist military efforts are therefore 
considered to be defensive although, according to 
western criteria, their aims are purely expan-
sionary. 
39. Among the expressions used, the concept of 
a world social<i.st system covem ali states and 
forces considering themselves socialist (of Soviet 
allegiance) ; members of the Warsaw Pact and 
Comecon are generally known as the socialist 
community or socialist brother countries. 
40. (ii) In official statements, the capability 
and intentions of the potential aggressor are 
always described in such a way as to justify the 
need for a counter-offensive by the Warsaw 
Pact. It is difficult to pinpoint criteda for 
forming an opinion ; they should be considered 
rather as different starting pOIÎ!Ilts for aS~reSSing 
the same factom. 
41. (iii) Forces in the Warsaw Pact are taken 
to be ali the armed forces of a state, an alliance 
or one side in a civil war, whatever their declared 
purpose. Ali armed forces serve the interests of 
the dominating class. What determines the 
internai and external structure of the$e forces is 
always based on the firm intentions of the 
dominating class. 
42. (iv) In describing the capability of the 
W arsaw Pact forces, three levels of command 
must be distinguished, i.e. strategy, operational 
technology ·and tactiœ. Where strategy is con-
cerned, the capability of W arsaw Pact forces is 
included in the context of a fundamental political 
intention. Conversely, tactical considerations are 
often related to concrete matters for training 
purposes in many cases. Operational descriptions 
tend to be abstract and refer more frequently · 
than others to events during the second world 
war. 
43. (v) When referring to possible wars, 
publications are also based on the actual current 
situation of the Soviet Union and its allies. 
Future wars are therefore not described in terms 
of their possible technico-military shape but 
primordially acoording to their nature. What is 
decisive is the aim pursued by a belligerant for 
it can thus be determined whether the means 
available will really be used and to what extent. 
4. Assessment of the overall East- West 
situation at world level 
(a) Statements by NATO countries 
44. There is no full and exhaustive assessment 
of the overall East-West situation at world level 
in NATO publications or those of its member 
countries. By their very nature, national publica-
tions deal with special interests and from a 
geographical point of view too. However, they 
contain much 'information which can be con-
sidered as basic factors for making an assessment. 
For instance, General Hrug said that : 
- the Soviet Union had acqUJÏ!l'ed quantita-
tive superiority in many decisive fields; 
- technologically, it was in the process of 
catching up with the West in qualitative 
terms; 
- Soviet forces had every category of 
military, nuclear and conventional capa-
bility: 
- for the conduct of war on land, sea 
and in the air ; 
- with permanent combat-readiness 
and long-term supply capability. 
General Brown said that : 
- the Soviet Union would certainly spark 
off crises of which it would take 
advantage but would avoid direct 
military confrontation ; 
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- the Soviet Union would become more 
aggressive insofar as it became •aware 
of the relative improvement in its 
military power ; 
- the divergent ai.Jml of the United States 
and the Soviet Union were still a source 
of conf:Lict between the two states ; 
- the two countries would neverthéless 
endeavour to reduce tension in order to 
avoid total war. 
(b) W arsaw Pact statements 
45. The recurring theme of W arsaw Pact 
publications on the strategie situation is the 
swing of the balance of strategie forces to the 
side of socialism since the second world war. This 
is justified by : 
- the increased capability of the Warsaw 
Pact; 
- the decline of western influence in the 
third world ; 
- domestic, economie and social dif-
ficu1ties in capitalist countries. 
AU this was possible in Europe without war and 
without interference by the Soviet Unioo. 
46. The increased military capability of the 
Warsaw Pact is generally considered as a decisive 
condition of this positirve trend. The Soviet Union 
visibly considers that this suffices inter alia : 
- to prevent the enemy from taking 
military action against the Soviet Union 
and its allies ; 
- to prevent the enemy from making full 
use of its military means to defend 
· positions throughout the world ; 
- to afford support to allied forces, even 
very indirectly ; 
- to guarantee the security of its own 
sector. 
Here, military and economie capabilities are 
considered jointly. 
47. However, this situation seems to be con-
stantly threatened by general technico-military 
progress and the western economy being IS'Ilp-
posedly directed towards armament, which makel!l 
the Soviet Union and its allies increase their 
military potential even more. 
48. Y et is this compatible with the assertion of 
:Mr. Ustinov, Soviet Minister of Defence, which 
remains to be proved, that the Soviet Union and 
its allies have not increased the:ir troop levels 1 
49. Admirai Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief 
of the Soviet navy, in particular, describes and 
justifies the spectacular strengthening of Soviet 
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naval strength aa an instrument which must be 
capable of neutralising American seaborne 
strategie weapons and is already able to back 
Soviet mate interests throughout the world. 
50. The analysis of local warfare since 1945 
and crirticism of "western efforts to extend 
NATO's ~phere of interest" must be seen in this 
context. 
51. W arsaw Pact publications underline the 
special frm.portance of Europe and of Central 
Europe, the main theatre for war. W arsaw Pact 
military strength is considered sufficient to wipe 
out NATO forces in the event of war despite their 
degree of combat-readiness and superior combat 
potential including conventional means. Here, 
the vliews of the German Democratie Republic 
are particularly significant. They underline the 
world repercussiom; of the situation in Europe 
and in Central Europe in particular and warn 
against any deterioration in the present balance 
of forces, which might jeopardlise the MBFR 
negotiations. 
52. Conversely, the present weakness of 
NATO's southern flank is presented as a possible 
starting point for political action, but it m im-
mediately made clear that in the event of war 
account would have to be taken not only of 
NATO itself but also of ali the capitaliist forces 
led by the United States. 
53. The Poles seems more reserved, although 
their position is similar on this point. It would 
appear that Poland too accords particular 
importance to the balance of forces in Europe 
especially since in the event of war between the 
Warsaw Pact and NATO, Polish forces would be 
fighting side by side with Warsaw Pact forces 
outside Polish territory. 
54. Moreover, the strengthening of the coun-
try's internai defences bears witnes.<~ to the 
emphasis placed on national interests. Efforts to 
limit strategie weapom; are considered more 
positive in Poland than in the other countries ; 
the West's supertiority in this respect is chal-
lenged openly. Balance between the Soviet Union 
and the United States is considered an essential 
condition of world stability. 
S. Possible Soviet perceptions of the historical military 
background 
(a) Assessment of the potential enemy 
55. Few western assessments of the East-West 
mi1itary balance make any systematic attempt to 
examine the likely Soviet perception of the 
balance of force ,in the world in which the Soviet 
Union finds itself. In this respect the Soviet 
Union is a poor publicist in its own cause ; this 
is partly because of traditional secrecy on most 
official, especially mlilitary, matters - practised 
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to an extent that inhibits dissemination of inform-
ation within the Soviet bureaucracy- and partly 
because most published Soviet descriptions of 
potential adversaries are unrecognisable portraits 
in the WMt. 
56. The Committee in this section does not 
seek to act as a public relations adviser for the 
Soviet military authorities, although to many 
observers they appear to be in need of one, but 
to mention three factors which need to be taken 
into account when contemporary levels of Soviet 
forces and equipment are interpreted in terms of 
both capability and likely intentions. These 
factors are : 
(i) the total strategie environment of the 
Soviet Union 1 - the population, the 
economie resources and armed forces 
of ali neighbouring countries and 
potential adversaries ; 
(ii) the time-lag between a planning 
decision to develop and produce a 
particular piece of military equip-
ment and its appearance in service, 
which will not be shorter than in the 
West where it is assumed to be 
between five and fifteen years 
depending on the complexity of the 
equipment and the amount of new 
technology involved. Thus new 
weapons now observed to be entering 
service with the Soviet forces must 
presumably be meant to meet a 
military requirement perceived to 
exist sorne five to fifteen years earlier, 
based in sorne cases no doubt on 
Soviet projections of western military 
developments which may not have 
materialised, and at a time when the 
elima te of East-West relations was 
substantialiy different to that now 
prevailing ; 
(iii) the modernisation of existing weapons 
systems both by NATO and by the 
Soviet Union and its allies, which 
should be considered a normal process. 
It will hardly benefit either the 
requirements of defence or of arms 
control if the modernisation of NATO 
weapons systems is viewed as neces-
sary to stabilise NATO's defence 
capability, while at the same time 
comparable Soviet measures are 
viewed as an additional threat. 
(b) Statements by NATO countries 
57. Ail publications of NATO and its member 
States indicate that in recent years the Warsaw 
Pact and the Soviet Union in particular have 
1. See Appendix I. 
considerably strengthened their fighting potential 
in both quantitative and qualitative terms. More-
over, it should be specified that their attack 
capability is increasing and the time required 
to prepare an attack is now only a few days. It is 
noted that: 
- there is a balance of strategie nuclear 
systems between NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact; 
- there have been major improvements in 
tactical nuclear weapons which are 
partly responsible for the Warsaw Pact's 
superiority ; 
- a comparison of conventional forces 
clearly demonstrates the Warsaw Pact's 
superiority in Central Europe. 
(c) Warsaw Pact statements 
58. Ali Warsaw Pact publications clearly show 
that imperialism, i.e. the West as a whole, is 
considered to be the principal enemy. The 
People's Republic of China, although also seen 
,as an enemy, is considered less important in 
military terms. Military studies concentrate 
almost entirely on NATO and the United States 
in particular, but also the Federal Republic of 
Germany. NATO is said to have aggressive inten-
tions ; its armed forces are described as offen-
sive; the United States economy in particular 
is considered very productive in the armaments 
sector. 
59. Western statements that Soviet military 
superiority is a military threat are said to be 
slanderous in the context of an ideological war 
whose sole aim is to justify high military budgets 
and discredit the Soviet Union in the eyes of the 
third world. 
60. Ail Warsaw Pact publications are adamant 
about the possibility of a war with the West and 
consequently the Soviet Union must not relax its 
military efforts. It is clear that western nuclear 
weapons are a source of special concern. 
61. Since the end of the sixties, the accent has 
been more on localised war but mainly in the 
framework of hostilities resulting from positions 
occupied in the third world. 
62. Admirai Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of 
the Soviet Navy, has made a very objective 
assessment of western naval strength. He recog-
nises its geographical advantages and admits the 
effectiveness of its naval forces in the third 
world. He attaches particular value to the possi-
bilities of action by American seaborne strategie 
nuclear weapons, even against the Soviet Union. 
63. However, other service representatives 
indicate that training is shaped according to 
NATO force capabilities. The tank defences of 
the western armies in particular are in the centre 
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of many practical tactical discussions in which 
it is made clear that aU available means will have 
to be used to overcome them. 
64. The German Democratie Republic's picture 
of the military enemy is drawn with especial 
clarity. Its publications are mainly concerned 
with NATO forces stationed in Central Europe 
and in particular with the capability of the 
Bundeswehr which is said to have a high degree 
of combat-readiness and a high combat potential 
which should be met by the German people's 
army. A positive assessment of NATO military 
integration by a responsible East German author 
may be considered original. For instance, a state-
ment about the importance of Spain and the 
obvious account that must be taken of France 
indicate that in the event of war, apart from 
NATO, the Warsaw Pact has other capitalist 
enemies in mind. 
65. Polish publications also depict the West 
as the principal and most aggressive enemy. 
However, they underline more clearly than 
publications in the GDR for instance that the 
strength of the Soviet si de forces the West to 
moderate its military posture. The image of the 
direct military enemy reflects Poland's geo-
graphical position surrounded by socialist coun-
tries : it is considered that there is a greater 
threat to Polish territory from subversive action 
and air attack than from ground operations. 
6. R6le and tasks of the various armed forces 
(a) Statements by NATO countries 
66. The United States is increasingly seeing 
its own armed forces as holding a key rôle in 
the Alliance system, although its main tech-
nological and military task is to maintain a 
second strike capability. The fundamental con-
cept for meeting a threat from the Warsaw Pact 
and possible attack is the maintenance of a 
deterrent force and a flexible response capabi-
lity. In the view of the United States, the aim is 
to keep the Alliance intact or to restore its 
territorial integrity. In this respect, conventional 
forces are of growing importance. 
67. The United Kingdom is also concentrating 
its defence efforts increasingly on its tasks in 
the Alliance. It considers the nuclear component 
of its armed forces as one of its principal con-
tributions. 
68. Since it withdrew from the Alliance's 
military organisation, France has occupied a 
special place. The main features of France's 
security policy are based on the maintenance 
of its freedom to take national decisions and 
preclude in principle : 
- a return to the NATO integrated mili-
tary organisation ; 
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- the inclusion of France's nuclear deter-
rent in the strategy of the Alliance ; 
- French participation in the concept of 
forward defence in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany by acceptance of an 
assigned wartime position ; 
- French participation in any negotia-
tions on the limitation or reduction of 
nuclear weapons. 
69. However, these principles do not exclude : 
- the use of French nuclear weapons on 
the side of the allies or on the territory 
of an allied state after appropriate con-
sultations and witk the formal agree-
ment of the state concerned ; 
- defence of French territory - mainly 
in accordance with national views -
even on the other side of the Rhine in 
concert with the Alliance's operational 
command. France reserves the right to 
decide on the time and extent of its 
participation. 
(b) Statements by Warsaw Pact countries 
70. AU authorities in the Warsaw Pact conn-
tries consider the military strengthening of the 
Warsaw Pact community of socialist states to be 
a decisive condition for the move towards world-
wide socialism. W ars for socialism are still 
justified, which means that the Warsaw Pact 
commands consider this move to be a political 
process of which the armed forces are the decisive 
instrument. 
71. 1t is considered that the specifie task of the 
armed forces is direct deterrence and the exercise 
of political pressure or the affirmation of a mili-
tary presence and the demonstration of military 
strength, particularly in the third world. This is 
where the Soviet navy plays a leading rôle. A 
high degree of readiness for combat and nuclear 
war might allow the W arsaw Pact forces to 
ensure freedom of action for their political com-
mands, even in unfavourable conditions, and 
effectively to neutralise western military pres-
sure. 
72. Armed forces are assigned a stabilising 
rôle, particularly in order to maintain the cohe-
sion of the Warsaw Pact as an alliance. 
73. Whereas, according to the German Demo-
cratie Republic, the task of military strength is 
seen as being exclusively for the socialist bloc 
as a whole, which suggests the total subordination 
of the German people's army, Polish publications 
indicate that part of the potential is to be used 
for more limited national tasks and presumably 
remains under national command. 
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7. Capabilities of the varioas armed forces 
(a) Statements by NATO countries 
74. In the publications of NATO and its mem. 
ber states, the capabilities of the respective armerl 
forces are measured in the light of their ability : 
- to deter a potential enemy : 
- to avoid, by their very presence, the use 
of their military means to exert massive 
military pressure ; 
- to repel the enemy in the event of 
attack. 
75. In general, with the exception of France, 
NATO's strategie nuclear potential (United 
States and the United Kingdom) is now con-
sidered to have second strike capability. 
76. However, there is concern about the inabil-
ity of the Alliance's armed forces to carry out 
the following tasks : 
- deterrence in Europe ; 
- to intercept and drive back a Warsaw 
Pact attack in Europe, even with only 
a short warning (mainly with con-
ventional forces) ; 
- the maintenance of sea links between 
the United States and Europe ; 
- the timely strengthening of the Euro-
pean front by calling on reserves from 
the United States, for instance. 
77. NATO's long-term defence programme 
measures have allowed this concern to be over-
come. 
78. France considers that its strategie nuclear 
weapons systems have operational capability. 
Where the armed forces are concerned, the 
ongoing reorganisation of the major army for-
mations should be emphasised. 
79. The French army is not at present in a 
position to ensure a triad comparable to the 
NATO triad (strategie nuclear, theatre nuclear 
and conventional forces), its conventional com-
ponent being too weak. It must therefore retain 
a structure which allows it to move cautiously 
from the ail or nothing of de Gaulle's day to 
greater flexibility. Despite many divergences, 
this attitude is close to NATO's present doctrine. 
(b) Statements by W arsaw Pact countries 
80. Warsaw Pact publications bear witness to 
the effort made by the Soviet Union and its 
allies to deploy their military capability in every 
field. Particular importance is attached to a 
common ideological approach and common 
scientific and military bases. 
81. The level of instruction of the population 
allows the most up-to-date command techniques 
to be used. A particularly strong point is con-
sidered to be the fact (borne out by experience 
during the second world war) that liaison 
between all action taken by the command, includ-
ing allied commands, is co-ordinated by a central 
body in the Soviet Union, which allows maximum 
advantage to be taken of the economie potential. 
The armed forces are considered capable of 
carrying out widespread oo-ordinated ground 
operations (beyond the front line = theatre of 
manoeuvres) in modern conditions, attack being 
the essential point. 
82. Skilful use of artillery in greater numbers 
and with increased mobility thanks to se]f-
propelled guns should allow western tactical 
nuclear weapons and tank deferrees to be coun-
tered. The emphasis laid on the time factor may 
be interpreted as an effort to precede deferree 
preparations and the enemy's arrivai on the 
battlefield. However, these aims would appear to 
be limited by an inadequate decision-taking 
capability and insufficient mobility at the lower 
command level. 
83. The navy should be capable of carrying 
out independent operations : 
- to hold its own in face of strong enemy 
naval and air forces ; 
- to launch strategie nuclear weapons 
deep into enemy territory ; 
- to fight enemy offensive forces at sea, 
thus limiting, from the sea, the strategie 
threat to its own hinterland. 
84. Despite the geographical position of their 
country, Polish authors consider that this is not 
enough to remove the threat of an air attack on 
their territory. Effective civil deferree is there-
fore considered to be an essential accompaniment 
to the armed forces. 
8. Possible shape of armed conflict 
(a) Statements by NATO countries 
85. Annual reports and official statements by 
NATO and its member states contain little about 
this subject which on the other hand is frequently 
referred to in statements to the mass media by 
politicians and military commanders (e.g. Min-
isters of Deferree, General Haig, General Schulze, 
General Wust, Major-General Close). 
86. Since NATO and its member states have 
adopted a purely defensive military strategy, 
the shape of hostilities, at least at the start of a 
war, is determined by the potential enemy. Con-
sequently, ali imaginable forms of war are 
expected, starting with wars waged with con-
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ventional weapons. To meet every possible 
variation, it is necessary for NATO to have 
the maximum mobility in the framework of the 
flexible response. 
87. So far, France's political and military 
command has generally avoided making formai 
public statements on this subject. 
(b) Statements by Warsaw Pact countries 
88. Fundamental views on war have already 
been described above. Publications show that the 
Warsaw Pact is undeniably considering the 
possibility of world-wide nuclear war and that 
it still considers such a war to be a realistic 
or even licit means. Even in the nuclear age, 
local wars are still a reality. The fact that a war 
in which nuclear powers are involved remains 
limited depends on the aims of the war and 
political intentions. However, any war of this 
kind may turn into a world war. 
89. The deployment of nuclear weapons at sea 
may deter the enemy from using such weapons 
against the Pact's hinterland and adds a new 
dimension to the theatre of naval operations. 
This means therefore that appropriate naval 
forces must be already commissioned in peace-
time for such an expensive and lengthy process 
cannot be carried out successfully in wartime. 
The need for armed forces to conduct operations 
in modern conditions, with or without recourse 
to nuclear weapons, explains why freedom of 
manoeuvre is sought in the event of a threat 
or use of such weapons. Concurrently, there is no 
doubt about the fact that enemy means of action 
are also the main target of conventional weapons 
and tactical manoeuvres on the battlefield. 
90. Finally, the notion of co-ordination of ali 
available means in modern warfare should be 
emphasised, which implies unified political and 
military command. 
9. Troop levels in Central Europe 
91. The question of troop levels in Central 
Europe will be considered in detail in Chapter 
II of the report dealing with the Vienna 
negotiations on mutual and balanced force 
reductions, but sorne general statements may be 
mentioned here and now. 
(a) Statements by NATO countries 
92. Only a few official published figures con-
cerning forces deployed in Central Europe by 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact are available. 
93. The 1975-76 white paper on the security 
of the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
development of the federal armed forces is 
revealing with regard to a comparison of the 
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forces in Central Europe which are the object 
of the Vienna MBFR negotiations. 
94. This white paper reaches the following 
conclusions : 
"The correlation of forces continues to be 
unfavourable to the Atlantic Alliance, upon 
introduction of the reserves of both sides." 
95. In reply to questions put by parliamentary 
groups in the Bundestag, the Federal Govern-
ment summed the position up as follows on 
7th June 1977 : 
"The conventional military potential of 
the Warsaw Pact states in Central Europe 
is quantitatively greater than that of 
NATO and far surpasses defence require-
ments." 
96. Referring to the MBFR negotiations, the 
1975-76 white paper indicates that "the Warsaw 
Pact is clearly superior in ground forces in 
Central Europe". 
97. White papers issued by other governments 
since 197 4 often only hint at the balance of 
forces in Central Europe. 
98. For instance, the Netherlands 1974 white 
paper mentions "the imbalance of forces to the 
detriment of the West" in connection with the 
aims defined by the two alliances in the MBFR 
context. 
99. The Italian 1977 white paper also mentions 
the imbalance of conventional forces in Central 
Europe which justifies the need for the MBFR 
negotiations. 
100. The British 1977 white paper is more 
explicit. It found the unequal balance of forces 
?etw~en East and West "destabilising", estimat-
mg, m the context of the MBFR negotiations 
in Vienna, that the W arsaw Pact ground forces 
in Central Europe outnumbered western forces 
by 150,000 men according to the figures tabled 
by NATO. 
101. The German and British white papers refer 
to the growing combat strength of Soviet divi-
sions stationed in Central Europe. The British 
white paper concludes that "although the number 
of ~ivisions has remained unchanged since ... 1968, 
the1r real combat strength, in terms of additional 
tanks, guns, armoured personnel carriers and 
manpower, has increased by the equivalent of six 
complete pre-1968 divisions". 
102. Communiqués issued after ministerial meet-
ings of the North Atlantic Council give consider-
able information about the threat and, in parti-
cular, the comparison of forces. The final com-
muniqué issued after the meeting on 8th and 
9th December 1977 called for the elimination of 
"the existing ground force manpower disparity 
in Central Europe" and "noted... the steady 
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growth in the military strength of the Warsaw 
Pact". The communiqué issued after the last 
session, held in Brussels on 7th and 8th December 
1978, underlines that "Ministers noted with con-
cern the continuing build-up of Warsaw Pact 
forces and armaments, both conventional and 
nuclear, notwithstanding repeated eastern assur-
ances that their aim is not to seek military 
superiority". 
103. Government statements on the comparison 
of forces deployed in Central Europe are rare. 
Statements by certain politicians on the subject 
are even more vague than official statements. 
Addressing the International Institute for Stra-
tegie Studies in London on 28th October 1977, 
Mr. Schmidt, Federal German Chancellor, said : 
"Since the start of the MBFR negotiations, 
the W arsaw Pact has further increased the 
disparities in military strength in terms of 
both conventional and tactical nuclear 
forces." 
104. In the United States, Senator Nunn 
asserted in a speech on 14th November 1977 that 
the MBFR negotiations would be marked by 
W arsaw Pact superiority in conventional mili-
tary plans in Europe and that the increase in 
Soviet forces noted since the start of the nego-
tiations had raised the number of troops weil 
above the level from which it was planned to 
make reductions. 
(b) Statements by W arsaw Pact countries 
105. Statements by NATO authorities, govern-
ments or individual politicians in the NATO 
countries on the balance of forces in Central 
Europe contrast with those of politicians in 
Warsaw Pact countries. The first official posi-
tion on the overall situation was given by 
Mr. Brezhnev himself at the twenty-fifth con-
ference of the Soviet Communist Party on 
24th March 1976. In his progress report, he 
referred to the MBFR negotiations as follows : 
"Our proposais are based on the mainten-
ance of the existing ratio of forces in 
Central Europe and, in fact, their balance, 
which we consider to be the only realistic 
basis." 
106. ln his official speech on the sixtieth 
anniversary of the October revolution on 2nd 
November 1977, Mr. Brezhnev described his posi-
tion on the balance of forces in Central Europe : 
"We do not wish to upset the approximate 
balance of forces which has now been 
attained, for instance between East and 
West in Central Europe." 
and in his speech in the Kremlin on 2nd March 
1979 he said: 
"Take the negotiations in Vienna. At 
present they have become bogged down in 
a dispute over the methods of counting 
the manpower of the armed forces of the 
two sides, right down to the last cook or 
medical orderly. Frankly speaking, this is 
simply a tactic on the part of the western 
countries, an attempt to evade agreement 
right at a time when the positions of the 
two sides on the substance of the matter 
had come considerably closer. After all, it 
is a fact that a general military equilibrium 
does exist in Europe, even if there are dif-
ferences in the structure of the armed 
forces of each side. And it is from this fact 
that one should proceed." 
107. In an interview with Neues Deutschland 
on 23rd November 1977, General Hoffmann, 
Deferree Minister of the German Democratie 
Republic, saw no "major difference" in the 
balance between the "two main groups of forces 
in Central Europe", despite certain quantitative 
and qualitative features. 
108. In contradiction with this view, General 
Hoffmann, speaking at the Party's Karl Marx 
college on 1st December 1975, said that : 
"The military superiority of the Soviet 
Union and of its allies over the imperialist 
powers is that it has made peace more 
certain." 
10. Balance of forces for security and détente 
109. A comparison of forces is one of the prin-
cipal means of assessing the overall situation, the 
basis of soourity policy and hence deferree policy 
planning and military programmes. 
110. For forces to be comparable, identical 
criteria must be available for the calculations. 
It is even more difficult and complex to make a 
rational comparison of the quality of weapons 
systems if account is taken of the fact that they 
are always built for a specifie task. It is there-
fore impossible to place side by side weapons 
which are obvious1y of the same type, such as 
the T-62, 64 and 72 tanks and Leopard, without 
taking into account and assessing a host of 
influencing factors. 
111. The comparison of forces reaches its limits 
when purely qualitative factors are involved 
such as morale, the quality of the command, the 
will to take decisions, the level of training and, 
in the words of Adelbert Winstein in F'rankfurter 
Allgemeine, "The number is not everything that 
counts". 
112. The trend of the measurable balance of 
forces indicates however whether the balance on 
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which our security is based is changing or has 
remained stable. 
113. The difficulty of making an accurate com-
parison of forces stems from the multiplicity of 
numbers, qualities and other influencing factors 
and the interdependence of the various ele-
ments. The danger of drawing conclusions from 
purely numerical comparisons without previously 
subjecting them to serious expert interpretation 
must be underlined. Politicians and military 
authorities should take account of these restric-
tions when they wish to make political and 
military use of the results of force comparisons. 
Only a carefully-prepared comparison of forces 
can provide the true base which politicians need 
to pursue realistically a policy of security, 
détente and arms control. 
114. A successful policy of security and détente 
depends on the maintenance of a ba1ance of forces 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which 
takes account of ali strategie, tactical, nuclear 
and conventional factors. After years of inferior-
ity in strategie weapons, the Soviet Union has 
managed to achieve parity with the United 
States. 
115. A comparison of ali the potentials shows 
that the North Atlantic Alliance has, at world 
level and taking into account all these factors, 
a deferree potential which is capable of effectively 
countering the strength of the W arsaw Pact. 
Neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact can pursue 
aggressive political aims directed against the 
other alliance by military means. Neither side is 
vulnerable to pressure. 
116. Since 1968, NATO's soourity policy has 
been based on two fundamental principles : first, 
the maintenance of a military potential and 
enough political solidarity to deter an aggressor 
and to defend the territory of the Alliance ; 
second, the pursuit of efforts ·to establish a last-
ing relationship allowing fundamental political 
matters to be settled. Military deferree capability 
and political détente are not contradictory but, 
on the contrary, complementary. 
117. The aim of détente is to appease tension 
in areas of possible hostilities by means of treaties 
and agreements. Attempts to eliminate tension, 
slow down the arms race and define controlled 
disarmament more effectively cannot be dis-
sociated. They meet the desire for security by 
ensuring stability at a lower level of armaments. 
The SALT and MBFR negotiations are directed 
towards this end. 
118. Backed by a reliable deferree capability, a 
responsible security policy must therefore leave 
no stone unturned to establish parity by political 
means, i.e. negotiations for the control of arma-
ments. 
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U. The Vienna negotiations on mutual and 
balanced force reductions 
l. Developments in the Vienna negotiations since 1973 
119. In June 1973, the member states of NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact agreed after five months 
of consultations to hold negotiations in Vienna 
on "mutual reduction of forces and armaments 
and associated measures in Central Europe". It 
was agreed that the general objective of the 
negotiations would be to contribute to a more 
stable relationship and to the strengthening of 
peace and security in Europe. The parties agreed 
that specifie arrangements would have to be 
worked out in such a way that they would in 
all respects and at every point conform to the 
principle of undiminished security for each party. 
120. In November 1973, the member states of 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact each submitted a 
draft agreement on the MBFR negotiations. 
When comparing these original proposais with 
the present stage reached in the negotiations, it 
can be seen that the positions of the two parties 
have drawn closer together on the main points, 
without NATO departing from its fundamental 
position on parity and collectivity. 
121. Basic proposais by NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact outlined the following framework for the 
agreement on reductions : 
122. The NATO proposal included two distinct 
and separate stages (in fact, two separate agree-
ments) : 
- Stage 1 providecl for a reduction of 
15% in United States and Soviet troops 
only, i.e. the withclrawal of 29,000 
troops for the United States and 60,000 
for the Soviet Union. It was specified 
that in the case of Soviet troops this 
applied to certain tank units bu:t there 
was no such provision in the case of 
the United States. 
- Stage 2 provided for reductions in all 
allied forces, limiting allied forces in 
Central Europe to a maximum level of 
700,000 troops, i.e. a reduction of 48,000 
for NATO and 157,000 for the Warsaw 
Pact. During this stage, a limit was 
also to be placed on manoeuvres and 
troop reinforcements. To date, little 
information has become available on the 
stabilising measures which NATO con-
siders to be an essential part of any 
agreement. 
123. The W arsaw Pact proposal called for a 
single three-stage agreement to reduce ground 
and air force levels and weapons, particularly 
nuclear weapons : 
- Stage 1 provided for a symbolic 
withdrawal of 20,000 troops by each 
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side, thus reducing the forces stationed 
in the MBFR area to 757,000 NATO 1 
and 905,000 for the Warsaw Pact. 
- Stage 2 provided for a 5 % reduction 
by both sides in 1976. Applied to initial 
ground force levels in the area, this 
percentage meant a reduction of 39,000 
for NATO and 46,000 for the Warsaw 
Pact, leaving a total of 718,000 for 
NATO and 859,000 for the Warsaw 
Pact. 
- Stage 3, planned for 1977, called for a 
10 % reduction by each side, which 
would have meant a further reduction 
of 78,000 for NATO and 92,000 for the 
W arsaw Pact. Once these reductions 
had been made, NATO would still have 
had 640,000 troops and the Warsaw 
Pact 767,000. 
- All in all, total reductions on each side 
would have been 137,000 for NATO and 
158,000 for the W arsaw Pact. 
124. No reference seems to have been made in 
these proposais to the "associated measures" 
included in the negotiations. 
125. Western proposais are based on the follow-
ing conditions : 
- European security can be guaranteed 
only by approximate equality of troop 
leveis on both si des; one of the aims of 
the MBFR negotiations in respect of 
existing disparities is to establish 
approximate pari<ty between ground 
forces by adopting collective overall 
ceilings for both sides and reducing 
disparities in respect of armoured 
vehicles; 
- agreements on reductions and levels of 
forces covering the American and 
Soviet reductions included in Stage 1 
must be collective. The breakdown of 
the volume of collective reductions is an 
internai matter for NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact; 
- the principle of the full maintenance of 
security must be guaranteed for ail 
parties; 
- the negotiations must be held in two 
stages. 
126. The East's proposals are based on the fol-
lowing considerations : 
- there is no imbalance in the present 
ratio of forces ; 
- the present ratio of forces has allowed 
peace to be kept in the last thirty years 
1. NATO estimates. 
and should therefore be retained. Any 
modification in this ratio would lead to 
instability; 
- the MBFR negotiations must take 
account of ali forces and weapons 
systems, ground forces being only one 
part of a complex equation ; 
- reductions must be of an equal per-
centage and apply to all armed forces 
and weapons systems ; 
- a national reduction percentage must be 
adopted for all states concerned. 
127. Data supplied by the Wa:rsaw Pact on 16th 
June 1978 on the levels of its ground forces in 
the reduction area as at 1st January 1976 reveal 
a figure 150,000 lower than the figure given by 
NATO for Warsaw Pact forces in the NATO 
guidelines area (i.e. the reduction area). Clarifica-
tion of this discrepancy has been a central aspect 
of the discussions in Vi enna since early 1977. 
128. On 15th July 1977, following the twelfth 
round of negotiations, in arder to clear up this 
point and revive mutual efforts to advance the 
Vienna negotiations, NATO made a proposai to 
overcome the stalemate in the discussion of these 
figures. In accordance with the principle of col-
lectivity, its proposai was that both alliances 
should elucidate the data in question. 
129. On 25th October 1977, during the thirteenth 
round of negotiations, the Warsaw Pact responded 
to this proposai with one of its own, taking up 
the main elements of the NATO proposai. 
130. On 19th April 1978, following the four-
teenth round of negotiatiom;, Ambassador de Vos 
stated at a press conference on behalf of the 
western delegation that : 
- participants had agreed on procedure 
for a fuller exchange of data ; 
- data had been exchanged in accordance 
with this procedure ; and 
- a detailed study of these data had been 
started. 
131. While seeking means of advancing the 
discussion on these figures, the North Atlantic 
Alliance considered the initiative taken by the 
Federal Republic of Germany for negotiating 
concrete reduction measures once the question of 
the figures had been settled. The exchange of 
data in accordance with the procedure adopted 
was a prior condition for implementation of this 
initiative. The exchange was made on 15th March 
and 5th April 1978. The NATO initiative was 
presented by the western participants at the 
plenary meeting on 19th April 1978. 
132. On 8th June 1978, the Warsaw Pact replied 
to the western initiative of 19th April on the 
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MBFR negotiations. This reply was the most 
important step made by the Warsaw Pact since 
1973 when the Vienna talks began. The NATO 
proposai and the East's reaction underline the 
interest shown by both sides in the MBFR nego-
tiations and their positive conclusion. 
133. According to the press, new developments 
in the Vienna negotiations may be summed up as 
follows: the NATO initiative of 19th April1978 
contains the following major details, subject to 
agreement on the figures : 
- NATO proposes to reduce, in equal pro-
portions, troops on both sides over and 
above the joint ceiling of 700,000; 
- members of NATO taking part in the 
MBFR negotiations also undertake, in 
the Stage 1 agreement, to fix the col-
lective total reduction of non-American 
troop levels during Stage 2. The two 
stages of the western proposai on the 
MBFR negotiations thus become more 
interdependent than before ; 
- NATO modifies its request that the 
Soviet Union withdraw an entire tank 
army from the reduction area during 
Stage 1. Instead, it is calling for the 
withdrawal of five divisions. The with-
drawal of 68,000 Soviet troops and 
1, 700 tanks calJed for in Stage 1 
remained unchanged; 
- furthermore, the West suggests that 
29,000 American troops be partially 
withdrawn in complete units during 
Stage 1 ; the other basic western 
elements and positions remain un-
changed. 
134. Subsequently, in its reply of 8th June 1978, 
the Warsaw Pact again modified its position: 
- this reply was still based on the same 
eastern assertion, i.e. that there was 
approximate numerical parity in forces 
of both sides in the reduction area; 
- on the basis of the figures it had pro-
posed, which were supposed to justify 
this so-called parity, the East was 
prepared to accept the NATO objective 
of fixing a common ceiling of 700,000 
men, i.e. to give up the advantage -
which it considered minimal- of 14,000 
troops in the ground forces ; 
- the NATO proposai not to take account 
of levels of air forces in the reductions 
but to fix a common ceiling of 900,000 
for 1evels of ground and air forces was 
adopted by the Warsaw Pact but sub-
ject to the common ceilings for ground 
and air forces being fixed separately -
700,000 and 200,000 respectively - to 
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prevent, once reductions had been made, 
a possible tramer of troops - unac-
ceptable to the Warsaw Pact - between 
ground and air forces ; 
- for Stage 1 of the reductions, the War-
saw Pact proposed withdrawing 7% of 
present levels of both Soviet and 
American forces in the reduction area. 
In other words, the Soviet Union was 
prepared to accept numerically asym-
metrical reductions in its forces as 
compared with American forces ; 
- for Stage 1 of the reductions, the 
Soviet Union took up certain elements 
of the former nuclear offer (Option 
III), th us accepting the western 
proposai of a mixed package (tanks 
against nuclear weapons). However, its 
offer stopped weil short of NATO's 
requirements and it also appeared to 
wish reductions in equipment to be 
applied to all direct participants ; 
- on collective ceHings, the Warsaw Pact 
now seems prepared to reach agreement 
with the West. The eastern counter-
proposal admittedly contained a number 
of provisions qualifying its concessions 
on a collective ceiling ; however, the 
member states of the W arsaw Pact 
proved flexible, even on this last point. 
2. Assessment of progress in the negotiations 
135. Y our Rapporteur considers that the Vienna 
talks are an essential part of East-West relations 
and should be in0luded in this framework. The 
political aim of these negotiations should be to 
contribute to a stable relationship and con-
solidate peace and security in Europe. 
136. To attain this aim, the total security of 
all participants in the Vienna talks must be 
protected, as is guaranteed by the foHowing 
basic principles of the NATO position : 
- European security can be consolidated 
only by an approximate balance in the 
troop levels of each side ; 
- agreements on reductions and levels of 
forces which exceed the Soviet and 
American reductions provided for 
during Stage 1 must be collective. 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact are 
responsible for the nationaL breakdown 
of reduction percentages. 
137. Progress with the discussion of figures 
during the fourteenth round of negotiations in 
Vienna has not yet clarified the reasons for the 
difference between western and eastern figures 
for eastern troop levels in the reduction area. 
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However, considerable additional data now 
available will facilitate a more concrete and 
appropriate study of this matter. It is essential 
to solve the dispute over troop levels and agree 
on data in order to conclude an agreement on 
limitations and reductions. Y our Rapporteur 
considers that the question of figures should 
be elucidated so that mistrust does not hold 
up the negotiations. 
138. It is the quantitative assessment of approx-
imate parity which gives the discussion of 
figures a political dimension. 
139. In its reply of 8th June 1978, the Warsaw 
Pact accepted the principle of conventional 
parity for the MBFR reduction area. This 
formai agreement with the western side will have 
no practical worth until the question of figures 
has been solved. Theoretically, asymmetrical 
reductions in forces exceeding the common 
collective ceiling nevertheless remain possible. 
Ilowever, the response of the Warsaw Pact is 
still dependent on the figures it gives for eastern 
troop levels. 
140. The principle of parity was recognised in 
a joint declaration issued by Chancellor Schmidt 
and Mr. Brezhnev on 6th May 1978 which states 
~nter alia that : 
"Both sides deem it important that no one 
should seek military superiority. They 
proceed on the assumption that approximate 
equality and parity suffice to safeguard 
defence. They believe that adequate 
measures of disarmament and arros limita-
tion in the nuclear and the conventional 
fields, which meet that principle, would be 
of major significance." 
141. Thus, to the agreed parity between the 
United States and the Soviet Union in inter-
continental strategie nuclear weapons, was added 
conventionwl parity in Central Europe, essential 
for the stabilisation of peace. Whereas there used 
to be an issue between NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact about recognition of the principle of con-
ventional parity of ground forces in Central 
Europe and also about the true level of Warsaw 
Pact troops, the two parties now ·agree on the 
principle of parity. 
142. This trend makes a major contribution to 
the policy of arros control and disarmament, 
particularly as there has been a ~ong struggle 
against the East's maxim, described inter alia 
by General Hoffmann, Defence Minister of the 
German Democratie Republic, as follows : 
"The political content of the combat-
readiness of our land, sea and air forces 
and of our frontier troops is to contribute 
to the aU-round superiority of the com-
munity of socia1ist states, thus compelling 
the enemy to make further concessions 
with a view to establishing peace in 
Europe." 
143. An explanation must now be given for the 
differences in numerical levels. NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact declare they are in favour of 
parity. The West considers that the Warsaw 
Pact may not be using the same criteria for their 
calculations as NATO. 
144. In future, the threat will lie increasingly 
clearly in the sphere of weapons systems. In this 
connection, Chancellor Schmidt very rightly 
stated: 
"First there is the discussion on data 
which 1 consider has been going on for too 
long. Nevertheless, it has helped to bring 
both sides to the point where they are 
beginning to accept the idea of ba1ance and 
speak of parity. The new western proposais 
are realistic and seek to leave behind the 
discussion on figures and give a new turn 
to the negotiations. As presented by us, 
these proposais will not be accepted by all 
participants, but they will provoke con crete 
reactions. This wiJil make it possible to go 
beyond the stage of simply interpreting 
statistics and of all-or-nothing proposais 
which have no chance of success. An 
agreement on the true number of troops 
and tanks included in the :reduction area 
defined for each side seeins possible only 
if we insist on absolute accuracy." 
145. Numerical differences might be explained 
by differences in the definition of armed forces, 
the division of tasks between military and civilian 
forces and the rate of recruitment of regular 
army formations and the resulting fluctuations. 
146. Discussion of data affords an opportunity 
to reach agreement on figures which correspond 
to the balance of forces and troop levels, are 
recognised by both sides and allow mutuai and 
balanced reductions to be made. If both parties 
continue to study aU these questions now that 
they are drawing fWldamentally doser together 
in Vienna, and if they are p:repared to accept a 
compromise wherever possible, a rapprochement 
may be hoped for. 
147. In any event, the figures put forward by 
the two sides will have to be revised when 
reductions are started. This raises a problem 
insofar as it will be difficult to insist on western 
figures for the East in the face of the East's 
assertions. Moreover, neither side will allow the 
other to make enquiries anywhere or at any time 
in its military headquarters without warning. 
148. The second probiem, of major political 
importance, concerns the principle of collectivity. 
The NATO countries will sign no agreement or 
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con tract which allows the W arsaw Pact to oppose 
the process of Western European unification. 
149. According to NATO, the reduction per-
centages adopted jointly must be shared between 
the various states by decisions taken within the 
alliances. The W arsaw Pact would Iike a national 
breakdown. This course must not be embarked 
on if it implies that decisions taken by the 
Alliance depend on the agreement of the eastern 
partner. The latter would th en at the same time 
have access to the strongest ground force in 
Western Europe, i.e. the Bundeswehr. Sorne 
assert that this is the true aim pursued by the 
Soviet Union in Vienna. 
150. The proposai made by the W arsaw Pact on 
8th June 1978 contains elements which will have 
to be studied in future negotiations to ascertain 
whether worthwhile concessions are made on the 
question of collectivity. 
151. NATO and the Warsaw Pact already 
agreed in preliminary talks in spring 1973 to 
negotiate reductions in troops and weapons and 
associated measures. Here, the follow-up embodied 
in the East's reply of 16th December 1975 to the 
proposai in NATO's Option III is worthy of 
special attention. This means that ali parties to 
the negotiations are prepared to reduce troop 
levels and make a balanced reduction in specifie 
weapons. In its reply of 8th June 1978, the War-
saw Pact accepted the mixed package concept set 
out in the NATO proposai of 16th December 
1975 (Option III) as a procedure which might be 
used for the balanced reduction of weapons 
applied to all parties to the negotiations. 
152. It must be specified however that so far the 
W arsaw Pact is still not prepared to make the 
reductions in conventional forces called for by 
NATO in return for a reduction in nuclear 
means as set out in Option III. If the W arsaw 
Pact fails to change its position, NATO may be 
compelled to modify its offer. 
153. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact should respect 
the provisions of the agreement of June 1973 and 
participate unreservedly in the preparation of 
associated measures in the MBFR framework as 
well as appropriate reciprocal measures designed 
to guarantee respect of the agreements concluded. 
3. Prospects 
154. Henceforth, the primary task will be to 
sound out the area of negotiations with scrupu-
lous respect for the principal bases, i.e. parity 
and collectivity, and to define possibil.ities for 
compromise through political decisions. 
155. In the current seventeenth round of nego-
tiations, apart from continuing the discussion on 
numerical data, it must be ascertained whether 
the W arsaw Pact is prepared to modify its offer 
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of 1,000 hattie tanks and 250 armoured vehicles 
by raising it to 1,700 tanks as NATO requires. 
A mixed package on this scale - withdrawal of 
1,000 tactical nuclear warheads, 54 Phantom air-
craft with a nuclear capability and 36 medium-
range Pershing missiles as weil as 29,000 Ame-
rican troops in exchange for 1, 700 Soviet hattie 
tanks and 68,000 troops - is, together with 
acceptance of the concept of the second stage and 
the principles of parity and collectivity, one of 
the requirements expressed by NATO in its pro-
posai of 16th December 1975 (Option III). 
156. In the l\fBFR discussions and negotiations, 
another matter now requires greater &ttention 
both in the Atlantic Alliance and in Vienna: 
i.e. the concrete preparation of the associated 
measures decided on in June 1973 and reciprocal 
measures for safeguarding and respecting agree-
ments in force. The question is whether ali the 
participants in the Vienna negotiations can 
strengthen the subsequent application of confi-
dence-building measures mentioned in the Hel-
sinki final act and conclude a new compulsory 
agreement on specifie measures adapted to the 
reduction area, including: 
- military confidence-building measures 
adopted in the CSCE final act : prior 
notification of large-scale military 
manoeuvres, invitation of observers to 
attend m!ilitary manoeuvres; 
- prior notification of large-scale military 
movements : going into the MBFR 
reduction area, leaving the area, and 
inside the area. 
157. The MBFR talks, which have now been in 
progress for five years, have made it clear to the 
Warsaw Pact that the members of NATO will 
not accept agreements which make the Federal 
Republic of Germany a special area. It lis also 
evident that for the interpretation of a treaty 
the Federal Republic would not face the Warsaw 
Pact or the Soviet Union alone. The Vienna nego-
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tiations are pursued collectively and agreement 
on MBFR is worked out collectively. Con-
sequently, NATO will interpret such agreements 
joinrtly and reply jointly to any criticlism.. 
158. A first agreement will be more to streng-
then political confidence than to change fun-
damentally the milritary ~ituation in Central 
Europe. However, it must not be forgotten that 
it will serve as a model for future agreements. 
From the outset, therefore, the first agreement 
must include elements which will be important 
for the effectiveness of future agreements, 
including the content and further pursuit of 
reductions, confidence-building measures and the 
satisfactory verification of agreements in force. 
159. The foreign policy matters between NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact have become difficult. If 
this trend continues, it may in the very near 
future produce an international atmosphere in 
which the arms race might be resumed. On the 
one hand, countries might feel that this would 
strengthen their secmity but on the other hand 
the introduction of new weapons systems might 
lead to political developments which would be 
difficult to control. 
160. In the MBFR negotiations, the NATO coun-
tries abided by the Alliance approach of military 
security and détente in working out a construc-
tive policy. A policy based on military ~ecurity 
and détente aiming at overall balance should 
prevent a worsening of the arms race which 
would threaten ail the states concerned. Without 
relfi.able military backing, any policy of détente 
would be irresponsible and a danger to security. 
161. Foreign policy, directed towards détente, 
must continue to be covered by defence policy. 
To meet the Soviet armaments effort which, in 
the view of many observers, exceeds the level 
necessary for defence purposes alone, the heads 
of state or government of the NATO countries 
have adopted a long-term defence programme 
allowing NATO to maintain its defence capa-
bility during the eighties. 
APPENDIX l 
1. NATO countries 
United States 
Canada 
Total WEU 
Rest of NATO 
Total NATO 
2. Neighbouring potential 
adversaries 
Yugoslavia 
Iran 
Mghanistan 
Pakistan 
China 
Japan 
Total neighbouring 
potential adversaries 
3. Total NATO and 
4. 
ô. 
6. 
neighbouring potential 
adversaries 
Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact 
countries 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
German Democratie 
Republic 
Hungary 
Po land 
Romania 
Total non-Soviet W arsaw 
Pact countries 
Soviet Union 
Total Warsaw Pact 
co un tries 
Ratio 6: 3 
Ratio 5: 3 
APPENDIX 1 
Strategie indicators as seen from Moscow 
GNP 
$ bn. 
1,890.0 
197.9 
1,520.7 
169.3 
3,777.9 
37.8 
72.6 
2.3 
17.6 
350.0 
677.0 
1,157.3 
4,935.2 
18.6 
49.6 
54.6 
25.2 
86.1 
51.4 
285.5 
1,083.0 
1,368.5 
1: 3.6 
1: 4.6 
Defence 
budget 
$ bn. 
115.20 
3.64 
58.94 
6.33 
184.11 
2.36 
!l.94 
0.06 
0.94 
3500 
8.57 
56.87 
240.98 
0.43 
1.82 
3.15 
0.66 
2.55 
0.92 
9.53 
130.00 
139.53 
1: 1.7 
1: 1.9 
Popula-
ti on 
m. 
218.63 
23.70 
255.28 
69.66 
567.27 
21.95 
36.37 
20.47 
76.78 
975.00 
115.12 
1,245.69 
1,812.96 
8.85 
15.07 
16.83 
10.67 
34.95 
21.67 
108.04 
261.31 
369.35 
1: 4.9 
1: 6.9 
Active 
armed 
forces 
thousand 
2,068.8 
80.0 
1,865.4 
811.6 
4,825.8 
267.0 
413.0 
110.0 
429.0 
4,325.0 
240.0 
5,784.0 
10,609.8 
150.0 
186.0 
157.0 
114.0 
306.5 
180.5 
1,094.0 
3,638.0 
4,732.0 
1: 2.2 
1: 2.9 
Tanks 
11,000 
32 
10,083 
4,817 
25,932 
2,150 
1,620 
740 
1,065 
10,000 
790 
16,365 
42,297 
1,925 
3,400 
2,500 
1,100 
4,100 
1,700 
14,725 
50,000 
64,725 
1: 0.7 
1: 0.8 
Total 
combat 
aircraft 
4,900 
214 
2,320 
864 
8,298 
329 
459 
144 
257 
5,000 
358 
6,547 
14,845 
263 
613 
362 
180 
725 
437 
2,580 
8,896 
11,476 
1: 1.3 
1: 1.7 
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Major 
surface 
combat 
ships 
172 
23 
198 
53 
446 
4 
Il 
-
8 
23 
58 
104 
550 
5 
-
19 
-
14 
6 
44 
243 
287 
1: 1.9 
1: 2.3 
Sub-
marines 
(other 
than 
strategie 
ballistic 
missile) 
75 
3 
81 
42 
201 
5 
-
-
4 
75 
14 
98 
299 
4 
-
-
-
4 
-
8 
243 
251 
1: 1.2 
1: 1.2 
Notes: The table takes no account of countries close to Soviet territory - Finland, Sweden, Austria - although 
there are presumably Soviet military contingency plans for possible opposed operations in these countries ; it takes 
no account either of countries more distant from Soviet territory with which the United States has bi- or multi-
lateral defence treaties (Spain, 1976; Australia and New Zealand, 1951 ; Organisation of American States 1948) 
although the Soviet General Staff presumably take account of the armed forces of these countries when considering 
the capability of Soviet forces for "projecting Soviet power". 
Source: ISS Military Balance 1978-79. Figures are the most recent there given (1978 or 1977). Soviet GNP in 
dollars estimated on assumption defence budget is 12% of GNP. 
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Country National ourrency unit 
(0) (1) 
Belgium •.•••.•.....•.•.•.• Million Frs. 
France .................... Million Frs. 
Federal Republio of Germany Million DM 
Italy .•.•.....•••..•...•.. Million Lire 
Luxembourg ............... Million Frs. 
Netherlands ......•.•••...• Million Guilders 
United Kingdom •.....•.... Million f 
TOTAL WEU ......... 
Canada ................... Million S 
Denmark •.•............... Million Kr. 
Greece • • 0. 0 ............ 0. 0 Million Draohmas 
Norway •.•••••.•.••....•. Million Kr. 
Portugal •.•.•...••..•.•... Million Escudos 
Turkel ................... Million L. 
Unite States ............. Million $ 
TOTAL NON-WEU b •• 
TOTAL NATO b ...... 
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1974-78 
FINANCIAL EFFORT 
Defenoe expenditure (national currency) ourrent priees Defence expenditure (US S million) a GDP in purchasers' values (US $ million) a Population (thousand) Defence expenditure as % of GDP in purchaBers' values a 
1974 1975 1976 
(-5) (-4) (-3) 
57,395 69,936 81,444 
47,878 55,873 63,899 
35,644 37,589 38,922 
2,852 3,104 3,608 
710 836 983 
6,254 7,246 7,817 
4,160 5,165 6,132 
2,862 3,127 3,589 
4,439 5,281 5,680 
24,126 43,917 . . 
3,938 4,771 5,333 
25,108 19,898 18,845 
15,831 . . . . 
85,906 90,948 91,013 
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1977 1978 f 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 f 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 e 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 e 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 e/ 
---- --
--
------
(- 2) (-1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
--------
89,480 99,008 1,474 1,902 2,110 2,497 3,152 53,709 62,686 67,912 79,205 96,805 9,772 9,801 9,818 9,830 9,857 2.7 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 
73,530 83,414 9,944 13,035 13,369 14,965 18,484 265,507 338,5l0 349,254 380,659 468,501 52,460 52,700 52,891 53,084 53,278 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.9 
40,184 42,588 13,775 15,267 15,456 17,307 21,203 381,499 419,494 444,552 514,045 636,623 60,020 59,825 59,564 59,462 59,147 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3 
4,533 5,223 4,391 4,756 4,335 5,137 6,154 156,605 176,270 172,836 196,045 235,980 55,413 55,812 56,156 56,446 56,697 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.6 
1,029 1,160 18 23 26 29 37 2,347 2,297 2,399 2,778 3,467 357 359 356 355 354 0.8 1.0 l.l 1.0 1.1 
9,260 9,367 2,324 2,865 2,957 3,773 4,330 70,718 82,909 90,012 l06,394 130,273 13,545 13,654 13,770 13,853 13,937 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.5 3.3 
6,822 7,492 9,736 11,476 11,075 11,907 14,381 191,930 228,096 220,831 244,502 308,855 56,011 55,981 55,959 55,919 55,941 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.7 
--------
41,662 49,324 49,328 55,615 67,741 1,122,315 1,310,262 1,347,796 1,523,628 1,880,504 247,578 248,132 248,514 248,949 249,211 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.6 
--
--
----
4,124 4,597 2,926 3,075 3,640 3,878 4,030 152,237 164,019 196,141 200,253 206,270 22,395 22,727 23,025 23,280 23,499 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 
6,343 7,135 728 918 940 1,056 1,294 31,826 37,508 41,188 46,016 54,897 5,045 5,060 5,073 5,089 5,105 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.4 
.. . . 804 1,363 . . . . . . 18,807 20,854 22,512 26,207 31,480 8,962 9,046 9,167 9,268 9,334 4.3 6.5 . . .. . . 
5,934 6,756 713 910 977 1,115 1,289 23,488 28,362 31,049 35,592 40,123 3,985 4,007 4,026 4,043 4,060 3.0 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.2 
22,082 26,111 985 780 624 577 594 13,271 14,754 15,375 16,302 18,058 9,218 9,633 9,694 9,773 9,858 7.4 5.3 4.1 3.5 3.3 
. . . . 1,140 . . . . . . . . 29,496 36,008 41,051 47,445 46,344 39,036 39,927 40,888 41,820 42,757 3.9 . . . . .. . . 
100,928 105,135 85,906 90,948 91,013 100,928 105,135 1,406,777 1,526,508 1,694,968 1,878,835 2,095,465 211,901 213,559 215,142 216,817 218,502 6.1 6.0 5.4 5.4 5.0 
----------
91,258 96,631 97,194 107,554 112,342 1,627,599 1,771,151 1,978,721 2,176,998 2,414,813 252,544 254,986 256,960 259,002 261,024 5.6 5.5 4.9 4.9 4.7 
-~---------- - -
132,920 145,955 146,522 163,169 180,083 2,749,914 3,081,413 3,326,517 3, 700,626 4,295,317 500,122 503,118 505,474 507,951 510,235 4.8 4.7 4.4 4.4 4.2 
Note a: GDP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States $ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by 
change in exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency 
conversion. 
Prior to 1977 tables of defence statistics published in reports of the Committee used gross national product (GNP) as a measure of national wealth. In line with the practice of other international 
organisations, the tables are now given in terms of GDP which is somewhat higher than GNP. Consequently, the figures for defence expenditure as a. percentage of GDP are slightly lower 
tha.n the peroenta.ges of GNP previously published. 
For the period 1974-78, the following rates of exchange have been a.pplied: 
Oowntrg Unit US $ per unit Unita per US $ Country Unit US $ pu unit Unita per us$ 
Belgium & L=embourg Franc Italy 1,000 Lire 
- 1974 0.02567 38.95 - 1974 1.53952 0.64955 
- 1975 0.02719 36.78 - 1975 1.53183 0.65282 
- 1976 0.02590 38.60 - 1976 1.20151 0.83229 
- 1977 0.02790 35.84 - 1977 1.13329 0.88239 
- 1978 0.03184 31.41 - 1978 1.17832 0.84866 
Oanada Canadian Dollar N etherlanàa Guilder 
- 1974 1.02248 0.97802 
- 1974 0.37163 2.69 
- 1975 0.98313 1.01716 - 1975 0.39539 2.53 
- 1976 1.01416 0.98604 
- 1976 0.37822 2.64 
- 1977 0.94034 1.06345 
- 1977 0.40745 2.45 
- 1978 0.87664 1.14073 - 1978 0.46224 2.16 
DenmarlD D. Kroner Norway N. Kroner 
- 1974 0.16408 6.0947 
- 1974 0.18106 5.52 
- 1975 0.17392 5.7499 
- 1975 0.19073 5.24 
- 1976 0.16543 6.0450 
- 1976 0.18327 5.46 
- 1977 0.16658 6.0032 
- 1977 0.18785 5.32 
- 1978 0.18134 5.5146 
- 1978 0.19076 5.24 
France Franc Portugal 
- 1974 0.20770 4.815 
- 1975 0.23331 4.286 - 1974, 1975 
- 1976 0.20922 4.780 - 1976 
- 1977 0.20352 4.913 - 1977 
- 1978 0.22159 4.513 - 1978 
Escudo 
0.03922 25.50 
0.03309 30.22 
0.02613 38.28 
0.02276 43.94 
Fed. Rep. of lhrmany Deutschmark T'l.lll'key 
- 1974 0.38647 2.59 - 1974 
- 1975 0.40616 2.46 - 1975 
- 1976 0.39714 2.52 - 1976 
- 1977 0.43070 2.32 - 1977 
- 1978 0.49785 2.01 - 1978 
T. Lira. 
0.07199 13.89 
0.06936 14.42 
0.06229 16.05 
0.05555 18.00 
0.04118 24.28 
Greece Drachma United Kingdmn 
- 1974 0.03333 30.00 - 1974 2.3401 0.427 
- 1975 0.03103 32.23 - 1975 2.2219 0.450 
- 1976 0.02734 36.58 - 1976 1.8062 0.554 
- 1977 0.02714 36.84 - 1977 1.7455 0.573 
- 1978 0.02729 36.65 - 1978 1.9195 0.521 
Note b: Defence expenditure figures for Greece and Turkey are not ava.ila.ble for the most recent yea.rs; for purpoaea of compa.rison all data rela.ting to these two countries have been therefore excluded 
throughout from Total non-WEU and Total NATO. 
e = Preliminary estima.te. 
1 = Forecast. 
GDP (p.v.) = Gross domestic product in purchasers' values, current priees. 
Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2(78)20. 
Al'PB:NDIX II 
Defence expenditure per head Defence expenditure as % of total WEU (US $)a 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 e/ 1974 1975 1976 1977 19781 
------(21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
--
151 194 215 2M 320 3.54 3.86 4.28 4.49 4.65 
190 247 253 282 347 23.87 26.43 27.10 26.91 27.29 
230 255 259 291 358 33.06 30.95 31.34 31.12 31.30 
79 85 77 91 109 10.54 9.64 8.79 9.24 9.09 
51 64 73 82 105 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
172 210 215 272 311 5.58 5.81 5.99 6.78 6.39 
174 205 198 213 257 23.37 23.26 22.45 21.41 21.23 
----------
168 199 198 223 272 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
----------
131 135 158 167 171 7.02 6.23 7.38 6.97 5.95 
144 181 185 208 253 1.75 1.86 1.91 1.90 1.91 
90 151 . . . . . . 1.93 2.76 . . . . . . 
179 227 243 276 317 1.71 1.84 1.98 2.00 1.90 
107 81 64 59 60 2.36 1.58 1.27 1.04 0.88 
29 . . . . . . . . 2.74 . . . . . . . . 
405 426 423 465 481 206.20 184.39 184.51 181.48 155.20 
----------
361 379 378 415 430 . . . . . . . . . . 
----------
266 290 290 321 353 . . . . . . . . . . 
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APPENDIX III 
(a) List of sources 
United States 
1. Brown,, George S., Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs-of-Staff, 20th J anuary 1977 : Mili-
tary posture for financial year 1978 (memo-
randum to the draft budget). 
2. Brown, Harold, Secretary of Defence, 13th 
April1977 : Speech at Rochester University, 
New York. 
3. Brown, Harold, Secretary of Defence, 6th 
May 1977 : Press conference, Washington. 
4. Brown, Harold, Secretary of Defence, 18th 
May 1977 : Press conference during the 
NATO ministerial meeting, Brussels. 
5. Brown, Harold, Secretary of Defence, 3rd 
August 1977 : Hearing, Washington. 
6. Brown, Harold, Secretary of Defence, 6th 
November 1977: Television interview, 
American Broadcasting Company (ABC). 
7. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Assistant to the Presi-
dent for National Security Affairs, 30th 
May 1977: Interview in United States News 
and W orld Report. 
8. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Assistant to the Presi-
dent for National Security Affairs, 25th 
October 1977 : Speech at a meeting of the 
Trilateral Commission, Bonn. 
9. Carter, President J., lOth May 1977: Speech 
to the North Atlantic Council, London. 
10. Carter, President J., 12th May 1977 : Press 
conference, Washington. 
11. Carter, President J., 12th May 1977 : Speech 
to the Chamber of Commerce, Atlanta 
(Georgia). 
12. Carter, President J., 22nd May 1977: 
Speech at Notre Dame University, South 
Bend (Indiana). 
13. Carter, President J., 30th June 1977: Press 
conference,, Washington. 
14. Cal'ter, President J., 12th July 1977: Press 
conference, Washington. 
15. Carter, President J., 21st July 1977: Speech 
to the Southern Legislative Conference, 
Charleston (South Carolina). 
16. Carter, President J., 27th August 1977 : 
Letter to the Atlantic Association. 
17. N unn, Sam, and Bartlett, Dewey, Sena tors, 
members of the Armed Services Committee, 
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24th January 1977: Report on NATO and 
the new Soviet threat. 
18. Nunn, Sam, Senator, member of the Armed 
Services Committee, 3rd August 1977 : Hear-
ing, Washington. 
19. Nunn, Sam, Senator, member of the Armed 
Services Committee, 14th November 1977: 
Speech. 
20. Powell, Jody, White House spokesman, 3rd 
August 1977 : Washington. 
21. Rumsfeld, Donald H., 17th January 1977: 
Annual report of the Defence Department 
for the financial year 1978 (memorandum 
to the draft budget). 
Federal Republic of Gerrnany 
1. Hauser, Erich, 9th August 1977 : W ashing-
toner lndiskretion als Querschuss gegen Bon-
ner Plane ?, General Anzeiger, Bonn. 
2. Ruehl,. Lothar : Die Wiener Verhandlungen 
über einen Truppenabbau in Mitteleuropa, 
Europa-Archiv, No. 13/1977. 
3. Schmidt, Helmut, 28th October 1977 : 1977 
Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, IISS, 
London. 
4. Schmidt, Helmut, Brezhnev, Leonid, 6th 
May 1978: Joint statement, Bonn (Bulletin 
44). 
5. Schmidt, Helmut : 25th May 1978 : Speech 
at the tenth special session of the United 
Nations on disarmament (Bulletin 55). 
6. 1975-76 white paper on the security of the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the 
development of the federal armed forces, 
Bonn 1976. 
France 
1. Extracts from government directives, the 
draft 1972 budget and the 1976 programme 
law on: 
- the essential tasks of the armed forces; 
- the rôle of nuclear forces ; 
- the rôle of ground forces. 
2. Barre, Raymond, Prime Minister, 21st June 
1977: Quoted by J. Isnard in Le Monde 
on French nuclear forces. 
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3. Bourges, Yvon, Minister of Defence, 20th 
May 1976: Speech in the National Assembly 
debate on the level and development of 
French armed forces. 
4. Giscard d'Estaing, Valéry, President of the 
Republic: 
- 24th October 1974: Press conference on 
the rôle of the armed forces and strategie 
nuclear weapons ; 
- 12th November 1975 : Televised inter-
view on military concept (basis, objective, 
threat). 
5. Harmel, Dieter, November 1977 : La force 
nucléaire française, Truppenpraxis. 
6. Isnard, Jacques, journalist and defence 
expert of Le Monde, 13th July 1977: La 
lente évolution de la doctrine officielle. 
7. Informations de politique de défense, 14th 
J uly 1977 : Le désarroi de la politique de 
défense française. 
United Kingdom 
1. Mulley, F., Secretary of State for Defence, 
16th November 1977: Speech to the Royal 
United Services Institute. 
2. Mulley, F., Secretary of State for Defence, 
17th October 1977 : Speech to the Foreign 
Press Association, New York. 
3. Statement on the defence estimates, 1977 
(white paper). 
APPENDIX III 
Italy 
1. 1977 draft defence budget : ltaly's security 
and the problems of the Italian armed forces, 
Rome1977. 
N etherlands 
1. Memorandum on disarmament and security 
submitted to the Second Chamber of the 
States-General by the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and Mr. Kooijmans, Secretary of 
State. 
2. Our very existence at stake - the defence 
policy in the years 197 4-83, The Hague, 
1974 (white paper). 
NATO and miscellaneous 
1. Atlantic News, lOth June 1977 (Brussels 
information service). 
2. Haig, General Alexander M., SACEUR : 
Statement to the United States Senate Armed 
Services Committee, lst March 1977. 
3. Haig, General Alexander M., SACEUR : 
Speech in the WEU Assembly. 
4. Horhager, Dr. Axel, April1976 : Die MBF'R 
Gespriiche - Probleme und Aussichten, 
Internationale Wehr-Revue, No. 2. 
5. Final communiqué issued after the minis-
terial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 
8th and 9th December 1977, Brussels. 
6. The Military Balance, IISS, London. 
(b) List of Warsaw Pact personalities 
I. Grechko, Andrei A. 
2. Ustinov, Dmitri 
3. Ogarkov, N. V. 
4. Yepishev, A. 
5. Kulikov, Viktor 
Marsha.l of the Soviet Union 
Minister of Defence until 1976 
Marshal of the Soviet Union 
Minister of Defence since 1976 
Marshal of the Soviet Union 
Soviet Chief-of-Staff since 1976 
Army General, Head of the Political Bureau of the Soviet armed forces 
Marshal of the Soviet Union 
Soviet Chief-of-Staff until 1976 
Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact armed forces since 1976 
6. Yakubovsky, Ivan 1. Marshal of the Soviet Union 
7. Tchernenko, Sergei 
Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact armed forces until 1976 
Army General 
Chief-of-Staff of Warsaw Pact forces until 1976 
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8. Gorshkov, Sergei 
9. Shavrov, 1. 
10. Mant, M. 
11. Peredelsky, G. 
12. Kondratkov, T. 
13. Honnecker, Erich 
14. Hoffmann, Heinz 
15. Kessler, Heinz 
16. Verner, Waldema.r 
17. Hoch, Peter 
18. Wilhelm, F. 
19. Fra.nke, Klaus 
20. Fiedler, H. 
21. Weber, W. 
22. Siwicki, Florian 
23. Chocha, Bolesla.w 
24. Molczyk, E. 
25. Wojcik, Edward 
26. Brezhnev, Leonid 
27. Dabrowa., S. 
Admirai of the Fleet of the Soviet Union 
Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet fleet 
Army General 
Head of the Soviet staff college 
Colonel, Soviet forces 
Ma.rshal of Artillery 
Commandant, missiles and a.rtillery, Soviet ground forces 
Colonel 
DOCUMENT 809 
Expert in war plans a.t the Lenin Politica.l Academy of the Soviet forces 
Secreta.ry-General of the SED 
President of the Sta.te Council of the German Democratie Republic 
Army General 
Ministry of Defence of the German Democratie Republic 
Colonel-General 
Chief-of-Staff of the armed forces of the German Democratie Republic 
Admirai 
Head of the Politica.l Bureau of the armed forces of the German 
Democratie Republic 
Military History Institute of the German Democratie Republic 
On the staff of the revue M ilitiirwesen in the German Democratie Republic 
On the staff of the revue M ilitiirwesen in the German Democratie Republic 
Colonel 
Expert in milita.ry economy a.t the Friedrich Engels milita.ry a.ca.demy of the 
German Democratie Republic, Dresden 
No rank 
On the staff of the revue Militiirwesen in the German Democratie Republic 
Major-General 
Chief-of-Staff of the Polish people's a.rmy 
Major-General 
Head of the staff college of the Polish people's a.rmy 
Major-General 
Head of the Training Section of the Polish people's a.rmy 
No rank 
Polish a.rmy 
Secretary-Genera.l of the Soviet Socia.list Party and Cha.irma.n of the Praesidium 
of the Soviet Union 
Head of the Polish Delegation to the MBFR negotia.tions 
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Amendments 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 
The balance of force 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 1 
tabled by Mr. Baumel 
19th June 1979 
1. Leave out the second pa.ragraph of the prea.mble to the draft recommandation and insert: 
"Noting the East-West economie and military balance, but concemed by the Warsaw Pact's 
superiority in severa! fields on the central front and by the Soviet milita.ry doctrine of •daring 
thrusts' against NATO forces which can be perceived as a substantia.l threat by the NATO 
countries ;". 
2. In the fourth pa.ragraph of the preamble, lea.ve out "approximate"; after "in the area" insert 
"and throughout the continent". 
3. At the beginning of the draft recommandation proper, lea.ve out "Urge member govemments :" 
and accordingly leave out "to" in lines one and two of paragraph 1. 
4. At the beginning of paragraph 2 of the draft recommandation proper, insert "Urge member 
govemments"; leave out "allied" and insert "their". 
5. At the beginning of paragraph 3 of the draft recommandation proper, insert "Follow efforts by 
member govemments of the NATO integrated organisation". 
6. At the end of the draft recommandation proper, add a paragraph 4 as follows: 
"4. Examine the possibility of promoting the early start of negotiations between ali states con-
cemed with European security with a view to reducing conventiona.l weapons and introducing 
confidence-building measures covering the whole European continent." 
Signed : Baumel 
1. See 4th Sitting, 19th June 1979, and 5th Sitting, 20th June 1979 (Amendments 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 negatived; 
Amendment 6 agreed to). 
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Study on collective logtstical support 
DRAFT ORDER 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
by Mr. Roper, Chairman 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
22nd May 1979 
DRAFT 0RDER 
on a study on collective logistical support 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Roper, Cha.irman 
1. Background 
II. Partial implementation of Order 40 - study on rational deployment on 
the central front 
III. Procedure for a study on collective logistical support 
IV. Finance 
APPENDICES : 
1. Order 40 on a conference on the rationalisation of the European defence 
efforts 
II. Resolution 50 on a conference on the rationalisation of the European 
defence efforts 
III. A. Coat estimate for a study on collective logistical support based on 
the original estimate for the study on the rational deployment of forces 
on the central front 
B. Coat estimate for a study on collective logistical support based on 
actual costa incurred for the study on rational deployment of forces 
on the central front (Document 663) 
IV. Terms of reference for a study on collective logistical support 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
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Draft Order 
on a study on collective logistical support 
The Assembly, 
Reca.lling Resolution 50 and Order 40 on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts ; 
Noting the wide attention attracted by the study on the rational deployment of forces on the central 
front and the valuable contribution it made to allied defence planning ; 
Aware of the need to study fully means of rationa.lising logistica.l support for forces of the Alliance, 
especially on the central front, 
1. lNSTRUOTS its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to arrange for the study on collective 
logistical support proposed in Document 810 to be carried out forthwith in accorda.nce with the terms 
of reference and procedure set forth in that document, and to be printed and published on completion ; 
2. DECIDES that the oost of the study sha.ll be met from the ordina.ry budget of the Assembly. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Roper, Chairman) 
1. Background 
1. The Committee in implementation of an 
earlier Order of the Assembly (No. 36) established 
a sub-committee which held extensive hearings 
and discussions throughout 1971, 
"to examine the possibility of organising a 
conference on the rationalisation of the 
defence efforts of the European countries, 
members of the Alliance." 
This proposai had arisen from observations in 
an earlier report of the Committee 1 which are 
relevant here : 
"41. A detached observer of the European 
defence scene, his mind uncluttered with the 
preconceptions that have accumulated over 
the years, might weil conclude that the pre-
sent manner in which the not negligible con-
tributions of the European countries in cash 
and manpower are translated into fighting 
units on the ground are about the least 
rational and least efficient that could be 
devised. After ali, the whole of the defence 
effort of most European NATO countries is 
concerned solely with providing defence in 
the NATO framework. Of the total of the 
defence budgets of ail European NATO 
countries, probably more thau 90% is spent 
on NATO related defence. Yet twelve sover-
eign defence ministries are maintained, many 
with three often autonomous armed services 
within them. The largest European defence 
budget is ten times that of the smallest. 
43. (iii) Rational dep"loyment and "logistical 
support 
... A more intensive effort can however be 
made to provide an integrated logistical 
organisation, at least for the WEU forces 
in Northern Army Group, instead of leaving 
logistical responsibility in national hands. 
The Committee knows from practical expe-
rience that incompatibility of nationally-
supplied equipment has prevented NATO 
forces from operating as effectively together 
as they should. The multiplicity of makes 
and models creates a logistician's nightmare. 
Such relatively simple things as non-standard 
couplings can adversely affect the ability of 
ships and aircraft alike to operate effectively 
when away from home stations. Even with 
1. European security and arms control, Document 527, 
3rd November 1970, Rapporteur : Mr. van der Stoel. 
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the best of intentions, such matters as con-
figuration control and quaU.ty assurance can 
be so differently treated among two or more 
nations which are co-operating to produce 
spares for standardised equipment as to ren-
der 'identical' spares non-interchangeable. 
To solve problems of logistical support, 
managerial techniques must be devised to 
cope with them on a NATO-wide basis. 
Efforts to mount even an exploratory effort 
in this direction have consistently run foui 
of the shibboleth that logistics is a national 
responsibility." 
2. At the conclusion of the 1971 hearings the 
Committee finally recommended 1 that five pre-
liminary studies be undertaken prior to any 
decision on the convening of a conference : 
(i) (a) a rational distribution of defence 
tasks between countries ; and 
(b) a rational deployment of forces on 
the central front ; 
(ii) (a) a concerted long-term programme 
for standardised armaments pro-
curement ; and 
(b) collective logistical support ; 
(iii) a comparative study of the structure of 
national defence organisations. 
3. The Assembly endorsed this proposai in 
Order 402 and Resolution 5()3 adopted on 1st 
December 1971, and in implementation of Order 
40 the Presidential Committee approved a sup-
plementary budget based on the financial pro-
posais in Document 559, to provide for the 
studies envisaged. The Council however declined 
to make this finance available, although it stated 
that it shared the Assembly's aims. 
ll. Partial implementation of Order 40 -
Study on rational deployment on the central 
front 
4. The five proposed studies remained in abey-
ance through lack of funds until the spring of 
1973 when the Committee in another context 4 
proposed that the report on rational deployment 
1. A conference on the rationalisation of the Euro-
pean defence efforts, Document 559, 16th November 
1971, Rapporteur : Mr. Rivière. 
2. Text at Appendix I. 
3. Text at Appendix II. 
4. European security and relations with the countries 
of Eastern Europe, Document 604, 3rd May 1973, Rap-
porteur: Mr. Critchley. 
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of forces on the central front should be initiated 
urgently. On the report of the Committee, the 
Assembly, on 21st June 1973, adopted Order 
43, instructing the Committee "to arrange for 
the study of the rational deployment of forces 
on the central front, proposed in Document 559, 
to be carried out forthwith ... and to be printed 
and published on completion" and deciding "that 
the cost of the study shall be met from the 
ordinary budget of the Assembly". 
5. In implementation of Order 43 General 
Ulrich de Maizière, former Inspekteur der Bun-
deswehr, was appointed as the expert to under-
take the study on the rational deployment of 
forces on the central front, and the Committee 
appointed one of its members, Mr. Dankert, to be 
associated with General de Maizière in the study. 
Mr. Dankert and General de Maizière, in the 
course of 1974, visited the capitals of countries 
maintaining forces on the central front, and the 
various NATO headquarters concerned, for dis-
cussions with Ministers, senior officiais and offi-
cers concerning the subject of the study. A first, 
classified, draft of General de Maizière's study 
was communicated to the Ministers of Defence 
of the countries maintaining forces on the central 
front. 
6. The final text of the study was amplified in 
sorne particulars to take account of suggestions 
made by Mr. Dankert as the Committee's repre-
sentative, then, after submission for declassifying 
to the authorities who supplied information for 
the first draft, it was published as an unclas-
sified document 1 with a preface by Mr. Dankert 
which, after explaining the procedure leading up 
to the study, made its status clear : 
"10. The following study is the respons-
ibility of General de Maizière, although in 
accordance with the procedure envisaged by 
the Assembly in adopting Order 43 I have 
been associated with him chiefly in the fact-
finding interviews which we undertook 
together. It was always the Committee's 
intention, however, in proposing the five 
studies in the first place, that the essential 
drafting should be entrusted to an expert, 
who would be free to express his own views. 
This General de Maizière has done, and the 
study has not been submitted to the Com-
mittee prior to publication. 
11. I myself do not entirely share ail the 
views expressed in General de Maizière's 
1. Rational deployment of forces on the central front, 
study by General de Maizière (Rtd.) arranged by the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in 
implementation of Order 43, Document 663, 2nd April 
1975. 
236 
study. As Rapporteur of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments, I am 
responsible for a chapter on the same sub-
ject in the Committee's forthcoming report 
on the state of European security to which 
reference should be made for a statement of 
the Committee's views. I do, however, com-
mend the whole study by General de 
Maizière as a most authoritative basis for 
discussion of a subject of great urgency." 
The preface concluded with an expression of the 
Committee's thanks to General de Maizière. 
7. Not long after the publication of the study 
plans were announced for the deployment of 
certain United States forces in the Northern 
Army Group area, very much as the Committee 
had envisaged. 
ID. Procedure for a study on collective 
logistical support 
8. If the Assembly adopts the draft order, the 
Committee would appoint one of its members to 
be associated with the expert chosen to under-
take the study. Subject to the financial provi-
sions described below, the study would be car-
ried out in accordance with the now tried pro-
cedure used for the study on rational deployment 
of forces on the central front, described above. 
The Presidential Committee, on the recom-
mendation of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments, would appoint a recog-
nised expert in the field of logistics to undertake 
the study, which it is intended would be sorne 
20,000 to 50,000 words in length. The terms of 
reference proposed by the Committee are at 
Appendix IV. 
IV. Finance 
9. As it is thought unlikely that the Council 
will modify its original refusai to approve a 
supplementary budget for a study t, the Com-
mittee intends that the study now proposed be 
financed from the ordinary budget of the Assem-
bly, as was the study on rational deployment of 
forces on the central front, on conditions to be 
approved by the Presidential Committee 2• 
1. Paragraph 3 above. 
2. Cost estimates at Appendix III. 
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ORDER 40 1 
on a conference on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts 2 
The Assembly, 
1. Instructs its Presidential Committee to take a decision on a draft supplementary budget for 
preparatory work on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts and transmit it to the 
Council for approval ; 
2. Instructs its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments : 
(a) To organise the preparatory studies on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts 
proposed in Document 559 once the Council has approved the corresponding supplementary budget ; 
(b) To report further if in the light of progress on the preparatory studies the Committee deems it 
desirable to organise a conference on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 1st December 1971 during the Second Part of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session 
(llth Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Rivière on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments (Document 559). 
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APPENDIX II 
RESOLUTION 50 1 
on a conference on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts 2 
The Assembly, 
Recalling its Orders 36, 38 and 40, 
APPROVES the proposais for preparatory studies and a possible conference on the rationalisation 
of the European defence efforts put forwa.rd in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments (Document 559). 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 1st December 1971 during the Second Part of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session 
(llth Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Rivière on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments (Document 559). 
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APPENDIX III 
1. 
2. 
APPENDIX III 
A. Cost estimate for a study on collective logistical support 
based on the original estimate for the study on the rational 
deployment of forces on the central front 
(adjusted to Deeember 1918 priees) 
Travel, translation, secreta.rial work and expert's fee 
Prin ting 
Total 
DOCUMENT 810 
F. frs. 
251,000 
9,000 
260,000 
This sum is 3.05 % of the total 1979 Assembly budget approved by the Council, or would be 1.5 % 
of the annual budgets if expenditure straddled two financia.l yea.rs. 
B. Cost estimate for a study on collective logistical support 
based on actual costs incurred for the study on rational 
deployment of forces on the central front (Document 663) 
(eonverted from 1914 and 1915 priees to Deeember 1918 priees) 
Travel and expert's fee: not more than 
Printing : 59 pages + 3 maps in colour 
Total 
F. frs. 
87,830 
54,600 
142,430 
This sum is 1.67% of the total1979 Assembly budget approved by the Council, or would be little 
more than 0.8 % of the annual budgets if expenditure straddled two financial years. 
Note : In converting to Deeember 1978 priees on the basis of the consumer priee index in France, 1973 priees 
have been multiplied by 1.73, 1974 priees by 1.52, 1975 priees by 1.37. 
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APPENDIX IV 
Terms of reference for a study on collective logistical support 
(adapted from Appendix III to Document 669) 
The study should first define "logistics" for 
its own purposes, in the light of the extensive 
literature on the subject and the varied uses of 
the term. A particular definition should be 
adopted for the main body of the study to deal 
with the problems of Allied Forces Central 
Europe, which in any case would exclude the 
broader procurement functions 1• 
The study would describe the present situa-
tion concerning forces assigned to NATO, where 
logistics remains essentially a national responsibil-
ity with the NATO headquarters exercising cer-
tain planning and advisory functions. The study 
should concentrate on the situation in Allied 
Forces Central Europe because purely national 
logistics systems are least adapted to the theo-
retical optimum on this front where so many 
different national forces are deployed. Under 
present circumstances it might be profitable to 
concentrate in particular on Northern Army 
1. Which functions the Committee in Document 559 
envisaged would be dealt with in a separate study on 
standardised armaments procurement. 
240 
Group, but account should be taken of any pro-
posais for radical redeployment 1 • The study 
should examine the functions of existing NATO 
agencies, such as MAS; NAMSA; Hawk; 
NADGE, etc. 
The study should formulate proposais for 
increasing the effectiveness of the logistics 
system, whether through the harmonisation of 
national logistics systems or improved co-opera-
tion between them. It should examine the extent 
to which a multinational system for collective 
logistical support could be compatible with natio-
nal responsibilities. 
The possible enlargement of the scope and 
responsibility of existing NATO agencies may be 
suggested, or the creation of new agencies with 
specifie logistic functions. An attempt should be 
made to assess any cost savings and/or increased 
military efficiency which might be expected to 
result from the proposais. 
1. Such as the present deployment of certain United 
States forces in the Northern Army Group area. 
Document 810 
Amendment 1 
Study on collective logistical support 
AMENDMENT 1 1 : J 
tabled by Mr. Valleix 
1. Leave out para.gra.ph 1 of the dra.ft order proper and insert: 
19th Jnne 1979 
"INSTRUOTS its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to arrange for a study on collective 
logistical support by member countries for integrated military structures and on that of the French 
forces, as proposed in Document 810, to be carried out forthwith in accordance with the terms of 
reference and procedure set forth in that document, and to be printed and published on completion ;". 
Signet!, : VaUeix 
1. See 5th Sitting, 20th June 1979 (Amendment negatived). 
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Replies of the Council to Recommendations 322 to 328 
RECOMMENDATION 322 1 
on Europe 's extemal relations 11 
The Assembly, 
Considering that Europe can prosper only if peace is preserved ; 
Considering that the Western European countries share the common objective of promoting demo-
cracy and human rights universaliy and that this objective does not constitute interference in the internai 
affaira of other states; 
Considering that Western Europe's foreign policy must demonstrate a readiness to co-operate with 
ali parts of the world in order to assure the security and well-being of their peoples; 
Considering that the security of Europe, which presupposes a stable balance of forces, can beat be 
maintained through the preservation of the Atlantic Alliance ; 
Concerned at the intensification of the Soviet Union's arroament efforts ; 
Considering further that an arros race between East and West cannot increase our security, but 
only precipitate new dangers ; 
Convinced that the continuation and extension of détente with the objective of arros control and 
balanced force reduction agreements serve the interests of peace and military security ; 
Considering that East-West co-operation in ali fields is an essential element of security and should 
be continued on a stable basis ; 
Considering that the North-South dialogue should be intensified in order to overcome as soon as 
possible the gap between North and South; 
Convinced that economie and social progress and hence internai security and stability are in the 
interest of industrial and developing nations alike ; 
Aware that Europe's dependance on importa of raw materials constitutes a high degree ofvulner-
a.bility; 
Considering that the restoration of democracy in Greece, Portugal and Spain is a great achievement 
for Europe as a whole which must be consolidated through appropriate assistance measures by Western 
Europe; 
Convinced that world economie recovery and hence the economie stabilisation of the western demo-
cracies require close international co-operation in the political and economie fields; 
Considering that the activities of the WEU Council are based upon a treaty which grants it wide-
ranging responsibilities extending into the economie and social area, even though these are effectively 
exercised through other international organisations, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNOIL 
1. Examine regularly, particularly at its ministerial meetings, all the problems raised by the application 
of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty with a view to ascertaining the extent to which the oppor-
tunities that this article offers have been fuliy exploited; 
2. Examine regularly the military balance and state of East-West relations in Europe and maintain 
close co-operation between member countries in order to promote the progress of détente and negotiations 
on the controlied reduction of arroaments ; 
3. Study the security aspects of the North-South dialogue; 
4. Investigate the problem of conventional arros transfera especially to third world countries with a 
view to developing a common policy for the control of weapon exporta, recognising that any effective agree-
ment on arros transfera will require the participation of both supplier and recipient countries ; 
5. Promote close co-operation in all appropriate international organisations with the democratie nations 
of Southern Europe and the Mediterranean region and support these nations' ea.rly entry into the European 
Community and their share in the process of European integration. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th November 1978 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session 
(8th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Gessner on behalf of the General Affaire Committee 
(Document 790). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 322 
1. The Council wish to point out tha.t they have always sought to perform fully the task assigned 
to them under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Trea.ty. Determined to maintain this approach, they 
will continue to use the powers granted to them under the modified Brussels Treaty. 
2. Similarly, in addition to the discussions held on the subject in the framework of European poli-
tical co-operation and in the North Atlantic Alliance, the Council will continue to devote special attention 
to the various aspects of East-West relations. They are aware of the importance attached to the conti-
nuation of a realistic policy of détente and to progress in the field of arros control and disa.rmament 
within the context of the collective security policy of the North Atlantic Alliance. 
3. The Council fully recognise the importance of progress in the North-South dialogue and the bene-
fits which this would produce for world security. They therefore strongly support ali work designed to 
advance the dialogue and improve the economie position of third world countries. 
4. Member governments are aware that the growth rates in the acquisition of arms reached by third 
world countries in recent years are cause for serious reflection. As the Council recalled in their reply to 
point 3 of Recommandation 318, the final document of the United Nations special session calls for con-
sultations between major arros suppliera and recipient countries on the limitation of ali types of inter-
national transfer of conventional weapons. They added, however, that it must be home in mind that 
ali states have an inalienable right to security and that there can be no question of imposing limitations 
on buyers in an authoritarian mannar. The Council continue to believe that a possible solution might 
be to approach the problem on a regional basis through regional restraints in the form of agreements or 
understandings among recipients, with which suppliera should be associated. In this connection, member 
governments welcome the efforts undertaken by a group of Latin American and Caribbean countries in 
Mexico City in August 1978. 
5. The Council welcome the forthcoming enlargement of the European Community to include Greece, 
Portugal and Spain, as an important contribution towards ensuring a lasting stabilisation of their demo-
cracies and hence towards strengthening and safeguarding the free part of Europe as a whole. By uniting 
the majority of European democracies the enlargement can thus be seen as a mark of success of Euro-
pean integration policy. 
In the negotia.tions with Greece a decisive breakthrough was achieved on the substantive issues 
at the end of last year. The talks on Portugal's entry opened on 17th October 1978. On 19th December 
1978, the Council of the European Communities decided that negotiations on Spain's accession would 
be started at an early date. The official opening I_Ueeting was held on 5th February 1979. 
In the field of political co-operation there have been intensified contacts, in view of the forth-
coming European Communities enlargement, between the nine European Community countries and the 
countries seeking entry, i.e. Greece, Portugal and Spain so as to familiarise these countries with the joint 
positions adopted by the Nine on foreign rolicy issues. 
1. Communioated to the Assembly on 21st Ma.roh 1979. 
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RECOMMENDA TION 323 1 
on disarmament 11 
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware that world expenditure on armaments has now reaohed $400 billion per annum and that 
some of the poorest oountries are devoting more than half of their publio expenditure to defence ; 
(ii) Noting tha.t, apart from the biologioa.l warfare convention of 1972, no arms control agreement since 
the war has yet aohieved any mea.sure of disarmament ; 
(iii) Believing that new impetus must be given to negotiating certain urgent and oonorete measures of 
arma control and disarmament but that the ultimate objective must remain general and oomp1ete disarma-
ment under effective international control ; 
(iv) Welooming the conclusions of the special session on disarmament of the United Nations General 
Assembly to the extent that it has fooused world opinion on the urgenoy and importance of arms control 
measures, and tra.nsformed the Committee on Disa.rmament into a more effective negotiating forum ; 
(v) Reoalling its proposais of 1972 and 1974 for a United Nations satellite observation capability; 
(vi) Reoalling further the expertise aoquired by the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments and 
urging that it be pla.ced at the disposai of any international disarmament organisation ; 
(vii) Reoalling the a.nnua.l publications of the League of Nations: "Arma.ments Year Book" and 
"Statistioal Yea.r Book of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition" ; 
(viii) Reoalling the work under the diplomatie conference of 1975-77 of the ad hoc committee on inhuma.ne 
weapons and the associa.ted conferences of government experts ; 
(ix) Aocepting the responsibility shared by WEU members with other major arma suppliera to seek 
agreements to reduce the world trade in arma.ments, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE COUNOIL AND MEMBEB GOVEBNMENTS 
Take concerted action in aU appropriate bodies with the foUowing objecta in view : 
1. To secure universa.l agreement on a programme of immediate disarmament and arms control mea.sures 
to be concluded in the next five years, including : 
(a) a comprehensive test ban; 
(b) a chemioal weapons treaty; 
(c) a strengthened nuclear non-proliferation régime with rigorous safeguards a.t aU stages of civil 
nuolea.r fuel cycles, linked with a.ppropriate seourity assurances to non-nuclear countries ; 
(d) a. substantial reduction to restore the balance of forces and arma.ments in Europe ; 
(e) agreements involving both supplier and recipient countries to restriot the international tra.nsfer 
of conventional arms whioh recognise the special responsibility of the major arms-producing 
countries to exercise restraint in their arms transfer policy ; 
(/) the scrupulous and systematic application of measures provided by the CSCE final act to 
strengthen mutual confidence in the military field ; 
(g) the extension to other areas of confidence-building measures of the type included in the CSCE 
final act; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2lst November 1978 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordina.ry Session 
(lOth Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments (Document 788). 
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(k) agreements to restrict the development of new generations of inhumane conventional weapons 
and incendiaries ; 
(i) the creation of denuclearised zones and zones free of military bases in various regions of the 
world; 
and, concurrently if possible with the first agreement providing for independant verification : 
(j) the establishment of an international disa.rma.ment agency under United Nations a.egis equipped 
with its own mea.ns of verifying compliance with arms control agreements a.nd peacekeeping 
arrangements, and responsible inter alia for publishing, on the ba.sis of its own sources of infor-
mation a.s weil as ma.ndatory reports by a.il countries, a.nnua.l reports on the forces and armaments 
of a.il countries and arms transfera between countries ; 
2. To secure the participation of ail nuclear wea.pon powers and previous members in the transformed 
Committee on Disa.rmament and the negotiations in that body of agreements on the foregoing items 1 (a), 
(b), (e), (g) and (k) ; 
3. To examine sympa.theticaily the proposais for an ali-European conference on disa.rmament convened 
with the participation of a.ll signa.tory states of the CSCE final a.ct with a view to ensuring the progressive 
a.chievement of a. programme of confidence-building mea.sures and controlled limitation of forces; 
4. To maintain the expecta.tions of progress on concrete measures of disa.rmament engendered by the 
special session of the United Nations General Assembly, by the convening of a. further special disarmament 
session in 1981 to review progress. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 323 
1. The Council take the opportunity of confirming their frequently-repeated undertaking to support 
ali efforts to further progress towards general and complete disarmament under close and effective inter-
national control. 
In this context and in line with the results of the special session on disarmament of the United 
Nations General Assembly, member states will continue to work for the definition of a series of priority 
measures for adoption as a matter of urgency. 
However, while this undertaking still holds good, there would seem to be no possibility of setting 
a precise term for the conclusion of universally acceptable agreements on aU the specifie points listed 
by the Assembly, although sorne are now sufficiently advanced to offer the hope and possibility of 
achieving this goal in the near future. 
Furthermore, disarmament and arms limitation are usually understood to cover agreements aimed 
at preventing inter alia the use or introduction of specifie types of weapons when they have been 
identified in concrete terms. Mention should, therefore, be made of the success not only of the convention 
on biological weapons but also of other agreements of undoubted significance and value such as the 
ENMOD (convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modifica-
tion techniques). 
(a) (b) Negotiations are now in progress between three nuclear powers for the complete banning of nuclear 
tests. 
As regards the prohibition of chemical weapons, it is hoped that the Committee on Disarmament 
will in due course produce a draft treaty. 
(c) Strong nuclear non-proliferation arrangements are among matters of vital concern to the member 
countries of WEU. They are one of their primary objectives in the appropriate fora and are no obstacle 
to international co-operation in the field of peaceful applications of the atom. 
(à) No practical opportunity will be neglected by the members of the Alliance participating in the 
Vienna negotiations on MBFR of strengthening stability in Europe by mutual balanced force reductions 
to achieve a common collective ceiling. 
(e) The problem of limiting transfera of conventional weapons should be dealt with through agree-
ments worked out on a regional basis between purchasers and forming the subject of subsequent con-
sultations with supplying countries ; in this connection, mention should be made of the Mexican proposai 
for an agreement to limit the acquisition of conventional weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
(/) Reinforcement of the confidence-building measures provided for in the final act of the CSCE 
undoubtedly constitutes a significant factor and its progress should match that of ali the measures 
provided for in the final act of the CSCE. 
(g) At the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, member countries sponsored a 
resolution, calling for consideration by ali states of arrangements for appropriate confidence-building 
measures. 
(h) The chances of limiting the use of certain conventional weapons are to be assessed by a special 
United Nations conference which will convene in Geneva in September this year and will take appropriate 
decisions arrived at by consensus. 
(i) The creation of nuclear weapon-free zones would unquestionably make a positive contribution to 
disarmament and non-proliferation. The Council and member states reiterate their undertaking to support 
the establishment of such zones, wherever nuclear weapons are not needed to maintain the balance and 
therefore to guarantee the safety of ali states, and provided the countries in the region concerned agree. 
(j) Finally, as regards the establishment of an international disarmament agency under United Nations 
aegis, equipped with its own means of verifying compliance with international arma limitation agree-
ments and peacekeeping arrangements, the Council and member states hope that it will be possible, in 
the future, to examine the substance of such a proposai, by such means as the United Nations may con-
aider appropriate. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on llth June 1979. 
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2. During the special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly, member 
states gave proof of their determination to set up a negotiating body in which all nuclear weapon powers 
and major military powers can take part, taking due account of the need to keep numbers small so that 
the proceedings do not become unwieldy. To this end, the existing members of the CCD were reappointed 
in order to ensure the continuity of work already started and the total number of participants was 
increased to make the negotiating body more representative without loss of efficiency. 
In this context, the Council and member states are most anxious that all the states nominated and, 
in particular, the nuclear weapon powers should take up the seats reserved for them from the outset. 
As regards the agenda for the Committee there is nothing to prevent the negotiating body from discussing, 
by consensus and within the terms of its own standing orders, any question submitted to it and in 
pa.rticula.r those listed by the Assembly. 
3. The proposai for a European disarmament conference on conventional weapons with a.ll partici-
pants in the CSCE attending is at present the subject of close study and of consultations between member 
states and all the countries concerned. 
4. The member states of WEU will make every effort to ensure that the objectives laid down by the 
tenth special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly are fulfilled as far as 
possible before the next special session fixed for 1982 by the thirty-third General Assembly for the 
purpose of reviewing the progress of work on disarmament, of reporting on its findings and possibly of 
setting new objectives. 
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RECOMMENDATION 324 1 
on the limitation of strategie arms 1 
The Assembly, 
Believing that the security of Europe must continue to rely both on a credible nuclear deter-
rent, i.e. a clearly-demonstrated threa.t of destruction to the adversary far grea.ter than the stake 
represented by the territories defended, and on sufficiently numerous conventiona.l forces ; 
Considering tha.t the United States strategie nuclea.r forces form the preponderant part of the 
allied deterrent but tha.t the British and French nuclear forces, through the uncertainties with which 
they face Soviet planners, ma.ke a. grea.ter contribution than their size would suggest ; 
Stressing that the Atlantic declaration made in Ottawa on 19th June 1974 a.ssigns to the 
British and French strategie nuclear forces a deterrent rôle of their own ; 
Deploring the inadequa.cy of progress in détente and concerned by the deterioration of East-
West relations ; 
Welcoming any attempt to curb or stop the quantitative or qualitative strategie arms race; 
Convinced of the essentia.l and urgent nature of genuine European concertation on defence 
matters, for which the WEU Council is the na.tural framework, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE ÜOUNOIL 
1. Work together to reach agreement on a common defence policy based on deterrence and taking 
account of the results of the strategie arms limitation talks ; 
2. Accept no restrictions, imposed or implied, on the forces of allied countries not directly parti-
cipating in the talks; 
3. Mainta.in the right of nuclear powers members of the Alliance to provide _mutual assistance in 
respect of nuclear weapons ; 
4. Look to a co-ordinated effort to re-establish the true balance of nuclear and conventional forces 
between the Alliance and the Warsaw Pact; 
5. Monitor the pursuit, deepening and extension of the process of détente; 
6. Ensure that the North Atlantic Council effectively examines every aspect of the strategie arms 
limitation ta.lks and that the WEU member states may through this channel assert their interests in 
this field. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2lst November 1978 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session 
(lOth Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments (Document 787). 
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to Recommendation 324 
1. The member governments have recently reaffirm.ed their resolve to seek further improvement in 
East (West relations and their continued commitment to a policy of détente as the best means of promot-
ing stable and mutually beneficiai relationships between governments and better and more frequent 
contacts between individuals. Concrete, balanced and verifiable arms control and disarmament measures 
would in their view contribute significantly to this search for security, stability and peace. 
2. In this context a SALT II agreement which contributes to strategie stability, maintains deterrence 
and responds to the security interests and concerns of the North Atlantic Alliance is considered to be 
in the common interest. Member governments have recently welcomed the progress made in the nego-
tiations, and have expressed support for America.n efforts to bring them to a successful conclusion. 
3. SALT bears directly on the interest of member governments because of the rôle of American 
strategie forces in the "NATO Triad" of conventional forces, theatre nuclea.r forces and strategie nuclear 
forces, which provide a spectrum of military capabilities enabling NATO to meet aggression at any level 
with an appropriate response, while also making it impossible for an aggressor to calculate in adva.nce 
the nature of the response his attack will provoke, or how the confl.ict may develop thereafter. 
4. Conscious of this direct interest, the Americans have kept the North Atlantic Council informed 
of the progress of the negotiations and, in particular, there have been regular discussions on issues of 
special interest to member governments of WEU. 
5. Notwithstanding i'epeated eastern assurances that their aim is not to seek military superiority, 
member governments have continued to note with concern the steady build-up of Warsaw Pact forces 
and armaments, both conventional and nuclear. In the face of these developments, it remains the view 
of member governments that there is a need to devote the resources necessary to modernise and streng-
then allied capabilities to the extent required for deterrence and defence. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 2lst March 1979. 
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The Assembly, 
Aware tha.t the growing coat of modern armaments technology and current economie trends ca.n _ 
lea.d to unilateral disa.rmament through inflation in the countries of the Alliance ; 
Stressing the need for the joint production of armaments in order to provide interoperability and 
standardisation of military equipment ; to ensure the survival of a viable European armaments industry ; 
and lastly a two-way street in armaments with the United States; 
Considering that limited but as yet too slow progress in these directions is now being made in the 
independant European programme group, in the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors, and 
Milita.ry Agency for Standardisation, in ali of which ali WEU countries participate ; 
Believing that only if the European armaments industry as a whole is restructured on a viable and 
competitive commercial and industrial basis will adequate progress be made ; 
Welcoming the study of the European armaments industry being underta.ken by the Standing Arma-
mente Committee, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNOIL 
1. Urge that efforts to achieve joint production, interoperability and, when necessa.ry for the security 
of Europe, the standardisation of defence equipment in the European countries of the Alliance be con-
centrated in the independant European programme group with auch assistance as the Standing Armaments 
Committee can provide ; 
2. Give consideration to the restructuring of the European armaments industry under the aegis of 
the European Community, relying on its responsibility in the fields of industrial and customs policy and 
research; 
3. Ensure tha.t once the present study of the European armaments industry is completed, full use be 
made of the resources of the Standing Armaments Committee to assist in the foregoing tasks ; 
4. Request the governments concerned to arrange for the IEPG to submit an annual report on its 
activities to the Assembly. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 22nd November 1978 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session 
(12th Sitting). 
2. Expla.na.tory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Critchley on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments (Document 786). 
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l. For the reasons previously stated in the reply to Assembly Recommendation 297, the Council 
consider that efforts to organise European co-operation in the field of armaments production are essential 
and should be vigorously pursued. This is the aim of the independant European programme group in 
its work on the joint development and production of weapons systems or equipment of major importance 
for the preservation of European armaments industries. Although deta.iled programmes have not yet 
been worked out, considerable progress has been made in some fields such as the harmonisation of equip-
ment time-tables, the defining of certain specifie projects and the study of problems relating to practical 
aspects of co-operation. 
At the same time, the IEPG has succeeded in working out a common European line of approach 
to offers of co-operation from the North Americans in the framework of the "transatlantic dialogue". 
Current discussions relate to the possibility of sharing development and production between Europeans 
and North Americans for certain "armaments families", with the Europeans seeking to redress the balance 
of production and trade in terms of both quality and quantity. Indeed, the search for standardisation 
must not be allowed to operate exclusively to the advantage of equipment of American origin, leaving 
the European industry with only a subordinate rôle as subcontractors which in the long term would be 
a threat to its existence. 
2. The restructuring of the European armaments industry raises a number of complex problems 
which are not limited to industrial and customs policy or research policy, but directly involve the secu-
rity of states. 
The Assembly's suggestion would therefore imply a wide interpretation of the field of application 
of the Treaty of Rome ; such an interpretation has already been opposed by a number of governments. 
3. The first results of the Standing Armaments Committee's study on the European armaments 
industry confirm tha.t this body is a useful instrument for thought and analysis which can be used to 
good purpose by the governments. Like the Assembly, the Council consider that the resources of the 
SAC should continue to be fully employed and when the current study has been completed they will 
consider the possibility of giving it new tasks in areas where its resources can be used without duplicating 
the activities of other bodies. 
4. The independant European programme group brings together representatives of aU the European 
states which are members of the Alliance, except Iceland. The submission of a report on the activities 
of the IEPG to the WEU Assem'bly, with which they have no organisational links, would undoubtedly 
give rise to di:fficulties for some of these states. It is more appropriate for WEU Assembly delegates to 
be briefed through national channels on IEPG activities. 
1. Communicated to the ABSembly on 2lst March 1979. 
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The Assembly, 
Considering the continuing high level of Soviet space efforts which might result in the Soviet Union 
occupying a dominating technological position with dangerous consequences in the economie, political antl 
military fields ; 
Aware that the United States space efforts are levelling off and that decisions are not being taken 
for a detailed long-term United States space programme; 
Convinced that the European space policy to be defined in the near future should take into account 
the danger which might result from this world situation ; 
Considering the vast industrial potential which has been developed during the la.st fifteen years 
and especially since 1971 when the space applications programme started; 
Taking into account the need to provide mankind with knowledge of and the means to attenuate 
the consequences of drought, energy shorta.ges, pollution, famine and natural disasters, 
REoOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNon. 
Urge member states: 
A. To instruct ESA to study the possibility of : 
(i) establishing a more sophisticated global communications network in which the data gathered 
by remote sensing, environmental and meteorological satellites could be combined ; 
(ii) building a small prototype solar power satellite providing electrical capacity; 
and to release the financial means necessary for these studies ; 
B. To indicate at the next ESA Council meetings which elements of ESA's draft spacelab follow-on 
development programme are to be carried out ; 
C. To prepare a policy defining the medium- and long-term goals of the European Space Agency and 
their fina.ncial implications and to have a. draft long-term budget drawn up, inter alia to ensure, in the 
future, the existence of a. study group to draw up a coherent programme ; 
D. In the United Nations Committee on the Pea.ceful Uses of Outer Space, and in its sub-committees, 
to afford strong support to steps to oblige states launching satellites, in addition to mea.sures governing 
security and the provision of mutual assistance, to a.ccept specifie commitments to provide information 
about their satellites which have sources of nuclear energy on board. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 22nd November 1978 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session 
(12th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Scheffier on behalf of the Committee on Scientifio, 
Technologioal and Aerospaoe Questions (Document 7S4). 
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While ESA's Ea.rthnet programme for the acquisition and distribution of remote sensing data also 
possesses decentralisation features in the form of national points of contact to satisfy usera with pre-
dominantly regional requirements, the Meteosat programme within the scope of the telecommunications 
network of the World Meteorological Organisation involves global acquisition and distribution of wea.ther 
data. Therefore, prior to detailed studies on an alternative or supplementary global telecommunications 
network, ESA should collaborate with the World Meteorological Organisation in carrying out a prelimin-
ary study examining both the user requirements and the advanta.ges and drawbacks of the technical 
possibilities. 
Numerous studies are already available on the subject of solar power satellites for supplying the 
earth with energy. In view of the enormous expanse necessitated by such systems, the realisation of even 
only a "small prototype" is a.t least premature. In any case, every precaution should be taken to ensure 
tha.t no environmenta.l problems can arise. ESA is examining the possibility of collaborating with NASA 
in the contemplated construction of a power module for space flight functions, which could also be used 
for subsequent Spacelab flights. 
At the current discussions on future ESA programmes and their financial implications the ESA 
Council will also decide whether ESA's draft Spacelab follow-on development programme, or elements 
of it, should be carried out. The medium-term goals of the European Space Agency are clearly defined 
by the agreements and undertakings entered into by the member states in the context of the numerous 
optional programmes approved for both application satellites and launchers. The Agency also has funds 
available in its own general studies budget to finance preparatory work on the desirable aim of formulating 
a coherent programme setting long-term goals for Europe. 
The Council welcome and will support the efforts already undertaken by individual member states 
of WEU in the United Nations Committee on the peaceful uses of outer space and in its sub-committees 
to ensure the security of satellites having sources of nuclear energy on board and to provide information 
pa.rticularly in the event of re-entry into the earth's atmosphere. 
1. Communioated to the Assembly on 25th April 1979. 
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The .Assembly, 
Welcoming the decision of the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to set up a. joint pensions 
administration section a.s a. first step towards the creation of a. truly independant body to deal with pensions ; 
Reitera.ting its regret tha.t provision ha.s still not been made for a. reversiona.ry pension to be gra.nted 
to the widowers of female staff in the same conditions a.s for the widows of male staff ; 
Deploring the fact that no reply was given to the .Assembly's recommandation to set up a. committee 
of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE COUNOIL 
I. Promote in the fra.mework of the co-ordinated organisations : 
1. The creation of a.n independant body for the administration of pensions for staff of the co-ordinated 
organisations ; 
2. The granting of a. reversiona.ry pension to widowers of fema.le staff in the same conditions as for 
the widows of male staff ; 
3. The establishment of a. committee of senior experts to plan and promote a. personnel policy ; 
II. Give consideration to using a. percenta.ge of the pension validation monies received to crea.te a. fund 
from which interest-bea.ring housing loa.ns could be made to the staff of WEU; 
III. Invite the Secreta.ry-Genera.l to give priority, when va.ca.ncies arise, to staff a.lrea.dy serving in the 
organisation in order to ensure maximum ca.reer prospects. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 23rd November 1978 during the Seoond Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session 
(13th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report ta.bled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affaira 
and Administration (Document 783). 
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I.l. In April 1978 the Council a.pproved the 149th report of the Co-ordina.ting Committee concerning 
the principle tha.t a. joint pensions administrative section should be set up a.s a.n inter-organisation unit 
of the co-ordina.ted organisations. 
The stage now rea.ched in recruiting staff and in the organisation of such a. unit makes it likely 
tha.t it will sta.rt work in the course of 1979. 
I.2. The Council a.pproved on 21st Ma.rch 1979 the 161st report of the Co-ordina.ting Committee con-
cerning the gra.nting of reversiona.ry pensions to widowers of female staff in the sa.me conditions as for 
the widows of male staff with affect from 1st January 1979. 
This implies the reopening of the option for those female staff members concerned and includes 
the a.ppropriate amendments to the Pension Schema Rules. 
I.3. The Council indica.ted in their reply to Recommandation 302 tha.t the functioning of the machinery 
for co-ordination wa.s under review by varions a.uthorities ; this is still the case. 
II. The Secretary-General and the Budget Committee are a.t present considering va.rious solutions to 
the problem of loans for the construction, purcha.se or improvement of living accommodation following 
the introduction of the Pension Schema. 
III. The Council are a.wa.re of the limited scope for internai promotion due to the small size of the 
prga.nisation, the need to respect the distribution of posts as between na.tiona.ls of the member states and 
specifie technica.l qualifications for certain appointments. 
The Secretary-Genera.l, however, while taking account of these restrictions, seeks every a.vaila.ble 
opportunity to promote staff within the organisation. 
1. Communioated to the Assembly on 25th April 1979. 
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The Assembly, 
Aware that meteorology for both civil and military purposes is a national responsibility but by 
definition it is an international co-operative science calling for continuons international collaboration; 
Considering that co-ordination at civillevel is conducted in the World Meteorological Organisation, 
its regional organisations and technical commissions and at military leve! in the NATO meteorologica] 
group of the Military Committee ; 
Noting that the availability of adequate data on surface weather and upper air conditions over the 
North Atlantic and North and Central Mrica is of vital importance for weather forecasting in Europe; 
Regretting that the network covering the North Atlantic has been reduced to four stations and 
that the USSR has replaced the United States as an operator of weather ships ; 
Considering ESA's success in pursuing the Meteosat research and development programme and 
convinced that the time is now ripe to urge the users, i.e. the national European meteorological services, 
to launch the operational phase of a European Meteosat system ; 
Aware that civil and military agencies in the United States have to share the same meteorological 
satellites, ocean surveillance satellites and also the space shuttle, but that in Europe, since countries such 
as Sweden and Switzerland take part in the Meteosa.t programme, this is not possible for political reasons ; 
C<>nsidering that the need for a defence meteorological satellite programme nevertheless exista in 
Europe, possibly linked to the NATO communications satellite system, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNOIL 
A. Draw the attention of member governments to the need to provide more reJiable but oost-effective 
meteorological information covering the North Atlantic and North and Central Africa by increasing the 
number of observation posts in these areas, and, especially in the North Atlantic, by establishing a network 
of ocean buoys, organising automated meteorological data collection by specially-equipped aircraft and 
placing a system of meteorological satellites in polar orbit ; 
B. Promote the formation of an organisation by the European meteorological services or institutes to 
start the operational phase of a European meteorological satellite system "Eurometsat" similar to the 
"Eutelsat" of the European postal authorities ; 
C. Afford its active support to the study of the establishment of a meteorological satellite system for 
defence purposes, possibly linked to the domestic United States and NATO satellite programmes, together 
with an appropriate network of mobile ground stations ; 
D. Invite member governments to test existing military meteorological co-ordination by means of more 
frequent exercises to verify the implementation of recommandations made by the meteorological group 
of the NATO Military Committee; 
E. Encourage member states to engage their efforts jointly and fully in fundamental researoh so asto 
understand the mechanism which determines weather conditions and elima te, as weil as the possible distur-
bances human activities can bring about. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 23rd November 1978 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session 
(13th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Hawkins on beha.lf of the Committee 
on Soientifio, Teohnologioal and Aerospa.oe Questions (Document 785). 
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A. The acquisition of additional data from "data sparse area.s" such as the North Atlantic and the 
polar regions ca.n be considered of vital interest for the meteorological services in Europe. While obser-
vations over land areas are a national responsibility, observations over ocean areas are carried out 
individually or jointly by many countries operating in a world-wide system. The World Meteorological 
Organisation co-ordinates the collection, processing and transmission of data gathered by, for example, 
marchant ships from where observations are being made on a voluntary basis, and by a system of North 
Atlantic ocean stations jointly operated and financed by several European countries and even one Central 
American country. Recently WMO has initiated a study on an integrated observing system over the 
oceans in which special attention will be given to factors such as reliability and cost effectiveness. 
The results of the fust global atmosphere research programme (GARP) experiment which is taking 
place in 1979 and is also being co-ordinated by WMO, will form an important contribution to the study. 
It is likely that this study will result in a recommendation for the introduction of an "optimum 
mix" of observing systems, containing many components, such as satellites, buoys, ships and aircraft. 
Polar and geostationary satellites might form an integrated component in such a system, and in this 
connection it should be noted that by their nature, polar satellites have an observation capacity which 
is not restricted to certain (limited) areas. Bence these satellites derive their importance from their 
usefulness for both land and sea areas ail over the world. The Council are aware that the realisation of an 
optimal meteorological observing system depends on close co-operation between ali countries in and 
around the areas and regions involved. The Council hence welcome and recommend the active particip-
ation of the member states in both regional and world-wide efforts in the maintenance and improvement 
of observation and data collection systems now available for the North Atlantic and for North and 
Central Africa.. 
Moreover, the Council draw the attention of member states to the need for close co-operation in 
the evaluation of new observing techniques and to the need for integration of those systems which prove 
to be coat-effective in the longer term. 
B. In order to provide the most comprehensive information, satellite data can best be analysed 
together with processed data from ail other meteorological sources. In order to ensure the availability 
of an operational European meteorological satellite capability, which might form a vital part of the 
global observing system co-ordinated by WMO, special consideration should be given to: 
(a) a further intensification of the co-operation between the satellite operating agencies and the 
national meteorological authorities ; 
(b) the outcome of the studies on medium-term planning which recently have been initiated by 
the European Space Agency ; 
(c) studies of the effectiveness of satellites and other special observing systems including cost-
benefit analysis ; 
(d) a further improvement of international meteorological communication facilities for the exchange 
of both basic and processed information. In this respect it should be mentioned that the 
developing countries may benefit considerably from an improved international meteorological 
communication network. 
C. In the case of an armed conflict, military satellites are unlikely to be less vulnerable than satellites 
for civil purposes. Therefore, in such a case, duplication does not provide substantial additional guarantees 
in respect of the availability of the required satellite data. With regard to the remarks under points A 
and B on the importance of a world-wide "optimum mix" of the different observing systems, it seems 
extremely unlikely that a sepa.ra.te European military contribution can be provided which does not 
duplicata the already existing satellite observing systems. 
The Council stress the importance of continued close co-ordination between military and civil 
meteorological authorities in order to ensure an optimal use of the available systems. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on llth June 1979. 
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D. The Council welcome ali initiatives to incorporate meteorologica.l foreca.sting between a.rmy, na.vy 
and air force for combined operations, both national and interna.tiona.l. 
E. During recent yea.rs, the co-operation between European states in fundamental resea.rch rela.ted 
to meteorology ha.s intensified considerably. Problems related to the provision of medium-range forecasts 
(5 to 10 days a.hea.d) are dealt with in the framework of the a.ctivities of the European centre for 
medium-range wea.ther forecasts a.t Reading (United Kingdom). With regard to changea in world weather 
conditions, in the longer term it should be noted that the mechanisms of climate and ma.n-climate 
interactions form an essentia.l part of the proposed second four-year climatology resea.rch programme 
which will be executed as an indirect action programme in the fra.mework of the co-ordina.ted research 
and development activities of the European Community. Furthermore, the WMO ha.s recently proposed 
to launch a world climate programme. Recognising the threat to ma.nkind resulting from huma.n activ-
ities which may cause alterations in world-wide climatological conditions, the Council believe tha.t joint 
resea.rch must be undertaken and tha.t joint action programmes should be worked out. 
The Council therefore welcome theae initiatives and invite member states to pa.rticipate actively 
in the abovementioned programmes. 
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